

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny & Death



7 August 1955 – 23 March 1956



23 March 1956 – 27 October 1958

Iskander Mirza

Pakistan's First Elected President's
Memoirs from Exile

Compiled & Edited by
Syed Khawar Mehdi



Foreword by Hassan Abbas

September 29, 2025⁹

With best Wishes

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The Governor-General standard/flag in blue (7 August 1955– 23
March 1956) is on the left, the Pakistan flag is in the centre
and the President of Pakistan standard/flag in blue
(23 March 1956 – 27 October 1958) is on the right.

The cover photograph was taken in Daaca,
East Pakistan, in 1954.

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Cover design by Syed Khawar Mehdi

COMMENTS ON THE BOOK

Hamid Khan, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan /Author

- President Iskandar Mirza, by writing his memoirs, tendered a valuable service to the present and future readers in Pakistan by sharing his experiences, decisions and interactions with his contemporary leaders and by expressing his own thoughts and ideas about governance of Pakistan.

- His daughters and their successors deserve compliments for saving, protecting and preserving his narrative for about half a century. It must go into print as an important version of the history of Pakistan. The future generations will certainly benefit from the book.

- It was rumoured over the years that India was initially prepared to make a deal with Pakistan over Kashmir in exchange for Hyderabad state. Mirza has stated this in the following words: 'After the Junagadh fiasco, a messenger came to Karachi from Sardar Patel, the strong man of the Indian government who was in charge of the integration of princely states. Patel said that if we would lay off Hyderabad, we could take Kashmir. It was a fair offer but the government let it go.' I think there should be serious deliberations in Pakistan over this offer, if at all there was any such offer.

- With the benefit of hindsight and with the knowledge that Pakistan's history is replete with details of corruption of politicians, generals and bureaucrats particularly during and after Ayub regime, Iskander Mirza emerges as a financially clean public official, a rare breed. He lived in misery in a foreign land and was unfairly deprived of his pension and other benefits that were due to him as retired public servant. He was unfairly denied return to Pakistan by General Yahya and was unjustly deprived of burial in Pakistan. He ought to have been honored with official burial in Pakistan, being its first President.

- He cannot be absolved of the blame of postponing and eventually cancelling the general elections. Perhaps he knew that

after such elections, he had to seek fresh mandate as President under the Constitution from the newly elected Assemblies. He might not be happy about such prospect because many politicians had turned against him due to his frequent meddling in politics.

- He appears to be aggrieved of the actions of General Ayub and his military junta in throwing him out of power after a few days of imposition of martial law and sending him in exile to Britain. He should have known better. You die by the sword you live with. When you have yourself resorted to unconstitutional steps, how can you be aggrieved of others doing the same, only because this time it were you who were on the receiving end.



Ammar Ali Qureshi; Independent Researcher/Author

- Among the first Indians to be trained at Sandhurst, Iskander Mirza rose meteorically from being Deputy Commissioner Peshawar in 1945 to Governor General of Pakistan in 1955. Mirza's memoirs—hitherto unpublished— have been an important omission in Pakistan's history as he played a key role in Pakistan's formative years. President Mirza was exiled by the army junta led by General Ayub Khan a month after the 1958 coup. Candid and revealing, his memoirs will be of interest to both historians and students of history. Syed Khawar Mehdi, by unearthing/presenting very useful information about Gwadar's purchase in 1958, has made the book even more appealing.



Dr Syed Jaffer Ahmed Director, Institute of Historical and Social Research, Karachi

- In reproducing an authentic version of Iskander Mirza's autobiography along with his quite revealing interview with Abul Hassan Ispahani and few historical documents, the editor of this book sets out to put the record straight about Mirza, one of the most influential figures in the power structure of the post-colonial state in Pakistan. The real strength of the book lies in the fact that it brings to the fore information based on primary sources which would help researchers approach the period with more accuracy and authenticity.

*This book is dedicated to
the People of Pakistan who deserve nothing
less than the truth,
and to
The Daughters of Iskander Mirza*

خطر ہے رشتہ الفت رگ گردن نہ ہو جاوے
غرور دوستی آفت ہے تو دشمن نہ ہو جاوے
سمجھ اس فصل میں کوتاہی نشو و نما غالب
اگر گل سرو کے قامت پہ پیراہن نہ ہو جاوے
مرزا غالب

I fear lest the affectionate relationship might become for me a source of arrogance. I fear that I might become proud over your love; and in love, for pride to come about is most undesirable. May it not be that you would become an enemy!

Oh Ghalib, if the branches of the roses don't grow and embrace the cypress and cause it to wear a colorful robe of flowers, then consider that there's a lack of grooming and flourishing.

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SECTION A

FOREWORD

Dr Hassan Abbas

Through this enlightening narrative of Pakistan's fourth Governor-General and first President, Iskander Mirza, the editor/compiler, Syed Khawar Mehdi, endeavors to set a very important node of Pakistan's historical record straight. He has also not only succeeded in doing justice to this crucial task but has also opened up many avenues of further research for historians interested in Pakistan's early and formative years.

With a sharp introductory note, Khawar shares with us an unpublished autobiography of Iskander Mirza and transcript of a highly informative interview with Abul Hassan Ispahani, a respected figure of the Freedom Movement. From intriguing aspects of why the facts of Iskander Mirza's life remained hidden for so long to how stories about his life and times offer new insights into the mindset of Pakistan's political and military elite, the book offers fascinating details. Khawar doesn't believe in mincing words. His introductory discourse

is sharp and he expresses his assessments and interpretation in a straight-forward fashion. I believe the editor has built this work on solid sources and deep research and has not shied away from strongly criticizing the state as well as Pakistani academia for not doing enough to present a fair assessment of Mirza. He deserved better without a doubt.

Iskander Mirza was the first victim of Pakistan's first military dictator, General Ayub Khan. They were friends of 20 years and Mirza had appointed him his prime minister—a controversial and unconstitutional decision—but he had little idea that Ayub had ambitions of his own. Not only that Mirza was humiliated and exiled by Ayub, his remains after his death in 1969 were not allowed to be buried in Pakistan by General Yahya Khan which was truly unfortunate, unjust and reflective of the extent of the ruling establishment's pettiness and fear of being exposed. As far as Mirza was concerned, he was honest in acknowledging his “error of judgment”, as Khawar tells us, and Mirza bravely even went to the extent of saying that those who reach top political positions and commit such mistakes deserve what they get.

Mirza's life story is a fascinating tale full of adventure, drama and intrigue. From his military training at Sandhurst to his move to join the Indian Political Service serving in what is today the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP), he interacted with prominent personalities of the times including Jawahar Lal Nehru, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

His observations about tribal ethos and rivalries among the Pashtuns are enticing as well as entertaining. He travelled across British India enriching his experience and he shares the wisdom he acquired in these pages adding greatly to the value of the discourse. Having myself served as a police officer in KP (then NWFP) in late 1990s, I greatly enjoyed his insights into the political realities of the area including his witty observations about the law and order situation in the Pashtun areas. He once advised the Governor of the province, Sir George Cunningham,

Foreword

not to give much credence to police reports, saying, “all my experience in all the districts had convinced me that these are usually exaggerated and sometimes faked.” He was politically astute and masterful as an administrator earning the trust of the British before Partition as well as of Jinnah and the Muslim League. Some of his assertions and reports as regards Pakistan’s founding father and some of his political stalwarts may sound controversial or overly critical to some but it must be remembered that he was their contemporary and saw them from close. He surely had his likes and dislikes. He remained patriotic and dedicated to Pakistan till his last breath. To his credit, he had committed to serve the cause of Pakistan while being a British civil servant taking serious risks.

His description of challenges faced by a nascent Pakistan add to former Prime Minister Chaudhry Mohammad Ali’s well-known book titled, *The Emergence of Pakistan* published first by Columbia University Press. His explanation of the building of Pakistan’s armed forces and especially triggering the Pashtun tribals to proceed to Kashmir offer some new materials that will greatly interest historians. His depiction of the political dramas that unraveled before his eyes are also astonishing to say the least. He too was an influential player in the corridors of power till his unceremonious ouster.

The Gwadar Papers, so meticulously researched by Syed Khawar Mehdi, offer credible evidence of Mirza’s vision and strategic thinking. He played a critical role in the final acquisition of the port and it is clearly supported by these papers. While Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon is also justly given credit for negotiating the deal successfully (benefitting from his connections in London that influenced Oman), Mirza was the powerful head of the state who was overseeing the process and making important decisions.

There are many assertions in the discourse, for instance, about India’s offer to Pakistan to lay off its hands from Hyderabad and take Kashmir, that will be — and must

be — debated. Debating about conflicting versions of history is a healthy debate. Pakistan will benefit from such discourse. Nothing in Mirza's account can be dismissed off-hand but it is worth remembering that he wrote this narrative when he was living in exile in London and must be very disappointed in how things were developing in his beloved country. As they say, time is also a great healer and he must have reassessed his opinions and evaluated his missteps.

To the best of my knowledge, his version of history adds great value to the history of Pakistan's formation as well as its early years. The editor, compiler and custodian of these materials is an honourable and patriotic man dedicated to Pakistan. We owe him and other family members of Iskander Mirza involved in this project a very special thanks for preserving this valuable resource and deciding to share it publicly.

Dr Hassan Abbas is Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the Near East South Asia Strategic Studies Centre (NESA), National Defense University in Washington DC. He serves as a senior advisor at Harvard University's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and his current research work focuses on building narratives for countering political and religious extremism and the rule of law reforms in developing states.

PREFACE: HOW IT ALL STARTED

Syed Khawar Mehdi

*“Seek the wisdom that will untie your knot.
Seek the path that demands your whole being.
Leave that which is not, but appears to be.
Seek that which is, but is not apparent”.*

Rumi (Mevlânâ Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Balkhī)

Major General Syed Iskander Ali Mirza, President of Pakistan, remained undefended all these years even though family and well-meaning scholars and individuals on occasions tried to correct the historical distortions created during the tenure of General Ayub Khan and indifferently followed by subsequent governments.

The falsifications of history were countered with facts but the sincere efforts didn't go far due to the unsympathetic attitude of publishing houses fearing backlash from the State. The sincere efforts by family, especially his daughters, through *Letters to the Editor* in various newspapers and magazines did make some headway and later materialized in the form of a series of articles by his daughters, Begum Fakhri Asad Ali, in magazines and books published by Begum Shah Taj Imam.

These daring efforts were commendable in bringing forth the truth and keeping interest alive but could not go far due to the politically inconducive environment and weak promotion. Then there were other books that didn't do justice to the memory of Iskander Mirza with pertinent historical accounts getting submerged in intellectual didactics and self-glorification straying away from the all too important context of Iskander Mirza as President of Pakistan.

Suffice it to say that Iskander Mirza, the first President of Pakistan, remained undefended in Pakistan's history books where his name is either missing or restricted as a passing reference to the 7 October 1958 martial law which otherwise would have been the shortest martial law had the highly-ambitious General Ayub Khan not taken over the government through a coup d'état on 27 October 1958.

Unlike the diaries of Ayub Khan which were all intact, maintained by his family and an abetting State, Major General Iskander Mirza wasn't fortunate enough and all his diaries, personal papers and belongings were either confiscated on the special orders of General Ayub Khan or destroyed.

All these years, Iskander Mirza's character assassination became fashionable and no opportunity was missed to attack and besmirch his reputation and blame him for anything and everything that went wrong in Pakistan. There were academics willing to please the regime, members of the establishment and flatterers in press who took it as pastime to make Iskander Mirza the whipping boy for all of Pakistan's ills. The slanderous onslaught was led, guided and directed by sycophants trying to please President Ayub Khan and win his attention. In this hateful pursuit, some in the bureaucracy and a few politicians even had his name removed from school textbooks. In Pakistan, where picayune rulers, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats have roads and development projects named after them, you won't see a single road or institution named after Iskander Mirza; not that he or his family ever desired such petty accolades but it

shows how ungracious and arrogant certain people can become and display their calibre when vested with power.

There were few Pakistanis who withstood the prevailing hostility, dared to speak the truth and not only defended him but also continued to meet him in exile and found him to be an honourable, deeply patriotic but broken man due to the inexorable humiliations wrought on him by President Ayub, his lackeys and General Yahya. The sad fact is that, even today, in 2023, Iskander Mirza's name continues to be bowdlerized by the establishment.

In all fairness, President Ayub Khan may not have been the only one behind the hateful tirade but he never discouraged those who were outdoing each other by concocting and circulating all kinds of disinformation casting aspersions on Iskander Mirza's financial propriety, his integrity and character. Such was the atmosphere that prevailed and influenced the average Pakistani's impression of their first President. It would indeed be a miracle if these memoirs can initiate an open debate aimed at correcting historical distortions, bring about fair mindedness and restore the image of an incorruptible person who served his Quaid and country with integrity, utmost devotion, dignity and remained honour-bound to Pakistan in duty, destiny and death.

Reading his memoirs made me realise the misery and misfortune that were unleashed on Iskander Mirza who was forcibly sent abroad, never allowed to express his side of the story, strictly forbidden to return to Pakistan, the homeland that he dearly loved. The injustices met out to him convinced me to undertake this project and share with academics, historians and readers in Pakistan and abroad Iskander Mirza's side of the story that remained in the family archives for more than fifty years.

It took extensive research spread over five years with help from family and friends. I scoured scores of publications, locating archives and the countless discussions with Iskander

Mirza's daughters and those who worked with him in various capacities when he was President of Pakistan in order to gather the facts relevant to accounts mentioned in his memoirs. It was this spirit of fair mindedness that made me take up the task of clearing his name and presenting the facts as they are without any bias or hidden agenda as a befitting recognition and tribute to a man who gave his very best to Quaid-e-Azam and Pakistan with unflinching loyalty and devotion.

The last Governor-General and the first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, was sent into exile by his handpicked Prime Minister, a serving general of the Pakistan Army whom he had, in good faith, nominated as Chief Martial Law Administrator for a limited-duration martial law to clean up and get the country on course. General Ayub Khan had different ideas; on the morning of 27 October 1958 upon assuming charge as Prime Minister, that same night, and without wasting time, he used the newly-acquired constitutional legitimacy to his advantage and sent his confidante generals to the President's House with an Army posse and forcibly made President Iskander Mirza sign a pre-drafted resignation letter at gunpoint.

The *Dawn* newspaper, in an earlier report (16 October 1958), quoted President Iskander Mirza: "I shall run martial law for the shortest duration possible...Then we shall have a national council of not more than twelve to fifteen persons and run on that basis for some time to clean up the country." He openly went on to indicate that thirty or forty men of goodwill and experience would be asked to frame a constitution. Censorship would be lifted and the constitutional debate would be in the open. The all too ambitious General Ayub Khan did not like the declaration that martial law must be lifted by 7 November. According to President Mirza: "I could see no reason for any longer duration: the country had accepted the revolution with enthusiasm, and I saw no reason why the public, or individuals, should be punished to suffer unnecessarily."

General Ayub Khan believed differently and went out of

his way to tone down the assurances the President gave at his 15 October press conferences. On 17 October, General Ayub issued a statement as follows: “There seems to be a fear in the minds of the people that if martial law is lifted soon the old order will return” **“Let me assure everyone that, whereas martial law will not be retained a minute longer than is necessary, it will not be lifted a minute earlier than the purpose for which it has been imposed has been fulfilled.”**

The Times London interpreted the statement with the headline **MARTIAL LAW TO BE RETAINED** (18 October 1958). In the same report, *The Times* correspondent observed: “General Ayub Khan’s statement this morning is in no sense a direct contradiction of the President Mirza’s declaration on the same subject.... But, with the subtlety of their kind, political observers are inevitably comparing their terms with some care.” *The Times* noted that “the President’s assurances were welcomed with relief by the more liberal-minded” but went on to suggest that a majority would like General Ayub Khan and the army to stay in control of the job of “clearing up the mess”.

What President Iskander Mirza did not fully realise was the fact that he and General Ayub Khan were moving apart in their thinking notwithstanding the fact that Ayub Khan was a friend of his of twenty five years’ standing and unequivocally trusted by him. Perhaps that was a mistake. Ayub Khan could now see that the revolution enjoyed overwhelming support from the public and well knew that President Iskander Mirza was consulting with Chief Justice Munir on the form of a new constitution. General Ayub knew that, if President Iskander Mirza had his way, the Army would soon march back to the barracks. Ayub Khan had his own ideas about all this and acted solely out of self-interest.

The coup d’état on the night of 27 October 1958 struck like a treacherous storm and so began the tragic journey for

the deposed President; he was shuttled to Quetta early morning on the 28th, kept for few days before being shuttled back to Karachi on the way to London where he would spend the rest of his life in solitude, dignity and with unflinching love for his country till his last breath.

Iskander Mirza was honour-bound to Jinnah and Pakistan from the moment he had his first meeting in March 1943 with Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The self-imposed silence by this man of utmost integrity was broken by the publication of *Friends Not Masters* in 1967 – a dishonorable attempt by President Ayub Khan in self-projection and glorifying his image while still in office. Towards this propaganda exercise, Ayub Khan most brazenly availed state resources, the services of civil servants to the extent that a serving Information Secretary ghost wrote his book. Undoubtedly the book *Friends Not Masters* is a disreputable example of such indecorous abuse of position and conduct unbecoming of an officer and sadly brought disgrace to the office of the President of Pakistan.

It's most convenient to write when in the seat of power with the entire state machinery at one's disposal and eager civil servants anxiously offering services as handmaiden to further a ruler's ambitions and agendas. But it was beyond Iskander Mirza's sense of decorum and respect for the honourable office to have written a book while being President. Even though he had the unique distinction of having a personal relationship with both Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Khan Liaquat Ali Khan, he never got tempted by the desire to use his relationship with two of the most powerful people in Pakistan for self-promotion or gaining favors unlike Ayub Khan who owed his career to Iskander Mirza who, on many occasions, lived up to being a good friend and rescuing his friend from difficult situations.

According to Muhammad Zahid Rifat in *The Nation* of 6 July 2018: "It is also a fact though very little known somehow that, prior to his death, the Quaid-e-Azam as the first Governor-

Preface: How it all started

General of the newly-established free, independent and sovereign state had, in 1948, punished a senior army officer for being more interested in politics than Army affairs. He was none else than Brigadier Muhammad Ayub Khan. The reprimand so given in the Quaid-e-Azam's own handwriting is still preserved in the Cabinet Division's archives and may never see the light of day like several other well-guarded documents that should have been placed in the public domain a long time ago as per "Right of Access to Information Act, 2017" which clearly states that the government believes in transparency and the right to have access to information to ensure that the people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have improved access to records held by public authorities and promote the purposes of making the government more accountable to its people.

At various times after his retirement in London, the exiled President Mirza penned down accounts of certain episodes with the encouragement of old associates. The appearance of *Friends Not Masters* by Field Marshal Ayub Khan gave offence by its slighting of Major General Iskander Mirza, the first President and last Governor-General of Pakistan. He thus resolved to write his memoirs and sought assistance in getting them into book form. A natural raconteur, he found no difficulty in educating the past. The perusal of his own talk, via tape recordings, stimulated the exiled President into further writing. It was necessary to check this material fairly thoroughly as everything was put down from memory. Research through old newspaper files resulted in the discovery of speeches and statements made during the 1950s and some excerpts were fitted into the story. By 1969, a connected though incomplete narrative had been put together. It was intended that this should form the substance of a publication. For various reasons, mainly of health, General Mirza found it difficult to give the narrative his attention. He did go through it and made minor additions. While in exile in London, Iskander Mirza suffered a series of heart attacks and breathed his last on 13 November 1969 – but the story doesn't

end there.

The government of Yahya Khan was so fearful of Major General Iskander Mirza in death that he was denied burial in his homeland in spite of several requests from the family. Less than a year before his death, Major General Iskander Mirza had requested General Yahya Khan that he be allowed to come back to Pakistan but was rebutted with a curt no. Later General Mirza's daughter, Taj Imam, also sent a request to President Yahya Khan which, too, was turned down. At that time, Iran had extremely cordial relations with Pakistan and the Shahinshah of Iran, having personal regard for Iskander Mirza, offered a state funeral with full military honours for the first President of Pakistan at Shahar e Rey near Tehran. Those who knew Syed Iskander Ali Mirza will recall his distinctive style of address and can judge how far the man speaks as himself through these pages in his defence without compromising on decorum and his love for Pakistan.

Major General Iskander Mirza was an honourable man of strong character who faced many a tribulation during exile in London but never complained or ever badmouthed his country unlike the later day rulers who never missed any opportunity, when not in power and abroad, callously taking shots at Pakistan, shamelessly hobnobbing with Pakistan's enemies and, most disgracefully, settling scores in the media oblivious to the shame it brought to Pakistan. Even in exile, honour meant a lot to Iskander Mirza as is obvious in this excerpt from a letter to his son, Humayun Mirza, dated 9 November 1958: "I trusted the Army and in (the) military honour of General Ayub Khan. This was an error of judgment and people who get to the top and misjudge as I did ___ have no right to complain and deserve what they get. This is the end of an episode as far as I am concerned. Individuals don't count, it is the country which matters." Perhaps the matter would have rested on that last word from Iskander Mirza but for the malicious propaganda and disinformation directed at him in

Preface: How it all started

General Ayub Khan's *Friends Not Masters*.

For various reasons, Iskander Mirza's memoirs couldn't be published and now, after more than half a century, it is being published in its totality and lays open the facts in his own words for historians, academics and the people of Pakistan to judge the man who was a trusted lieutenant of Quaid-e-Azam and, while in Indian Political Service, secretly worked with Jinnah (who fully recognized the invaluable potential in the young Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar) towards the most challenging task of achieving Pakistan from the British. It is interesting to note that, as far back as 1943, Iskander Mirza, an IPS Officer and expert on NWFP and the Tribal Areas had, in 1943, long before Pakistan came into existence, established his allegiance to Jinnah and "recognized him as the political head of the Muslims of India".

This book is in three parts. Section A comprises the Foreword by Dr Hassan Abbas who is Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the Near East South Asia Strategic Studies Centre (NESA), National Defense University in Washington DC; Preface, List of Characters, Acknowledgements, the Memoirs with minor editing of grammar and the chronological narration of historical accounts, the transcription of Iskander Mirza's interview that he gave to his friend, legislator and diplomat, Abul Hassan Ispahani, in London on 23 September 1967. Section B covers Iskander Mirza's role in the acquisition of Gwadar based on actual declassified documents from the National Archives in the UK and Arabian Gulf Digital Alliance. Section C comprises Favourite Books from Iskander Mirza's personal library, Afterword, Glossary and Index.

The Illustrations are in three sets. Set 1 covers the period as Governor General and President. Set 2 covers Indian Political Service, Defense Secretary of Pakistan and Personal & Family photos. Set 3 covers Exile, Funeral and the National Archives in London.

Thursday, 9 February 2023

LIST OF PERSONALITIES

SHORT BIOS

Abdul Mansoor /Abul Mansur Ahmad (1898–1979). Actual name was Ahmad Ali Farazi. He was a Bangladeshi politician, writer and journalist. As a politician, he worked for the Indian National Congress, Krishak Praja Samity, Muslim League, and the Awami League. He was an author of stories, novels and political satires. As a journalist and politician, he wrote extensively on politics, culture and history. He was awarded the Bangla Academy Literary Award in 1960 and the Independence Day Award in 1979 by the Government of Bangladesh.

Abdul Qayyum Khan (1901–1981). Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was a politician in British Indian politics as well

List of Personalities

as in Pakistani politics. He began his political career with the Indian National Congress in 1934. He was Congress deputy leader in the NWFP Assembly. He joined the Muslim League NWFP Branch and after Independence became NWFP's first Chief Minister. During Ayub Khan's regime, he was disqualified from politics and imprisoned for two years. He was nominated as Federal Interior Minister by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a position he held until the 1977 elections.

Abdul Rashid / Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan (1906–1995). He was the Inspector General of Police in the NWFP province. He was appointed as the eighth Chief Minister of the NWFP from 1953 till 1955. He served in the cabinet of Dr Khan Sahib initially as Minister for Health and later as Minister for Finance and Information. He was elected as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan after Dr Khan Sahib's resignation. He served as Minister for Commerce and Industries in the cabinet of Prime Minister Sir Feroz Khan Noon. He was Minister for Home Affairs (Interior), Kashmir Affairs, States, and Frontier Regions in General Yahya Khan's presidential cabinet.

Abu Hossain Sarkar / Abu Hussain Sarkar (1894–1969). A Bengali politician and the 4th Chief Minister of East Pakistan. He joined the Indian National Congress and played an active role in the national movement. However, in 1935, over some difference of opinion with the Congress leaders, he left Congress and joined A.K. Fazlul Haq's Krishak Praja Party. In 1937, he was elected to the Bengal Constituent Assembly. As a United Front candidate, he was elected to the East Bengal Provincial Assembly in 1954. In 1955, he was Minister of Health in the cabinet of Prime Minister Chaudhari Mohammad Ali. In June 1955, he was elected as the Chief Minister of East Bengal. He played a vital role in floating the National Democratic Front (NDF) headed by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy in 1962 and actively participated in the movement for the restoration of democracy in the country.

Acharaya Kripalani (1888–1982). A prominent Indian educator, social activist and politician in both pre and post-independence India, his actual name was Jivatram Bhagwandas Kripalani, popularly known as Acharya Kripalani. He was a close associate of Gandhi and a long-time supporter of his ideology. He became General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee in 1928–29 and again from 1934–45. He was also elected to the Lok Sabha in 1951 and was re-elected in 1957, 1963, and 1967. He died at the age of 93.

Aftab Ahmad. Principal Secretary to Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the fifth Prime Minister of Pakistan (12 September 1956–17 October 1957).

Air Commodore (later Air Marshal) Asghar Khan (1921–2018). Muhammad Asghar Khan was a three-star Air Force General and politician. He served as the first Pakistani Muslim Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Prime Minister Suhrawardy upgraded him from Air Vice Marshal to the rank of three-star Air Marshal. Under his command, PAF defeated the Indian Air Force (IAF) during the 1965 war. After retiring from the PAF, he took over the command of Pakistan International Airline (PIA). In 1970, Asghar Khan formed his own political party called Tehreek-e-Istiqlal. He died on 5 January 2018 in Abbottabad at the age of 96.

Air Commodore Rabb (1914–1996). Maqbool Rabb, was commissioned in the Royal Indian Air Force on 15 February 1940. In 1941, he was elevated to Flying Officer and, in 1943, he was raised to the post of Acting Flight Lieutenant. In June 1947, he was appointed as Squadron Leader, No. 2 Squadron, Kohat, Royal Indian Air Force. Later, he was assigned as Wing Commander of Elementary Flying Training School, Jodhpur; he was the first Indian to be given this high position. After Partition, he chose to live in Pakistan and was promoted to Air Commodore in the Royal Pakistan Air Force.

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Air Vice Marshal Atcherley (1904–1970). Sir Richard Llewellyn Roger Atcherley was a senior officer in the Royal Air Force. From 1949 to 1951, he served as Chief of the Air Staff for the Royal Pakistani Air Force in 1949. He died on 18 April 1970 aged 66.

Air Vice Marshal Cannon (1904–1986). Leslie William Cannon was a senior officer in the Royal Air Force. He served as Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Pakistan Air Force from 1952 to 1955.

Amir of Bahawalpur (1904–1966). Sir Sadiq Muhammad Khan V Abbasi was the Nawab of Bahawalpur State. On 15 August 1947, he was promoted to the title of Amir of Bahawalpur. He acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan a month later. Following India's partition, he established the Amir of Bahawalpur Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Fund to assist refugees fleeing India. In 1955, he and Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad signed an agreement under which the State of Bahawalpur became part of the province of West Pakistan. In May 1966, Nawab Sadiq died in London.

Amir of Khairpur (b. 1933). George Ali Murad Khan Talpur II ascended the throne on 24 July 1947 when his father, Faiz Muhammad Khan II, was deposed by the British on 19 July 1947 on grounds of being mentally unfit. Since he was a minor, the state was governed by a regency board made up of his close relatives. On 3 October 1951, one of the regents, Mir Ghulam Hussain Khan, signed the document of accession on behalf of the Amir, acceding the state to the Dominion of Pakistan. In 1955, the state merged with Pakistan, removing Amir's sovereign status.

Aslam Khattak (1908–2008). His full name was Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak. He was a Pakistani politician and diplomat. During his civil service career, he worked for Dr Khan Sahib's provincial government in the NWFP. In the 1970 elections, he was elected as an independent to the NWFP Provincial Assembly. In 1972, he was elected Speaker of the

NWFP Assembly. From 1973–1974, he served as the tenth Governor of NWFP. As a diplomat, he served as Ambassador to Iran (1974–1977), Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Ataur Rehman Khan (1905–1991). A Bangladeshi lawyer, politician and writer. Served as 5th Chief Minister of East Pakistan from 1956 to 1958 and as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh from 1984 to 1986.

Attlee (1883–1967). Clement Richard Attlee was a British politician. He was the first Labour Prime Minister (1945–1951) with a majority in government. He presided over the establishment of the welfare state in Great Britain, the granting of independence to India and the conversion of the British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations. He was made a member of the House of Lords after he retired and became the first Earl Attlee.

Ayub Khan (1907–1974). Muhammad Ayub Khan was a British Indian Army officer who opted for the new state of Pakistan. He was a self-appointed Field Marshal, a five-star general and statesman. He served as the second President of Pakistan and its first military dictator from 1958 until his forced resignation in 1969.

Bahadur Khan (1908–1975). Khan Sardar Bahadur Khan was a Pakistani politician. He served as the 9th Chief Minister of the NWFP. He was the brother of President Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan. In 1939, he was elected as a Muslim League member to the NWFP Legislative Assembly from Haripur. He served as Minister for Communications in the cabinets of multiple prime ministers viz. Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra. From 1954–1955 he served as Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan.

Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan (1905–1990). Born as Irene Margaret Pant in a Hindu family that had adopted Christianity, she was one of the leading women figures in the Pakistan Movement, a career economist and prominent stateswoman. Irene Pant was teaching Economics in a Delhi

College when she met Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan. They married in 1933 and Irene Pant became Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan. After Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in 1951, she continued to be active in public life and her non-profit organization, All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA). She was appointed as Pakistan's first female Ambassador to Italy and Tunisia. She died on 13 June 1990 and was buried next to her husband in the precincts of the Quaid-e-Azam's Mausoleum.

Begum Shah Nawaz (1896–1979). Her actual name was Jahanara Shahnawaz. A politician and Muslim League activist, she was the daughter of Sir Muhammad Shafi and wife of Mian Shah Nawaz. In 1935, she founded the Punjab Provincial Women's Muslim League. In 1937, she was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly and was appointed Parliamentary Secretary for Education, Medical Relief and Public Health. In 1938, she became a member of the Women's Central Sub-committee of the All-India Muslim League. She was president of the provincial branch of the All-India Muslim Women's Conference and also served as vice-president of the Central Committee of the All-India Muslim Women's Conference. She was a member of the All-Indian General Committee of the Red Cross Society.

Brigadier Sher Muhammad Khan (d. 1949). He graduated from the Royal Military College at Sandhurst in 1932. He fought in the Waziristan Campaign of 1936–1939. In the Second World War he served in Africa and earned his Military Cross. After partition of India, he was appointed as the first Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) by General Messervy. He held the post for six months and was then appointed as Director Military Operations (DMO). In both these key posts he was involved in the Kashmir War 1947. He died on 13 December 1949 in a plane crash.

Ch. Farzand Ali. He was elected as a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from Bahawalpur District in May 1956 and remained a member till October 1958.

Ch. Muhammad Hanif. He was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Multan constituency in 1951, serving from 7 May 1951 to 14 October 1955. He was re-elected in 1956 and remained a member from 19 May 1956 to 7 October 1958.

Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha. He was a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly during 1946-47.

In 1947, he was elected as a member of the West Punjab Legislative Assembly and remained a member until 1949. During this period, he also served as Parliamentary Secretary.

In 1951, he was elected as a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and remained a member until 1955. During this time, he served as senior minister in the cabinet of Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana.

In 1962, during Ayub Khan's regime, he was elected as a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and remained a member till 1965.

Ch. Salahuddin. In 1946, 1951, and 1956, he was chosen to represent the Gujranwala constituency in the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

Chaudhari Muhammad Ali (1905–1982). He was the 4th Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 1928, he joined the Indian Civil Service as an accountant in the Audit and Accounts Service. After Independence in 1947, he was appointed Finance Secretary under Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad. In 1951, Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin appointed him as Finance Minister and he retained this position in Mohammad Ali Bogra's government. Following the dismissal of the Bogra administration by Governor-General Iskander Mirza on 11 August 1955, he was appointed Pakistan's 4th Prime Minister. During his tenure, the constitution was promulgated on 23 March 1956.

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Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman (1889–1973). One of the founding fathers of Pakistan and leader of the All-India Muslim League in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh). He was an active worker of the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements. He left Congress and joined the Muslim League. He became a strong supporter of Jinnah in the Pakistan movement. In 1937 and 1946, he was a Muslim League member in the UP Legislative Assembly. In 1946–47, he became the Muslim League member of the Indian Constituent Assembly. At the time of Independence in August 1947, he was still serving as the Muslim League member of the Constituent Assembly of India. He migrated to Pakistan in November 1947.

Chundrigar (1897–1960). Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar was commonly known as I. I. Chundrigar. He was the 6th Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 1938, he was chosen Deputy Leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party. After Partition, he was appointed Minister of Commerce and Trade in Liaquat Ali Khan's administration. In 1950, he was Governor of the NWFP. From 1951 till 1953, he was Governor of West Punjab. From 1955 till 1956, he was appointed Minister of Law and Justice. In 18 October 1957, he became 6th Prime Minister of Pakistan. He resigned on 11 December 1957. His tenure is the third shortest served in the parliamentary history of Pakistan. In 1958, he was appointed President of the Supreme Court Bar Association which he remained until his death in 1960.

Dr Khan Sahib (1883–1958). His real moniker was Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan. He was the elder brother of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. After obtaining a medical degree from London and serving for some time as a captain doctor in France during the First World War, he returned to India. He practised medicine briefly before entering politics. He and his brother were opposed to the partition of India and favoured a united country. His coalition of the Khudai Khidmatgars won offices in the province in both the 1937 and 1946 elections. He was thrice the Chief Minister of NWFP (1937–9; 1943; 1946).

On 22 August 1947, he was dismissed by Governor George Cunningham on the advice of M.A. Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan. He returned to politics as a minister in the cabinet headed by Mohammad Ali Bogra in 1953 and, in 1955, became chief minister of the unified province of West Pakistan. In 1958, he was assassinated at Lahore by a dismissed patwari from Mianwali whom he had refused to reinstate.

Eisenhower (1890–1969). David Dwight Eisenhower was the 34th President of the United States (1953–61). He had been Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in western Europe during the Second World War. After the war, he assumed the supreme command over the new NATO forces being assembled in 1951. Republican emissaries in Paris persuaded him to run for President in 1952. In the 42nd presidential election, held on 4 November 1952, Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower won a landslide victory and became the 34th President. In November 1955 he was re-elected for his second term.

Fazal-ul-Haq / A.K. Fazlul Haq (1873–1962). His full name was Abul Kasem Fazlul Haq, aka “Sher-e-Bangla”. He was a British Indian and Pakistani lawyer, writer, who served as the first and longest Prime Minister of Bengal. He also held different political posts including General Secretary of the Indian National Congress (1918–1919); Education Minister (1924); the first Muslim Mayor of Calcutta (1935); Chief Minister of undivided Bengal (1937–1943) and East Pakistan (1954); Home Minister of Pakistan (1955–56); Governor of East Pakistan (1956–58); Food and Agriculture Minister of Pakistan (1958–61). He died on Friday, 27 April 1962.

Field Marshal Lord Wavell (1883–1950). A senior commander of the British Army. His name was Archibald Percival Wavell. He served in the Second Boer War, the Bazar Valley Campaign and the First World War. He served in the Second World War, initially as Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. From July 1941 until June 1943, he served as Commander-in-Chief in India, (apart from a brief tour as

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Commander of ABDACOM), and then served as Viceroy of India until his retirement in February 1947. He died on 24 May 1950.

Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (1884–1981). Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck was a British army commander during the Second World War. He was a career soldier who spent much of his military career in India where he rose to become Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in 1941. In July 1941, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East. In June 1943, he was again appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. He was promoted to Field Marshal in 1946. As Supreme Commander in India, he administered the splitting of the Indian Army following the creation of Pakistan. He retired to the UK but, at the age of 84, immigrated to Morocco where he died at the age of 96.

G.B. Raisani (1924–1987). His real name was Nawab Mir Ghous Bakhsh Khan Raisani. He was born on 6 September 1924 in Kanak, Baluchistan. He attended Colonel Brown Cambridge School, Dehradun. Raisani was a Pakistani politician who served as the 2nd Governor of Baluchistan from 26 December 1971 to 29 April 1972. He was also a Federal Minister for Food and Agriculture and the provincial President of the Pakistan People's Party. He was killed in 1987 along with his four bodyguards in the Mehrgarh area of Kachhi District.

G.M. Syed (1904–1995). Ghulam Murtaza Syed was a prominent Sindhi politician who is also known for his scholarly work. He began his political career when he joined the Khilafat Movement. In 1938, he joined the All-India Muslim League and became a member of its Central Committee but, in 1946, he left the party. In 1972, he founded the "Jiy-e-Sind" movement which intended to create "Sindhu Desh". He has written over 60 books on topics like politics, religion, culture, literature and a commentary on the famed poet, Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai. He spent approximately thirty years of his life in prisons and house arrests for opposing the

anti-Sindh policies. He died on 25 April 1995.

G.S. Bhalja. An Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer in British India who, after independence, became the first Defence Secretary from 21 July 1947 to 6 October 1947.

Gandhi / Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948). Commonly known as Mahatma Gandhi and Bapu, he was an Indian lawyer, politician, social activist and writer who became the leader of the nationalist movement against the British rule of India. In 1921, he became President of the Indian National Congress, and launched a nationwide campaign to achieve Swaraj or self-rule. He was imprisoned several times during his pursuit of non-cooperation and undertook a number of hunger strikes to protest the oppression of India's poorest classes. Following Partition in 1947, he went on hunger strikes in the months that followed, eventually succeeding in stopping the rioting. He was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, a young Hindu fanatic, in Delhi on 30 January 1948.

General Akbar Khan (1912–1993). Mohammed Akbar Khan was an officer of the British Indian Army and later the Pakistan Army. He took part in the Waziristan Campaign during 1937–1938. During the Second World War, he served in Burma to fight the Imperial Japanese Army. During the time of Independence in 1947, he commanded the Kashmiri rebels and Pashtun irregulars in the Kashmir War of 1947 under the pseudonym "General Tariq". In 1951, he was found guilty of an attempted coup known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy and served a five-year prison sentence. Later, he served as the Chief of National Security under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He died in 1993 at the age of 81 in Karachi.

General Burki / Wajid Ali Khan Burki (1900–1989). He was sent to England to study medicine at the University of St Andrews. He received his M.D. degree in 1926. In 1927, he joined the Indian Medical Service and worked in military hospitals at Jalandhar, Quetta and Karachi. He then went to England to pursue further medical education, earning

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his D.O.M.S. degree in 1932. After Independence, he chose to live in Pakistan and became the first Deputy Director of the Army Medical Corps, Pakistan. In 1952, he was appointed Major General. In 1953, he was appointed Director-General of the Armed Forces Medical Services. He also served as Minister-in-Charge of the Ministry of Health under the military government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

General Cariappa (1899–1993). His full name was Kodandera Madappa Cariappa, commonly known as K.M. Cariappa. He was a career soldier serving in various posts including the Middle East combat (1941–42) and the Burma front (1943–44). In January 1949, he was named the first Indian Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. In 1986, the Indian government promoted him to the honorary rank of Field Marshal in recognition of his exemplary services to the country.

General Iftikhar (1907–1949). Muhammed Iftikhar Khan was an officer of the British Indian Army and later the Pakistan Army. After attending the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on the Unattached List for the Indian Army on 29 August 1929. Following Partition in 1947, he opted to join the Pakistan Army. On 1 January 1948, he assumed the command of the 10th Division. He had been nominated to become the first local Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army after General Gracey's retirement. However, he was killed in a plane crash on 13 December 1949 before being appointed Commander-in-Chief.

General Musa (1908–1991). Muhammad Musa Khan was recruited to the British Indian Army as a Jawan in 1926 and eventually joined the 4th Hazara Pioneers after being promoted as Naik (a non-commissioned officer) in the British Indian Army. He participated in the Waziristan Campaign from 1936 to 1938. During the Second World War, he served in the Burma Campaign, North Africa and the Middle East. Following Partition in 1947, he chose Pakistan and became a Staff Officer

in the Pakistan Army. During the Kashmir War of 1947, he served as acting Brigadier and in charge of the 103rd Infantry Brigade in Kashmir. In October 1958, he was promoted to four-star General and was named Commander-in-Chief when Ayub Khan was promoted to Field Marshal. When he retired in 1966, Ayub Khan nominated him Governor of West Pakistan. In 1985, he was appointed Governor of Baluchistan.

General Raza (1905–1984). Nawabzada Agha Mohammad Raza was a Pakistani general and a diplomat. He was trained at the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in England and served as an Indian government official before Partition in 1947. After Partition Pakistan appointed him Adjutant General responsible for reorganizing the army. He served as Ambassador to China in 1951–54 and 1962–66, Ambassador to Iran, France, and Italy and, in 1971–72, to the United States. later he became the administration head in the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad. He died on 16 June 1984.

General Ross Mackay / McCay (1895–1969). Ross Cairns McCay was a native of Australia. He enlisted in the First Australian Imperial Force in August 1914 and left from Melbourne on 20 October 1914 for conflicts in Gallipoli, Egypt, France and Belgium. In February 1918, he was transferred to the British Indian Army. He served with the British Army in India and Burma in the Second World War and remained in the Indian Army after the Second World War. He was Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief from 1944 to 1946. In August 1947, he was Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan Army. In 1951, Ross was placed on the retired list of the British Army with the honorary rank of Lieutenant General. His final appointment was as Chief Military Advisor to the Government of Pakistan until 1952.

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General Sir Douglas Gracey (1894–1964). Sir Douglas David Gracey was a British Indian Army officer who fought in both the First and Second World Wars. After the Second World War, he commanded, Northern Command and Indian I Corps in India. After Partition, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Commander-in-Chief in the Pakistan Army. In 1948, he succeeded Frank Messervy as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. He retired from the Pakistan Army in April 1951.

General Sir Frank Messervy (1893–1974). Sir Frank Walter Messervy was a British Indian Army officer in the First and Second World Wars. He received his education at Eton College and Sandhurst Military Academy. He was commissioned into the British Army in 1913. In 1946, he was made General Officer Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Command in India. After Independence, he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. He retired from the British Army in 1948 and was granted the honorary rank of General.

General Yahya (1917–1980). Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan was commonly known as Yahya Khan. He was a four-star general who served as the 5th Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Chief Martial Law Administrator and as the 3rd President of Pakistan. He held the country's first free and fair elections in 1970 but a severe conflict erupted between the Central Government and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami Party in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan responded by ordering the army to suppress the Awami League Party which led to the breakup of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. Yahya Khan resigned on 20 December 1971 after Bangladesh's independence from West Pakistan.

General Zia ul-Haq (1924–1988). He was a four star general and politician from Pakistan who became the country's 6th President after imposing Martial Law in 1977. Zia was President until his death in a plane crash in 1988. He is the country's longest-serving de facto ruler and Chief of Army

Staff. He was a key figure in the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979. In 1985, he lifted Martial Law and held party-free elections, Zia selected Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister and accumulated more presidential powers via the 8th Amendment to the Constitution. He also attempted to extend his support base by advocating for the Islamization of Pakistan.

Ghulam Muhammad (1895–1956). A Pakistani politician and financier who served as the 3rd Governor-General of Pakistan. He joined the Indian Civil Service as a Chartered Accountant at the Indian Railway Accounts Service. After Independence, he joined the Liaquat Ali Khan administration as the country's first finance minister. Following the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, he was invited by Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin to be the Governor-General. Nationwide violence due to the language movement in East Bengal and religious riots in Lahore made him dismiss the Nazimuddin administration. In 1955, he was forced to resign from the post of Governor-General due to poor health by Interior Minister Iskander Mirza who took control of the office. He died in 1956 in Karachi.

Ghulam Muhammad of Lundkhwar (b. 1908). He joined the All-India National Congress and the Khilafat Committee. He was a staunch supporter of Muhammad Ali Jauhar. In 1942, when he left Congress, he was invited by Mohammad Ali Jinnah to join the Muslim League which he refused at that time but, in 1944, he accepted the invitation and became a member of the NWFP Muslim League Working Committee. After Independence, he joined the All Pakistan Awami Muslim League. During the tenure of the Qayyum government, as an opposition leader, he was arrested and sent to jail for four and a half years.

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Gulbadin Hekmatyar (b. 1949). An Afghan politician, former Mujahideen leader and drug trafficker. He is the founder and current leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin political party. During the Soviet-Afghan War 1979, he received aid from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, United States and United Kingdom. When the Soviet-Afghan War ended in 1989, he used funds and weaponry provided by the CIA and ISI to establish his group into one of the Middle East's main heroin producers. He served as Afghanistan's Prime Minister from 1993 to 1994 and briefly again in 1996. The Taliban takeover of Kabul compelled him to flee to Tehran, Iran. In 2016, he signed a peace deal with the Afghan government and was allowed to return to Afghanistan after almost 20 years in exile.

H.S. Suhrawardy (1892–1963). Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was a Bengali barrister and politician. He was Prime Minister of Bengal in 1946–47 and Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1956–57. He was called to the Bar of England and Wales through Gray's Inn in 1922–23. After returning to India, he entered politics and became Deputy Mayor of Calcutta in 1924. In 1925, he joined the All-India Muslim League. In 1946, he headed the Muslim League government as Prime Minister of Bengal. In 1956, Iskander Mirza made him Prime Minister after Chaudhry Muhammad Ali had resigned. However, due to the political turmoil in Pakistan at that time, he resigned on 17 October 1957. After being disqualified from politics by President Ayub Khan, Suhrawardy relocated to Lebanon where he died in 1963.

Habibullah Khan (1901–1978). A political activist from Bannu, he campaigned against the British Rule in NWFP. He joined the Khaksar Movement and worked in the NWFP. Upon the Partition of India in 1947, he opted for a career in law and became the first district and sessions judge of the Peshawar High Court in 1947. He started his political career when he won the elections in 1962 and was appointed Interior Minister of Pakistan when General Ayub Khan was declared President.

He was the first Chairman of Pakistan's Senate, serving from 6 August 1973 to 5 August 1975, and was re-elected for the Senate's second term from 6 August 1975 to 4 July 1977. He served as acting President of Pakistan from 1977 to 1978 when General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq imposed martial law on the country.

Hari Singh Nalwa (1791–1837). He was Commander-in-Chief of the Khalsa, the army of the Sikh Empire. He is known for his role in the conquests of Kasur, Sialkot, Attock, Multan, Kashmir, Peshawar and Jamrud. He was responsible for expanding the frontier of the Sikh Empire beyond the Indus River right up to the mouth of the Khyber Pass. He served as Governor of Kashmir, Peshawar and Hazara. He established a mint on behalf of the Sikh Empire to facilitate revenue collection in Kashmir and Peshawar. He died fighting the Pathan forces of Dost Mohammed Khan of Afghanistan. He was cremated in the Jamrud Fort built at the mouth of the Khyber Pass.

Harold Macmillan (1894–1986). Maurice Harold Macmillan, 1st Earl of Stockton, was a British Conservative statesman and politician who was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1957 to 1963. Due to the Suez Canal debacle, he became Prime Minister after the forced resignation of Sir Anthony Eden in January 1957. In 1963, he was confronted with the French veto (29 January 1963) of Great Britain's entry into the European Economic Community and the country's problems with the balance of payments. The sacking of six cabinet ministers and a series of scandals, the most damaging of which involved the minister, John Profumo, he resigned in October 1963. He was created Earl of Stockton in 1984 and died in 1986.

Hassan Ispahani (1902–1981). His actual name was Mirza Abul Hassan Ispahani. He was a Pakistani politician and diplomat. He joined the All-India Muslim League in April 1941. He became a member of the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1946 and represented the Muslim League. After independence

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in 1947, he became a member of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. He was Ambassador to the United States from September 1947 to February 1952, Vice Chairman of the Pakistan Delegation to the UN Security Council on the Kashmir issue, High Commissioner to the UK from 1952 to 1954, Federal Minister for Industries and Commerce from 1954 to 1955 and Ambassador to Afghanistan in 1973–74. He died in Karachi in 1981.

John Foster Dulles (1888–1959). An American diplomat, lawyer, and Republican Party politician. He served as the United States Secretary of State under President Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1953 to 1959 and was briefly a Republican US Senator for New York in 1949. Poor health forced him to resign his position at the Department of State in April 1959, only weeks before his death on 24 May 1959.

Kh. Safdar. His actual name was Khawaja Muhammad Safdar. He was a Pakistani politician from the Pakistan Muslim League. He took an active part in the Pakistan Movement. In 1962, he served as the Leader of Opposition in the Provincial Assembly of West Pakistan until General Yahya Khan disbanded the Assemblies. In 1965, he was elected Member of the Provincial Assembly of West Pakistan from Sialkot and remained so till 1969. From 1975 till 1977, he was member of the Senate of Pakistan from Punjab. In 1981, he was nominated Chairman of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), Pakistan.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan aka Bacha Khan (1890–1988). The younger brother of Dr Khan Sahib, Bacha Khan was an alumnus of Aligarh Muslim University. Having witnessed the repeated failure of revolts against the British Raj, Bacha Khan decided that social activism and reform would be more beneficial for the Pashtuns. This led to the formation of Anjuman Islah-e-Afghana in 1921 and the Pashtun Jirga in 1927. A close friend of Mahatma Gandhi, Bacha Khan was referred to as the “Frontier Gandhi”. He founded the Khudai Khidmatgar movement in 1929 and strongly opposed the Partition of

India. After Partition, Bacha Khan demanded an autonomous Pashtunistan administrative unit within the country. In 1956, he was arrested for his opposition to the One Unit programme. He spent many years in prison but would not support Pakistan. He died on 20 January 1988 at the age of 97 and was buried in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in accordance with his will.

Khan of Kalat (1902–1979). Khan Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Ahmedzai was the last Khan of Kalat, a princely state within British India and the Dominion of Pakistan, serving from 10 September 1933 to 14 October 1955. In 1958, he briefly declared himself Khan again in defiance of the Pakistani authority. On 6 October 1958, the Pakistan government arrested and imprisoned Mir Ahmad Yar Khan on sedition charges during the coup d'état against President Iskander Mirza. He was later released and his title was briefly restored in 1962. He served as the Governor of Baluchistan from 1974 to 1977. He died in 1979.

Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894–1964). He was one of the leading founding fathers of Pakistan. Born into an aristocratic Nawab family in Bengal in 1894, he was educated at the Aligarh Muslim University before pursuing his post-graduate studies at Cambridge University. He was appointed a Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire (CIE) in 1926. He was knighted in 1934 by the King-Emperor, George V, when he was appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire (KCIE).

He is noted as being the first Bengali to have ruled Pakistan, first as Governor-General (1948–51) and later as Prime Minister (1951–53). In 1922, he joined the All-India Muslim League in Bengal. He was initially the Education Minister but climbed the ranks to become Chief Minister of Bengal in 1943–45. After Partition, he became the first Chief Minister of East Bengal. He kept this position until his promotion as 2nd Governor-General in 1948 following Jinnah's death. After the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali

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Khan, he relinquished the position of Governor-General and assumed leadership as Prime Minister. He died in 1964 aged 70.

King George V (1865–1936). George Frederick Ernest Albert was King of the United Kingdom and the British Dominions and Emperor of India from 6 May 1910 until his death in 1936. He was the second son of Prince Albert Edward, later King Edward. He served in the Royal Navy until the death of his elder brother, Prince Albert Victor, in 1892. In 1892, he was created Duke of York. He married Princess Mary of Teck, who had been his brother's fiancée, in July 1893. He was created Duke of Cornwall and Prince of Wales after his father's accession in 1901. He succeeded his father on 6 May 1910 and was crowned on 22 June 1911. He died on 20 January 1936.

Langley (1894–1968). James McLellan Langley was an American newspaper editor and diplomat. He worked for the daily newspapers *Manchester Union Leader*, *Concord Monitor/The New Hampshire Patriot*. In 1957, he was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan for two years. He died in Concord, New Hampshire, on 23 June 1968.

Lieutenant General Nazim Ali Khan. An understudy of General Ross Mackay [McCay]. He took over as Chief of Staff when General Mackay departed.

Lord Halifax (1881–1959). Edward Frederick Lindley Wood was a senior British Conservative politician of the 1930s. He held several senior ministerial posts during this time, most notably those of Viceroy of India from 1925 to 1931 and Foreign Secretary from 1938 to 1940. His term of office as Viceroy in India coincided with a period of intense nationalist ferment among Hindus and Muslims. He died on 23 December 1959 aged 78.

Lord Linlithgow (1887–1952). Victor Alexander John Hope was a British Unionist politician, agriculturalist and colonial administrator. In 1936, he took over as Viceroy of India from Lord Willingdon. During his tenure, the Government of India Act 1935 came into force in 1937, Congress ministries resigned to protest the involvement of Indians in the Second World War, the Second World War began, Subhash Chandra Bose resigned, the Forward Bloc was founded, Subhash Chandra Bose escaped from India, Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory, Atlanta Charter, August Offer (1940), the Indian National Army was founded, Cripps Mission (1942), The Quit India Movement was launched, demand of divide and quit, Bengal Famine of 1943. His seven-year tenure as Viceroy is the longest in the history of the Raj. He died in 1952.

Lord Mountbatten (1900–1979). Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten was a British statesman, naval commander and the last Viceroy of India. As Viceroy of India, he administered the transfer of power from Britain to the newly-independent nations of India and Pakistan at the Partition of the subcontinent. On 27 August 1979, while on vacation in Ireland, he was assassinated by the IRA (Irish Republican Army) who detonated a bomb aboard his yacht.

Lord Pethick-Lawrence (1871–1961). He was born in London as Frederick William Lawrence. After his marriage, he added his wife's family name, Pethick, to his own. He was a British politician who was a leader of the women's suffrage movement in Great Britain during the first two decades of the 20th century; he later served as Secretary of State for India and Burma (1945–47). He died at Hendon, London, in September 1961 aged 89.

Lord Sinha (1863–1928). Satyendra Prasanna Sinha was a prominent British Indian lawyer and statesman. He was appointed standing counsel to the Government of India in 1903. In 1905, he was the first Indian to be appointed as Advocate-General of Bengal. In 1909, he became the first Indian to serve

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on the Viceroy's Executive Council. He returned to England in 1917 to work as an Assistant Secretary of State for Edwin Samuel Montagu. After his return to India in 1920, he was appointed as the first Governor of the province of Bihar and Orissa. In 1926, he returned to England and became a member of the Privy Council's Judicial Committee in London but ill health forced him to return to India. He died on 4 March 1928 at Berhampore.

Lord Spens (1885–1973). William Patrick Spens was a British lawyer, judge and Conservative politician. He served as Chief Justice of India from 1943 to 1947. He was admitted to the Privy Council in 1953. After retiring from the House of Commons in 1959, he was created 1st Baron Spens. He died in November 1973 aged 88.

Lt General (R) S.M.A. Faruki. During the Second World War, he was serving in the Indian Army Medical Corps. After Independence, in 1948, he served as DGMS (Director General Medical Services). He was one of the two senior IMS (Indian Medical Services) officers, Lt. Gen. S.M.A. Faruki and Lt. Gen. Wajid Ali Khan Burki, who played a key role in early formative years of Army Medical Corps. Shortly afterwards the Command Lab at Rawalpindi was raised to the status of the Central Military Pathological Laboratory (CMPL).

M.A. Khuhro (1901–1980). Muhammad Ayub Khuhro was a politician from Sindh, Pakistan, who served as Sindh's first Chief Minister after independence (1947–48) and again served two more terms in 1951 and 1954–55. Later, he became the Defence Minister in the cabinet of Firoz Khan Noon. He retired from politics and died in 1980.

M.R. Kayani (1902–1962). His full name was Malik Muhammad Rustam Kayani. He was a distinguished Pakistani jurist who served as Chief Justice of West Pakistan from 1958 to 1962. In 1927, he started his career in the civil service in Punjab, British India. In 1938, he was transferred to the judiciary after serving for 8 years on the executive branch. He was promoted

as a judge of the Punjab High Court in 1949 and then the Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court in 1958. In 1956, he was elected President of the West Pakistan Branch of the Civil Service of Pakistan Association. He retired in October 1962 and died on 15 November 1962.

Machiavelli (1469–1527). Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469. He was an Italian Renaissance political philosopher, statesman, historian and secretary of the Florentine Republic. He has often been called the father of modern political philosophy and political science. His works included *The Prince*, *The Discourses on the First Decade of Livy*, *The Art of War* and the Comedy, *Mandragola*, a satire on seduction. He died on 21 June 1527 at the age of 58.

Maharaja of Kashmir (1895–1961). Hari Singh was the last ruling Maharaja of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1923, following his uncle's death, he became the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1947, Hari Singh wanted Jammu and Kashmir to remain as an independent kingdom. He was required to accede to the Dominion of India to get the support of Indian troops against an invasion by tribal armed men in his state. He remained the titular Maharaja of the state until 1952 when the monarchy was abolished by the Indian government. After spending his final days in Bombay, he died on 26 April 1961.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839). Popularly known as *Sher-e-Punjab* or “Lion of Punjab”, he was proclaimed the first Maharaja of the Sikh Empire. His domains extended from the Khyber Pass in the northwest to the Sutlej River in the east and from the Kashmir region at the northern limit of the Indian subcontinent southward to the Thar Desert. He was the first Indian who fought the Pashtuns (Afghans) and turned the tide of invasion back into the homelands of the traditional conquerors of India. He thus became known as the Lion of the Punjab. He died in his sleep on 27 June 1839.

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Mahmood Mirza. He was the son in law of Iskander Mirza. He was employed by Pakistan International Airways.

Major Barnes (1871–1946). Sir Reginald Walter Ralph Barnes was a cavalry officer in the British Army. He served in several regiments and commanded a battalion of the Imperial Yeomanry, the 10th (Prince of Wales' Own) Royal Hussars, the 111th Brigade, and three divisions. During his career, he served in the Spanish–American War, the Second Boer War and the First World War.

Major General Azam Khan (1908–1994). After graduating from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Muhammad Azam Khan was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on the Unattached List for the Indian Army on 29 August 1929. He began his career in the Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own) in the British Army. Later, he joined the British Indian Army in 1930. He chose the Pakistan Army after Partition. As the General Officer Commander of the Lahore Garrison, he was named Martial Law Administrator in 1953 following the cabinet's decision to declare martial law. On 28 October 1958, he was made Minister for Refugees Rehabilitation in Ayub Khan's administration. On 14 April 1960, he was appointed Governor of East Pakistan. He died in Lahore in 1994.

Major General Latif Khan. He was the first Pakistani Commandant to take over the military Command and Staff College in Quetta after General John Tilly (the last British Commandant of the Staff College, Quetta, 1952–54) in 1954.

Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi (1913–2002). He was commissioned into the 7th Light Cavalry of the British Indian Army in 1933. During the Second World War, he led the 1st battalion of the First Punjab Regiment. After the war, he served as the Defence Attaché of the British Indian Armed Forces in Washington, DC. He opted to migrate to Pakistan. He commanded Pakistan's 14th (Parachute) Brigade in the 1947 Kashmir War for which he was awarded the country's first Hilal-i-Jurat. He was appointed Adjutant General of the

Pakistan Army and later served as Chief of General Staff. He died on 29 May 2002 at Sher Manzil in Lahore.

Major General Sir Walter Cawthorne / Cawthorn (1896–1970). Sir Walter Joseph Cawthorn was an Australian soldier and diplomat and a former head of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). He was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1918. In the Second World War, he was in command of the Middle East Intelligence Centre and later became the Director of Military Intelligence at the General Headquarters in India. From 1948 to 1951, he was Deputy Chief General Staff, Pakistan Army, under Lieutenant General Ross C. McCay. He left Pakistan in 1951. He returned to Pakistan in 1954 as Australia's High Commissioner to Pakistan. He died in Melbourne at the age of 74.

Malik Abdul Aziz. He was elected member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Sialkot constituency in 1951. In the same year, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary.

Malik Firoz Khan Noon (1893–1970). He was the 7th Prime Minister of Pakistan. He became a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He left the Muslim League in 1955 to help establish the Republican Party and later became its President; he joined the coalition of the three-party government that endorsed Iskander Mirza for the presidency. On 16 December 1957, he became Prime Minister of Pakistan but was removed when President Iskander Mirza imposed martial law. He died on 7 December 1970.

Marshal Lyautey / Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve Lyautey (1854–1934). French statesman, soldier, marshal of France and a devoted believer in the civilizing virtues of colonialism. He built the French protectorate over Morocco.

Maulana Abdul Hammed Khan Bashani / Maulana Bhashani (1880–1976). A Bengali politician whose political tenure spanned the British colonial India, Pakistan and Bangladesh periods. For his lifetime advocacy

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for the poor, he was given the honorary title Mozlum Jananeta (Leader of the Oppressed). In 1954, he became a member of the Parliament of Pakistan. He was elected to the Bangladesh Parliament following the country's independence in 1971. He died on 17 November 1976 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, aged 96.

Maulana Maudoodi (1903–1979). Abul A'la al-Maudoodi was an Islamic scholar, Islamist ideologue, Muslim philosopher, jurist, historian, journalist, activist and scholar active in British India and Pakistan. In August 1941, he founded Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in British India. He died on 22 September 1979 at the age of 75.

Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar (1878–1931). An Indian Muslim activist, prominent member of the All-India Muslim League, journalist, poet, a leading figure of the Khilafat Movement and one of the founders of Jamia Millia Islamia. He was education director for the Rampur state and later joined the Baroda civil service. He launched the English weekly, *The Comrade*, in 1911 in Calcutta. He was elected to become the President of Congress in 1923. He was also one of the founders and 14th President of the Muslim League. He died on 4 January 1931 and was buried in Jerusalem.

Menderes (1899–1961). Adnan Menderes was the Turkish Prime Minister from 1950 to 1960. He was one of the founders of the Democrat Party (DP) founded in 1946, the fourth legal opposition party of Turkey. He was overthrown by the military junta in the 1960 coup d'état and executed by it on the island of İmralı on 17 September 1961.

Menzies (1894–1978). Sir Robert Gordon Menzies was Australia's 12th and longest-serving Prime Minister. He held the office twice, from 1939 to 1941 and from 1949 to 1966. After the longest continuous ministry in Australian history of over 18 years, Menzies retired in 1966.

Mian Amiruddin. A member of the Punjab Legislation Assembly in 1941–46. He was later elected Chairman of the Lahore Municipal Committee. He was Mayor of Lahore from 1947 to 1949. Mian Amiruddin and his son, Mian Salahuddin, son-in-law of Allama Iqbal and father of Mian Yousuf Salahuddin, was also active in the industrial sector.

Mian Iftikharuddin (1907–1962). A politician and an activist of Congress who later joined the Muslim League and worked for the cause of Pakistan under the leadership of M.A. Jinnah. Following Pakistan's independence in 1947, he became the first President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League. He was also appointed Minister for the Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Government of Punjab. He resigned from his ministry in 1949 and was formally expelled from the Muslim League in 1951. Later he formed his own Azad Pakistan Party.

Mian Jafar Shah Kakakhel (1903--). He was elected President of the NWFP Hijrat Committee. In the 1937 general elections, as a Congress candidate, he was elected member of the NWFP Legislative Assembly from Nowshera and was appointed Chief Parliamentary Secretary during Dr Khan Sahib's tenure. In the 1946 elections, as a Congress candidate, he was again elected as member of the Legislative Assembly of NWFP. Following Independence, he left Congress and joined Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan. He was appointed Minister of Education in the Qayyum Khan Cabinet. In the Suhrawardy cabinet, he served as Minister of States & Frontier Regions & Information and Broadcasting. He was Minister of Communications in I.I. Chundrigar's cabinet and Minister for Food and Agriculture in the Firoz Khan Noon government.

Miss Fatima Jinnah (1893–1967). Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah was a Pakistani dental surgeon, writer, stateswoman and one of the founders of Pakistan. She was the younger sister of Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah. In 1965, she came out of her self-imposed political retirement to take part in the presidential election against the military dictator, Ayub

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Khan. She was backed by a consortium of political parties and, despite political rigging by the military, won two of Pakistan's largest cities, Karachi and Dhaka. The US magazine, Time, while reporting on the 1965 election campaign, wrote that Miss Jinnah faced attacks on her modesty and patriotism by Ayub Khan and his allies. She died in Karachi on 9 July 1967. She is widely known as Madr-e Millat (Mother of the Nation).

Daultana (1916–1995). Mian Mumtaz Daultana was a Punjabi politician who supported the Pakistan Movement in British India. In 1942, he joined the Punjab Muslim League. In 1946, he was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly. In 1951, he served as the second Chief Minister of Punjab. He was also Defence Minister in the cabinet of I.I. Chundrigar in 1957. He was High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1972 to 1979. He died on 30 January 1995 aged 78.

Warren (1893–1957). Avra Milvin Warren was a career diplomat. He was the US Ambassador to four countries [Panama (1944–45), Pakistan (1950–52), Turkey (1953–56)] and Minister [Dominican Republic (1942–43), New Zealand (1945–47), Finland (1947–1950)]. He also served in the US Army during the First World War. He died in Dallas, Texas, on 23 January 1957.

Mohammad Ali Bogra (1909–1963). A Pakistani Bengali politician, statesman and career diplomat who was the third Prime Minister of Pakistan after the dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin. He stepped down in 1955 in favour of Finance Minister Muhammad Ali. As a diplomat, he was Pakistan's Ambassador to Burma (1948), High Commissioner to Canada (1949–1952), Ambassador to the US twice and Ambassador to Japan (1959–1962). He died on 23 January 1963 in Dacca.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948). Indian Muslim barrister, politician, founder and first Governor-General of Pakistan (1947–48). He was elected to India's Imperial Legislative Council in 1910. Committed to home rule for India and to maintaining Hindu-Muslim unity, he joined the Muslim League in 1913 and worked to ensure its collaboration with Congress. He was opposed to Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Movement and withdrew from Congress. When Congress declined to form coalition provincial governments with the Muslim League in 1937, Jinnah began advocating for India's partition and the establishment of a Muslim state. He died in 1948 at the age of 71.

Muhammad Ali Khan. He was a member of the cabinet of King Mohammad Nadir Shah. He attended the February 1939 conference held in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Muhammad Hashim Khan (1884–1953). Younger brother of King Mohammed Nadir Shah. When Nadir Shah became King of Afghanistan, he was appointed member of the Council of Ministers. Following Nadir Shah's assassination in 1933, he became Prime Minister of Afghanistan. He was the virtual ruler of Afghanistan during the early years of the reign of his nephew, Mohammad Zahir Shah. He remained Prime Minister until his health forced him to resign in May 1946. He died in Kabul on 26 October 1953 at the age of 69.

Muhammad Munir (1895–1979). The second Chief Justice of Pakistan from 1954 to 1960. In 1949, he was made Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court. In 1954, he became Chief Justice of the Federal Court and Chief Justice of Pakistan. Justice Munir invoked the doctrine of necessity validating the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in a controversial 1954 judgment validating the extra-constitutional use of emergency powers by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad. Besides being the Chief Justice, he was Chairman of the Delimitation Commission from June 1956 to July 1958. He retired on 2 May 1960 and died in 1979. In his book, From

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Jinnah to Zia, he argued that Jinnah stood for a secular state.

N.M. Khan (1907–1972). He was an ICS (Indian Civil Services) officer and, later after Partition, he became a CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan) officer. He was appointed Assistant Accountant General in 1930 and posted in Bengal as District Magistrate and Collector of Midnapore in 1942. He was Director of Agriculture from 1945–46 and Chief Secretary of East Pakistan in 1952. He was transferred to Karachi as Secretary of Industries in 1954. He was appointed Chief Commissioner of Karachi and President of BCCP (Board of Control of Cricket in Pakistan) in 1956. He retired from service in 1966. He died in Lahore on 21 April 1972.

Nawab Gurmani (1905–1981). Before Partition, Mushtaq Ahmed Gurkani was a member of the Punjab Legislative Council from 1930 to 1936 and Parliamentary Secretary to the Punjab Minister of Education and Health from 1937 to 1942. He was also Director General of Resettlement and Employment and Joint Secretary to the Government of India. After Partition, he was Dewan (Prime Minister) of the Bahawalpur State (1947–1948), Minister of Kashmir Affairs (1949–1951), Minister of Home Affairs, States and Foreign Regions (1951–1954), Minister of Punjab (1954–1955) and Governor of West Pakistan (1955–1957). He died in 1981.

Nawab Hamidullah Khan (1894–1960). The last ruling Nawab of Bhopal which merged with the state of Madhya Pradesh in 1956. His mother, Begum Kaikhusrau Jahan, abdicated in his favour in 1926 and he governed until 1949. He retained the honorific title until his death in 1960. He left no sons when he died and was succeeded by his second daughter, Sajida Sultan.

Nawab of Dir (1885–1966). His full name was Nawab Muhammad Shah Jahan. In 1925, he became the Nawab of Dir. He was supported by the British government which conferred on him the title of “Knight of the British Empire” (KBE). He ruled Dir for more than 35 years. During the Kashmir war in

1948, he sent his volunteers to help the Pakistan Army against the Indian occupation. In 1961, General Ayub Khan replaced him with his son, Muhammad Shah Khosru Khan, after riots broke out in the state of Dir. He was sent into exile in Lahore where he died in 1966.

Nawab of Junagadh (1900–1959). Sir Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III Rasul Khanji was the last ruling Nawab of the princely state of Junagadh in India. In August 1947, the princely states were given the option of joining either India or Pakistan. The Nawab of Junagadh made the decision to accede to Pakistan. He and his family were forced to flee to Pakistan due to the riots that erupted in Junagadh during Partition. They settled in Karachi where he died on 17 November 1959.

Nawab Qizilbash (1908–). His full name was Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash. He started his legislative career as a Unionist, later joining the Muslim League and subsequently the Republican Party. He later became Minister for Industries in the cabinet of Prime Minister I.I. Chundrigar and later Minister for Industries, Commerce and Parliamentary Affairs in the cabinet of Sir Firoz Khan Noon. From March to October 1958, he was Chief Minister of West Pakistan until the cabinet was ousted following President Iskander Mirza's imposition of martial law. After the fall of the Ayub Khan government, Qizilbash became Finance Minister in the cabinet of President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan.

Nawab Zaman Khan Kuki Khel. He was from the Kuki Khel branch of the Afridi tribe and was a leader of the Kuki Khel tribe. He and his family commanded the tribe for almost a century from the great White Fort of Tirah. He was awarded the Khan Bahadur title posthumously in recognition of his public services.

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951). A Pakistani statesman, lawyer, political theorist and one of the leading activists in the Pakistan Movement. After being invited to join the Indian National Congress, he later joined the All-

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India Muslim League. He served as the first Indian Finance Minister in the Interim Government led by Viceroy of India Louis Mountbatten. After Independence in 1947, he became Pakistan's first Prime Minister on 15 August 1947; he was also the first Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and Border Areas Minister until his assassination in 1951. In Pakistan, he is also referred to as Quaid-e-Millat (Leader of the Nation) and Shaheed-e-Millat (Martyr of the Nation).

Noorjehan (1925–1983). The eldest daughter of Iskander Mirza and Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza. She was married to Mahmood Mirza. She died in 1983 in Karachi.

O'Neil Shaw. His full name was John Charles Liddell O'Neil Shaw. In the First World War, he served as a Lieutenant in the infantry division of the British Indian Army. He joined the Indian Police Service as Superintendent of NWFP on 5 May 1920. In February 1922, he was promoted to Assistant Superintendent. In March 1925, he became Senior Superintendent of Police in NWFP.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964). An Indian barrister, anti-colonial nationalist, secular humanist, social democrat and author. As President of the Indian National Congress in 1929, Nehru called for complete independence from the British Raj. Upon India's independence in 1947, he became the country's first Prime Minister. His premiership ended with his death on 27 May 1964 due to a heart attack. He was the longest-serving Prime Minister of India.

Philip Mason (1906–1999). An English civil servant and writer. He worked for the Indian Civil Service from 1928 to 1947. From 1933 to 1936, he was Under Secretary in the War Department and then Deputy Commissioner in Garhwal until 1939. During the Second World War, he held appointments in the Defence and War Departments at Delhi as Deputy Secretary, Defence Co-ordination and War Departments (1939–42), Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, India, Head of Conference Secretary, South-East Asia Command (1942–4)

and Joint Secretary, War Department (1944–7). He died on 25 January 1999.

Pir of Wano. A local tribal mullah who lived in Dommel, Kashmir.

President Nasser (1918–1970). Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein was an Egyptian army officer who was Prime Minister (1954–56) and President (1956–70) of Egypt. As an army officer, he led a coup that deposed the royal family (1952) and installed General Muhammad Naguib as head of state. In 1954, he deposed Naguib and made himself Prime Minister. He was formally elected President in June 1956. He died on 28 September 1970.

Princess Abida Sultan (1913–2002). The eldest daughter of Hamidullah Khan, the last Nawab of the Bhopal State. In 1926, she married Nawab Mohammad Sarwar Ali Khan, ruler of Kurwai State. In 1928, she was recognized as the heiress apparent to the Bhopal throne. After Independence, she migrated to Pakistan in 1950 where she joined the Foreign Service. As a result, the Government of India barred her from succession and her younger sister, Sajida, succeeded her instead after her father died in 1960. She died in Karachi in 2002.

Qazi Muhammad Isa (1914–1976). A Pakistani politician and one of the prominent leaders of the Pakistan Movement from Baluchistan. He was the youngest member of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League. He was President of the Baluchistan Provincial Muslim League during the 1947 referendum. In February 1948, he was made Chief Advisor, Council of the Agent to the Governor-General of Pakistan in Baluchistan. He was Ambassador of Pakistan to Brazil and a member of the Pakistan delegations to the United Nations. (1950, 1954, 1974). He was a Member of the Committee on Minorities in the Constituent Assembly. He died on 19 June 1976.

R.A. Butler (1902–1982). Richard Austen Butler was a prominent British Conservative Party politician. During the

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Second World War, he was appointed President of the Board of Education and was responsible for the 1944 Education Act. During the Conservative government tenure, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer (1951–5), Home Secretary (1957–62) and Foreign Secretary (1963–4). He died in March 1982.

Radcliffe (1899–1977). Sir Cyril John Radcliffe was a British lawyer and Law Lord. He was known for his role in the partition of India. The Radcliffe Award was the boundary drawn between the Indian and Pakistani parts of the Punjab Province and Bengal Presidency of British India and was named after him as its architect. As the joint chairman of the two boundary commissions for the two provinces, he had the responsibility of equitably dividing 175,000 square miles of territory with a population of 88 million. The demarcation line was published on 17 August 1947. Today, its western side is part of the India–Pakistan border while its eastern side serves as the Bangladesh–India border. He died in April 1977 aged 78.

Rana Gul Muhammad Noon. He was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Multan constituency in 1951 and remained in that position till 1955.

Rear Admiral Jefford (1901–1980). James Wilfred Jefford was the first Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Pakistan Navy serving from its establishment in 1947 until 1953. He spent the majority of his early career in the Royal Indian Navy. He became Vice Admiral in the Royal Pakistan Navy in 1953, the same year that his command was terminated. He died on 1 January 1980.

Rommel (1891–1944). Johannes Erwin Eugen Rommel was a German army officer. He rose to the rank of Field Marshal and earned fame at home and abroad for his leadership of Germany's Afrika Korps in North Africa during the Second World War. Nicknamed the "Desert Fox", Rommel also commanded German defences against the Allied invasion of northern France. After being implicated in a plan to assassinate Adolf Hitler, he committed suicide in October 1944.

Sandeman (1835–1892). Sir Robert Groves Sandeman was a British Indian Army officer and colonial administrator. He was known for his activities in Baluchistan where he introduced a system of “tribal pacification” that endured until 1947. He died at Bela, the capital of Las Bela state, on 29 January 1892.

Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (1899–1958). A Muslim League leader in the Pakistan Movement from NWFP. Initially, he was a member of Congress but later joined the Muslim League and became a confidante of M.A. Jinnah. He was a member of the Muslim League Council. He was Muslim League Member of the NWFP Legislative Assembly (1937–45), Finance Minister of NWFP (1943–45), member of the Muslim League Working Committee (1944–1947). After Independence, he was appointed Minister for Communication in Pakistan (1947–49). In 1949, he became Governor of Punjab. He was President, Pakistan Muslim League (1956–58). He died on 14 February 1958.

Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan. He was elected member of the Punjab Assembly from the Rahimyar Khan District in 1956 and remained in that position till October 1958.

Sh. Fazal Illahi. His full name was Khan Bahadur Sheikh Fazal Illahi Piracha. He was elected member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Shahpur tehsil, Sargodha District constituency in 1951 and became Minister of Rehabilitation and Colonies, Food, Public Relations and Press.

Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah) of Iran (1919–1980). Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was the last Shah (King) of the Imperial State of Iran from 16 September 1941 until his overthrow in the Iranian Revolution on 11 February 1979. He died in Cairo, Egypt, on 27 July 1980.

Shahryar Khan (b. 1934). A career diplomat of Pakistan. In 1960, he was posted as Third Secretary in the Pakistan High Commission in London and was Second Secretary in the Pakistan Embassy in Tunis (1962–66). He was Pakistan’s

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Ambassador to Jordan (1976-82), High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (1987-90), Ambassador to France (1999-2001) and Foreign Secretary (1990-94). He was Chairman, Committee on Foreign Service Reforms, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-99). He was also Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board (2003-6). In 2014, he was reappointed Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board. He is the only son of Nawab Sarwar Ali Khan of Kurwai and Princess Abida Sultan of Bhopal.

Sidney Cotton (1894-1969). Frederick Sidney Cotton was an Australian inventor, aviator, photographer and aviation photography pioneer responsible for developing and promoting an early colour film process and largely responsible for the development of photographic reconnaissance before and during the Second World War. He died on 13 February 1969. He carried out several airlift missions from Karachi to the princely State of Hyderabad before the fall.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home (1903-1995). A British Conservative politician. He was a member of Parliament as a Unionist (1931-45, 1950-51) and Parliamentary Private Secretary to Neville Chamberlain (1937-39). He was Foreign Secretary (1960-3) and again in Harold Macmillan's government (1970-4). He was Prime Minister (1963-64).

Sir Ambrose Dundas (1899-1973). A British civil servant and colonial administrator in British India. He joined the Indian Civil Service in 1922. He was Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan (1947-48) and Governor of NWFP (1948-49). He was also Lieutenant Governor of the Isle of Man (1952 to 1959). He died on 29 April 1973 in Binfield, Berkshire.

Sir Anthony Eden (1897-1977). A British Conservative Party politician. He was a member of the House of Commons (1923-1957), Foreign Secretary (1935-38), (1940-45) and (1951-55). He was Prime Minister from 1955 until his resignation in 1957. He died on 14 January 1977 aged 79.

Sir Bernard Burrows (1910-2002). A British diplomat. He was posted to Cairo in 1938 where he served

throughout the Second World War. He was Head of the Eastern Department in the Foreign Office (1947–49), Counsellor in the British Embassy in the United States (1950–53), Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (1953–58), Ambassador to Turkey, Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Defence (1963–66), Permanent Representative to NATO (1966–70). He died on 7 May 2002.

Sir Claude Henry Gidney. He was a colonial administrator and worked in the Indian Political Service as Officiating Resident at Hyderabad. In 1932, he was Secretary to the Government of NWFP.

Sir Derek M.H. Riches (1912–1997). A British diplomat. He was Counsellor in the Saudi Embassy, Head of the Eastern Department in the Foreign Office (1955–58), Head of the Arabian Department (1959–61), Ambassador to Libya (1961–63) and Ambassador to Congo. His last posting was as Ambassador to Lebanon (1967).

Sir Francis Wylie (1865–1952). Sir Francis Verner Wylie was an Indian Civil Servant. He entered the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in 1914. He was on military duty in India (1916–19). He was appointed Prime Minister of Alwar State (1933 to 1938) and later Governor of Central Provinces and Berar (1938 and 1940). He was Political Adviser to the Crown Representative (1940–41) and (1943–45). In 1941, he succeeded Sir William Fraser-Tytler as British Minister in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Sir George Cunningham (1888–1963). An administrator in British India. He served as Assistant Commissioner in Punjab (1914–17), Political Agent in Waziristan (1922–23) and Councillor in Kabul (1925–26). He rose to be the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, and was subsequently appointed acting Governor of NWFP (1932–33). He was thrice Governor of NWFP, twice during the British Raj and once after the formation of Pakistan. He died on 8 December 1963 aged 75.

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Sir Herbert Barker (1869–1950). An English osteopath/manipulative surgeon. He developed a highly successful technique specializing in knee and other damaged joints both in top sportsmen and the general public. He advocated the avoidance of surgery. However, his methods were never formally approved by the medical establishment.

Sir Ivor Jennings (1903–1965). Sir William Ivor Jennings was a British lawyer and academic. He was Vice Chancellor of the University of Ceylon (1942–55) the University of Cambridge (1961–63). He was an authority on constitutional law. He advised D.S. Senanayake on drafting the Constitution of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). He then served as constitutional adviser to the Government of Pakistan. He was a member of the Reid Commission from June 1956 to 1957 which was responsible for drafting the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya (now Malaysia). In 1959, he was advisor to the committee drafting the constitution of Nepal which was named “Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1959.” He died on 19 December 1965 at the age of 62.

Sir Mirza Ismail (1883–1959). An Indian statesman who was the Dewan (Prime Minister) of the Kingdoms of Mysore (1926), Jaipur (1941) and Hyderabad Deccan (1946–8).

Sir Olaf Caroe (1892–1981). An administrator in British India working for the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Political Service. He first went to North-West Frontier in early 1916 as an officer in the Queen’s Regiment and was stationed in Peshawar and Nowshera. After the First World War, he joined the Indian Civil Service and, following three years in the Punjab, was posted to the NWFP in the Political Service where he held, in succession, charge of the districts of Mardan, Hazara, Kohat and Peshawar itself. He was later appointed Chief Secretary when NWFP became a Governor’s province. In 1934, he was sent to Delhi in the Foreign Department in which he eventually served as the Viceroy’s Foreign Secretary

throughout the Second World War. The Government's dealings with NWFP, Baluchistan and the independent peripheral state of Afghanistan were in Caroe's hands over a period of some ten years. He was the last British Governor of NWFP (1946–47). Olaf Caroe authored *The Pathans* regarded as a classic and definitive work on the social and political history of the Pathans from 550 BC to AD 1957.

Sir Zafrullah Khan (1893–1985). Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan was a Pakistani politician, diplomat and international jurist known particularly for his representation of Pakistan at the United Nations (UN). Following Pakistan's independence, he was selected by M.A. Jinnah as the first Foreign Minister of Pakistan and served concurrently as leader of Pakistan's delegation to the UN (1947 to 1954).

From 1954 to 1961, he was a member of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. He represented Pakistan again at the UN from 1961 to 1964 and was President of the UN General Assembly in 1962–63. Returning to the International Court of Justice in 1964, he served as the Court's President from 1970 to 1973.

Sirdar Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan (1899–1959). A Muslim League representative from NWFP. He was one of the leaders who seconded the Pakistan Resolution passed on 23 March 1940. From 1943 to 1945, he was elected Chief Minister of the NWFP in the first Muslim League ministry in NWFP. After the creation of Pakistan, he was appointed Vice-President of the NWFP Muslim League. From 1949 to 1953, he was Ambassador to Burma.

Sirdar Muhammad Daoud Khan (1909–1978). An Afghan politician, general and prime minister of Afghanistan. He began his career as a provincial governor and later became a military commander before being appointed Prime Minister by his cousin, King Mohammed Zahir Shah. He overthrew the monarchy with the backing of the Afghan Army officers

List of Personalities

and proclaimed himself the first President of the Republic of Afghanistan. In 1978, during the Saur Revolution, he was deposed and assassinated by the Afghan military and the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Sirdar Patel / Sardar Patel (1875–1950). Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai Patel was an Indian lawyer, freedom fighter, barrister and statesman. He was one of the leaders of the Indian National Congress during the struggle for independence. He served as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Information and Minister of States. He was also well known as the “Iron Man of India”. He is also remembered as the “patron saint of India's civil servants” for having established the modern All-India Services system. Patel died on 15 December 1950 in Bombay.

Sirdar Shah Mahmood Khan (1890–1959). Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1946 to 1953. He was a brother of King Mohammed Nadir Shah and an uncle of both Mohammad Zahir Shah and Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan. After Mohammad Nadir Shah assumed the Afghan throne in 1929, he served as Minister of War in his cabinet. He died at the age of 71 on 27 December 1959 in northern Afghanistan.

Soofi Abdul Hamid / Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan. An elected a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Sheikhpura constituency (1951–55). In the same year, he was appointed Minister of Agriculture, Forests, Animal Husbandry and Co-operatives.

Syed Ali Hussain Gardezi. He was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Multan constituency in 1951 and served from 7 May 1951 to 14 October 1955. In the same year, he was appointed Minister of Industries.

Yusuf Khattak (1917–1991). Muhammad Yusuf Khan Khattak was a politician, left-wing intellectual, lawyer and noted Pakistan Movement activist from NWFP. Despite being a member of the Muslim League, in 1971, he was named Federal Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources in

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Cabinet as a result of Qayyum Khan's alliance with the Pakistan People's Party. He died on 29 July 1991.

Z.A. Bhutto (1928–1979). A Pakistani barrister and politician who was the ninth Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1973 to 1977. Prior to that, he was the fourth President of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973. His government drafted the Constitution of Pakistan in 1973 which is the current constitution of the country. He was the founder of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and remained its Chairman until his execution in 1979.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

حقیقت آینه‌ای بود
که از آسمان و از دست خدا به زمین افتاد
و شکست،
هر کس تکه‌ای از آن را برداشت،
خود را در آن دید،
گمان کرد حقیقت نزد اوست.
حال آنکه حقیقت نزد همگان پخش بود.

— مولانا
فیہ ما فیہ

*"The truth was a mirror in the hands of God. It fell from the sky,
and broke into pieces. Everybody took a piece of it,
and they looked at it and thought they had the truth."*

Mevlânâ Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī

Unquestionably it was challenging to finding these shattered pieces of truth and putting them together. Nevertheless, with turf came the courage and with every piece of truth came strength that enabled the quest to bring justice to the memory of the man who remained undefended and deceitfully confined to forced ignominy by the machinations of the insecure establishment of the time and sadly enough thereafter as well.

General Iskander Mirza had two sons and four daughters who grew up in the Karachi of yore. The elder son Humayun, was studying abroad when Iskander Mirza was deposed, the tall and handsome younger son Enver died earlier in 1953 in an air crash while serving in PAF. While the ex-President spent his days in exile, in Karachi it was his first wife Rifaat Iskander Mirza and the four iron-willed daughters along with supportive spouses who boldly faced the hostile society but never gave up defending and upholding their father's honour. A silent prayer for Iskander Mirza's children, who are no more, especially the iron-willed daughters who kept alive memories of the man who remained honour-bound to Pakistan till his last breath.

The person most helpful in making this book possible was my late mother-in-law Begum Fakhr e Jehan Asad Ali who gave me her father's manuscript, photographs, audio/video recordings and was extremely keen for it to be published. I am grateful to Mehreen Madani, wife of Hassan Madani, for the letter from Iskander Mirza in exile to her mother and his eldest daughter, Begum Nur Jehan Mirza. Begum Zeenat Mirza, my wife's aunt and Iskander Mirza's daughter, who withdrew from public life in her last days, was delighted when I told her of my plan to publish her father's manuscript; she was most thrilled when I completed the first draft of the Preface and listened most enthusiastically as I read it to her. Iskander Mirza's youngest and favourite daughter, Begum Shah Taj Imam, whose younger daughter, Rifaat Ali Shah wife of Syed Najaf Ali Shah, graciously shared photos and documents from her mother's archives. Equally insightful and enlightening were the many discussions I had with Fazilat Ali Shah, elder daughter of Begum Shah Taj Imam and wife of Syed Nusrat Ali Shah. I'm thankful to "The Dawood Foundation" for the unique set of photographs and to Mrs Muneeza Shamsie for the Ibex hunt photo taken in Kirthar. This book would have remained incomplete without the material on Gwadar and the help from the wonderful people at the National Archives in London. My

Acknowledgements

many visits there were all very rewarding. My gratitude to DAWN Media Group and Hameed Haroon for granting permission to use articles and editorials from the *Dawn* newspaper.

Working on the Memoirs with Lightstone Publishers' wonderful team (Nadia Ghani, Noor Jatoi and Muhammad Junaid) was a delightful experience. Aameena Saiyid, besides being a well-known name in Pakistan's publishing industry and a pioneer of Literature Festivals, is also a dear friend of the family; her able guidance and the efficient team at Lightstone Publishers were most helpful in making it a smooth and pleasurable journey.

Professor Hassan Abbas who most graciously agreed to write the Foreword was always there and only a WhatsApp message away with his invaluable counsel and most helpful critique of my drafts. Indeed, a man of great scholarship and profound humility. Thanks to Saif Mahmood from Oxford University for his helpful suggestions and sharing the Columbia University portal on Mirza Ghalib, a treasure trove of information for Ghalib aficionados and immensely helpful in verse selections for the Memoirs.

My sincere gratitude to the scholars who endorsed the Iskander Mirza Memoirs; namely, Professor Francis Robinson, Professor Ian Talbot, Professor Faisal Devji, Senator Javed Jabbar, Hamid Khan Esq., Professor Syed Jaffer Ahmed and Ammar Ali Qureshi Esq.

I am also grateful to Cesca D'Souza, Raja Sultan Murad, Niaz Baker, Brig Mirza Hamid Hussain's daughter Hamida Osman, Asiya Lassi and Sabahat Kalim Sherwani. Ghousia with her resourcefulness was always there with good advice whenever I ran into road-blocks. These amazing and talented people with their valuable suggestions, expertise, encouragement and prayers certainly played a role in making these Memoirs possible.

No book is possible without paper. About 2,000 years ago in China, communication took a quantum leap to the next level, crafting cloth sheets to record their drawings and

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

writings. And paper, as we know it today, was born! Paper was first made by Cai Lun, a Chinese court official. 2000 years later, we were having paper supply issues in Pakistan and along came a messiah. Thanks to Syed Hyder Ali of Packages Ltd.

I also acknowledge the public domain articles in various newspapers and publications from Pakistan, UK, US, ME and India; these were helpful in the referencing and corroboration of source materials.

In the end, a very special thanks to my wife, friend and soulmate, Ferial Ali Mehdi, whose encouragement, wise counsel and help in the contextualization of photos, documents and proofing helped me sail thorough the endeavour and truly made it an enjoyable experience. Ferial, with her limitless patience, was my rock all throughout the course.

Syed Khawar Mehdi
Thursday, 9 February 2023

Governor-General and President



Have borrowed
today 24/4/08 the
following books

- 1) The Pathans (Oleab)
(Carr)
- 2) From Peshawar to Pander
(Hornby)
- 3) Beyond Khyber Pass
(Lionel Thomas)
- 4) Waziristan 1919-20 Pto
(WATTEVILLE)
- 5) Isikand Mirza Speaks (Selim)

6) Iskander Mirza
Rise & fall of a great leader
(Selim)

Ardeshir Cowasjee

24/4/08

**Ardeshir Cowasjee had plans to write a book on Iskander Mirza.
Note acknowledging books borrowed from Syed Khawar Mehdi**

Gen Mirza to be permanent G-G

THE Queen has appointed General Iskander Mirza to be the permanent Governor-General of Pakistan with effect from Oct 6, 1955, on the recommendation of the Government of Pakistan, it was officially announced yesterday.

Mr Ghulam Mohammed, who has been ailing and on leave, has resigned with effect from that day.

A farewell function was held by the Acting Governor-General to give a send-off to Mr Ghulam Mohammed and his departure from the Governor-General's House to that of his son-in-law in Clifton was marked by an

September 20, 1955

impressive ceremony.

Mr Ghulam Mohammed also issued a touching farewell message to the nation.

The Cabinet Secretariat Press note announcing the resignation of Mr Ghulam Mohammed said:

"His Excellency Mr Ghulam Mohammed, Governor-General on leave, has on grounds of health tenders his resignation with effect from the 6th of October, 1955, when his leave expires. Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to accept his resignation and on the recom-

mendation of the Government of Pakistan to appoint the Acting Governor-General, His Excellency Major-General Iskander Mirza, as Governor-General with effect from the same date."

The tea party given by Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza in honour of Mr Ghulam Mohammed was attended by the PM, Chaudhri Mohamad Ali, and his Cabinet colleagues, the President of the CA, Mr Abdul Wahab Khan, the Governors of Sind and the Punjab, Mr A.T. Naqvi the Chief Commissioner of Karachi, members of the Diplomatic Corps, and others.

Dawn 20 September 1955. General Iskander Mirza to be permanent Governor General. Dawn newspaper Archives



DAWN 50 YEARS AGO TODAY

Mirza as first president

TAKING advantage of the week-end adjournment of the Constituent Assembly, the various groups of the Coalition Party have been busy clearing up and finalising their views on some of the matters that yet remain to be incorporated in the Constitution.

Yesterday was a busy day for most MCAs, and UF members and Muslim League members have had several informal and separate meetings of their own.

It is believed that the choice of a Provisional President of the Republic who has to be elected within 30

February 19, 1956

days of the passage of the Constitution Bill was also mooted and there is complete unanimity among members on conferring that distinction on the present Governor General Major General Iskander Mirza.

Since he became Head of the State, his constitutional and democratic approach to all problems and his helpful guidance of the Ministry whenever it has been sought, have profoundly impressed all in the know.

His election to the highest

office in the Republic is, therefore, now considered to be a certainty.

As a result of the current group and inter-group consultations, it is also considered certain now that "ticklish" questions like that of the system of electorates and the future of Karachi will be left to the decision of the National Assembly at the appropriate time.

When the Constituent Assembly meets again on Monday, progress with the completion of the second reading of the Bill is expected to be spectacularly rapid.

*Dawn 19 February 1956. Iskander Mirza as first President.
Dawn newspaper Archives*



DAWN 50 YEARS AGO TODAY

President to be elected in March 5

PAKISTAN will be declared a Republic on March 23, 1956, and will remain a member of the Commonwealth. The first President will be elected on March 5, 1956.

These decisions were taken yesterday by the Coalition Party which met for about two hours in the Constituent Assembly Building.

The Party also nominated the present Governor-General, Major-General Iskander Mirza, as its candidate for Presidentship of the Republic.

Resolutions embodying these decisions will be presented in the Constituent Assembly

March 2, 1956

when it meets today at 3 p.m.

The resolution for declaring Pakistan a Republic on March 23 will be moved by Mr A.K. Fazlul Huq. The resolution also says that March 23 will be celebrated every year as Republic Day. It will also be known as Constitution Day under the provisions of the Constitution passed by the Assembly on Feb 29.

Mr Fazlul Huq also moved the Pakistan Resolution on the same day in 1940 in Lahore at the historic meeting of the All-India Muslim League Council.

The Prime Minister, Mr Mohammad Ali, will move his resolution that Pakistan will remain a Republic in the Commonwealth of Nations in pursuance of the declaration made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London on Feb 5, 1955.

The resolution fixing the date of the election of the First President of Pakistan as March 5, 1956, will be moved by Mr I.I. Chundrigar.

The notices of these resolutions were received in the Constituent Assembly Secretariat yesterday afternoon.

*Dawn 2 March 1956. President to be elected on March 5.
Dawn newspaper Archives*



DAWN 50 YEARS AGO TODAY

Mirza Republic's first president

MAJOR-General Iskander Mirza was yesterday elected unopposed as President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the interim period. The Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, Mr Abdul Wahab Khan, announced Maj-Gen Mirza's election in the House, which met for a brief period for this purpose. Fifty Members had proposed Maj-Gen Mirza's name for the office of the President.

Maj-Gen Mirza will hold this post till a permanent President is elected and assumes his office after the general elections. He will

March 6, 1956

assume his office on March 23, 1956, when Pakistan will be formally proclaimed Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

After his election, glowing tributes were paid to Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza by all sections of the House present.

The Prime Minister, Mr Mohamad Ali, congratulating Maj-Gen Mirza on his election as the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan said that he (Maj-Gen Mirza) has served Pakistan in various capacities worthily and well.


"A staunch friend, a forth-

right man, a great administrator - these are the qualities that mark him above all - a sincere patriot who when he says "My country first and last" means it - names it with the whole of his being", he said.

Mr Mohamad Ali hoped that Maj-Gen Mirza would continue to serve Pakistan as "worthily and as well" in this new capacity as he had served her in the past.

Pakistan, he said, "may rise to ever greater glory with Maj-General Iskander Mirza as President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan."

*Dawn 6 March 1956. Iskander Mirza. Republic's first elected President.
Dawn newspaper Archives*



DAWN 50 YEARS AGO TODAY

Pseudo-mullahs under fire

December 30, 1957

INAUGURATING the International Islamic Colloquium — the first of its kind in the East — in Lahore today, President Iskander Mirza launched a frontal attack on "half-baked and ill-educated mullahs' " who, for centuries, have monopolised the pulpit and made Islam a captive in the four walls of mosques and castles.

President Mirza appealed to the enlightened Muslims to apply the Islamic principles of universality, fraternity, integrity, mercy, cooperation and goodwill to present-day problems to prove to the world at large that Islam was the most powerful and dynamic movement in the history of mankind.

A distinguished gathering of about a thousand including some hundred ladies and 140 delegates, watched the impressive inaugural ceremony. The spacious Punjab University Hall, venue of the Colloquium, was tastefully decorated and the national flags of all the 34 participant nations hung from balconies to add colour to the occasion.

The President was received by the heads of the visiting delegations outside the hall and entered at the head of a small procession amidst whirring of movie cameras.

The President's inaugural address was heard in pin drop silence, following the address of welcome presented by Mian Afzal Husain, Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University.

Raising his voice, President Mirza declared that the fact that Islam is capable of belonging to the modern world makes it possible to recognize that it is a living and dynamic force.

*Dawn 30 December 1957. Pseudo Mullahs Under Fire.
Dawn newspaper Archives*

Mirza blames intelligentsia

PRESIDENT Iskander Mirza described in his Republic Day broadcast as unpardonable “the apathy, inactivity and frustration displayed by our intelligentsia” where problems facing the country and their solution were concerned.

“Whose fault is it, if, in a country like this, people are content with sitting in their parlours and just criticizing? The common man is too ignorant and too illiterate to look beyond the struggle for his own existence. But the intelligentsia is the hard core of our society. What has our intelli-

March 25, 1958

gentsia done beyond being critical, apathetic or frustrated.”

He, however, said that “the game is not yet over. Another great opportunity is coming to them very soon in the shape of, general elections. Do not let the elections go by default. If you do not wish to mortgage the future of your country to continued instability and insecurity, then see to it that only good, honest and patriotic elements are returned in the elections.”

He guaranteed that the elections would be completely

free and fair.”

The Muslim League nominations given by the Karachi Provincial Muslim League Parliamentary Board for the coming Karachi Municipal elections were set aside by the organisation’s Appeal Sub-Committee which decided to throw open the elections to all eligible Muslim Leaguers.

The Appeal Sub-Committee, included Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, Sheikh Sadiq Hasan and Mr Manzare Alam, setting aside the nominations recommended to the PML Working Committee.



*Dawn 25 March 1958. Iskander Mirza blames Intelligentsia.
Dawn newspaper Archives*



*President Iskander Ali Mirza signing the
Constitution of Pakistan in 1956.*



Iskander Mirza taking oath as President of Pakistan.



*President Iskander Mirza in his office - 1957.
Courtesy, Humayun Mirza*

23/10 23/10/15

TO
Bag Nov 25

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Open.

DW
23/11

Draft Letter

To:
Sir Bernard
Burrows, K.C.M.G.,
Residency,
Bahrain

From:
D.M.H. Riches, Esq.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN
DIVISION
23 NOV 1957
SENT TO
23/11

I think that you should know
the following piece of information, for
your own guidance only.

In conversation with the Prime Minister
on October 30 the President of Pakistan
brought up the subject of Gwadar, which he
said really must be settled in Pakistan's
favour if Pakistan were to remain in the
Commonwealth. The Prime Minister referred to
the discussions we hoped to have with the
Sultan of Muscat either in London or in
Muscat, and agreed that the Sultan was a
difficult man but he was beholden to the
United Kingdom. It might help him to make up
his mind about Gwadar if Pakistan applied
some pressure on the frontier. The President
asked if H.M. Government would like this
pressure applied now but the Prime Minister
said that it would be better to wait for the
moment.

2. The above is for your own information
only.

(D.M.H. RICHES)
A.R. 23/11

P.Co. 51-7162

When President Iskander Mirza strongly communicated to Great Britain
that Gwadar really must be settled in Pakistan's favour if Pakistan
were to remain in the Commonwealth.
Courtesy. The National Archives, UK



*President Iskander Mirza, PM Chou en Lai & Ambassador Geng Biao
at a Chinese Embassy reception Karachi, 1956.*

The New York Times

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1958

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1958.

SOVIET SEEKING CHEMICAL DATA

U.S. Concerns Get 'Shopping Lists'—Moscow Would Buy the Processes

By HAROLD M. SCHMECK Jr.
Special to The New York Times.
CHICAGO, Sept. 7.—The Soviet Union is increasingly shopping in the United States for chemical technology, according to a survey reported in Chemical and Engineering News.

The magazine, a weekly publication of the American Chemical Society, said American concerns had been giving "the cold shoulder" to these queries on important chemical manufacturing processes.

Producers are afraid their sales would "come back to haunt them" in the form of increased export competition by the Soviet Union, the article said.

The industry representatives queried in the magazine's survey also indicated that dealings

U.S.S.R. IRAN SAUDI ARABIA OMAN PAKISTAN

Special to The New York Times.
LONDON, Monday, Sept. 8.—Sultan Said bin Taimur of Muscat and Oman ceded his only overseas colony to Pakistan today.

The colony is the port and peninsula of Gwadar on the Gulf of Oman, about seventy-five miles east of Pakistan's Iranian border.

Gwadar was important in the old days as a slave port on the notorious Mekran coast. It was part of the dynastic empire that included the rich island of Zanzibar, which is now a British protectorate off the East African coast of Kenya.

The cession of Gwadar was announced early today by the Foreign Office, which used Britain's good offices in bringing about the transfer.

The Foreign Office said that

the Sultan had informed Britain he had decided to transfer Gwadar to Pakistan effective today "as a gesture of goodwill." Gwadar had been ruled by the Sultanate since the eighteenth century.

Gwadar is an arid, semi-sterile peninsula about twenty miles wide at the end. The port is in a narrow neck of the peninsula. The Mekran coast was a base for slaving expeditions among Baluch tribes.

The former importance of these outposts of the old Muscat empire is evident in the composition of the populations of Muscat and Matruh.

McKay Undergoes Tests
SALEM, Ore., Sept. 7 (AP)—Douglas McKay, Secretary of the Interior from 1953 to 1956, underwent tests of his circulatory system today at a hospital, where he had been rushed by ambulance yesterday. His physician said the former Oregon Governor "is very tired and has slightly elevated blood pressure." At least two days of tests will be required before any conclusions can be reached.

Mr. McKay now is chairman of the United States section of the International Joint Commission.

Gwadar Enclave given to Pakistan.
The New York Times, 8 Sept 1958

The New York Times

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1958

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language of this kind was favorable climate for negotia-
bound to make an impression in negotiation on other questions.
New Delhi. While no spectacu- There is some feeling among

Smuggling Era Ends at Gwadar Port As Pakistan Takes Over From Oman

Special to The New York Times.

GWADAR, Pakistan, Sept. 8.—Smugglers closed their store-
houses here today when the green and white flag of Pakistan was raised over the 300-square-mile peninsula of Gwadar, on the Gulf of Oman.

Pakistan acquired the territory, about seventy-five miles east of Pakistan's Iranian border, for £3,000,000 (\$8,400,000) from the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The British Government assisted in the negotiations.

For centuries the port of Gwadar, in a narrow neck of the peninsula, was a base of pirates, slave traders and smugglers. The British smashed the slave trading and piracy long ago, but smugglers continued to use Gwadar's free port facilities to feed markets in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan with gold, pearls and luxury goods. Today even this ended.

A Pakistani gunboat rode at anchor in Gwadar port as the British political agent here formally handed over possession to a representative of the Pakistani Government. Pakistan hopes to develop Gwadar as a second port for West Pakistan, now served only by Karachi. Gwadar also will continue as a fishing center.

The territory had been ruled by Muscat since the eighteenth century. In 1784, Syed Sultan, a Muscat prince, was granted asylum here after an abortive rebellion against his father. The Khan of Kalat, who controlled the port, granted the prince half its revenues as a maintenance allowance. Syed Sultan later succeeded to the throne of Muscat.

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Smuggling Era Ends at Gwadar Port as Pakistan
takes over from Oman.
The New York Times, 9 Sept 1958



*President Iskander Mirza with
Shahinshah of Iran & Princess Ashraf.*



Iran postage stamp commemorating friendship with portraits of Shahinshah of Iran & President Iskander Mirza.



Ahmed Dawood, Chairman of The Dawood Foundation, attending a dinner with President Iskander Mirza & Mohammad Aly Rangoonwala. TDF Photo



Governor General Iskander Mirza being introduced to the cricket team.



Governor General Iskander Mirza with General Ayub Khan.




*Ibex Hunt - Syed Asad Ali, Iskander Mirza.
Sitting L-R: Jahanara Habibullah, Dr Shoukat Haroon,
Louise Broussard.*



*President Iskander Mirza with industrialist Ahmed Dawood.
TDF Photo*



*President Iskander Mirza at a formal dinner at Hotel
Metropole in Karachi with industrialist Ahmed Dawood, Chairman
of The Dawood Foundation. TDF photo*



President Iskander Mirza introducing industrialist Ahmed Dawood to President of Syria Shukri Al Quwalti. TDF Photo



President Iskander Mirza in Lisbon, Portugal, at the State reception in his honour by the President of Portugal.



President Iskander Mirza with Ahmed Dawood examining the camel cart which was the logo of Dawood Cotton Mills. TDF Photo



President Iskander Mirza & King Saud in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.



*President Iskander Mirza at the ingauration of Liaquat National Hospital,
Karachi, with Syed Wajid Ali, Dr Hussaini and General Ayub Khan.*



President Iskander Mirza and Nahid Mirza (his second wife) with Shahinshah of Iran at Roza e Imam Ali Raza (Aleh Salam).



President Iskander Mirza with Shahinshah of Iran during the latter's state visit to Pakistan.



*President Iskander Mirza meeting sportsmen.
General Ayub Khan on the left.*



*President Iskander Mirza with King Zahir Shah of
Afghanistan at the Kabul Airport.*




President Iskander Mirza with General Iftikhar who was to become COAS, Pakistan Army, but was killed in an air crash.



President Iskander Mirza with a visiting Head of State.



President Iskander Mirza with Prince Karim Aga Khan.



Prince Karim Aga Khan arrives in Karachi for his enthronement ceremony on 23 January 1958 escorted by President and Mrs Iskander Mirza.



President Iskander Mirza with Turkish and Iraqi heads of state and General Ayub Khan.



*President Iskander Mirza with
Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.*



*President Iskander Mirza with Shahinshah of Iran
being introduced to a guest.*



President Iskander Mirza with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.



*President Iskander Mirza with
Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali.*

THE MEMOIRS

THE MEMOIRS

I

THE FRONTIER BETWEEN THE TWO WARS

For generations, my ancestors held the office of Nawab Nazim of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa having their court at Murshidabad. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, my grandfather was superseded by another branch of the family as head of the Nizamat and we were removed to Bombay. There I was born on the 13 November 1899. My mother, who was of Iranian descent, brought me up entirely. She was quite advanced according to the ideas of society in those days, playing tennis and riding a horse. She was awarded the Kaisar-i-Hind decoration for social work. I was educated in part at Elphinstone College but mainly by private tutor, Mr Lee-Wilson. He was a Quaker with an austere approach to life. He used to give me a boxing lesson every morning as soon as I got up.

In 1918, Indians were made eligible to hold the King's

Commission in the army. I applied for a commission and went to Simla for an interview. Most of the new Indian cadets were being sent to a cadet college at Indore but a few were selected for Sandhurst. Rather to my surprise, I was one of the first batch of five Indians chosen for Sandhurst. We sailed for England in October 1918 but, because of the ending of the war and the sudden demobilization of thousands of men, we were held up at Port Said and Cairo and only reached London in December. I entered Sandhurst in January. Life was very pleasant and I got into the cricket team of the R.M.C., being awarded my blue. It was most unfortunate that, of the other Indian cadets, two died and two were removed so I was the only one to pass out.

When I was commissioned in July 1920, I was attached to the 2nd Battalion, the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) for the year's secondment to a British regiment which was required of every officer in the Indian Army. The Cameronians were then at Kohat so I was introduced at once to the North-West Frontier where I was to spend so much of my service.

We took part in the Khoodad Khel operation and went on to Parachinar. At that time, war with Afghanistan seemed imminent. I have a vivid memory of watching an Afghan battalion on parade from a fort at Kherpachi. The commander was sitting on a charpoy (string bed) shouting commands. I also witnessed from the fort the killing of a murderer, as required by Islamic law, by a woman who was the mother of the murdered man. Later on, while going down the mountain with my platoon, I fell and injured my back badly. This continued to give me much trouble and I was compelled to go to Europe on medical leave. After failing to get any help in Vienna and Berlin, I came to London. None of the specialists could offer me any hope so I was advised to see the famous osteopath, Sir Herbert Barker. He told me that if I would submit myself to his special treatment — which would be excruciating — he could cure me. After one month of agony, I was able to walk normally again. My wound gave me no further trouble for over thirty years

until, out shooting in 1954; I picked up an ammunition box and wrenched my back again. The necessity then to come to London again for treatment was to be a turning-point for me and for my country.

When I was fit again, I joined my own regiment: the 17th Poona Horse (Queen Victoria's Own) at Jhansi. Although these were the years of the Khilafat Movement and of Gandhi's first civil disobedience movement, I must confess that those events made little impression upon me. I was more interested in pig-sticking and polo than in politics.

One event, however, stands out in my mind. In 1922, my squadron was sent to Allahabad to reinforce the security arrangements for the Kumbh Mela, the great gathering of pilgrims at the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges. In order to control the thousands of pilgrims, the government had set up barriers to seal off certain approaches. The civil police were guarding the barriers and the Poona Horse were held in reserve: in the parlance of those days to provide a "show of force". The Congress decided to defy the government. The leader was the young Jawaharlal Nehru, who was the first to climb over the barricade. I could not help but admire his courage in facing what might have been a volley from the police. Instead, the magistrate in charge, the police, and also my own troopers, made a hasty strategic retirement.

In 1925, my mother (who had moved to Bangalore, near to Sir Mirza Ismail, her cousin, who was then Dewan of Mysore) died. She has been a great influence in my life. Her code of conduct, though simple, was strict. I loved her, but I was in awe of her.

Meanwhile the Poona Horse moved up to Bannu in Waziristan in 1924. I was squadron officer with B squadron: all Muslims, Khaimkanis, a branch of the Rathor Rajputs. Life was agreeable, but terribly monotonous: stables, parades, and nothing much else to do. I was stationed in command of a squadron at Khajuri, a fort on the road between Bannu and

Miranshah, the headquarters of the political Agent, North Waziristan. Later, we moved up to Razmak, the great cantonment which had been built after the First World War to dominate the unsettled border with Afghanistan and Waziristan.

There were always two schools of thought on the question of the control of the Frontier tribes. One, on the analogy of the Sandeman policy in Baluchistan, pressed for a forward policy, and integration of the tribal areas with the settled districts up to the international border with Afghanistan. The other favoured the close border policy which meant, broadly speaking, non-interference in inter-tribal affairs, and restricting control to ensuring the safety of the settled areas and some forward highways, like the Khyber Pass road, and the roads like the Tochi valley and Wana roads which led to the headquarters of the Tochi Scouts and the South Waziristan Scouts, at Miranshah and Wana.

Just after the First World War, as a result of the success of Marshal Lyautey in Morocco, who brought about security and order by constructing large number of roads, a school of thought gained predominance in the Government of India and on the NWFP that a similar policy of road-building was the answer to tribal control on the Frontier. Hence, the expensive circular road was constructed: Bannu-Razmak-Dera Ismail Khan where it joined up with the existing Dera Ismail Khan-Bannu road.

I was in daily contact with the Tochi Scouts and the Political Officers and I decided that I would put in for a transfer to the Indian Political Service (which was drawn half from the Indian Civil Service and half from the Indian Army). There were already a few Indian officers in the IPS, including one of my contemporaries from the cadet college at Indore. My transfer came through and I was appointed to the Political Service from 2 August 1926, and set off to the United Provinces, to Aligarh District, to receive magisterial training. From there I went to the Revenue School at Moradabad and then back to

the Frontier to my first assignment: Supernumerary Assistant Commissioner, Hazara. From there I went to Peshawar District to work at revenue settlement under Mr (later Sir Francis) Wyllie. At this time, I first came to know Dr Khan Sahib and his brother, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, (of the Muhammad Zai tribe of Charsadda Pathans). In 1927, Dr Khan Sahib was retired from the Indian medical service and had a very good private practice in Peshawar. He had been M.O. to the Guides (Frontier Force) in Mardan. He was married to an Englishwoman and was very friendly with the British even allowing himself to be made a paying honorary Member of the Peshawar Club. For reasons best known to the British, Indians were debarred from being ordinary members. Most of us refused to become Honorary Members.

A great change in Dr Khan Sahib's attitude came in 1930 after the Peshawar shootings. He joined his brother as an active member of the Indian National Congress and they participated in every anti-British movement and were sent to jail several times. I continued to regard him as a man of complete honesty and sterling character, even though we were now (as it were) on opposite sides of the game.

My first really independent charge came in 1928 when I went down to Tank (between Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan) as Assistant Commissioner. Here I stayed two years keeping the peace with the help of the Bhattani khassadars (the armed tribal levy used for territorial policing). The work in the settled portion of the Tank Sub-Division of the District of Dera Ismail Khan was that of ordinary district administration but with two peculiarities. I had a surfeit of matrimonial cases amongst the Bhattanis settled in the administrated areas, decided under the Frontier Crimes Regulations. Bhattani girls had a habit of eloping with their paramours. The more a girl eloped, the higher the price to be paid to her family! We had to operate swiftly under the Frontier Crimes Regulations, using summary procedure, in order to prevent blood feuds leading to murder.

The settlement was based on payment of an agreed sum of money to the aggrieved party. As the proceedings were entirely in Pashto, one had to be proficient in this language. The second peculiar feature was the irrigation system, based on the *kukyat abpashi*, or, water custom, and administered by the Assistant Commissioner. This was interesting work, and if one was lucky in one's experiments there was an increase in the cropping area, enhancing the popularity of the Assistant Commissioner concerned. On the other hand, a bad decision could lead to inter-village rioting of furious nature.

Then in 1930 I went to Bannu as Assistant Commissioner. This was the time of Gandhi's second civil disobedience campaign which stirred up the restlessness of the Frontier. By May, the whole tribal territory from Malakand to Waziristan was in a state of revolt. The Khan brothers had now organized the Red Shirts on para-military lines, with officers and "generals", but they tried to apply the methods of non-violence. At Bannu, we had a similar movement, the Black Shirts, led by Habibullah Khan. These were mainly recruited from Bannu city.

The Deputy Commissioner, Sir Claude Gidney, was a very kind man and one could see he was averse to taking harsh measures. We were able to get through the troubles without much bloodshed excepting with the Hathi Khels. There was a clash between them and the troops and there were casualties on both sides including British officers of the 5th Frontier Force Rifles. From these experiences I drew the lesson that one should always try to avoid the use of troops in putting down civil disturbances unless the civil officer in charge is actually with the troops, well forward. The troop must be kept under the close control of a civil officer if an unnecessary clash is to be avoided.

I soon had the opportunity to try out my own methods. My next posting was to Peshawar District where the Deputy Commissioner was Mr (later Sir) Olaf Caroe. I became Assistant Commissioner, with headquarters at Nowshera. Peshawar

District had been the scene of the most violent clashes with the Red Shirts active in the city, and tribal lashkars (raiding parties) operating from the foothills. In August 1930, the province was placed under special laws. Then in December the Government of India decided to declare the Indian National Congress an unlawful organisation: so that consequently the Red Shirts also come under the ban. Their resistance continued and a big operation was planned for Christmas Day. The nerve-centre of the anti-government movement in Nowshera Sub-Division was in a village called Pabbi on the Nowshera-Peshawar section of the Grand Trunk Road. I concentrated one battalion of British infantry, one squadron of cavalry, and about three hundred police in an open space at Pabbi, and went there at dawn on December 25th. My plan was to overawe the Red Shirts and I hoped that that a big show of force would make shooting unnecessary. The cavalry commander, Major Barnes, of my old regiment, the Poona Horse, and the British infantry commander accepted my views. Nothing is more abhorrent to the troops than to have to take military action against non-combatant mobs.

The Red Shirts were well disciplined and obeyed Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence to the letter. We managed to calm the people without bloodshed; however, I had to order occasional baton charges by the police. I took the cavalry and a body of police in lorries to patrol on the radius of eight miles round Pabbi. Very early we bumped into trouble. But to cut a long story short, by the first week of January 1931, I judged that the situation was sufficiently stable to be handled without deployment of troops, and I was able to return them to their permanent stations in Nowshera and Peshawar.

Some Pathan friends did warn me that my way of dealing with the situation was not popular with senior police officers in Peshawar but I was not prepared to accept their criticism. The Red Shirts actually wanted the government to be repressive (to shoot a few of them) as by this means they hoped to aggravate

hatred of the government. During the whole of the period, not one senior police officer came anywhere near me, though my Deputy Commissioner, Caroe, was in close touch with me personally and by telephone and expressed himself as quite happy with the way I was working.

The situation in the Nowshera Sub-Division had become quite normal by May 1931. In those five months, I don't think I arrested more than 150 persons. I only made arrests when absolutely necessary. The Congress wanted the jails to be filled and I was not going to play their game.

Under the Gandhi-Irwin pact, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was released from jail in March, and immediately began reorganizing his movement which was now declared lawful. In July, the Deputy Commissioner decided to proclaim Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code, banning meetings, processions and demonstrations within the area four miles on each side of the Grand Trunk Road from Attock to Peshawar. This created a difficult situation for me as the greater portion of the Grand Trunk Road passed through my Sub-Division. The Red Shirts answered by arranging religious meetings within the four-mile limit and though the law was being broken I did not think it politic to take action. The Gandhi-Irwin pact was in operation and we all had to mind our step. But in August the Red Shirts announced that despite the ban under Section 144 they would concentrate their forces in Akbarpura and hold a mass meeting. In my judgement this constituted open defiance to the law, without any cover of religion, and on the day fixed I went to Akbarpura with all the police I could muster and awaited events.

As soon as about a thousand Red Shirts were gathered together I ordered them to disperse. On their refusal, I ordered a baton charge and covered the police with a hundred rifles in case of necessity. I accompanied the charge and ensured that the minimum amount of force was used. But the Red Shirts intended to make the most of the occasion and about a hun-

dred of them lay down on the ground, pretending to be badly injured. After about an hour, some of the other Red Shirts and some villagers came out with pitchers of water to give to the injured. It was a very hot day. I concluded that, if they were allowed to give out water, the “wounded” would remain lying on the ground. So I prevented the water reaching them. Because of the heat, every man who was pretending to be wounded gave up and walked away. I was able to move the police back to the shelter of the trees. The demonstration petered out.

For my actions I was accused by Mahatma Gandhi of violating the Geneva Convention as regards allowing relief to the wounded. Abdul Ghaffar Khan came to Akbarpura and charged me with having ordered the police to bayonet young children and added that an aeroplane had bombed a house in the village and that a Koran was burnt. All these accusations were false and foolish. This was the Congress technique: to create trouble and then charge the government with every type of atrocity. I went to Simla, and was questioned about the incident. I insisted that, although we had been through a rough time, I had often seen as much foul play in a hockey match. The government was satisfied with my explanation.

From Nowshera, I went back to Hazara District to officiate as Deputy Commissioner in 1933. This was usually the quietest part of the Frontier but, at this time, the Black Mountain tribes were being stirred up by the Mullahs over the issue of Shahidgunj in Lahore (whether a site belonged to a mosque or a gurudwara). They came down into the valley and it was necessary to call out the Gurkha Brigade from Abbottabad to push them back. Early in 1936, I went to Europe on six months’ leave and, on return, was posted to Mardan Sub-Division of Peshawar District as Assistant Commissioner but with the purpose of preparing the ground for creating a separate district for Mardan. This followed and I became the first Deputy Commissioner of Mardan. During this period, elections were held under the 1935 Government of India Act for the first

legislatures in which elected ministries were to take office with full powers at the provincial level. The main contestants were the Congress and the Muslim League. Sir Abdul Qaiyum, the grand old man of the Frontier, was a Minister in the outgoing government. He belonged to the Mardan District and wanted me to help him.

As a government officer, I was supposed to be neutral but, as a Muslim, I did not want the Congress to win. Despite barring one Congress leader – Ghulam Muhammad of Lundkhwar – from standing as a candidate on technical grounds (he was debarred, having served three years' imprisonment), I was not able to do much. The Congress was all-powerful and won easily, not only in Mardan District but all over the province, emerging as the largest party in the new legislature. Dr Khan Sahib became chief minister. Sir Abdul Qaiyum who, all his life had helped his people and fought for their rights, died soon afterwards. The Governor, Sir George Cunningham, attended his funeral.

There was hardly any change during Dr Khan Sahib's period when he was running the settled areas as chief minister. He was quite ready to work with the government; he worked very well. He was a very close friend of Sir George Cunningham with whom he used to play bridge once a fortnight at least. Cunningham became Governor of the North-West Frontier Province just after I became Deputy Commissioner of Mardan (February 1937). He had previously been Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Lord Halifax. He was one of the finest administrators of his day. Dr Khan Sahib tried to employ the ordinary law to the exclusion of the Frontier Crimes Regulations but he soon found that this would not work in the peculiar conditions obtaining in the Pathan land and soon had to sanction a return to the Frontier Crimes Regulations.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru visited Mardan District at his time, coming by the same route as the Sikh general, Hari Singh Nalwa had taken when invading the country during the

days of Maharaja Ranjit Singh! In order to avoid trouble, I confined the police to their stations and barracks. There was a tremendous reception for Nehru and the crowds were terrific. The plan of the Congress leaders went astray and there was a shemozzle. I was accused of causing this by Abdul Ghaffar Khan though Dr Khan Sahib exonerated me. I could only keep order if I was allowed to make arrangements ab initio. But I don't think the public would have wanted an orderly reception!

Early in 1938, I was appointed Political Agent, Khyber. The duties of this office, despite the glamour attached to its name, was far less onerous and the objective was simple: Political control of the tribes in the Agency and correct behaviour by the tribes towards Afghanistan. The latter objective was made difficult as, according to old customs, the Afghans, by payment of small subsidies, created an Afghan Party amongst the tribes and so often got involved in internal feuds and the Political Agent had to exert his good offices to sort out the mess.

In 1938, Muhammad Afzal Khan, the Sanghul Khel Shinwari leader, had a fight with his Afghan overlords and fled into Tirah in the Khyber Agency where he was given shelter by the enemies of the Afghan allowance-holders. The Afghans naturally protested and I was ordered by the government to go to Kabul to have talks with the Afghan leaders to try to effect a settlement. I went to Kabul in February 1939, in bitterly cold weather and, with the British Ambassador, saw the Afghan leaders, H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan, the Prime Minister, H.R.H. Sirdar Shah Mahmood Khan, Muhammad Ali Khan and some other princes at a conference. Talks were friendly and the Afghan princes and officials I found highly impressive and fully versed in tribal matters. We were quickly able to arrange a settlement: I wish all disputes could be settled in one meeting. Sirdar Muhammad Hashim kept to the point: and so everything was settled all right. I was able to get the Afridi Maliks of the Khyber to agree to our decisions and Muhammad Afzal Khan

Shinwari went back home.

In October 1939, after the outbreak of the Second World War, I suddenly received information that two relations of the Afghan royal family had fled into Tirah, and were staying with Nawab Zaman Khan Kuki Khel, and that an Afridi lashkar under Khushal Khan, a well-known Afridi stormy petrel (who in 1930 had invaded Peshawar District) was marching on Jalalabad on the road to Kabul in their support. By exercising strong political pressure and threat of air action, I was able to obtain the surrender of the two sirdars and the retreat of the Afridi lashkar back to Tirah. The Malikis cooperated fully and an Afridi war was averted. The deployment of some thirty aeroplanes in Peshawar was observed by the tribes – as they were meant to – and Nawab Zaman Khan was discouraged by the disagreeable possibility of having his home bombed: I showed him air photographs of his two large houses in Tirah to make it clear that we had his number.

II

WARTIME STRESSES
AND STRAINS

Early in 1940, I was appointed Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Political Agent, Mohmands. I was the first Indian to hold this appointment. As Political Agent, Khyber, I had sometimes told the Indians with whom I played bridge at Peshawar what a delightful charge I had and perhaps some of them had passed on my remarks. At any rate, my new post was completely different. In ordinary time, the D.C. had to work twelve hours every day and now it was much worse because of the war. We were all wondering what the Congress would do now that we were at the beginning of a world-wide conflagration. We were not left guessing long, for, soon after I had taken over as D.C. Peshawar, negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, broke down. The High Command of the Congress directed all the Congress ministries to resign and, in pursuance of this directive, Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues

Wartime Stresses and Strains

resigned. Soon afterwards, another directive came ordering token civil disobedience by selected individuals. This consisted of a few Congressmen going into public places and declaring “it is wrong to help the Government in the war” thus inviting arrest.

Dr Khan Sahib announced the date and time he was going to perform his civil disobedience (14 December 1940). I tried to dissuade him, reminding him that we were at war and this could be construed as treason. He disregarded all I had to say and, on the day appointed, he appeared in the main bazaar of Peshawar garlanded up to his neck in flowers. A crowd of about ten thousand collected. Accompanied by the senior Superintendent of Police and the City Magistrate, I had also taken up a position on one side of the bazaar. Dr Khan went around in circles, uttering the formula “Don’t help in the war.... don’t help in this war....”, not in a very loud voice. After allowing him to do this for some time, I took pity on him and went to where he was to request him to accompany me in my car. I could see relief on his face and he came very quickly. A press man came running up to me asking “under what section? Under what section?” (of the law) and I replied that I hadn’t thought about it.

We drove off in the direction of the jail. The doctor, who at first was very stiff, gradually relaxed and looked happy. However, we turned away towards his house, and again he became very stiff and militant. However, the driver had instructions to go to Dr Khan Sahib’s house and that was that. We all dismounted and entered his drawing room where he found his English wife looking like a tigress. Apparently, people had told her that, during the war, open incitement to oppose the war could lead to capital punishment. She thought that he had come to say goodbye before being taken out to be shot. Instead I handed over the doctor and asked her to ensure that he was not a naughty boy ever again. I left the room to the accompaniment of Dr Khan Sahib shouting “You can’t do this

to me”. I said nothing and beat a hasty retreat with my officers.

The Pathans, by temperament, are not really suited to this kind of passive resistance. From 1930 to '33, they were given the task of marching in column disobeying the orders of the Government. In Charsadda Sub-Division of Peshawar District, they stood up to cavalry charges without flinching and with the utmost bravery. They took any amount of punishment. But in ordering individual civil disobedience, the Congress High Command had failed to understand the Pathan. He was asked to do something for which he had no liking or enthusiasm. The Government of India – which, in all the provinces, was taking the movement seriously and filling up the jails – also did not understand the Pathan psychology. Lord Linlithgow sent telegram after telegram saying “what actions are you taking?” Sir George Cunningham, who understood the Pathans better than anybody else, allowed the movement to kill itself by ridicule. The result was that this movement came to an end in the Frontier Province months before it died away in the rest of India, and we had a relatively quiet and orderly province until Congress launched the Quit India Movement in 1942.

Other events in India made little impression on the Frontier. Already the Muslim League had held their Lahore meeting and had issued the famous Lahore Declaration in favour of what they called “independent states” in the north-west although they had not defined Pakistan up till then. There were no repercussions along the border because, quite honestly, there was no Muslim League there. Whenever I said that to people in India, they used to get very angry and think I was anti-Muslim. I was only telling the truth.

In 1941, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union and the Russians became our “allies”. This made the situation slightly awkward for those who, from the end of 1939 to early 1941, were directing and intensive anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign. I was also involved in this as, when P.A. Khyber, I was doing a good deal of propaganda. When I took up the matter later

with some of the Afridi and Mohmand Maliks, they all had a good laugh. They told me they had never taken seriously all the stuff I used to push out in regard to the Russians. So much for my complacent feeling that I was doing good work! All I did was to waste a considerable amount of time and money. The tribesmen, especially the Afridis, are astute people and knew much more about what was really going on in Central Asia than we gave them credit for.

In 1942, the war situation was bad. Rommel was advancing in Cyrenaica and the Japanese had declared war on Britain and the United States. The Germans were advancing on Stalingrad and had penetrated the Caucasus, and there was talk all over India that the German and Japanese armies would meet each other in India. At this time, when the military situation was at its worst, the Cripps mission arrived in India to attempt a political settlement. In the then mood of the Indian leaders – when they openly said that they would not accept a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank – the Cripps mission was bound to fail. Thereafter, the political situation deteriorated and the Congress started the “Quit India” movement. On August 8th, the Congress Working Committee was arrested. Dr Khan Sahib started running round Peshawar paying off his bridge debts. He was not a bad player but, more often than not, he held bad cards.

I realized that, this time, it would not be an easy job and I had to make serious preparations. Sir George Cunningham sent for me. He was always a complete gentleman with nerves of steel and had a great affection for the Pathans. We discussed the situation in detail. He was rightly of the opinion that the position in the NWFP was quite different to the rest of India and, whatever the directives of the Government of India, he would maintain his liberty of action and would not fill the jails. He directed me to try to control the situation on the basis of as few arrests as possible and, above all, no shooting. He added that Peshawar was the focal point in the whole province and he

relied on me to overcome all difficulties. He could back me up to the hilt. I thanked Sir George for the confidence he placed in me and asked him not to attach too much importance to police reports as all my experience in all the districts had convinced me that they were usually exaggerated and sometimes faked. My problem, as I saw it, was to try to concentrate Red Shirts activity in Peshawar city. We gave out, here and there, that we would be happy if the agitations would be dispersed as, with our superior facilities for quick movement, we could easily deal with dispersed attempts to bring the government to a standstill! The reverse would have been the case as, with our limited police numbers, we could not have operated in many places. The only way we could then have acted would have been by shooting; a course of action in complete variance to the instructions given by Sir George Cunningham.

I soon got to know that the Red Shirts were concentrating in a large school in Peshawar city. They established a camp which controlled, housed and fed about 1,500 Red Shirts. I also concentrated as many police as I could and awaited events. Every morning, the Red Shirts would parade in front of the school at about 9:00 a.m. after first drinking tea from a common cauldron and eating huge chunks of bread. Their commanders would harangue them, calling on them to sacrifice their lives and march them off towards the cantonment. On the boundary of the cantonment, on a railway bridge, I used to concentrate a large force of police with batons and, some distance in the rear, a company of British troops with rifles.

On the first day, about a hundred Red Shirts got over the bridge and entered the Sessions Court where they messed things and stopped the work. After that, we improved our dispositions and no Red Shirt succeeded in getting into the cantonment. Every day, the Red Shirts would make a rush at us with cries of "Allah-ho-Akbar". We had to use our staves to stop them. In the process of hurling them back, quite a few Red Shirts were injured and some bled profusely. These were

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paraded in the city, with blood streaming down, as propaganda against us. The conflict was watched by large crowds who began to join in, slinging large stones at us. My police were injured and I also received a large stone upon my thigh and the bruises made me lame for some time though we always managed to keep back the Red Shirts. We arrested large numbers every day and kept them in a pen till sunset when we released them.

The set-piece went on for a month (October 1942) and I noticed the crowds from the city and the villages getting larger and larger and more and more excited. These crowds numbered from twenty to fifty thousand; a good many Afridi and Mohmand tribesmen. I could see that the set-piece could not last much longer without our having to open fire. We had two companies of British troops always close by. Firing would have meant heavy casualties to the civil population and a wave of resentment and hatred of the government would have gone right through the province and tribal areas and we might land ourselves into a full-scale tribal war at a time when we were very short of troops. I expressed my apprehensions to Sir George Cunningham, who was as cool as a great administrator should be, and he told me to do my best. I spoke to Dr Khan Sahib who laughed and said Pathans were ready to die in thousands. My determination not to shoot down Pathans of whom, after 20 years of close association, I was very fond was reinforced because I was quite sure things would get much worse that way.

In 1940, soon after I had been appointed Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, I studied the general situation in India and especially the attitude of the two Pathan leaders, Dr Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. I was convinced the Indian National Congress would not permit a peaceful India during the war. The Congress high command would strike when our military situation in the war was at its worst. In 1940, through my agents, I got in touch with two Red Shirt generals and started paying them to work for me inside the Red Shirt organization. So, when matters were coming to a head

in 1942, I sent for them and suggested that they take charge of the food arrangements in the Red Shirt camp in Peshawar city and to see me the moment they had succeeded in doing so. After carrying out my instructions, they came to see me and I gave them some long phial containing Croton oil and told them to pour the contents of the phial into the tea cauldrons before the morning tea was issued. This they succeeded in doing. The thousand Red Shirts, after taking the doctored tea, paraded before the commander and, before long, started breaking ranks and running here and there. Most of them ran towards the bank of the canal nearby. They could not remove their trousers quick enough as they wound themselves with turbans to deaden police blows with staves. But this very action made it impossible for them to remove their trousers quick enough and most of them spoilt their trousers – a very great disgrace amongst the Pathans. (My own Red Shirts, when they took their morning tea, also took a strong dose of the Croton oil, a very strong purge, so as to avoid detection.)

To make a long story short, the sorry state of the Red Shirts on the canal bank was witnessed by large crowds of Peshawar citizens who laughed their hearts out and, whenever they saw any Red Shirt in the city, they used to laugh and no Red Shirt dared to come to the city in uniform. The anti-Government Red Shirt movement collapsed from this day. The nine Congress doctors who sat in solemn conclave gave their opinion that the sudden attack of violent dysentery was the aftermath of a severe epidemic of malaria which was rampant in Peshawar District in (the) previous summer.

For the rest of the war, the Red Shirt movement was immobilized. My next involvement in politics came from the other side: from Mr Jinnah and the Muslim League. About the end of March 1943, I was invited to a tiger shoot by H.H. the late Nawab of Bhopal, Nawab Hamidullah Khan. I stopped at Delhi on my way back to Peshawar and went to see Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, an old friend of mine. The same evening,

he telephoned to me and said the Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, wanted to see me urgently next morning at 11:00 a.m. I hardly knew Mr Jinnah and could not imagine why he wanted to see me. However, I went. Mr Jinnah met me in his study and opened the conversation by saying that he knew my mother well. He had worked with her in 1912 in organizing relief supplies to Turkey during the Balkan war. He then rather surprisingly asked: "Are you a Muslim?" This seemed a rhetorical question and I replied: "We have been Muslims since the time of the Prophet. We are no converts."

Jinnah then said: "Do you recognize me as the head of the Muslims of India?" I replied: "I recognize you as the political head of the Muslims of India." He then came straight to the point. He said he was trying to bring about a Muslim government in areas where Muslims were predominant. But there was no Muslim League government in any of the provinces. He added that he had been reliably informed that, if I tried, I could organize the formation of a Muslim League in the NWFP and if I accepted him as the leader of the Muslims of India I must do as he asked.

I replied that I was merely the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar: the only man who could do what he wanted was Sir George Cunningham. I added that the Muslim League hardly existed in the province. He replied that he wanted a promise from me that I would try my upmost. I had no option but to give him this promise. But I went on to say that the head of the League in the Frontier Province, Sirdar Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan, was useless and corrupt. I was told that, whatever the merits or demerits of Sirdar Aurangzeb Khan, and whatever the condition of the local League organization, I must help in the interests of the Mussalmans of India. I tried to warn Mr Jinnah that, although Cunningham had been very kind to me, he was not the man to accept anybody's advice against his own better judgement. I recalled how he had ignored the entire Government of India in 1940 and 1942 and handled the Red

Shirt movement in his own way. After this, Mr Jinnah shook me by the hand and I left.

A fortnight after my return to Peshawar, I received a telephone message, sent by the Quaid-e-Azam through a mutual friend, urging me to hurry on the formation of the ministry. I was at my wit's end as I had not made an inch of progress. However, God was on our side. Sir George Cunningham had been on a visit to Kabul and, when he returned, he at once asked me to go and see him. I had hardly sat down when he remarked that the Government of India were pressing him to form a new ministry in the province as they were anxious to demonstrate that Congress was not the only party and that popular government could function despite their Quit India Movement.

The situation was completely normal, and I could honestly say that the time was opportune. I must say here that, under no circumstances, would I have ever dreamed of giving any but an honest view to my Governor for whom I had feelings of deep affection. When asked who should be called upon, I could properly advise the Muslim League as this was the only party in the field and, as Sirdar Aurangzeb Khan was the leader of this party, he was the automatic choice and I was saved the distasteful job of suggesting his name.

Sir George then sent for Aurangzeb and commissioned him to form a ministry. I don't know if the Quaid-e-Azam really thought this was all my doing. I am convinced he was too clever to think so. The Sirdar was now eating out of my hand, so to say, and requested my help in the formation of a ministry. The human material available was useless. I had my eyes on Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. He was the leader of the Ahrars, a fanatical Islamic group. The Ahrars were bitter opponents of the Muslim League, and, by a peculiar chance, allies of the Congress. Nishtar was certainly not fond of Jinnah and, only the previous year, he had made a violently abusive speech against him at the Mahbat Khan mosque in the presence of a friend of mine,

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Maulana Jamal Khan. Nishtar was a native of Peshawar city and I knew him. I appealed to Nishtar's Muslim sentiments and he readily agreed to join the Muslim League and was taken by Aurangzeb into his cabinet.

My troubles started from the day Aurangzeb got into the saddle (25 May 1943). Here was a man who, only a few days before, when he came to my house, used to sit on the floor refusing to take a chair unless I helped him to be chief minister! And now he started intriguing against me in the lowest possible manner. His personal courage was less than zero. When the activities of the Anjuman-e-Ghuraba, a communist-inspired body, became dangerous and I proposed some action, he concurred. But on the day I started to act involving baton charges and use of tear gas, he disappeared to Abbottabad and on return started flirting with some of the ruffianly leaders of this organization.

I ignored all this but I could not ignore the Sirdar's tampering with law and order. Appeals for mercy from murderers used to remain in his office for ages and, ultimately in most cases, were accepted giving the administration a bad name. Then, one evening, my Senior Superintendent of Police, Mr O'Neil Shaw (an officer of great experience and ability) came to see me. He produced a list of eighty persons to whom licenses for revolvers and shot guns had been issued by the chief minister, direct, without consulting me or the police. Thirty-eight names on this list were persons of known bad character! Obviously, in Peshawar, where murders used to occur at slight provocation and where blood feuds were rampant, we had to be very careful before an arms license was issued. I lost my temper and wrote to the Chief Secretary to (the) Government, requesting that an order be issued debarring the Chief Minister from issuing any arms licenses without the concurrence of the Deputy Commissioner. This letter got to the Chief Minister, as I knew it would, and the fat was truly in the fire.

• The Governor was in a difficult position. He could not

get rid of (the) ministry though he had nothing but contempt for Sirdar Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan. He wanted to keep me if possible. After some fireworks, the Governor arranged a meeting between the Chief Minister, Chief Secretary and myself. The meeting was acrimonious. Aurangzeb demanded that I take back the letter. I replied that I would not change a comma. The Chief Minister demanded my removal and, in order not to embarrass Sir George Cunningham, I asked for four months' leave and a transfer from the province.

I had worked for five years as Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, in a difficult period and I was very tired. My application was accepted and so I left the Frontier in February 1945 after nearly twenty-five years' service and my close connection with the Pathans, of whom I was so fond, came to an end, Aurangzeb Khan did not last long as his own followers in the Muslim League turned against him and he had scarcely any supporters in the provincial legislature. It was lucky I was not in the province at the time Aurangzeb was defeated (13 March 1943); otherwise, I would have been blamed for the defeat. Unless there is a dictatorship, corruption combined with bad administration cannot last for long.

While in Jaipur, staying with my uncle, Sir Mirza Ismail who was the Dewan, I was posted to Sambalpur as Political Agent, Orissa States. I arrived in Sambalpur in the Province of Orissa in May 1945 never having been in these parts though I am the direct descendent of the Nawab Nazims of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa who were rulers of the Province before the advent of the British. I had also never served before on the states side of the Indian Political Service and so was completely new to my job. And as I was the first Indian to hold this post of Political Agent, I was interested to study the reaction of the twenty-three rulers of the Agency. When Lord Sinha was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Bihar in the 1920s, and the Orissa states at the time were under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Bihar, some of the rulers had sent a telegram of protest to the Viceroy and the

states were taken under the direct jurisdiction of Government of India in the Political Department. For years afterwards, this incident and a few others were used as an argument against employing Indians of the Indian Political Service in the States.

This segregation of the Indian Princes from the people of their own race and blood was a mistake as it created a hatred against them in the minds of Indians from British India. When British rule came to an end in 1947, their days were numbered and, in two or three years, all the Princes of India, and later the few Princes of Pakistan, were removed from power and became pensioners: a great pity, a great many of these Princes were natural leaders and men of considerable ability, of culture, of tradition, and of manners. I had the honour of having many of them as my friends.

Situated as I was, I had to walk very warily. I started reading all the files and papers in my office and soon found that there was no more than an hour's work a day in the office, a striking change from the twelve hours as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar with quite a few hours of headache added to it. The only way to do one's job I found was to tour and, as road communication was not too bad, most of the year I was in Orissa, I toured. Touring also entailed big game hunting and as I was very fond of this sport and, as the states of Orissa were a paradise for big game, I was able to shoot a large number of tigers, bison, panthers etc. Most of the states were tolerably well run and the people were fond of their rulers. But malnutrition was terrible. Though there was plenty of rice, and cheap, there was hardly anything else for the general mass of the population. The staple diet was rice and green chillies and a great deal of drinking from a potent drink extracted from the Mahwa flower. I found the women much bigger and studier than the men. On investigating the cause, I found as a rule the men ate the rice and the women drank the rice water. The doctor told me that most of the vitamins were in the water. This reminded me of what I read in my school-boy days about the great sacrifice of

the Indian troops at the siege of Arcot when they drank the rice water and gave all the rice to their British comrades – not much sacrifice, perhaps.

The rulers on the whole were all right. The Rajas of Bamra and Gengpur were go-ahead young men, well-educated and anxious for the uplift and prosperity of their people. On the other side were rulers like the Raja of Dhenkenal who was one big headache and his state was run by me, as Political Agent, through a Minister. None of the states were larger than the District in British India and some as small as a Tehsil. There was a great jealousy amongst the rulers and all my efforts to unite them failed. They had pedigrees of over 2000 years and were very proud. To make a long story short, I spent my tour of duty of one year in a pleasant atmosphere and today I am sorry that the rulers have ceased to exist and I do hope they and their people are happier and more prosperous than in my time.

III

THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA AND PARTITION

In April 1946 I received a telegram notifying me I was posted as Joint Secretary in the Defence Department of the Government of India. This post was not on the cadre of the Indian Political Service and I am sure that this was managed for me by Sir Ambrose Dundas who had been Chief Secretary in the NWFP and who was now the Secretary at the Defence Department. I hardly knew anyone else of influence in Delhi.

The set-up in the Defence Department was as follows: Defence Member, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (who was also Commander in Chief), Secretary, Sir Ambrose Dundas, an Additional Secretary, Mr G.S. Bhalja and two Joint Secretaries, Mr Philip Mason and myself. This team worked very smoothly and we were very happy together. The work was not as onerous as that of Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, but was heavy enough, and a good deal of time was taken up in committee meetings. Nawab Gurmani was in charge of rehabilitation (of demobilised soldiers). He hardly did any work. He was marking time to get a bigger job which he secured soon afterwards, as Prime Minister of Bahawalpur, greatly to the annoyance of a

Muslim I.C.S. officer who thought he had the job in his pocket!

I arrived in the aftermath of the famous Red Fort trials of the leading officers of the so-called Indian National Army. A number of Indian soldiers and officers had sold their military honour and joined the Japanese after the surrender of Singapore. The trial, in my opinion, was a blunder as it gave a great deal of publicity to the officers put on trial. Wise men like Sir George Cunningham advised dropping the matter. But it was not to be. The Congress helped some officers and the Muslim League waded in to help some of the others. The whole thing ended in a fiasco. But the damage was done: politics had been brought into the army. Henceforward, the political situation in India was simmering furiously. Lord Pethick-Lawrence, with his committee, was in Delhi, trying hard to solve the Hindu-Muslim problem. They actually came to a settlement with this concurrence of the Quaid-e-Azam, Mahatama Gandhi and other Congress leaders. But Pandit Nehru made a speech afterwards which amounted to a repudiation of all that had been agreed. This gave the Quaid-e-Azam the opportunity to withdraw from his commitment and he announced that nothing but Pakistan would satisfy the Muslims. The Viceroy, Field Marshal Lord Wavell, then asked the Hindu and the Muslim leaders to form an interim government. Jinnah refused but the Congress agreed and an interim government was formed with Nehru as the senior member of the Council of Ministers. Hindu-Muslims riots then took place on a big scale in Bengal and Bihar. They were put down with a firm hand. The police and the army did admirable work thus proving that the fears in the minds of the British administrators that the Indian Army could not be relied on (because of politics) was proved baseless.

Gradually the Muslim League realized that abstaining from entering the interim government was doing no good and notified the Viceroy that they were ready to come in. Soon after taking over the Communications portfolio, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar sounded me out several times to become Director

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General of Civil Aviation. I had absolutely no knowledge of aviation and declined to take over control of that department.

While the country was drifting into a deplorable state of communal tension, the Labour government in England were pressing the Viceroy to get on with the task of liquidating British commitments in India. Lord Wavell refused to take the responsibility of scuttling as, in his view, it would mean bloodshed on a vast scale. History has shown how right this great soldier and English gentleman was. The British Government were adamant. Lord Wavell was replaced by another famous military leader and man of action, Lord Mountbatten. He probably came with a directive to arrange to scuttle within as short a time as possible. At any rate, in announcing the change of Viceroys in the House of Commons, Mr Attlee announced that British rule would be brought to an end by June 1948, come what may.

Although Muslim pressure for Pakistan was increasing, there was still no sign that the British government would give way on this issue. Thus it was, in February 1947, that the Quaid-e-Azam telephoned me and asked me to come over (in) the evening to see him. His way of dealing with a tricky problem was very clever (so I thought). He started by asking me if I still regarded him as the leader of the Muslims of India and would I obey his orders? In the situation I was in, I could only reply: Yes. He then went on to say that he was afraid he was not going to get Pakistan, unless some serious trouble was created and the best place to do this was on the North-West Frontier with the tribes. In his view, it was important to demonstrate Muslim anger before the British actually handed the country over to the Congress. If Pakistan was not conceded by negotiation, we must fight. If negotiations had failed by the middle of May, he wanted me to resign from the service, go into the tribal territory and start a Jihad. He said that, according to his information, I could achieve this if I really tried.

His request took my breath away. My associations

with the British were of long standing. I was fond of them and they included some of my best friends. With Hindus, too, my relations were excellent and I had some good friends among them. Having worked for such a long time in different Political Agencies, I knew better than anybody of the great efficiency of the British system of control over the tribes and their rapid intelligence network. Besides, the risings, if they took place, would mean bloodshed. This could only take the form of raids on border villages in the settled areas in which quite a few Hindus would be killed. All this passed through my mind in a flash. Yet I decided to fall in with Quaid-e-Azam's plan. If the Muslim leader, with all his knowledge of the political ramifications, was of the view that a certain courage was necessary to safeguard the future interests of the Muslims, I felt it was not for me to raise objections. I had no desire to be branded as a man who was found wanting when the time for action came.

I thought that I could not hope to achieve anything very much; with a liberal expenditure of money, I would be able to cause some trouble in Waziristan, Tirah and the Mohmand country. I gave my estimate of the sum of money required as one crore of rupees (Rs. 10,0,00,000 or £ 750,000) I also said that, before I could disappear into tribal territory, some cover story would have to be invented. Mr Jinnah had already anticipated these requirements: he had the cover and the money ready. The cover was an appointment with H.H. the Khan of Kalat and the treasure was provided by H.H. the Nawab of Bhopal. I met the latter the same day and he placed Rs 20,000 at my disposal for preliminary activities. The Quaid-e-Azam also gave me an assurance that, if anything happened to me, (which, to my way of thinking, was a certainty), my family would be looked after.

Next day, I began to make plans. It was a vast undertaking and required time to organize. I am sure Mr Jinnah was too shrewd to expect anything spectacular. A few tribal risings would have been enough for his purpose. I sent for some of my friends from the tribal territory and from Peshawar and

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Dera Ismail Khan. After a good deal of discussion, I drew up a plan for approaching the Waziristan, Tirah, and Mohmand tribes, the people I had worked with and knew well. But, early in May, the Quaid-e-Azam sent for me again and told me that, as Pakistan would be conceded, the plan would be abandoned. To be honest, I sighed with relief.

This incident shows that the Quaid-e-Azam had great determination and was prepared for any action if, in his view, it was necessary for a particular course. He took no advice and acted on his own. He had no illusions about the Muslim League. After independence, when I saw him one day as Governor-General, I said in the course of conversation that we must try to be considerate to the Muslim Leaguers as, after all, they had brought in Pakistan. Jinnah immediately replied: "Who told you the Muslim League brought in Pakistan? I brought in Pakistan – with my stenographer." Jinnah was a very polite man unless something roused him. When Lord Mountbatten wrote to him inviting him to lunch to meet H.R.H. Shah Mahmood Khan of Afghanistan, he refused; saying, "If His Royal Highness wishes to see me, he can come to my home." Doubtless, he wished to emphasise his position as leader of the Muslims but the result was that this fine man, H.R.H. Shah Mahmood, was not friendly towards Pakistan at a very critical period when it would have been possible to settle all differences with Afghanistan in a friendly manner. All because the Quaid-e-Azam allowed his pride to run away with him.

Soon after came the announcement that Britain would hand over power on 15 August 1947 and we were all given calendars indicating the number of days left before D-Day. The task was colossal. That it was completed speaks volume for the esprit de corps and devotion to duty of all concerned. A simple transfer would not have been easy but, combined as it was with partition of the country, it became a truly Herculean task. I must mention Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, the Military Financial Adviser, who represented Pakistan on the Steering Committee.

He was at his best in this operation where his experience in the Audit and Accounts Service made him highly efficient.

Early in June, a proposal was mooted to retain the Indian Army undivided. When, out of the old India, two separate states were being created, to prevent the division of the army was just absurd. Ultimately it was settled that the army would be divided on the lines of Muslims opting for Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs for India. This was not difficult: what was difficult was the division of armaments and stores. It was decided that this should be carried out by the Supreme Commander, Sir Claude Auchinleck, as a military operation without any political interference. But the time was too short and the politicians could not be excluded.

As Joint Secretary, the task of watching over the share-out in the interests of Pakistan fell to me. It was obvious that we were going to be very short of essential supplies, especially in tanks and ammunition. I used my powers to concentrate as much as I could (on) essential items in the arsenal at Ferozepore. We were sure that Ferozepore must come to Pakistan as a Muslim-majority district under the partition of the Punjab which was being worked out by the tribunal set up under Radcliffe as chairman. In the end, when Radcliffe's Award was announced, Ferozepore was given to India. This was a serious blow which caused our military build-up to be hamstrung from the word Go. We now had no arsenal in Pakistan.

During the two months prior to D-day, we were constantly receiving reports, via military and civil intelligence, of a deep conspiracy in the Sikh princely states and in the East Punjab to create communal-disturbances with a view to killing Muslims and driving them out to Pakistan. The Viceroy and the political leaders knew all about this but seemed incapable of doing much. Nobody was prepared to postpone D-Day or delay the departure of the British troops. When Pakistan declined to accept Lord Mountbatten as joint Governor-General of the two new dominions, Mountbatten no longer had much use for

the Muslims. There was a chance of settling the water dispute – the control over canal water – by asking for a decision by Lord Spens' committee. But this was overlooked. Altogether, the situation was drifting from bad to worse. At a period when it was essential to preserve a strong administration with a reliable army to maintain law and order and create confidence, these very ingredients were being dissipated and tragic events were in store for the country. As D-day approached, we formed up a train to carry the documents, etc., to Rawalpindi where a general Headquarters for the Pakistan Army was being formed with Lieut. General Sir Frank Messervy as Commander-in-Chief and Lieut. General Sir Douglas Gracey as Chief of Staff. The Air and Naval Headquarters were being built up at Karachi, which was selected by the Quaid-e-Azam as the seat of Government. The Defence Ministry too was located in Karachi.

The Defence Ministry train never reached Rawalpindi as it was burnt in India at Bhathinda by the Sikhs, thus presenting the Ministry of Defence with a very grave problem. Sir Ambrose Dundas, the Secretary of Defence in India before Partition, opted for Pakistan and he was confirmed as Defence Secretary of Pakistan but it was decided that he should remain in Delhi to supervise the partition of stores, etc., a very wise decision but one that entailed my having to organize the Ministry of Defence in Karachi and Rawalpindi under extremely difficult conditions. I arrived in Karachi on 18 August 1947. The Ministry was located in the High Court Building; everyone was scattered, with hardly any telephone communications, and there was a general shortage of stationery. The Ministry of Defence in Rawalpindi was much better situated as it was located in the old Northern Command headquarters. The Deputy Defence Secretary, Wing Commander Milroy Hayes, and the Chief Administrative Officer, Mr Ayton, did a remarkable job and deserve all praise. I only had one Under Secretary and Pilot Officer Ghose; in spite of lack of training both did a very good job. After seven days in the High Court, I created so much trouble that the old Western

Command headquarters was allocated to Ministry of Defence and I got my Ministry under one roof and established good telephone connections with Rawalpindi and Lahore.

By the first week of September, the Defence Ministry was functioning tolerably well in Karachi and Rawalpindi but then I started getting one shock after the other. One night, at about 9:00 p.m., I was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and there I found the Prime Minister, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Secretary in deep conclave. The Prime Minister addressed me more or less as follows, "Colonel Iskander Mirza, Junagadh has acceded to Pakistan and the Government has accepted the accession. The Nawab of Junagadh has asked for military help which must be provided immediately." I was completely aghast and had to exercise very great control not to blow up. I respectfully represented that it was not a practical proposition. The only means of communication with Junagadh was by sea and, at that time, there was only one unit fit for service, the frigate Godavari (now Sindh). The rest of the fleet was in the Indian harbour of Bombay being repaired. I warned that if foreign policy should run away from Defence preparations, we would be courting disaster.

The request to me was all the more surprising as the Prime Minister, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, was also in charge of the Defence and Foreign portfolios. Our leaders were not interested in geography or details when deciding policy. However, no troops, went to Junagadh because it was impossible. The ruling family was evacuated to Karachi by air, to its ultimate ruin. Politically the acceptance of the accession was disastrous. Junagadh was a predominately Hindu area and, when we accepted its accession, there was no logic in our protests when India accepted the accession of Kashmir.

About now, mass killings of Muslims in East Punjab and Delhi were in full swing. About a million were killed and there was mass exodus of the Muslim population of this area. Killings of Hindus and Sikhs started in West Punjab and was a mass

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exodus followed in the reverse direction. A mixed force of the Army under a British commander had been created to control and direct the exodus in both directions. This force on the whole did good work and saved millions of lives but there was severe criticism of Brigadier Ayub Khan, subsequently Field Marshal and President of Pakistan and, in order to save him, I had him transferred to Waziristan to command the Brigade on the line of communication to Razmak. The mass migrations created a huge problem in the West Punjab but it was tackled with great ability and the self-sacrificing spirit shown by some ladies under the dynamic leadership of Begum Liaquat Ali Khan was admirable.

The vast two-ways migration of populations was certainly not visualized by the Quaid-e-Azam. The exodus of the Hindus from the North-West Frontier was neither desired by the Hindu inhabitants nor by the vast majority of Pathans. It was brought about by the Kashmiri Chief Minister of NWFP Abdul Qayyum Khan. The migration from Sind was completely unnecessary; there were no communal disturbances in this Province and the relations between the two communities were cordial. But a Congress leader, Acharaya Kripalani, visited Karachi and the interior of Sind, and the mass migration began. One cannot help suspecting that the Sind migration was arranged by the communal section of Indian National Congress with a view to bringing about the migration of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from United Provinces, Bombay, Central Provinces and Rajputana to Sind. The Hindu migration was a blessing in disguise otherwise there would have been no room for Muslim refugees. The settlement of these refugees in Sind was haphazard and the town of Karachi was ruined in pursuance of the plan to create a U.P. enclave of Muslims. Later attempts to improve the sub-human conditions in which these refugees were living in Karachi were frustrated by political rivalries.

Before I go on to the worst consequence of Partition – the tragedy of Kashmir – I must break off to describe how the

new armed forces of Pakistan were created. We have seen how the Junagadh fiasco arose because of our military helplessness. Our navy was based in Karachi where we had good naval depots and training centers. We pulled our ships out of Bombay (where they were undergoing repairs and refits) in a hurry in the various stages of readiness which they happened to be in. For the new air force, we had already two squadrons of fighters. We found twelve Tempest planes in crates in Karachi harbour. With my encouragement, M.A. Khuhro, the chief minister of Sind at that time, seized the crates. But it transpired that the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, had given his word to Sirdar Patel that he would send these aeroplanes on to India. We had no option but to honour our prime minister's word. My intention was either to keep the Tempests or to exchange them then for double the number of Churchill tanks: our share of the division of pre-Partition resources. This incident shows that Pakistan's leaders were honest in their intention of developing friendly relations with India from the very inception of the state. On the other hand, India treated us shabbily even in such a matter as that of shoes. The Indians sent us P.T. shoes which could only fit Gurkhas! They were much too small for our troops. My diaries* of those days were full of incidents of this nature.

Out of these meagre resources, an army was created in a short space of time. We cannot be too grateful to our first British commanders: General Sir Frank Messervy, KCSI, KBE, OB, DSO, Commander in Chief (till February 1948) and General Sir Douglas Gracey, KCB, KCIE, CBE, NC, Chief of Staff. And then C-in-C. They and others (such as General Ross Mackay) worked day and night, planning to create an army of seven infantry divisions with one armoured brigade. Their combined efforts soon established the Pakistan Army as a fine fighting force. They established the Kakul Military College and the Staff College at Quetta where, after a short time, we were

* Iskander Mirza personal diaries were confiscated by the Ayub Khan regime.

accepting officers from the Commonwealth armies and from Iran (a country which has been our firm friend).

The air force started in a bad way; it was very small though we had some good Pakistani pilots. After a few months, we succeeded in getting Air Vice Marshal Atcherley as the commander-in-chief. From the time he took over command, the Pakistan Air Force never looked back. Atcherley raised the élan of the air force to an astounding degree. He was never defeated by difficulties. When he found he could not get the right sort of material for his officers, he established a school at Sargodha on the English public-school pattern and a feeder school at Murree. The navy was commanded by Rear Admiral Jefford who was loved by all, officers and men. But with our scanty financial resources, we could not do anything spectacular. Some destroyers were purchased and, in two years, we were appreciably stronger.

One military decision we had to take at once related to the future of the Frontier. We could not continue to tie down the troops in the great camps of Razmak and Wana. Neither money, men nor resources existed for this purpose and this point of view was pressed by me from the Ministry of Defence in no uncertain terms. The Defence point of view was backed on political grounds by Sir George Cunningham who, after a period of retirement in Scotland, had returned to his old post as Governor of the NWFP. A conference on withdrawal was convened by the Prime Minister at Rawalpindi. Evacuation was resisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but their objections had no solid basis.**

The decision to evacuate Razmak was speeded up because of events elsewhere. In the middle of December of 1947, "Operation Curzon", as it was sardonically named, was successfully completed. The troops pulled out from north and

*** For the Foreign Ministry, Colonel A.S.B. Shah argued that the tribes would rise and Afghanistan would send in troops.*

South Waziristan without a casualty. Sir George Cunningham himself marched with the troops and not a shot was fired. He had a wonderful control over all the Frontier tribes.

The success of the policy was proved time and again in later years. The fear that the Afghans would cross the Durand Line and take over Razmak and a large slice of Waziristan has not materialized. The Afghans are far too experienced to tie up a division of their army in the wilds of Waziristan for no purpose whatsoever while, in addition, burdening themselves with the task of controlling the Mahsuds and the Wana Waziris.

Meanwhile, the situation in Kashmir came to the boil. The division of the Defence Ministry between Karachi and Rawalpindi and the location of Army headquarters at Pindi and the naval and air headquarters at Karachi made for difficulty. We watched events as best we could. After the Junagadh fiasco, a messenger came to Karachi from Sirdar Patel, the strong man of the Indian government who was in charge of the integration of the princely states.

Patel said that if we would lay off Hyderabad, we could take Kashmir.^{***} It was a fair offer but the government let it go. In Kashmir, the Maharaja's officials and Dogra troops were plunging into something like a policy of genocide in the province of Poonch. The bloodstained clothes of Muslims, men and women, were being exhibited in tribal territory and the tribesmen were getting excited. They were encouraged by Abdul Qayyum Khan, the chief minister of the NWFP behind the back of Sir George Cunningham (when he discovered what was happening, he said he would resign and I had to beg him to stay).² The thing was done in the worst possible way; the tribes were told this was Jihad. They were even told they could loot villages. This made me very angry. Around the same time, my eldest daughter, Noorjehan, was getting married and I was on

^{***} *This is confirmed by Chaudhari Muhammad Ali in his book 'The Emergence of Pakistan', 1967, pp 299 – 300.*

my way to join family in Karachi.

Editor's Note: ("Iskander Mirza made it clear that the extent of the involvement of the Government of Pakistan in the tribal invasion of Kashmir was one subject in which he felt compelled to refrain from telling 'the whole truth'. Sir George Cunningham: a Memoirs, by Norval Mitchell (Edinburgh) appeared in 1968 and, when he had read the book, General Mirza commented "This has blown the gaff", and indicated that he would now revise his account of the Kashmir imbroglio. He did not get round to this. The following is taken from the very full account in the biography of Sir George Cunningham (Norval Mitchell, pp. 140-49). 'On 25th October Colonel Iskander Mirza arrived from Lahore at Peshawar. "He told me (Cunningham) all the underground history of the present campaign against Kashmir, and brought apologies from Liaquat Ali for not letting me know anything about it sooner. Liaquat had meant to come here last week and tell me about it personally but was prevented by his illness which seems to be fairly serious heart trouble. Apparently, Jinnah himself first heard of what was going on about fifteen days ago but said 'Don't tell me anything about it. My conscience must be clear'. Iskander is positive that Hari Singh (the Maharaja) means to join India.... within three months... it was apparently decided about a month ago that the Poonchis should revolt and should be helped. British Officers were kept out simply not to embarrass them'.

Cunningham decided that the tribal invasion was not his affair, and he recorded 'I am shutting one of my eyes'; but he resisted proposals that regular forces should be sent in, and turned down an order 'by the Ministry' for police from NWFP to go to Kashmir. When the tribal invasion disintegrated, and they returned laden with loot, Cunningham became very worried. He wrote, at the beginning of November; 'I could have found half a dozen excellent grounds for resigning in the last two weeks or so, but I feel that we may be able to get the thing gradually under control again and that one must just try to see it through'. When Cunningham did resign in March 1948, it was due to illness and under medical advice.")

But, on arriving at the airport, I found an urgent message from the Prime Minister telling me to return immediately. I went to my house, congratulated my daughter and flew straight

back to Lahore. There I learned that the Indians had flown in troops to defend Srinagar and were sending reinforcements by road via the Banihal Pass. The Maharaja of Kashmir had acceded to India (this took place on 27 October 1947). I was further told that there was a clash between the Indian troops (Sikhs) and advanced elements of the Lashkar. They had taken a nasty knock and the tribes were running back as fast as they could. I jumped into a car and drove to Rawalpindi as fast as I could go. When I reached there at 10:00 p.m., I drove straight on the Dommel in Kashmir where I met some tribal Mullahs: The Mullah of Kanki, the Pir of Wano and Badshah Gul. They tried their old trick of demanding blackmail: fifty lakhs of rupees to “about turn”. Pushing them aside, I spoke to the tribesmen and, more by luck than anything else, I was able to get the Lashkar to take up a strong position to cover Dommel bridge. The Indians attacked the position but we were able to consolidate our forces. Later we put in regular troops. It was vital for the security of West Pakistan to deny Dommel to the other side.

I know that I have been charged with promoting this tribal invasion. And I know full well that Kashmir is vital to Pakistan. But I refuse to accept any responsibility for this tribal invasion which was executed in the most stupid and childish manner. If our government really wanted to seize Kashmir by force, then, with proper control over the tribes and a few guns, machine guns and a thousand trucks, Kashmir could have been taken in forty-eight hours at the most. The Kashmir army as a fighting machine was far inferior even to that of Hyderabad. The objectives were easy to identify: capture of the airstrip at Srinagar and a few vital points in the Banihal Pass. This would have sealed off Kashmir and India could have done nothing. I repeat, the very stupidity of the tribal operation and the time chosen for it is a good enough proof that the central government had no hand in it. If adventurers like the Chief Minister of the NWFP encouraged and helped the tribes, I have nothing to

say. History, I am afraid, will blame Pakistan for not adopting stronger measures to halt the tribesmen. But it must be remembered that the army was not yet completely operational at the time of the tribal invasion: there were still units allocated to India within Pakistan and we were not in a position to take strong measures.

However, we were fully committed to Kashmir and had no option but to carry on the fight. The whole of the Frontier and even part of Afghanistan were involved. The Afghan tribes, the Suleiman Khels, gathered in large numbers, directed by the Pir of Wano and, from the town of Gujrat in the Punjab, attacked toward Akhnur. But, instead of heading for Akhnur, the Suleiman Khels changed direction and made towards Jammu. In the plains, they were attacked by armoured cars. They came back to Gujrat with quite a few Hindu prisoners and I had great trouble in rescuing them from the tribesmen who believed in killing all male prisoners and distributing the women amongst their own men. These tribes are completely medieval, and innocent (or ignorant) of civilized behaviour.

Other Afghan tribes as well as the forces of the Frontier Nawab of Dir made some daring attacks in the Rajgarh area. The Indian Army was now in full force in Poonch province and in the Kashmir Valley, and it was no use pitching tribesman against them.

The Quaid-e-Azam was watching these events with growing impatience and agitation. He sent for me and he said "Why don't you march in?" I said, "Your Excellency, it's not easy to march in; we are not organized on the ground and, further, we have small arms ammunition only long enough for a fortnight's contact. We can't possibly have a war on our hands." The same thing was told him in much stronger language by Sir Claude Auchinleck, who was Supreme Commander and also by the Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey. After the disastrous falling back, volunteers from the army were encouraged to go into Kashmir for a short time but we found that the Indian

army were pushing in so many men that we had to push in more and more troops. My orders at that time were to drive the Indians out of Kashmir but it was not possible. In the area of Poonch, there had been a considerable popular rising; we tried hard to capture this town and very nearly succeeded but the troops which had been sent in there retired before pushing the attack as they should have done. I cannot understand why that was; we should have been able to capture Poonch without much difficulty. The troops did not go forward with the determination required. One battalion was an Azad Kashmir unit without much experience. But there was also a Brigade of regular troops and they also fell back, too quickly and too far, with the result that a good deal of country in the Poonch area, including the important village of Mehendar, was lost. I wanted to take action against the Brigadier but General Gracey dissuaded me.

These attacks continued in 1948 and then, before the ceasefire was arranged on 1 January 1949, General Gracey came to me one day and showed me a plan which would arrange for the Pakistan Striking Force to be concentrated on the Akhnur border so that we could cut the lines of communication of the Indian troops operation in Poonch so that we could both capture Akhnur and bottle up about five or six Indian divisions. Also, he had a plan by which we had enough troops to protect the Lahore and Sialkot borders. Because the Indian Army in those days was not as strong as it is now, and having so many troops committed in Kashmir, they didn't have many troops to be a worry to us. We had about seven divisions in the Pakistan Army and we concentrated about five divisions in the vicinity. If the Government had allowed us to attack, I have no doubt that we would have captured Akhnur and destroyed about five divisions. It was a forward concentration and they were in a very dangerous position. I had to persuade the Government to give a decision quickly so that we could carry out the attack. General Gracey was in command. His plan was to seize this strategic point and cut off the main army from their lines

of communication and bottle them up in Poonch. But the Government refused. They sat on my proposal for a week or ten days and, in the end, they said it could not be done because the UN would not like it. And we had to fall back on the ceasefire. Otherwise, I am sure that, if this had succeeded, we would have got the whole of Kashmir.

However, in the most northern sector, things went very well. We were able to take over the Gilgit Agency and Skardu. Here, a rising of the Gilgit Scouts was organized by two British officers with the Scouts who were pro-Pakistan. An air link was created by the Pakistan Air Force flying with great daring along a hazardous route between high peaks and appalling weather conditions. One day, Chaudhari Muhammad Ali sent for me and said that a senior official ought to pay a visit to Gilgit in order to boost morale. I suggested several names but, in every case, it seemed that there were compelling reasons why that officer would find it impossible to go. In the end, I said to Muhammad Ali: "Do you want me to go then?" he expressed gratified surprise that I would take on the mission! I stipulated that, if I went, my pension rights must be secured to my family and, on that basis, I departed (14 November 1947).

I found conditions in Gilgit not at all bad despite daily bombing of the little town by Indian Air Force planes. I got the pipe band of the Gilgit Scouts to play after every air raid. This amused the Gilgitis and annoyed the Indians. We had an air raid warning system whereby the town of Gilgit received ten minutes of an approaching raider. This was organized by the Political Agent, Muhammad Alem Khan, a fine officer with plenty of guts. Each time, the Indians tried to blow up the P.A.'s house, and one portion of the house was destroyed. He and I used to run to the shelter the moment the alarm went. I also hoisted the Pakistan flag on a tower at the outskirts of the town. The Indian must have wasted hundreds of bombs, trying to destroy the tower but they only hit it once. I must mention here the bravery of the bomb disposal officer who had accompanied

me to Gilgit. Many times, he carried in his arms bombs which had failed to explode. He collected them all on one side of the river and blew them up. I take my hat off to this young chap and I hope he has had a successful career in the army.

I left Gilgit after some pleasant days in that delightful corner of the world. The Kashmir problem was constantly in our minds. It is my view that, if this conflict had not arisen, relations between India and Pakistan would have been friendly and mutual cooperation would have benefitted both the new states. But, as things were in Pakistan, public opinion would not have permitted any government to give up the struggle. There was constant skirmishing when the Pakistan and Indian armies made contact. But one thing was obvious. Whereas our expenditures over Kashmir was not too heavy, the Indians had to spend enormous sums, while their military transport was getting in a bad way according to our calculations, they had to supply more than five divisions over bad and mountainous roads.

When the ceasefire proposal came out from the United Nations, I was against it as the Indian position was considerably worse than ours at that time, especially in the matter of transport. As a cease-fire is a means towards an end, not an end itself, I begged for a time limit of three months to be fixed for the cease-fire. But all was in vain; I had no support, even from General Head Quarters. The result is that, despite so many UN resolutions for holding a plebiscite and a seventeen days war with India in 1965 (by which time India had become strong, thanks to massive military help from the Great Powers), the Kashmir situation is stagnant and Indo-Pakistan relations are as bad as ever.

IV

POLITICAL
INVOLVEMENTS

For nearly seven years, from 1947 to 1954, I was the permanent head of the Ministry of Defence. During that period, the Defence portfolio was always held by the Prime Minister: Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to 1951; Khwaja Nazimuddin, 1951-53; and Mohammad Ali Bogra, 1953-55. Soon after we settled in at Karachi, Quaid-e-Azam asked me to come and see him once a week to give a report on the armed forces. This seemed a little like going behind the Prime Minister's back but, when I consulted Liaquat Ali Khan about the propriety of this, he told me to go ahead. Although Mr Jinnah did not know a great deal about military matters, it was not difficult to explain points to him and he did not attempt to overrule professional military decisions.

In the Spring of 1948, I was directed by the government to take a mission to Europe to try to purchase ammunition of

which we were short. Owing to the Kashmir impasse, I found that the British government was very reluctant to provide any real help. However, some of my friends in England told me where to go and I was able to make ample purchases at prices which were much lower than I had at first thought I would have to pay. While in England, I was told to buy weapons and ammunitions for Hyderabad state (which was still holding back from adherence to India) and I was told to arrange for an air-lift of arms and ammunition from Karachi to Hyderabad. I was further directed to help the Arabs in their fight with the Israelis. I was lucky enough to be able to arrange the air-lift through Mr Sidney Cotton. This was a dangerous game as the planes had to fly over 600 miles of Indian territory and carry enough fuel for the round-trip to Karachi. As far as I can remember, we only lost one plane after three months of operating.

To help the Arabs was a tricky problem. When I contacted the military attaches of Egypt and other states, they began to ask about their “cut”. In the end, I offered them some 81-mm. mortars with the necessary ammunition. They were to give them back when they had achieved their objective. Needless to say, we never got them back. So, my efforts for both these causes were wasted: Hyderabad would not fight and the Arabs could not achieve enough unity to make a concerted effort. But I had no option: I had to obey the orders of my government.

Although I admired Liaquat Ali Khan as Prime Minister and honoured him as a selfless patriot, I observed one development with apprehension. In order to placate those who demanded that Pakistan become an Islamic state, he introduced an Objectives Resolution.* This did a lot of harm. It was a gift to the mullahs and brought in fanaticism. When I asked him why he felt it necessary to bring the Resolution

* *Out of 75 members of the assembly, 21 voted for the “Objectives Resolution”. All the amendments proposed by minority members were rejected. Consequently, all of them voted against it.*

forward, he answered that he needed to do it to strengthen his position. "Some of these people regard me as an outsider", he said. This was after the death of Quaid-e-Azam and then the Muslim Leaguers began to show what small men they were. By the end of 1949, the government had definitely decided to have a Pakistani Commander-in-Chief for the armed forces. India had already gone ahead in this respect. We had promoted several Pakistani officers to the rank of Major General, but we had not decided whom to make the chief of the Pakistan Army. After careful examination of the records of all the possible candidates, General Sir Douglas Gracey recommended General Iftikhar of Probyn's Horse. He was easily the most gifted Pakistani officer we had. He had a very good brain, was devoted to his profession and had no political ambitions. The Prime Minister accepted the joint recommendations of General Gracey as Commander-in-Chief and myself, as Secretary of Defence, and it was decided to send General Iftikhar for a final grooming at the Imperial Defence College in London. Unfortunately, on his way to England from Lahore, via Karachi, his aeroplane crashed and he was killed, together with his fellow-companion, Brigadier, Sher Muhammad Khan, who had also been selected for the Imperial Defence College, and would have received a high appointment on the General Staff. This tragedy was a bitter blow. Intrigues began among the generals to step into the shoes of General Iftikhar. At the very last moment, the Adjutant-General Ayub Khan, was nominated to succeed Gracey.

During 1950, the Korean War started and a number of countries made contributions towards the United Nations Forces. During a visit to the United States, Liaquat Ali Khan said that Pakistan would send troops to Korea. On receiving the report of the offer, I immediately asked General Gracey to prepare a Brigade Group for active service overseas.

The Brigade would not only gain combat experience but could expect to be given complete arms and equipment. The Turks had despatched a Brigade Group to Korea and by rotating

the forces had managed to get it re-equipped. I intended to do likewise. However, on returning to Karachi, the Prime Minister changed his mind on the advice of Chaudhari Muhammad Ali. The reason given was that the despatch of a Brigade Group would have left us very exposed to possible Indian attack. In my opinion, the despatch of Pakistani troops would have been the best insurance against an Indian attack which world opinion would not have allowed.

Before General Gracey left (in January 1951), we had another alarm in our relations with India. Communal riots broke out at Dacca and the Indians became angry. Before long, my intelligence people started reporting to me that there was a large concentration of Indian forces on the Punjab border. We also heard that the Indian Army's armoured division had left the Jhansi area where it was normally located and was moving up to Jullundar. There was an overall, linear concentration as if for attack. According to our reckoning, all this could only mean one thing: an Indian offensive. However, the scare fizzled out. One reason, I am sure, was a clever trick by General Gracey. He created a "ghost" division in the Multan area by setting up a radio network there and issuing a stream of operational orders to imaginary units. The Indians became worried at the threat of a flank attack from this non-existent division! Also (according to reports reaching us) the Commander of the Indian Air Force, who was still a British officer, informed Pundit Nehru and his Defence Ministry that they had no means of preventing Pakistan from launching an air attack and that Pakistan was in a position to bomb Delhi. This cooled down hotheads in India.

The Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, then went to Delhi and some kind of agreement was reached. After this Indian concentration, I warned the Prime Minister that we did not have the means, from our own resources, to create a really powerful modern army. We had the men: we did not have the armaments. We had one armoured brigade, made up of wartime tanks, Stewarts, and some Shermans with 76-mm guns. In artillery,

we were so short that we could not allocate divisional artillery... in case of war with India, we had planned to hold Lahore and Sialkot as bastions and, if the Indian bypassed these points, to fight a defensive battle on the Chenab River with Wazirabad as the bastion and then to counter-attack with available armour and infantry. But it would be necessary to switch the artillery to the Divisions earmarked for the counter-attack! A very dangerous and unsatisfactory situation and a manoeuvre of extreme difficulty but beggars cannot be choosers. We had to try and find some allies: this was absolutely essential if we were to survive. I began to look around.

When General Ayub Khan assumed command of the army from General Gracey, he inherited a fine force in a high state of efficiency. All the ancillary services (where we had been especially weak at the beginning) were now well organized and trained. General Ayub Khan was lucky to have such a force under him and, in order to make the transition easier, we retained General Mackay as chief of staff. Lieutenant General Nazim Ali Khan, a good staff officer, became his understudy and took over as chief of staff when General Mackay departed, leaving a fine record of work.

General Ayub Khan has devoted several pages of his book *Friends Not Masters* to dimming my image as Defence Secretary. I do not claim to have worked miracles but I did what I could to the best of my ability for our army during difficult days, (at least, they were difficult for me). Indeed, because I felt the need for a relief from the pressure, I put in an application to be considered for an ambassadorial appointment in Iran. The reply came back from the Prime Minister: "I cannot spare him."

Soon after General Ayub Khan took over, there occurred the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy", a plot to murder Liaquat Ali Khan, take over the army and run the country by a military dictatorship. All this came out by chance. The then Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, Mr Chundrigar, was told of the plot by a police officer to whom the leader, General

Akbar, imparted his plan in confidence. Chundrigar informed the Prime Minister who, at that moment, was at camp in Sargodha (Punjab). I remember I was touring in Khairpur State in Sind when I received a telegram to join the Prime Minister immediately. I got there somehow by all means available and, when I reached Sargodha, I met General Ayub. We went in together to Liaquat Ali Khan who was looking very glum as he gave us his information.

I suggested that, before we take any action, we must go to Peshawar to question the police officer, Kiyani, who was the informant. After doing this, we came to the conclusion that there was definitely something going on. First, we got hold of this officer commanding the Bannu Brigade who was in the conspiracy. We confronted him with the evidence we had collected; he was completely nonplussed and obviously frightened. Of course, he denied being involved but, when he got back to Bannu, he telephoned all the other officers in the conspiracy telling them that everything must be called off because the authorities were on to them. We then acted with speed. We arrested General Akbar Khan in his house at Rawalpindi and there we found all the documents relating to the conspiracy. The conspirators were tried and sentenced by a special court. We were quite ruthless in dealing with anyone involved.

Then came the sudden shock of Liaquat Ali Khan's murder in October 1951. I was in Karachi at the time, playing tennis, and a man came running up to me and said the Minister of the Interior wanted me on the phone. So I went to the club telephone and was told "Liaquat has been murdered." He told me that the shot was fired at the Muslim League meeting and the assassin was himself killed on the spot. So, we never got to the origins of the crime. Since Mr Jinnah's death, the office of Governor-General had been held by Al Haj Khawaja Nazimuddin, a grandson of the Nawab of Dacca. He now became Prime Minister while the former Minister of Finance, Ghulam

Political Involvements

Muhammad, took over as Governor-General. Nazimuddin was a very nice, pious man who would have done very well as chief Mullah. As Governor-General, he quietly went about his ceremonial duties leaving Liaquat Ali Khan to run the country. Now, as Prime Minister, he was completely out of his depth.

I was supposed to see him once a week in his capacity of Minister for Defence. It was difficult for me to get to see him. We frequently skipped the interview and I couldn't get a decision from him. I found I could never get answers to the most difficult files; these seemed to disappear under the other files. I told him bluntly that, in the Defence Ministry, we had to have decisions. If he didn't want to take a decision by himself, I was quite willing to bring the files along and stand beside him and take the decision on the spot. But it did not work out like that.

We then had a visit from John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State. Before his arrival, I got on to the army and told them that we were going to put on the best guard of honour that Pakistan could provide. I asked that our crack units should be creamed for the tallest, smartest men. We dressed them up in superb turbans – pagris and kullahs – so that they looked about seven feet tall. Mr Dulles was very impressed. He told me that this was the best guard of honour that he had seen in the whole of Asia. So it ought to have been! We then got down to serious discussions and I broached the subject of military aid. He expressed sympathy.

In the autumn of 1952, I went to Turkey with a military team which included General Ayub as C-in-C. In Ankara, I had a talk with Mr Warren, the American ambassador to Pakistan, and arranged to have a talk with the American Under-Secretary for Defence who was coming a few days later. The talks in Ankara seemed so full of promise that I told Ayub Khan to go

to the United States forthwith to pursue the matter further in Washington. He arranged to cable me in Karachi if there was a chance of success. In due course, a telegram arrived and I mentioned these developments to Mr Ghulam Muhammad. To my horror, the Governor-General decided to go to Washington at once himself. He should not have gone until there was some progress. However, we got a promise of aid. An American military mission assessed our needs and supplied us with artillery though far from enough. We also entered into a secret military pact with Turkey. All this laid the foundations for solid military support which was to come.

However, although things were going better on the Defence and Foreign policy side, on the home front we were sliding from bad to worse. The Mullahs were trying to take over the leadership of the country and some prominent politicians were encouraging them for their own ends. The Mullahs formed a body called Majlis-i-Amal and were directing their fire against the Qadiani Ahmaddiyah community and, in particular, against Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, who was a member of the community. The Mullahs denied that these people were Muslims and demanded the removal of Zafrullah Khan. Nazimuddin was quite agreeable to most of those fantastic demands. Agitation went unchecked all over the Punjab and even in Karachi. I became very worried. Nobody seemed to be prepared to open the eyes of the Prime Minister to the mess into which he was getting himself. After thinking the matter over for a long time, I decided that, as events were reaching a crisis, it was my duty to warn him. I therefore sent him this letter.

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

KARACHI, the 26th February, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

After considerable heart-searching I have come to the conclusion that it is my duty to give you my views for what they are worth, on the present condition of the country and the rapidly deteriorating situation.

2. The problems created by your personal enemies including Mullahs, if not dealt with firmly and now, will destroy the administration and the country. Lately I have been sending my own Intelligence men to meetings, etc. in Karachi – the abuses hurled on you and the Government are of such a violent and offensive nature that the prestige of the Government in Karachi to-day is at the lowest ebb. What the feeling is in the capital to-day will be the feeling in the whole country to-morrow. Such a thing as loyalty and team work does not exist in your Government, both in the Centre and the Provinces. By want of action and Government directive, encouragement is being given to all disloyal elements and selfish and dishonest careerists.

3. Though I am not a very religious man, I have the greatest respect for your religious beliefs and realize your hesitation and dislike for vigorous action against those persons who are working against you in the garb of religion. But is it religion to destroy the very foundation of the administration of the premier Muslim State? In Cairo, Sir Zafrullah Khan is being received with the utmost honour and respect. He is also meeting the heads of all the Arab countries where he has a very high reputation. Whereas in Karachi he is being abused in public meetings and his photographs are being spat upon. Last night he has been cartooned with a donkey's body. Can anybody say all this is not being reported to all the foreign capitals? What then is the position of Pakistan to-day internationally? - and you can imagine the disgust created by all this.

4. There is a school of thought which believes in the doctrine of masterly inactivity. This school harps ad nauseam on our economic situation, on the dangers of a wholesale rising, the

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

food crisis etc., etc. no administration can exist on a basis of fear, especially if it has got to rule Muslims.

5. Don't think for a moment that you have no friends. There are people who will stand by you till the last. I guarantee the Armed Forces will carry out any directive you may choose to give. For God's sake become a courageous leader and take decisive action. Once you do this, the whole country, with the exception of rascals, will rally round you, and the prestige of Pakistan will go up. The country will be saved.

Yours Sincerely,
Iskander Mirza

The Hon'ble Alhaj Khawaja Nazimuddin,
Prime Minister of Pakistan,
KARACHI

Note: When Mohammad Ali Bogra took over the Prime Minister's office, he found my letter in the Prime Minister's desk and returned it to me with the following rather fulsome note attached: "The Defence Secretary is to be commended for a very frank and realistic assessment of the situation as it existed when this letter was written. That – while professing full loyalty and support he warned the PM of the dangers inherent in "flirting" with the fanatical elements in the country – goes to show that he was actuated by a high sense of patriotism and devotion to duty. He tried to make the then PM see "the writing on the wall", and exhorted him, very correctly, to right the subversive elements of the Mullahs which was threatening the safety and security of Pakistan.

Our country is safe, so long as we can count on such selfless devotion to duty and the courage and loyalty of an officer like the Defence Secretary.

Md. Ali
6/8/53

Political Involvements

This letter was handed over to the Prime Minister as he received an ultimatum from the Mullahs, demanding that he declare the Qadianis a non-Muslim minority. That same evening, one of my intelligence men came to see me and said: "Sir, the Cabinet are meeting tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. to decide what action they are going to take about this demand upon the Prime Minister. But the Majlis-i-Amal have decided that about a hundred thousand people will march on the Prime Minister's house at 8 o'clock the same morning." When I questioned him, he assured me that he had been present when the leaders made their plans. So, I at once called for my car and went to the house of the Minister of the Interior, Nawab Gurmani. Gurmani was fast asleep. His bodyguard tried to prevent me from entering his room but I thrust them aside saying that I had serious news and woke the Minister up. When he asked me what was happening, I told him that next morning one hundred thousand men would be on the march. I went on: "the police will not be able to do anything whatsoever. And you will call on the army to shoot. I don't like shooting unnecessarily. This thing has to be stopped before there is shooting." When Gurmani asked what to do, I suggested that we both go to the Prime Minister's house. When we arrived there, we saw any number of Mullahs moving around.

In a little while, the Prime Minister came running in saying: "What is happening?" I repeated the information which my agent had given me. His response was to say: "Double my guard: immediate action." I assured him that, of course, this would be done but asked what else should we do? Nazimuddin turned for guidance to his Minister of the Interior. I said: "Please decide at once. I am ready to carry out orders." The Prime Minister replied, much to my astonishment, that he was not prepared to do anything without consulting the Cabinet. I was surprised that neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of the Interior felt they had the power to do anything.

Anyhow, the Cabinet was summoned. The other

ministers arrived about an hour after midnight and they had discussions and more discussions while I made some phone calls. Then I was asked to join them and I at once said: "Please shorten your discussion because you have only a few hours before you must take action. If you won't take action instantly, it will be too late and you will have to be responsible for the shooting." They asked me what action I would advise. I replied: "I have prepared five columns ready to move. You only have to give the word and they will go in prepared to take up position in the city. You need not expect much trouble."

And that is exactly what happened. We picked the troops, the magistrates and the police for their duties and they took up their positions during the night in certain areas where the mob usually collected. In the morning, when the people got up to come out, they found the police and the army already waiting to receive them. It worked even better than hoped and they did not have to use much force.

Once again, I had applied the technique I had worked out at Pabbi, Akbarpura and Peshawar to defuse the bomb.

One writer has observed: "Weak though Nazimuddin is said to have been, he was somehow brought to take firm action at the last possible moment. Not so Mr Daultana. The flame that was snuffed out in Karachi burst forth into a blazing conflagration in Lahore."**

Every day I was receiving intelligence reports that the situation in Lahore was deteriorating. Things had come to such a pass that the police dared not go into the city because they thought it was too dangerous for them. As things collapsed, I told the Prime Minister that something would have to be done.

He replied: "Yes, yes, something will have to be done.... But let us wait and see." Then he called a Cabinet meeting to which I was asked in order that I might give a military appreciation of the disposition of the troops in the Punjab. It

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Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1963).

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seemed rather unnecessary to me; I was puzzled as to what they intended to do. When I arrived, everyone was talking at once. Then a telephone call came through. It was the Governor of the Punjab, Mr Chundrigar, calling the Prime Minister. He said that Daultana, the Chief Minister of the Province, was also in his office. So, the Prime Minister went to take the call and the other ministers went along to hear what Chundrigar had to say. I sat where I was, thinking that they would not require me after all. But the Prime Minister came back and said that you must also come.

So, I went along with the others. The Governor asked the Prime Minister to speak to the Chief Minister of the Punjab. He (Daultana) said, "Sir, we have lost all control. Either you give in to the Majlis-i-Amal immediately or the whole of Lahore will be burnt down."

Then the Prime Minister repeated this to us in Urdu. I kept quiet thinking that one of the ministers would speak up but nobody said a word. So, I burst out: "Sir, if nobody is saying anything, I had better say something." The Prime Minister asked me what I wanted to say and I replied: "the first thing you had better do is put that telephone down. The Chief Minister had no business to talk like that on an open line. Tell him we are not discussing anything. That's all. And let me go."

He put the telephone down and gave me a strange sort of look adding: "Please give us a military appreciation." Just think: Lahore was about to go up in smoke – what could he do with a military appreciation at a moment like that? I went to the Military Intelligence office and asked for a special scrambler telephone we had to put me through to the Officer Commanding at Lahore, Major General Azam Khan. He came on the line and I said, "Azam, it looks as though the civil have lost control in Lahore. You are to take over immediately and declare martial law. Don't wait for any further orders. I take all responsibility. Declare martial law, take action and finish the thing off."

Azam Khan replied: "Sir, there will be casualties." I said:

“I expect casualties. Or you will not be doing your duty.” I came back to the Prime Minister and told him that I had ordered martial law and also ordered reinforcements to be sent to the Lahore Division. I ordered the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Musa, to ask general headquarters to despatch the Sialkot Division to Lahore to reinforce Azam Khan.

Major General Azam Khan acted swiftly. Control was restored within a matter of a few hours and the most prominent of the Mullahs were taken into custody. However, a certain amount of unrest followed, and Azam Khan started to send me telegrams – with a copy to the Prime Minister – stating: “X number Mullahs shot today.”

At this, the Prime Minister went off the deep end. He called me and moaned, “Colonel, I cannot sleep.” I said: “Why is that, Sir?” “The army is killing these Men of God... And I can’t sleep.” I said: “All right, I will make some arrangements to deal with this.”

I got onto the telephone to Lahore and said to Azam Khan: “You idiot, when you have to shoot these Mullahs, why do you have to advertise that you are shooting Mullahs?”

He said: “What shall I call them then, Sir?” I answered: “Say: so many bad characters shot.” After that, he used this formula, and everyone was happy, except perhaps the Mullahs. And this was how we were running the country.

The military occupation of Lahore took place on 6th March. Daultana started up again the dubious flirtation which he had been conducting with the Mullahs and he was replaced as Chief Minister of Punjab by Malik Firoz Khan Noon, an experienced public servant. This should have strengthened the position of Nazimuddin but, by now, his days were numbered. The Governor-General used to send for me and say: “How can we hope to run the country with this Prime Minister?” I used to keep quiet. What could I say?

After all, Ghulam Muhammad had played a leading part in making him Prime Minister. But the Governor-General came

to a decision that Nazimuddin must go. Ghulam Muhammad pressed for his resignation; Nazimuddin declined. On April 17th, acting under Section 10 of the Government of India Act (1935), the Governor-General announced that he was pleased to dismiss his Prime Minister. Nazimuddin refused to believe that he could be dismissed in this way when he enjoyed the support of the National Assembly and of the Muslim League. He made an appeal to H.M. the Queen as the constitutional Sovereign of Pakistan. Somehow, he was unable to get a telephone connection to Buckingham Palace and so he acquiesced in his dismissal.

They treated him very shabbily after his fall from power. All the official facilities were summarily withdrawn. He had no place in the eyes of authority; at an official reception, I noticed that he had been put among the most junior and subordinate persons present. Once, when my wife gave a dinner, she attempted to do him a little honour. Some person of importance could not come; so she put Nazimuddin in his place instead. There were protests from those whose official dignity was upset by this breach of protocol. Pakistan never treated its fallen leaders with much gratitude. Even the Quaid-e-Azam's sister was ignored and neglected after his death. Again my wife attempted to show courtesy to Miss Jinnah but she was a difficult person and rejected my wife's kind advances.

Who was to be next Prime Minister? Sir Zafrullah Khan suggested the name of Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's ambassador in Washington. He had made himself popular there and we were beginning to seek the friendship of the Americans. Also, he was a Bengali, so the replacement of one Bengali (Nazimuddin) by another would not upset the Bengalis as much as the installation of a politician from West Pakistan.

So Mr Bogra was summoned and, when he arrived, told he was Prime Minister. Bogra also became Defence Minister. As a matter of fact, he knew nothing about the army and was only interested in having (a) guard of honour mounted to give him a

dignified welcome. Still, Bogra was far better than Nazimuddin. He was a more modern type of man and you could get on with him. Although he was always thinking about the political consequences of everything, he did realise that strong action must be taken occasionally. I was rather disappointed in him when I went along with him to Delhi in one of the innumerable attempts to settle the Kashmir question. He habitually called Pandit Nehru “elder brother”, which was wrong, coming from one Prime Minister to another. Also, he went on a shopping spree in Delhi. I said to my wife: “please don’t you buy any saris. We are not going to show the Indians that we need their saris.”

Mohammad Ali Bogra’s first Cabinet was a Cabinet of politicians. They all intrigued like hell. Although I did not know it, I was coming to the end of my time at the Ministry of Defence. As a matter of fact, I was thinking of retirement. I had gone past the full period of service for my pension and I compared notes on the subject with Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, as head of the Civil Service, but I was told that my services were still required. In closing the account of my years at the Ministry of Defence, I must emphasise how much the Ministry did for the armed forces: we got all the money we possibly could at a time when the financial position was bad. We laid the foundations of Pakistan’s membership of SEATO (1954) and the armaments needed to expand and modernize our forces. In particular, we established good relations with the United States and obtained all sorts of benefits including a splendid military cantonment at Kharian.

We could not have attained one-quarter of what was actually achieved but for the brilliance of my deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Sir Walter Cawthorne. He worked in closest liaison with me. His loyalty was a byword. During the Second World War, he had been head of military intelligence in the Middle East. I took his guidance in all situations and his ideas always came up trumps. After he left the Pakistan service, he joined the Australian Diplomatic Service and returned to

Karachi as Australian High Commissioner.

I must also put on record that General Ayub Khan as Commander-in-Chief of the army did a good job and kept up the morale and discipline of the army though, unfortunately, he was not able to get on with some talented officers like Major General Latif Khan and Major General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi.

Early in 1954, I had a recurrence of my old back trouble and had to go to England on sick leave. Just at this time, in April 1954, there was a general election in East Pakistan. The Muslim League was utterly routed by a United Front of opposition parties led by the old guard politician, Fazl-ul-Haq. Soon after, there was a riot at the Adamjee Jute Mills at Narayanganj and 500 people were killed. Bogra began sending me telegrams: "Come back immediately." Although the doctor warned me that, if I discontinued the treatment, there was a good chance that I would end up paralysed, I felt I had no option but to go. Things were obviously bad.

When I returned, Mohammad Ali Bogra told me I was to go to East Pakistan to take over as Governor and restore order. He warned me I would have to take emergency powers in order to put down the rioting. Would I have to inflict casualties? He inquired anxiously. This man had brought me back thousands of miles in order to give me more trouble. I was entitled to play a little game with him. I replied that it might be necessary to shoot five thousand people in order to restore order. At this he lay back and groaned. I went off in a hurry but, before I left, I wired the army commander in Dacca, General Shaikh, unobtrusively to dispose his troops in preparation for an emergency.

When I landed in Dacca, I found that the central government had not notified my predecessor as Governor, Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, that he was about to be relieved, I had the embarrassing task of telling him myself that he would now have to vacate Government House. As soon as I had time to look around, I found that things were not as bad as they thought in Karachi. It was not necessary to use force to restore order;

although the army remained deployed for internal security for several weeks, there were no casualties. Fazal-ul-Haq's ministry was dismissed and the assembly prorogued (though not dissolved). Fazal-ul-Haq was a cunning politician and, like most men in Bengal politics, he had his legs in two countries: Pakistan and India. However, there was no denying that he was shrewd and, in his own way, likeable. It was not long before he staged a comeback.

As I saw it, my job was to restore peace and prosperity to a demoralized province and people. Because almost all the civil servants were either from West Pakistan or were "refugees" (i.e. from what was now the Indian Union), they had bad relations with the Bengalis. Too many of them adopted a superior attitude. Fortunately, the Chief Secretary, Mr N.M. Khan, though from the West Wing, was an exception. He knew everybody and was popular for his fair dealing.

The civil service had become undermined by political interference. A great deal of disaffection had been "exported" by India. There was left wing terrorist activity which, I suspected, was fomented by the communists. The Mazdoor trade unions were simply extremist political organizations, while the students were badly infected by the unrest.

After I had restored law and order and arrested the leading agitators, I turned my attention to reforming the University at Dacca and the colleges at Sylhet and Rajshahi. I found that students and staff had a great many legitimate grievances. The college facilities were very poor and some buildings had been filched for other purposes. I began to make plans to move the University right away from the inflamed atmosphere of Dacca to a brand-new campus about twenty-five miles from the city. I also overhauled the youth organizations and these began to have a good influence on students.

I tackled the poor morale of the police but they lagged behind the police of West Pakistan in discipline and efficiency. The labour situation was stabilized and production began again

at the Adamjee Jute Mills and other textile mills. Then came the problem of distributing cloth and other supplies to the people. Previously it had all disappeared into the black market. I was troubled because so much of the province's trade and industry were in the hands of Marwaris whose homes were in Calcutta.

The condition of the villagers, who formed 98 per cent of the population, was deplorable. I asked for a commission of experts to be supplied by the central government to study their problems, both economic and social. I hoped to launch a programme of development, spending funds in the countryside where it was most needed and also setting up village councils, or panchayats, in order to train the ordinary people in managing their own affairs. I was convinced that Bengal needed a rest from party politics which had been the main cause of the rot which had spread throughout the whole province.

At the beginning of August, all our resources had to be diverted to fighting the unprecedented floods which swept down the great rivers and invaded about 10,000 to 15,000 square miles affecting a population of about 10 Million. The local organizations mainly utilized the situation in order to try to make political capital out of the difficulties and to take credit for relief measures. The army and air force did sterling work in restoring communications, moving supplies and carrying out mass inoculations. American aid agencies came to our assistance very readily. They gave us food, milk, and cloth and provided workers.

I was hoping that I would be allowed to stay in Dacca for two or three years in order to carry out a thorough job of rehabilitation. Instead, I left the province in September and did not return. I had been looking forward to seeing through the reforms which the commission of experts had recommended. As it was, the chief memorial to my four months as Governor was the setting up of a Cadet College at Chittagong on the lines of the public school which Atcherley had established at Sargodha. It is still doing good work in educating active young

Bengalis.

It will be recalled that I had to discontinue my treatment in England at the behest of the Prime Minister. In September, I was again in pain and the doctors warned me that I must finish off the course of treatment. Accordingly, I took medical leave. As I fully expected to return, I took with me the file of my confidential reports to the Governor-General. When, after a week or two, I was again called back to Karachi – this time with no warning at all – I left my wife behind in London and also my confidential papers. By this chance, these papers have remained in my possession: among the very few that I now possess. These reports are reproduced in full in an Appendix as they give a very clear picture of the problems of Pakistan in those days and the means whereby I tried to put things right.

Relations between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister and the National Assembly now reached a critical stage. The Governor-General had continued to exercise important powers under the transitional constitution which was still in all essentials the 1935 Government of India Act. We have seen that he could dismiss a Prime Minister and suspend the Assembly (National or Provincial) under Section 92 of the Act.

On September 22nd, 1954, without any warning and in the absence of the Governor-General, a bill was introduced and passed through the National Assembly in one session which fundamentally amended the constitutional position. In essence, this transferred all power from the Governor-General to the Prime Minister. Henceforth, the Governor-General could only act on the advice of the Prime Minister who would derive his mandate from the legislature. So long as he had the support of the legislature, a Prime Minister was invulnerable. This was Mohammad Ali Bogra's bid to make himself a real Prime Minister, independent of the support of the man who had first put him into power. Having made himself secure (as he thought), he went ahead with arrangements for an official trip to the United States. Ghulam Muhammad was not the man to

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take this lying down. He was a sick man – indeed a dying man. He was away in Washington undergoing medical treatment. But he flew back to Karachi to take up the challenge. On 24 October he issued a proclamation of emergency declaring that the constitutional machinery had broken down and the Assembly could no longer function. A new Assembly would be elected and the ministry would be reconstituted. He had turned the tables on Muhammad Ali: this time he was in Washington and could not effectively reply. At this point, I came into the story. Mr Hassan Ispahani, the High Commissioner in London, phoned me up and asked me to come out to London Airport to meet the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was returning from the United States.

So, I accompanied Ispahani to London Airport but, before we reached there, Muhammad Ali and his party had arrived at the airport. As soon as he saw us, he said, “Don’t you know there is a great deal of trouble in Karachi and that they have just heard from one of the ministers, Mr Malik, on the telephone, that the Governor-General, is about to declare Martial Law?”

I knew nothing about this and was astounded. Just then, General Ayub Khan also arrived from America and joined us. I told Ayub what I heard and he took me aside and said, “Do not propose anything because, before leaving for America I was promised by the Governor-General (Ghulam Muhammad) that I should be asked to take over the country.” I replied, “Look, it would be a very stupid thing to do. He is a very sick man and you must not take everything he says seriously. Let us have time to think and see how things come about when we return to Karachi.”

Then Mohammad Ali Bogra asked me if I could get a special aeroplane so that we could get there quickly. I tried to get a Canberra from the Royal Air Force but it was not possible. So, another aeroplane (I think it was a BOAC Argonaut) was placed at our disposal and all of us, including even Mr Ispahani,

the High Commissioner, flew to Karachi. I did not even have time to say goodbye to my wife, and the same happened to the High Commissioner. On the flight, Mohammad Ali Bogra asked me if I could arrange for some army unit to guard him at the airport. I suggested it could be arranged but asked “Do you think it is really necessary?” He replied that his information was that it would be very necessary. I telephoned to General Musa by air-telephone from the aeroplane to inform him of the time at which we were arriving and could he arrange for an Infantry Company in battle order to be ready on the airport to protect the Prime Minister.* When we landed, we found an enormous and very excited crowd running here and there, with the Director of Civil Intelligence jumping from one side to the other and the whole place like a mad house. I then suggested to the High Commissioner, Hassan Ispahani, to get hold of Bogra, put him in a car and take him to the Governor-General’s house. I would follow later with some others.

When we got to the Governor-General’s house, General Ayub Khan and I went towards the Governor-General’s room (there was no sign up to then of Mr Ispahani and Mohammad Ali Bogra). When we got in there, we saw Chaudhri Muhammad Ali walking about in the room and the Governor-General lying on the floor on a white sheet in a terrible state. He was almost foaming at the mouth and striking out, right and left. His face was red and he was terribly ill and really not quite in his senses. We asked him what had happened and why he was lying on the ground in such a bad state. “Oh,” he said, “I am very angry, I want to get rid of this government, I do not want to see the face of the Prime Minister again. He has been disloyal to me and I want you to take over the country.” So, I talked to him quietly and said, “Look, this is not the way to do things. What will the world say? You wait; Mohammad Ali Bogra must have come

* *The presence of these troops may have given rise to stories reported by foreign correspondents that there was a plot against the Prime Minister. But it was the Prime Minister himself who asked for the troops.*

by now and he will come up and you must see him and have a heart-to-heart talk. You can settle things like that.”

So, one of the servants was sent down and Mohammad Ali Bogra with Mr Ispahani entered the room. In the first minute, I thought that the Governor-General was going to burst and have a mental collapse. But he gradually recovered and then he started talking. He was very furious; however, there was at last a breathing space and they came to an agreement on the basis that a new Cabinet would be formed and the Assembly would be dissolved and things would start de novo the next day. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was running between the Governor-General and Bogra and drafting something for all this to take effect next morning.

The next day, Ghulam Muhammad gave a list of persons he wanted in the Cabinet: Mr Ispahani, General Ayub, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and myself. Mohammad Ali Bogra was to be the Prime Minister and the others Bogra was to select himself.

A proclamation was then drafted by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali in consultation with Bogra and Ghulam Muhammad. This was issued to the press. The new Cabinet was sworn in next day with Ayub Khan as Minister of Defence, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as Minister of Finance and myself as Minister of Interior, States and Frontier Regions. I did not join the Cabinet without a struggle. I had talked with Ghulam Muhammad and convinced him that I ought to go back to Bengal where I was really needed. I did not see that, as Minister of the Interior, I could be of much use to the country. But when Ghulam Muhammad agreed to my returning, General Ayub Khan and Mr Ispahani both said they would not go into the Cabinet unless I was also a member.

And that is how I was roped into that Cabinet misnamed “Cabinet of all the talents” or “Cabinet of brains”.

The two other surprises to the outside world were the inclusion of Mr H.S. Suhrawardy and Dr Khan Sahib. Mr Suhrawardy had been a leading light in the opposition United Front but I had no objection to his joining as he promised

to disassociate himself from extremists such as Maulana Bashani.** Khan Sahib had been under a cloud since his Frontier government was dismissed at the time of Partition. He and his brother had been placed under arrest quite unnecessarily, in my opinion, and only released from jail in 1954. I strongly urged the inclusion of Khan Sahib in the new Cabinet as this would reassure the Pathans.

There were only three of the old Cabinet in the second Muhammad Ali ministry. It was really a new government. I made a statement a few days later, as follows: "Some underdeveloped countries have to learn democracy and, until they do so, they have to be controlled. With so many illiterate people, politicians could make a mess of things. There was nothing undemocratic in declaring a state of emergency because 95 per cent of the people welcomed it."

I made the speech because I was always thinking of the mess which the politicians had made of the country; I believe that, in order to clean up the mess and to work towards real democracy, responsible democracy, we must have controlled democracy so that we didn't run off the rails.

A few weeks later I made another speech in which I said: "democracy requires education, tradition, breeding and pride in your ability to do something well." These were not popular ideas. I know that I ran into a lot of criticism, not only in Pakistan, but in Britain and the United States as well. But I had become convinced that we needed a kind of "training program" for democracy if we were to succeed.

The politicians did not take this without the protest. They challenged Ghulam Muhammad's decision in Courts. But the Supreme Court ruled that the Governor-General's action was constitutional; however, they called on him to arrange for elections to be held in the near future, so as to set up another Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing a constitution.

** *Maulana Abdul Hammed Khan Bashani (also known as Bhashani).*

Elections for the new Constituent Assembly followed early in 1955.

They had peculiar type of election which I have not understood from that day to this. I was elected by a Punjabi group to represent Sialkot, a place where I have never been to. Some of those who were in the Cabinet did not secure election or declined to stand: such were Mr Ispahani and General Ayub Khan and so they left in July 1955.

During the eight months' life of this Cabinet, we managed to get quite a lot done. We were a very mixed crowd in the Cabinet with very different backgrounds. When we had a common problem to decide on, we all gave our views bluntly. It seemed that the most strongly you expressed your views, the greater chance there was a chance of getting acceptance.

In the international field, we negotiated an important security arrangement: the Baghdad Pact. Discussions focused on a pact between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain. The United States was prepared to give support but would not join formally, so as not to upset Egypt with which they wished to keep on good terms.

When the Bagdad Pact was first signed, the members were Britain, Turkey and Iraq. Iran joined soon afterwards. The question for our joining came before the Cabinet. Mohammad Ali Bogra was all for the pact and so was I. Hassan Ispahani was in the Cabinet room and there was not a word of dissent from him. But Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, supported by General Ayub Khan, objected to our joining unless the United States also joined. I sensed that there was going to be a split in the Cabinet on the issue so I proposed that we should postpone our decision and send General Ayub for talks with the Turkish Prime Minister. He could then advise us by telegram to join or not to join. We should accept his advice without further argument.

The Cabinet agreed and Ayub Khan left for Ankara. As we were dispersing from the Cabinet meeting, Mohammad Ali Bogra took me to his office and said: "What have you done? I

had arranged for the pact to be accepted by a majority of the Cabinet.” I replied “The matter would only be delayed for two or three days. All General Ayub really wants is a pat on the back from Mr Menderes. Then he will cable advising us to join.” This happened exactly as I expected. Ayub’s telegram came from Ankara strongly recommending that we proceed without delay. The proposal to join the Bagdad Pact was passed unanimously.

Those persons who later attacked the pact ignored the facts. We received military aid to the value of \$1.5 Billion* and the arms we were given were first-class. I was one hundred per cent in favour of the Bagdad Pact, and equally in favour of CENTO. The maintenance of the status quo in the Persian Gulf area is a matter of life and death to Pakistan.

The biggest problem at this time was to bring the different provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit. One aspect of the problem was the position of the rulers who had acceded to Pakistan. As I was also Minister of States and Frontier Regions, this came within my brief. I talked to the Khan of Kalat, the Amir of Bahawalpur, and the Amir of Khairpur, rulers of the three princely states in Pakistan. All three agreed with the one unit proposal and promised to fall in line. In particular, Bahawalpur acted in a most honest and honourable manner and helped with the amalgamation. The Pathans of the Frontier were strong opponents to the scheme. Rashid and Mian Jafar Shah, ministers in the NWFP government, were very much against the scheme but we talked them round and, ultimately, they accepted. Dr Khan Sahib had an important hand in settling the matter. I had a lot of sympathy for the Pathans and hoped that we might appoint a Lieutenant-Governor for the NWFP and Baluchistan but I could not get this

* Pakistan received military aid from the United States between 1954 and 1965. This greatly enhanced Pakistan’s defense capability as new equipment and weapons were brought into the armed forces, new military bases were created and existing ones were expanded and upgraded and two new Corps commands were formed.

agreed, because the Punjabi element was very much against this.

All this time, Ghulam Muhammad was a very sick man. He had been portrayed as a ruthless autocrat. I would like to recall that, during these months, when I was snowed under work and delayed night after night at the office, the Governor-General used to drive out to my house in order to reassure my wife. He used to have a chair placed in the garden and, though he had great difficulty in talking, he used to converse with my wife, apologizing for my absence and telling her that she must be patient for the benefit of the country. Eventually, he became so ill that he could not exercise his office.

There was a full meeting of the Cabinet on August 4th, 1955. I was asked to withdraw. Then (or so I am told) the ministers, with one exception, unanimously decided that I should be installed as Acting Governor-General.

Chaudhari Muhammad Ali is supposed to have urged that I should assume this post because (he said) I was the man who the previous year had prevented the army taking over the government of the whole country.** On August 7th I was sworn in as acting Governor-General supposedly for two months, while Ghulam Muhammad recovered. But we all knew that he could not come back. From this day, my troubles really began.

** Presumably this related to the incident when Ghulam Mohammad spoke to General Ayub Khan. He was in very bad health and incapable of rational decisions. In my conversation with him, I pointed out that he was the Queen's Governor-General and he could not divest himself of his powers. It did not take him long to realise his position. My view has always been that it was not a serious proposal, and I refuse to take any credit for its being discarded out of hand. If this was the reason for choosing me Governor-General and President; it does not speak much for the intelligence of those responsible.

V

ACTING AS UMPIRE

On 7 August 1955, I was sworn in as acting Governor-General. On that very same day, Mohammad Ali Bogra resigned from the office of Prime Minister. My troubles had begun. I asked him to continue pro tem and look for a new prime minister.

Bogra's resignation was the consequence of the new political situation following the elections for the second Constituent Assembly. From Bengal, there were now only two Muslim League representatives, all the rest belonged to the opposition groups; the Awami League, led by H.S. Suhrawardy, and the United Front, Fazl-ul-Huq's party. So, the Muslim League was now, virtually, a party of West Pakistan and they rejected the leadership of a Bengali with no political following. Meeting at Murree, they elected Chaudhari Muhammad Ali as the new leader of the Muslim League. The exact state of the parties was not clear: some members stood for election as independents and then accepted a party ticket later. But, according to the *Dawn* newspaper at that time, the Muslim League numbered twenty-seven in the Constituent Assembly, the United Front had twenty-three supporters and the Awami

League had thirteen members.

To my astonishment, Chaudhari Muhammad Ali came to see me, accompanied by Gurmani, and represented that it was the opinion of the Muslim League parliamentary party that Mr Suhrawardy should be the Prime Minister. I said: "This is a very peculiar way of forming a new government because – in any constitution – the largest party forms the government. I really cannot understand how can I override this obvious convention." I went on: "I am going to ask you, Chaudhri Sahib, to form a government. If you are unsuccessful in this task, it is up to you to come back to me and tell me that you have failed. But you can't tell me to ask this man, or that, to be Prime Minister. Now it is for you to try to form a government and come back to give me the names of your new ministry." Muhammad Ali then said that he would like to be Prime Minister and carry through the new constitution on which he had already done a lot of hard work. He asked me to try to win over Mr Suhrawardy to support him. I promised that I would do this.

During the next few days, the newspapers were full of rumours. Suhrawardy was tipped as the next Prime Minister. The Muslim Leaguers were short of a majority in the assembly (whose total number was eighty). Suhrawardy refused to join the government, except on his own terms, so Muhammad Ali was compelled to look elsewhere for allies. He came to an understanding with the United Front. On August 11th, the new government was sworn in. Five of the ministers had been members of the old government. These included Khan Sahib. Apart from Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, the League ministers were not very impressive. Fazl-ul-Haq was now Minister of the Interior. Considering his recent performance in Bengal, this was not a very promising appointment. One commentator observed at this time politics khalas aur administration chaloo ("Politics go out, administration starts up"). But actually, this was a cabinet of politicians with only Chaudhari Muhammad Ali as an administrator member. One left-wing member of

the Constituent Assembly, Mian Iftikharuddin, looking at the government benches and opposition benches, wittily called the assembly the “House of Musical Chairs”. As we were to see, he was all too right.

The first big measure posted by the new assembly was the Establishment of West Pakistan Act. Passed on September 30th, which came into force on October 14th. The whole of the West Wing was now merged into one unit centered upon Lahore. In the new set-up, the two most powerful men in West Pakistan would be Governor and the Chief Minister. Nawab Gurmani was appointed Governor. The question of the premiership rested with the Muslim League, still the unquestioned majority party in the West Wing.

Meanwhile, people were talking about the position of Governor-General. The two months during which I was “acting” were coming to an end. It was known that Ghulam Muhammad was no better in health. He ended the uncertainty by issuing a letter of resignation. The government requested the Queen to confirm my appointment as Governor-General and, on 7 October 1955, I became the permanent Head of State. In my speech at the swearing-in ceremony, I tried to suggest that, as we were drafting a new constitution, we should try to make a new start putting behind all the bickering and faction and division of the last years. I said: “Democracy presupposes the existence of a national approach in solving our problems. We must cease to think in terms of the interest of the East and West Wings of Pakistan and look at every problem from a national point of view. Democracy cannot function successfully and efficiently unless we place our allegiance to Pakistan above all local loyalties. In a democracy, the political parties have to place the interests of the nation above party interests..... The intelligentsia is the backbone of every society. This class, in our society, has become an unfortunate victim of frustration. This has impaired the flowering of our genius.”

I ended: “Do not harp too much on the past. Mind the

present, and look to the future with hopes and resolution.”

My appointment was greeted by the press in a friendly style. *Dawn* emphasized that I was a “strong man” and that I was above party politics. As head of an Asiatic state, one has to get used to flattery and to abuse but I think *Dawn*’s estimate was right. As regards being a “strong man”, all my training and experience had prepared me so that, when a decision had to be taken, I was ready to take a decision and, when responsibility had to be carried, I was prepared to take responsibility. As regards to party politics, when I became a member of the National Assembly, I had to take a party label so I took the Muslim League ticket. But I took no part in the affairs of the League (as Chaudhari Muhammad Ali was doing) and, when I resigned from the Assembly, I resigned from the Muslim League so that my membership lasted just about six weeks.

All the same, I was not left to occupy the position of an umpire. I was now installed in the office which had been held by the Quaid-e-Azam and the British Viceroys before him. They had not just been passive spectators of the political scene. In addition, I had to cope with a National Assembly in which no party had a majority. Quaid-e-Azam had been able to command the Muslim League to do what he wanted. After his death, the Muslim League, released from his stern control, showed itself a collection of office-seekers and become only one of several parties. At the time of my assumption of office, there were three major political parties (soon to be joined by a fourth), together with small parties and independents. Politicians were changing sides all the time. No party was able to command a clear majority in the National Assembly or in the provincial assemblies. And so, when a Prime Minister was in danger, he appealed to me to get him out of trouble. I was an umpire whom the different sides also wanted to lead their own teams. I soon had a taste of what I was in for over the choice of a chief minister for West Pakistan.

It was obvious to everybody that the Punjabis had gained

most out of the “One Unit” reforms Their capital, Lahore, was the political centre. They dominated the assembly and also the civil services. The Pathans, with their spirit of independence, were not reconciled to the new set-up. Abdul Ghaffar Khan joined hands with the Sind leader, G.M. Syed, to launch a popular movement to overthrow the One Unit structure (which, by the way, I firmly supported).

It would help to restore the confidence of the Pathans if one of their people became the chief minister. The obvious man was Dr Khan Sahib.

The first move came from the leaders of the Muslim League. The Prime Minister asked if he could bring a deputation to meet me in Karachi. Chaudhari Muhammad Ali arrived, bringing Nawab Gurmani, Mr Chundrigar (who had entered the National Assembly in the seat I had vacated and was now Law Minister) and Mumtaz Daultana, the leader of the Punjab Muslim League. They urged that, in view of the Afghan situation, it would be desirable to have Khan Sahib as chief minister. I replied that, of course, Dr Khan Sahib was an old friend of mine and one of the finest gentlemen in the country. But he was not a clever man nor a real politician. Unless the Muslim League was prepared to give him all-out support, he would get into a mess. This would create a worse situation of bitterness and suspicion in Afghanistan and among our own Pathans. But everyone present promised full support and an announcement appeared stating that Dr Khan Sahib would be given Muslim League backing as chief minister of West Pakistan.

On 8 January 1956, the draft of the proposed constitution was published. I was very doubtful about two of its features. I was opposed to inserting Islamic provisions into the machinery of government. We have seen how Liaquat Ali Khan’s “Objectives Resolution” gave a handle to the Ulema and allowed them to go on and almost destroy Pakistan in 1953. But the Muslim League never learnt anything from the past experience. Despite my repeated warnings, Muhammad Ali deliberately created

an “Islamic Republic” for Pakistan giving the Ulema another invitation to interfere. Maulana Maudoodi and his party were given a heaven-sent opportunity to mess up the state. Secondly, I was worried about the absence of any firm, fixed element in the government. I wanted to see a President at the head of the executive in the American fashion. Chaudhari Muhammad Ali and the others insisted on the “Westminster Model” of democracy. It never occurred to them that British parliamentary democracy had taken root because, throughout English history, the crown had provided a point of stability. Queen Victoria had played an important part in the government when, during the middle period of her reign, ministries had functioned with weak majorities or actually in a minority. King George V had intervened to form a National Government at a moment of national crisis. Even nowadays, when Sir Anthony Eden resigned without recommending a successor, Queen Elizabeth II had passed over Mr R.A. Butler, the deputy Prime Minister, to ask Mr Harold Macmillan to head the government. So, at the centre of things, there was a permanent head of state. The politicians could not see this. During the constitutional debates, they harped on the necessity to make the President follow the advice of the Prime Minister and give way to the “sovereign” power of the Constituent Assembly. They ended up by writing in some ambiguous provisions such as: “The Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President but the President shall not exercise his powers unless he is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly.” How did they expect this to work in the situation we had where politicians were switching their loyalties all the time? The point was that, in a crisis, somebody had to take responsibility and, in practice, this usually turned out to be myself.

During the constitutional debates, Mr Suhrawardy announced that he was not prepared to vote for this constitution and he walked out. This did not prevent him using and abusing

the constitutional set-up later. The constitution passed through the Assembly on 17 February and came into effect on 23 March. There was no candidate for the office of the President except myself and I was elected by the unanimous vote of the new National Assembly (actually, of course, identical with the previous assembly). I knew very well that the politicians thought they had put me on the shelf. They never tired of saying that Pakistan only had a President *nam ke waste* (in name only). They boasted that they had divested me of all real power; I knew that they would constantly ask me to help them whenever they got into difficulties. And that is exactly what happened in the next few months.

The Muslim League members of the West Pakistan legislature met on 3 April to consider the endorsement of Dr Khan Sahib as Chief Minister. Although this plan was the work of Muhammad Ali, most of his supporters were opposed to the idea. They still regarded the doctor as their enemy. They wanted a Leaguer at the head of the Ministry. Daultana, always ready to go with the tide, encouraged the revolt.

I was touring in Azad Kashmir at this time when I received a telephone call from Dr Khan telling me that the League had refused to give him support and intimating that he was thinking of resigning. I told him not to do anything hastily. I promised I would come to Lahore immediately and contact Nawab Gurmani as Governor. In Lahore, Gurmani advised Khan Sahib to hang on. He expressed the hope that, given time, the situation would right itself. There was no talk on this occasion of forming a new party but I could see that Dr Khan Sahib was in a very angry frame of mind. I returned to Karachi; Nawab Gurmani was an old hand at this game, a wily politician, infinitely better qualified than I was to settle the affair.

In Karachi, after a week or so, I received a telephone call from Khan Sahib to say that he was forming a new party to be called the Republican Party. Already a large number of Muslim Leaguers – both members of the provincial assembly

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and members of the national assembly – had joined the new party. I said: “Have you consulted Nawab Gurmani?” He replied “Gurmani is the man who has put this idea into my head.” I was flabbergasted. I asked if it was necessary to break up the Muslim League in this manner. He replied that it was necessary. Well, I had to accept the fait accompli. I knew that it is generally believed that I had a hand in the formation of the Republican Party but this simply is not true. I backed up Dr Khan Sahib. But I was never his master. And really, I had no desire to see yet another party to join in the struggle for power. A little later, Dr Khan Sahib came to ask me to suspend the constitution so that he did not have to face the assembly. I refused to intervene as there was no breakdown of the political system. Actually, he got on alright. Chaudhari Muhammad Ali was very annoyed but he did nothing to stop Khan Sahib’s activities. With a few weeks, leaders such as Sir Firoz Khan Noon and Nawab Qizilbash had joined him and, when the budget session of the West Pakistan assembly took place early in June, he got his budget passed by the comfortable majority of thirty.

All this time, trouble was brewing up in East Pakistan. Since June 1955, ministerial government had been restored with a United Front government led by Abu Hossain Sarkar. It was a corrupt and feeble government which was afraid to confront the provincial assembly. Towards the end of May, the assembly was at last summoned to meet. The governor suspended the constitution but I restored ministerial government on 1st June. The Sarkar ministry stumbled on until August when at last it resigned and was replaced by an Awami League ministry led by Aatur Rehman Khan. Both in West and East Pakistan, there was ample excuse to suspend the constitution and take back the government under my direct control. But I gave the provincial politicians the opportunity to do things in their own way.

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Meanwhile, I was able to do something to improve relations

with our neighbour, Afghanistan. Ever since Partition, these relations had been unhappy because of the Pashtunistan question. There came an open breach in 1954 when our Embassy in Kabul was burnt down and the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army threatened to march upon the city. Relations between the two countries were broken off and almost all trade came to a halt.

I had tried to understand the Afghan point of view ever since the days when I was Political Agent, Khyber, and Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Political Agent, Mohmands. I came to the conclusion that the Afghan suffered from being land-locked and had developed a phobia about control of their outlets to the Indian Ocean. I believed that it was necessary to give them direct access to the sea. It was also necessary to secure their cooperation in the affairs of the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier. The latter proposal would, I knew, be considered dangerous by the officers of the old Indian Political Service. But Afghan interference among the tribes of the Frontier was always a fact from the early days of British rule and before. The British had always had to accept, in practice though not in principle, the existence of an Afghan party among the Mohmands, the Waziris, the Afridis, the Mahsuds and in Bajaur.

From the inception of Pakistan, its leaders tried to kill the Pashtunistan demand by pretending that it did not exist. But Pakistan could not afford to alienate Afghanistan. Pakistan did not have the might of the old British Empire to draw upon and we had to take into account the increasing animosity of India who had much larger resources and armed forces at least three times larger than those of Pakistan. A belligerent and uncompromising attitude to Afghanistan might throw that country into the arms of India and perhaps give Russia a chance to gain influence. I saw no sense in following this negative policy.

Approaches were made to the King of Afghanistan but it proved difficult to fix a meeting. At last I received a firm

invitation to visit Kabul in August 1956. I arrived on 7th August in an atmosphere still bedeviled by the incidence of 1954. I received a cordial reception from His Majesty though the Prime Minister, Sirdar Muhammad Daud Khan (or H.R.H. Prince Daud), did not look very cheerful. There were large crowds by the roadside. They looked friendly and the threat given out by Afridi malcontents to make trouble en route did not materialize. The whole atmosphere lightened after the banquet given by the King at the Dilkusha Palace on 8th August. In his speech at the banquet, His Majesty said that Afghanistan had no territorial claims of Pakistan and was looking forward to a period of co-operation and friendship between the two countries. In my reply, I welcomed the King's declaration that there were no territorial problems and reciprocated his desire for friendship and cooperation. In quiet, fifteen minutes with the Prime Minister, I found him to be a man of great wisdom and an Afghan patriot. I knew that I would be able to get on well with him as he was honest and blunt with the shrewdness of a real statesman. I was confident of removing his suspicions given time.

The next day, there was a formal meeting presided over by the King and attended by all the important Afghan ministers. I found, to my relief, that the Afghan demand for Pashtunistan was no more than a desire to ensure for the Pathans equal rights with the other peoples of Pakistan (Punjabis, Sindis, etc.) and with the Pashto-speaking tribes within Afghanistan. I expressed my great relief that Afghanistan did not mean to try to separate the NWFP from Pakistan as this would mean the destruction of our national unity. I went on to put up some draft proposals for consideration namely the railway from Landi Khana, which connected the Khyber Pass with the Pakistan system, to be extended for some miles into Afghanistan; an import enclave, under Afghan control, to be constructed at the port of Karachi and sealed goods wagons to be available for Afghan imports and exports through Pakistan. I also hinted that I had a plan

for introducing an Afghan voice into the affairs of the Pashtun tribes of the NWFP which I would raise later.

There was one event which I greatly regretted during my Kabul visit. I had arranged for a further private discussion with the Prime Minister. I wanted to expand my proposals for Afghan participation in tribal councils and try to get his definite consent. Unfortunately, Prince Daud had an accident; he slipped in his bathroom and fractured three ribs. My last interview with him at Kabul took place at his sick-bed. I regard this as a stroke of really bad luck.

After my visit, our ambassador, Mr Aslam Khattak, did magnificent work in restoring relations. In December 1957, the King and Prince Daud visited Karachi. As regards Afghan participation with Pakistan in the affairs of the tribes, I suggested the following to the King as a skeleton program: A grand tribal assembly, a Jirga of all the tribes, to be called at Peshawar and to be attended by the King of Afghanistan and the President of Pakistan, with some of their ministers. In this Jirga, the tribes could express their satisfaction that Afghanistan and Pakistan were again friends and the hope that this friendship would always remain. In my own mind, this formula would provide a face-saving device whereby the prestige of the Afghan leaders would be satisfied.

The King invited me to visit him for a shoot during the winter of 1958 and was intended to settle the details of our joint meeting and Jirga. But, after I had to leave Pakistan, the idea remained stillborn. Thereafter, relations between the two countries deteriorated and, once again, diplomatic relations were broken off and even all the consulates were closed. Thanks to the mediation of the Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah) of Iran, relations have recently greatly improved.* It seems that Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah) has actually allocated an Iranian port to

* *Tehran mediated reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan when tensions surfaced during the 1960s owing to differences over the Durand Line demarcation.*

the Afghans and a rail link is being constructed. This will need to be a very long line of communication whereas, if my plan had been adopted, it would have been necessary only to construct about thirty miles of railway from the Khyber rail-head towards Jalalabad.

Let us hope that, in future, there will be greater understanding between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: perhaps, eventually, a loose form of confederation.

I was growing increasingly uneasy about the condition of Chaudhari Muhammad Ali. Conscientious and able as he was, he did not seem to have much political grip as the affair of Dr Khan Sahib showed.

Despite advice repeatedly given by me, and also by several of his friends, he offered the presidency of the Muslim League to Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. I said: "you have known Nishtar for ten years. I have known him for twenty-five years. Don't do this." Of course, in the days of the Quaid-e-Azam, the leader of the party and the Head of the State had been one. For a time, after Jinnah's death, Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman had been President of the League. This had not worked and, thereafter, the Prime Minister was President. Now, in January 1956, Muhammad Ali moved the nomination of Nishtar as President.

Nishtar was the son of a Mullah and completely fanatical in his views. He had been Governor of West Punjab and he had openly shown his fanaticism. He refused to take salute at a parade on the Mall in Lahore, because there was a statue of Queen Victoria nearby (a graven image, abhorrent to a pious Muslim). He attended a girl's hockey match but refused to shake hands with the members of the team because they were females. Now he began to behave as though he were above the government, adopting a dictatorial attitude. He gave Muhammad Ali no peace and I could see that the Prime Minister was rapidly losing his nerve. Things began to prey upon his mind and he was heading for a nervous breakdown. He started coming to my office almost every day. At times he

used to weep and implore me to put an end to his existence as he was responsible for so many mistakes.

The crisis came suddenly. On returning from a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, Muhammad Ali convened a meeting of the coalition groups supporting him in parliament. Several Muslim League members deliberately absented themselves. Nevertheless, the meeting gave the Prime Minister a vote of confidence. In his nervous condition, this was not enough. He decided that he no longer had the support of the League, and must therefore cease to be a party member. Undoubtedly, he could have joined in leading the Republicans but he also decided to resign as Prime Minister. I urged him to reconstitute his ministry and stay on (as) Premier. But he pleaded with me to let him go. I therefore had no option but to accept his resignation. I arranged for him to go to London for hospital treatment and he was away for about three months. Chaudhari Muhammad Ali was (and is) an honest and clever man but he suffered from indefinite peculiarity inherent in officers of the old Indian Audit and Accounts Service. During the 150 years of British rule, Audit and Accounts officers were never posted away from the central government. In Pakistan, this service was in control from the very beginning. Somehow, they were too remote from the actual conduct of affairs. They did not know how to handle men.

What next? On September 10th 1956, a presidential announcement was issued as follows: "The President today requested Mr Muhammad Ali to come back as Prime Minister as, in his judgement, he still commands the confidence of a majority in the National Assembly but Mr Muhammad Ali declined the offer. The President has therefore called upon Mr Suhrawardy to help him form a Ministry."

It will be recalled that Mr Suhrawardy had only thirteen supporters in parliament. He therefore joined forces with the Republicans who now marshalled thirty supporters in the National Assembly. Together, the coalition had a small majority.

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Given strong and undivided support in parliament, I have no doubt that Mr Suhrawardy could have provided Pakistan with a stable government which was sorely needed. He was an outstanding parliamentarian; indeed, he had no peer in Pakistan. He had plenty of courage and a brain as sharp as a razor. His weakness was women: where they were concerned, he was an idiot. In addition, he had an extraordinary knack for choosing the wrong men – both politicians and officials. Having chosen them, he kept them close beside him and was influenced by them. He never shirked responsibility and a crisis saw him at his best. But he was not cut out to be a leader of the minority section of coalition.

At once he found himself at odds with his Republican partners over the issue of the electoral basis: whether, as in undivided India, there should be “communal” electorates – that is to say, special constituencies for Muslims, Hindus, Christians, etc. – or whether there should be general territorial constituencies in which all the electors voted for the candidate of their choice (who, in theory, might be from any religion). In Bengal, the opponents of the League had come into power by forming alliances with Hindu organizations (the Hindus still formed a large minority in East Bengal). In the West Wing, there were only a handful of minority peoples – Christians and a few Depressed Class Hindus – but, strangely enough, the pressure to preserve the system of separate electorate was very strong in West Pakistan.

The constitution had ducked the problem leaving it to be settled later. In 1955, soon after I became Governor-General, the Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly came to me in a body and said that they would like to have joint electorates. I could see no objection to this because separate electorates had been introduced to safeguard the minority: and they were the minority. I took the question up with the Muslim League leaders including Chaudhari Muhammad Ali and Chundrigar. All replied in the strongest terms that they would give complete

support to joint electorates. I passed on these assurances to the Hindu leaders. Then – on what grounds and why, I have no idea – the Muslim League went back on its assurances. This was an enigma to me for why should the majority require protection against the minority. The Awami League was in favour of joint electorates. The Republican Party was in favour of separate electorates. In my own opinion, Suhrawardy and his party were absolutely right. I went to Dacca and sat on a platform at a meeting in order to demonstrate my support for Suhrawardy. He told me that, if he had to give way on this issue, his own party would renounce him. A compromise was agreed upon whereby East Pakistan was to have joint electorates and West Pakistan was to have separate electorates.

The next crisis came in the field of international relations. The latter part of 1956 witnessed President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, the long negotiations between the user nations (of course, Pakistan's trade with Europe was badly affected) and, finally, the Franco-British military action.

I had a long-standing invitation from the Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah) to proceed on a State Visit to Iran. Late in October 1956, I was ready to depart on the visit. Mr Suhrawardy was in China at that time and was due to return to Pakistan the day after I left. On the eve of my departure from Karachi, I received a call from the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom bringing a cable from Mr Harold Macmillan, then British Foreign Secretary. This informed me that a Franco-British attack on Port Said was imminent in order to secure the Suez Canal. I expressed my surprise that, as the Head of (a) Commonwealth country, I had not been informed until I was faced with a *fait accompli*. As I was about to go to Iran, I said that I would send a telex message to the (Shahenshah) Shah-in-Shah requesting him to invite the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Iraq (our partners in the Baghdad Pact) to come to Tehran to discuss the situation and formulate a plan for joint action. Before I left, I received an answer from the Shah informing

me that the Prime Ministers would come to Tehran during the period of my visit. I took off from Karachi at about 4 a.m. and reached Tehran about 9 a.m. I had talks with His Majesty while we awaited the arrival of the other leaders; they reached Tehran at different times.

There was a state banquet at the Gulistan Palace that night and the next day things began to move. We began our joint discussions with the Shah taking the chair at our meetings. It was not an easy situation. As Muslims, our sympathies were with Egypt and we knew the public opinion would react violently to the Franco-British invasion. But, as members of the Baghdad Pact, we did not wish to take action which might disrupt the Pact. We could only await developments.

That night, at about 2 a.m., I received a message from our Ambassador, General Raza, that the British Ambassador wished to see me urgently. He arrived at 4 a.m. to tell me that the British Government has passed on the information that the Prime Minister had declared a mass meeting in Karachi that he was going to take Pakistan out of the Commonwealth. I told the Ambassador that all this was a complete surprise to me; I added that he could assure the British Government that, so long as I was President of Pakistan, we would not leave the Commonwealth so easily. I told the British Ambassador that I needed time to think over what action I should take and I asked him to come back and meet me later in the morning.

When the Ambassador left, I tried to get some sleep but I could not rest because I was so worried. I sent for my Military Secretary, gave him a letter for Suhrawardy and sent him back to Karachi in the presidential aeroplane with instructions to see the Prime Minister immediately holding the plane in readiness to leave again. In my letter, I informed Suhrawardy of the presence of the other Prime Ministers of the Baghdad Pact countries and asked him to attend. He arrived the next day. At first, he was anti-British (having, at an earlier time, been noticeably anti-Nasser). However, the tact and firmness

of the Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah) began to have effect. Mr Suhrawardy saw the necessity to keep calm. We returned to Karachi and he played his part in defending our foreign policy notably in a speech at Dacca in December. This got him into trouble with a faction of the Awami League led by Bashani (who had been responsible for so much of the trouble in East Bengal in 1954). The “pro-Western” foreign policy was challenged at (a) conference of the party but Suhrawardy managed to secure a victory over the Bashani group.

This episode had ended with Mr Suhrawardy emerging as a firm friend of Iran and an admirer of the Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah). I was thinking that I would be able to cooperate with him until such time as elections came along but this was not to be.

The next explosion came in West Pakistan. G.M. Syed and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had aroused a great deal of support for carving Sind and the Frontier out of the West Wing. Both in the Muslim League and in the Republican Party, there were dissident elements who were still opposed to the One Unit idea. Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry began to break down. In the absence of any visible alternative (for both the Republican Party and the League were in a state of flux), it was necessary to have recourse to emergency powers; on the night of March 20–21, the constitution was suspended at Mr Suhrawardy’s request. There was an outburst of protest.

I felt that the time had come for some plain speaking. So, two days later, I made a speech in which I suggested that any further pressure for more local autonomy would mean the complete dismemberment of Pakistan. I went on: “Another malaise from which we have been suffering for the last ten years is the peculiar working of our parliamentary system. We have adopted it from the British system which was evolved in England over the course of centuries and is suited to the peculiar genius of the British people. But, in its application to our own conditions, we find that our Ministers, when in power, have to devote all

their energy and ingenuity to keep the parliamentarians happy even at the cost of elementary requirements of administration. The removal of the malaise requires serious consideration. I commend to your consideration a careful study of the American system of administration with necessary modifications to suit our own conditions. But, here again, the will of the people must prevail and, if you are happy with the present state of affairs, I have nothing more to say.”

Even in the perilous state we had now reached, the politicians were so intoxicated with their notion of democracy that they refused to consider any modification while all my enemies (of which there were no shortage) screamed that I was plotting to create a system of personal power for myself. Parliamentary government was restored in West Pakistan in July and almost at once the weakness of Khan Sahib’s position was exposed. Although a count of the Republican members showed 148 Republicans in an assembly of 300, they were not united behind Dr Khan. He resigned from the leadership and another Pathan, Abdul Rashid, became Chief Minister in August 1957. Out of office, Dr Khan Sahib made a speech at Peshawar calling for “honest politics”. He urged that “a revolutionary council should be set up to govern the country.” This did not please the politicians, either.

The Republicans were openly attacking the One Unit. Suhrawardy went on a tour of West Pakistan in which he defended the One Unit principle and thereby opened up attack on the Republicans. Dr Khan Sahib and others came to me with complaints about the Prime Minister’s speech-making tour. Another cause for complaint was that both the economic portfolios – those for Industries and Commerce – were held by Bengali (Awami League) ministers. I tried to bring the two parts of the coalition back into harness. I convened a meeting with Dr Khan Sahib and two other Republicans to meet Mr Suhrawardy; the meeting went on for four hours and was very exhausting. But, by the end, it seemed that the difference had

been cleared up. I arranged for a final meeting the next day when both sides would put their signatures to an agreement that one of the economic portfolios would go to the West and one to the East.

Next morning, while I was still in bed, my wife drew my attention to the newspaper where it was stated that the Prime Minister was demanding that the National Assembly be summoned so that the government should receive a vote of confidence. I thought that this was another example of newspaper sensationalism but, a few minutes later, a letter arrived from the Prime Minister (sent by special messenger) making the demand that parliament be summoned. I was furious. In my opinion, this was not an honest way for a Prime Minister to proceed. I phoned up Suhrawardy and accused him of double crossing me. I reminded him that we had made a definite agreement involving the departure of one Bengal minister, Mr Abdul Mansoor, yet he was now appealing to the Assembly, publishing his decision in the newspapers before he even had the courtesy to consult me. I issued an ultimatum: he must resign within two hours or I would dismiss him. Suhrawardy came round to meet me and actually wept. He pleaded for reconsideration but I replied: "Nothing doing". And so, he put (in) his resignation. The cause of this volte face was Suhrawardy's private secretary, an officer of the Indian Civil Service, Aftab Ahmad, who egged him on to demonstrate that he was the boss. So Suhrawardy fell a victim to bad advice. The sequel to this episode was that, when the next ministry was formed, Suhrawardy and Khan Sahib became best friends.

After Mr Suhrawardy went, I again had to look around. I asked Mr Chundrigar, the leader of the Muslim League parliamentary party, to form a government. The League had now come out in favour of One Unit. Chundrigar gained the support of the Republicans (or some of them). He also brought in Fazl-ul-Huq's Krishak Praja Party and some Hindu leaders. Six days after Suhrawardy's departure, Chundrigar was sworn

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in as Prime Minister. He was able and honest, absolutely straight though not brilliant. The cleverest man in the new ministry was Mumtaz Daultana who had a first-class brain. I hoped that the new government could survive until we were able to hold general elections in February 1959 though I was worried that the ministry had to rely upon Republican support. The Republicans had turned out to be an unprincipled lot.

A state visit had been arranged to Jordan, Portugal and Spain. I had already been compelled to cancel the Jordan part of the visit because of the political crisis but, as soon as the Chundrigar Cabinet were in the saddle, I set out to Europe. I stayed a few days in England and France and then arrived in Portugal. At once I started getting telegrams from Chundrigar complaining that the Republicans were up to old game of intrigue. However, I went ahead with the visit as planned. When I returned to Karachi, there was Mr Chundrigar on the airfield. He was very unhappy and said that the coalition had almost broken down. I burst out: "Look: on the one hand you say that the President is only for show. On the other hand, you make him do all the dirty work. Why on earth should I come into this?"

Chundrigar insisted that the situation required my help and guidance. So, once again, I sent for Dr Khan Sahib and demanded to know what the trouble was about this time. Dr Khan Sahib produced a few newspaper cuttings and said that they proved that Chundrigar and Daultana were damaging the interests of the Republican Party in order to further the Muslim League. I read the speeches through carefully and could not see any harm in them. I said: "Look, the Muslim League has been in existence for umpteen years. You only have a two-year old show. Why shouldn't they try to gain support for their party? Why can't you do the same?" The Republicans' contention was that, during the period of coalition, there was an understanding that neither the Republicans nor the Muslim League should speak in support of his own party. To my mind, this was

absurd. I told Khan Sahib that it was high time he and his party stopped behaving like children. The whole affair would have been laughable except that their unending pranks were making the existence of any government impossible and doing terrible damage to Pakistan. But the Republicans had made up their minds to break off relations with the Muslim League. Mr Chundrigar handed in his resignation.

I asked him to continue for another month in the hope that I might be able to do something. I just could not understand why it was that Khan Sahib and Suhrawardy were now as thick as thieves. I tackled Dr Khan, saying: "One day you are kicking each other and the next day you are blood brothers."

He replied: "This is politics." In his heart of hearts, Dr Khan hated the Muslim League. This came out clearly in our interview. I told him that he could not go on like that but I could not do anything. At this point, I even offered to resign if that would clear the air. But it was no use.

I was determined to keep Khan Sahib and Suhrawardy, the main organizers of difficulties, out of office. I sent for Sir Firoz Khan Noon. He was in London at that time but his friends told him to return and he came back in a hurry.

I had realized for some time that Republican tactics were designed to get them back into power. I had to have a government and I knew that the Republicans would have the support of the Krishak Sramik Party (Suhrawardy was also supporting them without wanting to come into the ministry). Sir Firoz was a great gentleman. He was absolutely honest and well-meaning but he did not have the capacity to be the Prime Minister of an impossible country as Pakistan had become. He was not up to all the intrigue that were rampant everywhere. He had lost his toughness and things continued in a very slipshod manner.

As the year 1957 ended, I issued a stern warning to the nation. Speaking to the citizens of Karachi on 27 December, I condemned "our much too frequent political crises". I went

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on: "I deeply regret the frequent changes in the government and am definitely of the view that they are doing immense disservice to the country.... We have to do our utmost to allow democracy a free hand provided always that the safety of the country is not endangered. Instability is bound to reflect on the administration which, I am afraid, has gone down considerably since the Partition. But the price had to be paid for running on democratic lines a country where the percentages of literacy are very low which, in turn, considerably weakens the control of the electorate on those in power.... We must concentrate on spreading education amongst our people.... I agree that we must try to get out of this transitional stage and have general elections as early as possible. But I must warn you that, unless you all exert yourselves and ensure that only patriots and men with character, ability, and honour are returned, the country will be in a worse condition than ever."

I reminded the people of my own responsibility as their elected President: "Disruptive elements.... are masquerading under innocent pseudonyms. No President of Pakistan, to whom the safety of the country is entrusted under the constitution, can allow the country to be run and destroyed by these disruptive elements."

In February 1958, Daultana and Chundrigar conceived the idea of bringing about a merger of the political groups in the West Pakistan.

I received the following letter from Daultana:

Karachi
20.2.58

My dear General Sahib,

I believe Mr Chundrigar is also going to Lahore on Saturday, namely on 23rd. If it is not possible to talk with him today

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perhaps you can direct him to meet you in Lahore. But this suggestion may only come from you.

Till everything is agreed, I would request that it may not be mentioned to others who saw and approved of the drafts. Many people are quick to feel ignored and left out.

I am leaving for Lahore tonight at 9 p.m. I shall be most grateful if I can have an opportunity to meet you this evening for a few minutes.

I can only press the necessity for definite decision and assured action. My own personal loyalty may please be considered, I beg you, beyond the slightest doubt.

With deepest respects and love,

Yours always,
Mumtaz

Attached to this letter was the draft outline of the programme “to consolidate patriotic forces in the country.” There was also a list of names of those who would be the candidates of this coalition in an election. The first name on the list was that of Bahadur Khan, brother of General Ayub Khan, who had welcomed Dr Khan Sahib at the gate of the jail on his release calling him “Uncle” and had then turned against him in the West Pakistan Assembly. The programme and the names are given as an appendix to this chapter. Nothing came to this plan. I mention this as an example of the way in which the politicians continually sought to involve me in party politics.

And so, the game went on. In West Pakistan, the Chief Minister, Abdur Rashid, resigned and joined the central government. Qizilbash became the third Chief Minister. Dr Khan Sahib was assassinated in his house at Lahore. With all his faults, he was a fine man and a loveable character; above all he was, in his own way, a patriotic Pakistani. The position in

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East Pakistan was becoming intolerable. There was a continual struggle between the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party (KSP). Fazl-ul-Huq had been Governor of East Pakistan since 1956. He dismissed the provincial cabinet on 31 March 1958. Mr Huq was then removed from the Governorship. In June 1958, the Awami League ministry was defeated. There was a KSP government for a few days and then they lost control. The Awami League came back and fell immediately. Two ministries went out of office within one week. Governor's rule was imposed again. It was clear to me that things could not go on like this much longer.

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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

Daultana's draft programme and list of election candidates

1. To consolidate patriotic forces in the country, to meet threats and dangers to the solidarity and unity of Pakistan, to promote justice, efficient administration and democratic values and to ensure the speedy holding of free and fair general elections, a Coalition of the following parties: -

1. (blank)

2. (blank)

has been formed in the National Assembly and the Assembly of the West Pakistan.

2. This Coalition will support the Ministry headed by Malik Firoz Khan Noon in the National Assembly and the Ministry headed by (blank) in the West Pakistan Assembly.

3. A committee consisting of the following (blank)

is set up to supervise, promote and take final decisions with respect to the functioning of the Coalition in all respects.

4. It shall be the function of the Committee to consolidate the Coalition as an electoral alliance between the Political Parties composing the Coalition, to see that an agreed list of candidates is prepared and accepted by the political parties composing the Coalition for the forthcoming general elections and to ensure the support of the coalescing Political Parties to the selected candidates.

Sardar Bahadur Khan (Hazara)

Abdul Qayyum Khan (Peshawar)

Yusuf Khattak (Kohat)

M.R. Kayani (Bannu)

M.A. Khuhro (Larkana)

Allah Bachayo Talpur (Hyderabad)

G.B. Raisani (Baluchistan)

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Qazi Muhammad Isa (Baluchistan)
Sardar Muhammad Ayub (Rahimyarkhan)
Ch. Farzand Ali (Bahawalpur)
Pir Makhad (Attock)
Sh. Fazal Illahi (Sargodha)
Kh. Safder (Sialkot)
Sh. Nasir Ahmad (Sialkot)
Malik Abdul Aziz (Sialkot-Muhajir)
Ch. Muhammad Hussian Chatha (Sheikhupura)
Ch. Salahuddin (Gujranwala)
Soofi Abdul Hamid (Sheikhupura-Muhajir)
Mian Amiruddin (Lahore)
Ch. Azizuddin (Lyallpur)
S.M. Illahi (Lyallpur)
Syed Ali Hussain Gardezi (Multan)
Rana Gul Muhammad Noon (Multan)
Ch. Muhammad Hanif (Multan-Muhajir)
Begum Shah Nawaz (Ladies)

Suitable candidates representing Karachi can be suggested later.

VI

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During these difficult times, I was constantly assured by General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief that the armed forces were behind me, ready to back me up if necessary. I regarded Ayub Khan as a reliable and trustworthy friend. During April 1958, he stayed in my house during important military planning discussions. On his departure, he wrote me the following note:

My dear President,

Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set-up for the defence forces. In doing so, you have shown tremendous courage and wisdom and have done the defence forces and the country a great service. History will have cause to be proud of you. I, personally, am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come up to your expectations. I can promise my very best effort. Once again, I thank you and the Khanum for your

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kind hospitality during my stay here. As usual, I have been very comfortable.

With respects,
Yours Sincerely,
M.A. Khan

During the summer months, our economic situation deteriorated. In the Punjab, there were more quarrels and feuds between Qizilbash and his enemies. Abdul Qayyum Khan (former Chief Minister of the NWFP) had become the leader of the Muslim League after the death of Nishtar and spent his time making violent and irresponsible speeches. In Bengal, when a meeting of the Provincial Assembly was called in September, the Deputy Speaker was assaulted and died of his injuries. Sir Firoz Khan Noon did nothing.

As it happened, Mr Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey, was making a visit to Formosa (Taiwan) at this time. He halted at Karachi for a couple of days to see me. One evening, he said he wanted to talk to me in confidence. We walked by ourselves in the garden. He told me that his ambassador had reported that Pakistan was going down the drain. Mr Menderes said: "You are our ally and naturally we are very worried and concerned about the future of your country. There comes a time when the Head of State may have to try to save his country at the risk of his life or any other risk. From what I have heard from our embassy, that time has come in Pakistan. Your Excellency must do something. I speak as your friend and the friend of your country."

I replied: "I have been thinking on these lines, too. I am not exactly clear as to the best course. The elections are only three or four months away. Once the elections are held, the politicians can do what they like."

Menderes answered: "You must not say that, as though you don't care whether your country goes to the dogs or not. You

have got to hold your country together.” Poor Mr Menderes, he was to suffer a worse fate than mine. He was executed for trying to serve his country.

I now had to take my decision. We had reached a point where public meetings were being held outside the President’s House at which politicians shouted abuse and threats at me personally while the loudspeakers directed the speech straight at my house. Among those demagogues was Abdul Qayyum Khan. There were two courses open to me. I could suspend the constitution, as Ghulam Muhammad had done, or I could abrogate it finally. If I took the first course, this would mean having one court case after another as had happened in 1954. I said to myself: why go through all that again? I decided that my best course would be to abolish the constitution and immediately to ask the Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, to set to work drafting a new constitution. I proposed to follow the American system of a presidential executive and a legislature. Considering the peculiar situation in Pakistan, I would have preferred some kind of indirect election of the President.

As regards the politicians, after Khan Sahib’s death about three months before, the Republican Party was virtually finished. It had no other real leaders. Suhrawardy was probably the only alternative; he was a very good parliamentarian. I knew that I could not trust him but still he was the best man. I would get the backing of Daultana and Qizilbash though most of the Muslim League were after my blood because they erroneously supposed that I had had a hand in creating the Republican Party. But, for the interim period, it was best to exclude the politicians from the government and function with a cabinet of civilians and army leaders. For I supposed that I could rely on the support of the army after Ayub Khan’s assurances. In addition, General Musa swore that he would shed his last drop of blood for me and General Burki made a similar promise of loyalty which he repeated to my wife. About mid-September, I informed General Ayub that I was contemplating action.

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General Ayub concurred and he then disappeared to Gilgit, a place where there were no troops. Perhaps his idea was to show that he had no hand in the coming revolution.

I prepared for the event by writing out a long proclamation, explaining why martial law was necessary. I called General Yahya, the Chief of the General Staff, and ordered to show it to General Ayub. When Ayub saw that I had named him as Chief of Martial Law Administrator, this brought him back to Karachi. He arrived on 5 October and came to see me. I said that the country had to be saved and we all had to work very hard. Ayub replied that his loyalty was with me and he would do anything I asked.

Then came the events which triggered off the takeover. On 6 October, the Khan of Kalat attempted to launch a rebellion. He had some wild ideas of setting up a Baluch empire. Fortunately, we were prepared. I ordered military action to be taken and the Khan was deposed and placed in confinement.

Sir Firoz Khan Noon needed to strengthen the Bengali element in his Cabinet. He selected two new ministers and brought them along to my office where they were sworn in during the morning of 7 October. In the evening, Sir Firoz informed me that they had resigned. I inquired what had happened. He replied that both men had asked for the Ministries of Industries and Commerce. He was not prepared to hand over both these portfolios to the newcomers; so they had resigned. I observed that we could draw the obvious conclusion; they wanted to make money and were not interested in working for the country. I was very glad that their resignations had been accepted. We could not go on working in this manner.

I came to the conclusion that this was the end of the road so far as the parliamentary democracy in Pakistan was concerned. That evening, at 10:30 p.m., my proclamation was issued to the public and the press. Orders were issued to the troops the same evening. We ordered an additional infantry brigade and an armoured regiment into Karachi. That was

more than enough, together with the troops already on hand. In fact, there were no disturbances whatsoever.

There was no pressure on me from the army to declare martial law. The proclamation was written by me in my own handwriting without the help of anyone. It was typed out only a few hours before it was issued. As this statement contained my considered views on the problems of Pakistan, I reproduce it in full:

◇ For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum, and the prostitution of Islam for political ends. There have been a few honourable exceptions. But being in a minority they have not been able to assert their influence in the affairs of the country.

◇ These despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of the lowest order. Adventurers and exploiters have flourished to the detriment of the masses and are getting richer by their nefarious practices.

◇ Despite my repeated endeavours, no serious attempts have been made to tackle the food crises. Food has been a problem of life and death for us in a country which should be really in surplus. Agriculture and land administration have been made a handmaiden of politics, so that in our present system of government no political party will be able to take any positive action to increase production. In East Pakistan, on the other hand, there is a well-organized smuggling of food, medicines and other necessities of life. The masses there suffer due to the shortages so caused in, and the consequent high prices of, these commodities. Import of food has been a constant and serious drain on our foreign exchange in the last few years, with the result that the Government is constrained to curtail the much-needed internal development projects.

◇ Some of our politicians have lately been talking of bloody revolution. Another type of adventurer among

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them thinks it fit to go to foreign countries and attempt direct alignment with them which can only be described as high treason.

◇ The disgraceful scene enacted recently in the East Pakistan Assembly is known to all. I am told that such episodes were common occurrences in pre-Partition Bengal. Whether they were or not, it is certainly not a civilized mode of procedure. You do not raise the prestige of your country by beating the Speaker, killing the Deputy Speaker and desecrating the National Flag.

◇ The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today. We cannot get men from the Moon. The same group of people who have brought Pakistan to the verge of ruination will rig the elections for their own ends. They will come back more revengeful because I am sure the elections will be contested mainly on a personal, regional and sectarian basis. When they return, they will use the same methods which have made a tragic farce of democracy and are the main cause of the present widespread frustration in the country. However much the administration may try, I am convinced, judging by shifting loyalties and the ceaseless and unscrupulous scramble for office, the elections will be neither free nor fair. They will not solve our difficulties. On the contrary, they are likely to create greater unhappiness and disappointment leading ultimately to a really bloody revolution. Recently, we had elections for the Karachi Municipal Corporation. Twenty per cent of the electorate exercised their votes and, out of them, about fifty per cent were bogus votes.

◇ We hear threats and cries of civil disobedience in order to retain private volunteer organizations and to break up the One Unit. These disruptive tendencies are a good indication of their patriotism and the length to which politicians and adventurers are prepared to go to achieve their parochial aims.

◇ “Our foreign policy is subjected to unintelligent and irresponsible criticism not for patriotic motives but from selfish viewpoints often by the very people who were responsible for it. We desire to have friendly relations with all nations but political adventurers try their best to create bad blood and misunderstandings between us and countries like the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R. and the People’s Republic of China. Against India, of course, they scream for war knowing full well that they will be nowhere near the firing lines. In no country in the world do political parties treat foreign policy in the manner it has been done in Pakistan. To dispel the confusion so caused, I categorically reiterate that we shall continue to follow a policy which our interests and geography demand and that we shall honour all our international commitments which, as is well known, we have undertaken to safeguard the security of Pakistan and, as a peace-loving nation, to play our part in averting the danger of war from this troubled world.

◇ For the last three years, I have been doing my utmost to work the Constitution in the democratic way. I have labored to bring about coalition after coalition, hoping that it would stabilize the administration, and that the affairs of the country would be run in the interests of the masses. My detractors, in their dishonest ways, have on every opportunity, called these attempts Palace Intrigues. It has become fashionable to put all the blame on the President. A wit said the other day, “if it rains too much it is the fault of the President and if it does not rain it is the fault of the President.” If only I alone were concerned, I would go on taking these fulminations with the contempt they deserve. But the attention of these traitors and unpatriotic elements is to destroy the prestige of Pakistan and the Government by attacking the Head of the State. They have succeeded to a great extent, and, if this state of affairs is allowed to go on, they will achieve their ultimate purpose.

◇ My appraisal of the internal situation had led me to believe that a vast majority of the people no longer have

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any confidence in the present system of Government and are getting more and more disillusioned and disappointed and are becoming dangerously resentful of the manner in which they have been exploited. Their resentment and bitterness are justifiable. The leaders have not been able to render them the service they deserve and have failed to prove themselves worthy of the confidence the masses have reposed in them.

◇ The Constitution which was brought into being on 23 March 1956, after so many tribulations, is unworkable. It is full of dangerous compromises, so that Pakistan will disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not removed. To rectify them, the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution. Then, it is my intention to collect a number of patriotic persons to examine our problems in the political field and device a Constitution more suitable to the genius of the Muslim people. When it is ready, and at the appropriate time, it will be submitted to the referendum of the people.

◇ It is said the Constitution is sacred. But more sacred than the Constitution or anything else is the country and the welfare and happiness of its people. As Head of the State, my foremost duty before my God and the people is the integrity of Pakistan. It is seriously threatened by the ruthlessness of traitors and political adventurers whose selfishness, thirst for power and unpatriotic conduct cannot be restrained by a government set up under the present system. Nor can I any longer remain a spectator of activities designed to destroy the country. After deep and anxious thought, I have come to the regrettable conclusion that I would be failing in my duty if I did not take steps, which in my opinion, are inescapable in present conditions, to save Pakistan from complete disruption. I have, therefore, decided that:

- a) The Constitution of 23 March 1956, will be abrogated.
- b) The Central and Provincial Governments will be dismissed with immediate effect.
- c) The National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies will

be dissolved.

d) All political parties will be abolished.

e) Until alternative arrangements are made, Pakistan will come under Martial law. I hereby appoint General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and place all the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command.

To the valiant Armed Forces of Pakistan, I have to say that “having been closely associated with them since the very inception of Pakistan, I have learned to admire their patriotism and loyalty. I am putting a great strain on them. I fully realise this. But I ask you, officers and men of the Armed Forces – on your service depends the future existence of Pakistan as an independent nation and bastion in these parts of the Free World. Do your job without fear or favour and may God help you.”

◇ To the people of Pakistan I talk as a brother and a fellow-compatriot. Present action has been taken with the utmost regret but I have had to do it in the interests of the country and the masses; finer men than whom it is difficult to imagine. To the patriots and the law-abiding, I promise you will be happier and freer. The political adventurers, the smugglers, the black-marketeers, the hoarders, will be unhappy and their activities will be severely restricted. As for the traitors, they had better flee the country if they can, and while the going is good.”*

Next day I wrote to the heads of friendly governments: to the Shah-in-Shah (Shahenshah) of Iran, President Eisenhower of the United States, Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Great Britain. I informed

* *Ayub Khan in Friends Not Masters, Pg 71. – asserts that I “hummed and hawed” about making Ayub Chief Martial Law Administrator, and only gave him a letter of appointment ‘two or three days after 7 October.’ In this case his deviation from the truth is beyond question, because his appointment – together with his dismissal of the Prime Minister (which Ayub says was his idea) were both in the proclamation of 7 October reproduced above.*

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them why I had felt compelled to proclaim martial law, and I emphasized that this would be of short duration. My intention was to lift the martial law after a month, and then proceed to introduce a new constitution. The heads of these governments replied, wishing me success in my task. Here is the personal message I received from Mr Macmillan:

“I thank you, Mr President, for your message received through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi. You may be confident of the close and continuing interest of the Government of the United Kingdom in the prosperity and progress of Pakistan. I note that the continuance of Martial Law will be for the shortest period possible, and I am glad to have your assurance that Pakistan will continue to honour all her commitments and to remain loyal to the free world.” (9 October 1958).

I also wrote a letter to Sir Firoz Khan Noon, explaining that I had to bring in martial law as, in my judgement, there was no other way out to save the country. I expressed my regret that I had to do this at the time when he was Prime Minister.

I had entrusted General Ayub Khan with the actual task of implementing martial law, and he began to issue a number of ordinances. On 8 October he made a broadcast in which he announced: “You may not know, but I refused on several occasions the late Ghulam Muhammad’s offer to take over the country.” If this was news to the people of Pakistan it was news to me also.

On 15 October I gave a long press conference to foreign and Pakistani journalists. The report in *The Times* (London) next day observed that: The President, informally dressed in white drill.... Talked with a sobriety and confidence unusual in one who has launched a revolution just seven days old. “I did not want to do it, I assure you.” He said. “For a long time, I went on hoping that something good would turn out, but things only went from bad to worse.” The *Dawn* report (16 October) quoted me saying “I shall run martial law for the shortest duration

possible.... Then we shall have a national council of not more than twelve to fifteen persons and run on that basis for some time, to clean up the country.” I went on to indicate that thirty or forty men of goodwill and experience would be asked to frame a constitution. The censorship would be lifted and the constitutional debate would be in the open.

General Ayub Khan did not like my declaration that martial law must be lifted by 7/8 November. I could see no reason for any longer duration: the country had accepted the revolution with enthusiasm and I saw no reason why the public or individuals should be punished to suffer unnecessarily.

General Ayub Khan believed differently and he went out of his way to tone down the assurances I gave at my press conferences on the 15th. On 17 October he issued a statement as follows: “There seems to be a fear in the minds of the people that if martial law is lifted soon the old order will return.... Let me assure everyone that, whereas martial law will not be retained a minute longer than is necessary, it will not be lifted a minute earlier than the purpose for which it has been imposed has been fulfilled.”

It would take a clever man to understand when the “not a minute longer..... not a minute earlier” time would arrive. *The Times* interpreted the statement with the headline MARTIAL LAW TO BE RETAINED (18 October 1958). In the same report, *The Times* correspondent observed: “General Ayub Khan’s statement this morning is in no sense a direct contradiction of the President Mirza’s declaration on the same subject.... But, with the subtlety of their kind, political observers are inevitably comparing their terms with some care.” *The Times* noted that “the President’s assurances were welcomed with relief by the more liberal-minded;” but went on to suggest that a majority would like General Ayub Khan and the army to stay in control of the job of “clearing up the mess”.

I did not fully realise that General Ayub Khan and I were moving apart in our thinking. Ayub Khan was a friend of mine

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of twenty years' standing. I trusted him absolutely. Perhaps that was a mistake. He could now see that the revolution enjoyed overwhelming support from the public. He knew that I was consulting with Chief Justice Munir on the form of a new constitution. He knew that, if I had my way, the army would soon march back to barracks. Obviously, he had his own ideas about all this.

A day or two after martial law was declared, I began to hear rumours that army officers were going into the Karachi shops and forcing the shopkeepers to sell commodities at cheap rates, threatening them with trouble if they refused. This was reported to me by an English friend. I passed this on to General Ayub Khan and he was not pleased. I was also being told that now that General Ayub had been appointed as Chief Martial Law Administrator with power flowing through his hands, he was thinking that he could get rid of me. I dismissed this as an absurd rumour: how could a friend of twenty years' standing behave like this?

During the two weeks after the revolution, I saw Ayub Khan quite a few times. Then he departed for a tour to East Pakistan. When he returned, his attitude to me seemed to have changed a good deal. He could not look me in the eye. Also, it was obvious that my telephone line was being tapped.

In his memoirs, *Friends Not Masters*, Ayub Khan recounts that, when he returned from Dacca, he was met at the airport by Major General Sher Bahadur with a report that I had contacted Air Commodore Rabb over the telephone and tried to persuade him to arrest three generals. I do not wish to try to refuse all that General Ayub Khan has to say about me. Those who know can speak the truth for themselves. But I must say something about this story which is, of course, completely untrue. I never spoke to Rabb over the telephone at this time or any other time. Of the three generals I was supposed to be wanting to arrest, two of them were seven hundred miles away from Karachi in Rawalpindi. The third was in Karachi

and was the Head of Intelligence. How on earth was an Air Commodore supposed to be able to carry out this assignment even supposing I had wanted the arrests made? The truth was that Air Commodore Rabb was an embittered man. He had hoped to become the commander of the Pakistan Air Force. But he was a playboy and vastly inferior to the man we selected, Air Commodore (later Air Marshal) Asghar Khan. I watched Asghar Khan's career personally. I had the highest regard for his ability and integrity; so did the British officer whom he succeeded, Air Vice-Marshal Cannon. So, because Rabb had been passed by in favour of Asghar Khan, he felt he had a grudge against me. After this incident, he obtained his reward: he was appointed Pakistan's Ambassador, first to Turkey and then to Lebanon.

However, all this time hidden from me. I continued to leave all the day-to-day management of affairs to General Ayub while I prepared the ground for the next stage in our search for a constitution we could work efficiently. Meanwhile, I carried out the pledge I had given at the news conference to constitute a revolutionary council or cabinet. I prepared a list of men untainted by the old party dogfight. They included lawyers, businessmen, senior administrators and a rising politician, new to office, Mr Z.A. Bhutto. There were to be four Generals in this council and these I accepted on General Ayub's recommendation. The names of the new cabinet (twelve altogether) were announced on October 25th. Two days later, on the morning of 27th, the new team took the oath of office. Ayub Khan was appointed Prime Minister. Perhaps it was because he could now claim some constitutional legitimacy that Ayub decided to move against me without further delay.

I had a last consultation with Chief Justice Munir. Early in the evening of October 27th, Ayub Khan and Burki came to see me and we all had drinks together in the garden. Both appeared perfectly friendly and normal. I do not think that Machiavelli could have faulted the manners of General Ayub that evening. I then went out to meet my wife at the house of

Mr Hassan Ispahani. My wife said that she was not feeling well, so I took her back to the President's House and we had a quick dinner and retired to bed.

At about 10 p.m., one of the bearers knocked at the door and announced that some generals were waiting below to see me. I immediately put on my dressing gown and came out. I was astonished to see a large number of troops in my garden and lining the verandah brandishing sten guns and revolvers. I could not imagine what all this was about. I went downstairs and there I saw three Generals – Sheikh, Azam Khan, Burki – and Major General Sher Bahadur. I asked what was going on: was there trouble in East Bengal? (I was constantly apprehensive about that province.) They replied that they had come to talk to me about a serious matter. I was to leave Pakistan.

I asked why. They simply replied that it would be in the interest of the country. I would have liked to tell them to go to hell. But I had no private army. I did not want to endanger and upset my wife. I was forced to agree. Next morning, in the newspaper, along with the announcement of the new cabinet, in which General Ayub Khan accepted office as Prime Minister, there also appeared a notice to the effect that I had resigned and Ayub Khan was now President. The world was left to make what it could of this contradiction.

Having gained my resignation at gunpoint, the three generals left the subsequent dirty work to Sher Bahadur whose manners were extremely bad. He tried to stampede us into leaving the President's House immediately. All around, they were brandishing sten guns and revolvers in an attempt to frighten my wife who refused to be frightened. We packed up our things in an hour or so and made ready to leave. A cavalcade of military vehicles drove us to the airport. There I was met by American Ambassador, Mr Langley, a personal friend. He looked very disturbed and unhappy. Air Commodore Asghar Khan was also present, looking miserable. We were then flown to Quetta by a transport plane. We were lodged in the house of

the head of the local administration of Baluchistan. We stayed there for five or six days surrounded by army officers with weapons. My wife became so furious by this display of arms that she rebuked Sher Bahadur for threatening us and reminded him that her Persian ancestors had been through there before – as conquerors. After that, the guns were less in evidence.

At last we were told the following day (2 November) we would be leaving Karachi for England. Before leaving Quetta, I asked that two persons might be asked to meet us at Karachi airport before our final departure: my son-in-law, Mahmood Mirza, and Hassan Ispahani. This was not done though, by good fortune, we ran into both of them before we left. My son-in-law is employed by Pakistan International Airways and was on duty at the time of our arrival while the Ispahanis had gone to meet their daughter who was arriving from London. Besides them, General Cawthorne had come to hear of our departure and so had the Portuguese Ambassador. They were there to see us off. We were delayed at the airport for seven hours as our BOAC plane had engine trouble. Eventually, we left in a KLM plane. From Amsterdam, we came to London where we stayed for some days in a hotel before finding our own accommodation. If it had not been for the kindness of friends, we would have been in difficulties as our own money and valuables were confiscated before we left Pakistan as were all my private papers and diaries.

And so, I ended my service to my country: banished without warning. The army, which I had helped to make into such a fine force, sent me off not with a guard of honour but with a prisoner's escort.

My only satisfaction was to feel that I had done what I had to do.

VII

AFTER TEN YEARS

For the last ten years, I have been living in London. Time goes by slowly. I have nothing much to do. In the summer, I watch cricket. I play bridge, I visit my friends. My circumstances are too modest to permit me to travel much. Naturally, I think a great deal about the past considering why events turned out as they did. My wife tells me that my main fault was in trusting those who did not return my trust. Certainly, I made mistakes. Anyone in my position, during the years in which politics in Pakistan went downhill, would have made mistakes. But, on the main question of whether or not I should have carried out the revolution, I do not think I was wrong.

Recently (1967), two books have appeared which purport to tell us how the present state of Pakistan came into being: President Ayub Khan's *Friends Not Masters* and Chaudhari Muhammad Ali's *The Emergence of Pakistan*. I did not think the (that) either of these gentlemen has said the last word on the subject. Pakistan was created by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. But independence also came with the result of sacrifices by Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Muhammad Ali,

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Khan Sahib and hundreds of the others who are totally unacknowledged in Pakistan today. Many of those in Pakistan who claimed credit for leading “the Freedom Struggle” in later years did little or nothing at the time. Some of those who came to the top in the Muslim League after the death of Quaid-e-Azam had only joined because they were refused places in the Congress.

When Pakistan first came into being, I was puzzled about which direction we were taking. Before we all left Delhi, I said to the Quaid-e-Azam one day: “Sir, we are all agreed to go to Pakistan but what kind of government are you going to have? Are you going to have a type of government with the accent on Islam?” “No – nonsense,” he replied, “I am going to have a modern government.” So, I expected that we were going to get a modern government where Islam would have its proper place, where people could follow their religion in their private life; not with religion being thrust down our throats for twenty-four hours of the day. But people like Maulana Maudoodi, who did their best to stop Pakistan come into being, tried to take advantage of the new state with its Muslim majority to enforce their own fanatical views.

The greatest danger in Pakistan is fanaticism. In the West Pakistan, fanaticism is just under the skin: you have only to scratch and it comes to the surface. A strong hand was needed to direct this powerful force in a positive direction. Unfortunately, it was not controlled that way. Those coming to power thought they could play with Islam.

Sir Ivor Jennings advised us upon the legal form of the constitution. Once, on a visit to Karachi, in a conversation, he jokingly said that, when he next came to Pakistan, he expected to see lots of people going around with no hands. He meant that we should revive ancient Islamic practices of punishment by mutilation. He was trying to give me a warning that there was such a thing as accepting fanaticism by degrees.

When Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar was in the Cabinet, he

After Ten Years

actually suggested one day that every man during the period of Ramadhan should be compelled to observe the fast and, in every area, watchmen should go round early in the morning during the period of Ramadhan to see that the people had risen before dawn and were preparing to keep the fast. I said that they had better not come to my house.

Then, during Nazimuddin's premiership, all this fanaticism flared up. I was compelled to take action because the ministers just stood passively on one side. I was absolutely sure that the Mullahs must not be allowed to run the country. And this was how I made my entry into the political game.

When I went to East Bengal as Governor, there was much less religious fanaticism. There, the danger lay in Communism which was being imported from Calcutta. As Governor, I did not go out of my way to attend Islamic festivals and prayers just to remind people that I was a Muslim; I knew that I was not popular because of this but I did not intend to begin playing the game of pretending to be pious in order to please the Mullahs. Strictly speaking, there are no Mullahs in Islam; so their claim that, under an Islamic constitution, they must be given a hand in running the affairs of the state is all nonsense.

This kowtowing to fanaticism was one shortcoming of the 1956 constitution: the other was the feeble imitation of the Westminster type of parliamentary government. As a matter of fact, Sir Ivor Jennings tried to persuade our politicians that they ought to combine the parliamentary system with a permanent executive, chosen for a fixed period, to provide continuity when ministries were defeated in the Assembly. I appeared to be alone in thinking that the Westminster system would have to be modified before it would work properly; there was nobody that I could find to join me in advocating alternatives. Even Ghulam Muhammad was in favor of parliamentary government at first. Later, I am quite sure that he became fed up with all the political intrigues but he was too ill to take action.

I have often been accused of pushing the presidential

system because I was the President myself and, by this change, could keep myself in power. It is therefore worth reminding my critics that I began to advocate a change long before there was any possible thought of my becoming President. As far as I can recall, I first put my views before the public in an interview with the BBC which I gave in February 1955. This was widely reproduced in the press at home and abroad (see, for example *Dawn*, 9 February 1955). I will quote a few of my words at that time: "For seven years we attempted to apply the British political system in Pakistan; the result is there for everyone to see..... Experience has thus shown that a radical change in our political system is necessary. We are thinking of the American system, with modifications to suit the special conditions prevailing in Pakistan."

The root cause of our difficulties lay in our educational backwardness. Only 16 per cent of the population were literate. What possible role was there for the illiterate masses in the Westminster form of government? There is an old saying: "democracy without education is hypocrisy without limitation" and today no Muslim country has democracy of the type of our 1956 Constitution. I wanted very much to strengthen the village panchayat system. When I went to Bengal, I found that the village councils had become very corrupt. As I have recounted, I arranged for a commission to study the Bengal situation and they listed three priorities: agriculture development, medical improvement and village reconstruction. It is a very great pity that I was not left to govern Bengal for two or three years because I had a great interest in the work and I am sure that I could have done something to improve the conditions of the poor people there.

The other political aspect of our educational situation was the poor state of the university education. These were the people – the intelligentsia – who ought to have provided the leaders for our new nation. But they were thoroughly demoralized. The students jumped on to the bandwagon of

After Ten Years

extremist politics. The professors and lecturers pandered to them and education just went down and down. At election times, the students abandoned their studies in order to campaign for the political parties. I was very keen to move the university away from the heated political atmosphere of Dacca. I wanted them to have a campus which was a real university and not just a part of the city. I would also have liked to see the extension of the public-school system, introduced by Atcherley in the West Wing, and extended by me to the East Wing. This would have meant that students would have entered the university with a proper foundation of knowledge and training instead of in the half-baked condition in which most of them arrived.

The civil service had been sucked into politics after ten years of party-political intrigues. One of the most important legacies left by the British was an independent civil service that came with a high sense of duty and integrity. Under political pressure, conscientious officers who were not afraid to speak their minds were thrown out, and junior officers, willing to toe the line, were promoted. This destroyed all the esprit de corps and led to inefficiency as officers were afraid to voice an honest opinion on difficult matters. All this became much worse under Ayub Khan.

The Civil Service had more or less capitulated. That only left us with the Army. I must confess that I could not think of a solution to the problem of our political inadequacy. I wanted a presidential executive at the top and the village panchayat system as the foundation. But what in between? I would not have favoured anything like Basic Democracy: with all its faults, a wide franchise was the best safeguard against corruption in elections. But I could not come up with the complete answer. I needed time to work things out. And there was no time to spare. Not long before his death, the Quaid-e-Azam told a friend that he had not expected the British to transfer power for fifty years. So, Pakistan arrived before Mr Jinnah expected and before he had time to make proper plans for a political system

for the Muslims of India. From the birth of Pakistan, one crisis had followed another; the unexpected always following the unexpected. I had to gain a breathing-space in order to consider how we could work towards a genuine democracy in Pakistan. I could expect no help from the politicians and, as I said in my proclamation, "We cannot get men from the Moon." And that was why I turned to the Army with which I had been so closely connected for so long.

What we had inherited from the old British-Indian army was essentially an infantry force. Its human material was excellent. But it was deficient in technical know-how. My plan was to create a small but highly mobile army. In our first commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Gracey, we had a man who understood the problem and how to resolve it. We had 250,000 armed tribesmen in Pakistan. Our relations with Afghanistan were not too good. These tribes might throw in their lot with the Afghans, if we were not careful. Then we had to face the possibility of conflict with India and so we had to place a strong guard over Lahore and Sialkot. Finally, we let ourselves in for an open-ended war in Kashmir and Poonch. This increased our problems tenfold. Altogether, it was necessary to maintain a firm defence posture towards India while, at the same time, holding ourselves ready and able to respond to any unexpected move elsewhere.

We first created an armoured brigade from our existing armour: this became one of the best armoured formations in Asia. With this as our nucleus, when American help arrived in the shape of Patton tanks, we were able to expand into a superb armoured division, the "Shield of Pakistan". In my time, we had a good relationship with the Americans. We offered to go to their help if trouble came but they made it clear that, what they wanted from us, along with Iran and Turkey, was to provide stability in a very sensitive and explosive sector of the world. We did provide stability and security in the face of the threat from Communism and, while insurrections broke out in the

After Ten Years

Middle East, South East Asia and the Far East, our part of the world remained quiet.

It was a pity that we were in such a hurry to get rid of good British officers, loyal to Pakistan, like Gracey. But as soon as the Indian Army appointed its first Indian commander, General Cariappa, our people began to get restive. Liaquat Ali Khan appointed the Nationalization Committee to speed up the handover to Pakistani officers. The great difficulty was that our officers were much less well educated, professionally, than those of the new Indian Army. Hardly any of our fellows had been through the Staff College at Quetta: I think only General Iftikhar had passed Staff College. Things were remedied when we had Quetta going again but this was no help with regard to our most senior Pakistani officers.

I cannot say how terribly I felt when the fine army we had created was so badly damaged in the totally pointless war with India in 1965. The rank and file and the officers up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, conducted themselves well. They fought with bravery and resolution. But what are we to say of the higher direction of the force? The worst episode was the action in which the armoured division was launched forth blind and sixty-five of the magnificent Patton tanks got bogged down, leaving the division to beat an ignominious retreat. This was the shameful and notorious “Patton-nagar”, as the Indians called it, and the graveyard of the best armour.

After the 1965 war, Ayub became a complete dictator and must take the blame for all the corruption and inefficiency and the alienation of the common man. He had taken over the entire press and all the media publicity were used for his personal publicity; he had absolute powers and this led to absolute corruption on a scale perhaps unprecedented in the Indo-Pak continent. Permits were the perquisites of high officials and their families. Such an ingenious path to easy affluence had never been known before.

I would have been happy if my service career had ended

with my charge of the Ministry of Defence. But fate had other things in store for me and I was destined to be the President of Pakistan at a time when politicians were thinking of their own interests instead of service to the country. I could have chosen to sit back and do nothing. This would have been completely constitutional under the 1956 Constitution. If I just wanted to enjoy being President, irrespective of what happened to the country, I could do this: indeed, I suppose that this is what the politicians would have liked from a President, *Nam ke Waste!* Instead, I chose to risk my future by getting rid of that impossible 1956 constitution. When the revolution came, the only person sticking his neck out was me. If the revolution had misfired, I should have been the scapegoat and I alone.

In my proclamation issued on 7 October 1958, I could have retained all power in my own hands, if I chose, at that moment. There was nobody to stop me. Everyone was glad to see the back of the party politicians. I was much better known than any of the army leaders and I had a reputation for getting things done. I doubt if they would have challenged me if I had just given them their orders. But I had no desire to be a dictator. I immediately delegated authority. I made it clear that martial law would last only for the definite period of one month. But the martial law administrators had no desire to hand back power. They conspired to get me out of the way and then they kept martial law going for another forty-four months till June 1962.

My hope is that the military control of Pakistan will not be perpetuated. It is encouraging that two men who I first selected as leaders — Mr Z.A. Bhutto and Air Marshal Asghar Khan — are giving a lead to the people. But the old danger of violence and anarchy is still there. The ordinary people of Pakistan deserve to have a happy and prosperous future. They are a fine people. It was their suffering, and not the suffering of their leaders, which brought Pakistan into being. They deserve to play their part in the governance of their country.

Indian Political Service,
Defense Secretary of Pakistan,
Personal and Family



*Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza,
mother of Iskander Mirza's six children.*




Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza at home in PECHS, Karachi, having tea. Courtesy, Humayun Mirza



Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza at home in PECHS, Karachi, with her sewing machine. Courtesy, Humayun Mirza



Wedding day.



*Captain Iskander Mirza and
Rifaat Sherazi.*



*Dilshad Begum, mother of
Iskander Mirza. Jinnah had
organized relief supplies with
her for Turkey during the
Balkan war in 1912.*



*Iskander Mirza's
sister, Qamar Taj Begum.*



Major and Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza with their children Nurjehan, Humayun, Zeenat, Fakhri, Taj and Enver at Khyber House, Peshawar, 1944.



Rifaat Sherazi at her engagement with Iskander Mirza.

CONFIDENTIAL

Brig M. Rahim Khan
PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI

No. 101 / 7 / CIA
23 August 59.

Mrs Shahtaj Imam,
2, Al-Hamra Housing Society,
LAHORE-6.

Dear Mrs. Imam,

Kindly refer to your application dated
5th August, 1959.

The President has considered your request
for enabling your father to return to Pakistan.
Under the prevailing conditions, it is considered
that your father should postpone his return to
Pakistan for some time. Would you, therefore, kindly
take up this case some time next year when it will
be again considered by the President.

With regards,

Yours

CONFIDENTIAL

*Begum Shahtaj Imam's correspondence with
General Yahya Khan requesting permission for her father to visit
Pakistan and General Yahya's response.*

SHAW WALLACE PAKISTAN LIMITED.

Corporate Secy

5th August 1969

Dear Mr. President,

I take the liberty of approaching you on a subject, which is of grave concern to me, my sisters, our children, friends and relations.

I am the youngest daughter of Maj. General Iskander Mirza and ever since his departure from this country did not have a chance to see him. Last year, after ten years, I was fortunate enough to go to London to see my father. It was a great shock for me to see that his heart attacks, had made him old and weak physically. My other sisters, and I felt that our father was in a most uncertain and doubtful health. We had therefore, been trying to persuade him to come to Pakistan, so that in his old age he should have a few peaceful and happy moments with his children and grand children. He has now agreed to visit us, for a short while, provided he is allowed to come.

Since you have already set a noble precedent by giving protection to the ex-President Mohammed Ayub Khan and upholding the prestige-dignity of the office, we sincerely request that our father may also kindly be allowed to visit Pakistan.

We seek your blessings in this request and hope you will grant us the privilege of having him with us.

Yours faithfully,

Shah Taj Imam

(MRS. SHAHTAJ IMAM)

*Begum Shahtaj Imam's letter to General Yahya Khan
requesting permission for her father to visit Pakistan.*

FROM THE PRINCIPAL, AITCHISON COLLEGE, LAHORE.

✓
TELEPHONES: { O. 3077
 { R. 2893
TELEGRAMS: "DIPLOMA, LAHORE."

No.P/1534/A-92.

5th June, 1953.

Dear Begum Sahibah,

Our grief at the tragic death of Anwar
Mirza is very great indeed.

I am enclosing a post copy of the telegram
sent to you this morning and also a copy of the
prayer said at the Assembly.

Please convey our deep feeling of sorrow
to Colonel Sahib and other members of the family.

Encl: As above.

Begum Iskandar Mirza Sahibah,
203-A, E.I.Lines,
Ka achi.

Yours sincerely,
Rifaat Ali
(Sayyid Zulfikar Ali)
Principal.

*Condolence letter from the Principal, Aitchison College, to
Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza on the death of her son,
FO Enver Mirza. (A)*

THE PRINCIPAL,

AITCHISON COLLEGE, LAHORE

TELEPHONES: Q. 3077.
R. 8863.
TELEGRAMS: "DIPLOMA LAHORE"

5th June, 1953.

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

Merciful Lord,

We come from Thee and unto Thy Presence we ultimately return.

اَنَا لِلّٰهِ وَاَنَا اِلَيْهِ رَاجِعُونَ

Thou, in Thy Mercy, hast chosen to recall to Thy Presence, a beloved son of this College, Pilot Officer, Anwar Mirza, whose sweet memory will abide with us for ever.

Grant him, Almighty Lord, peace, joy and rest in Paradise and the companionship of the saints. Thou choose the Death Anniversary of Hasrat Ali as the day for Anwar Mirza to attain eternal bliss in Thy love and in Thy presence. We resign ourselves to Thy will. Have, in Thy holy keeping him who was dear to us when he lived on earth, and whose memory will always be dear to us now that he has gone to his everlasting abode. May his soul live in perfect peace and have Thy blessings!

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّفْسُ الطَّيِّبَةُ اذْجِزِي دُعَايَ

رَبِّكِ رَاحِلَةً مَرْضِيَّةً ۝ نَادُجُنِّي

فِي رَمَضَانَ ۝ وَاذْجِزِي جَسَدِي ۝

Condolence letter from the Principal, Aitchison College, to
Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza on the death of her son,
FO Enver Mirza. (B)

ISKANDER MIRZA'S DEATH CONDOLED

KARACHI, Nov. 14: Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) today issued the following Press statement condoling the death of ex-President Iskander Mirza:

'Ex-President Iskander Mirza, our first elected President under the 1956 Constitution who expired in London and is to receive a State funeral in Teheran, was a man of charming and gracious personality. I met him last month in London and found him to be in poor health. He was anxious to return home even briefly. I am indeed sorry to hear of his sudden demise. I extend to his wife and family our profound sorrow and pray that his soul rest in peace'.

Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, in a condolence message sent to Begum Iskander Mirza today, said:

'In sincere and deepest sorrow I send you my heartfelt sympathies and condolences in the great loss you have suffered. May Allah give you His comfort and courage in bearing this heavy loss and to the departed soul His peace and blessings'.

Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, a former Central Industries Minister, in a statement said: "I was the only Pakistani, beside Mahmood Mirza, his son-in-law who saw Iskander leave the soil of Pakistan on November 2, 1958. I shall be leaving for Teheran to be present at his burial on Monday.

'I deeply mourn his demise with the members of his family, whose sorrow I share.

"Throughout his exile, I made it a point to see him and spend most of my time in England in his company.

"I am glad that he is being accorded a State funeral in Iran, although he was nothing more than a private citizen of Pakistan, holding an ordinary passport and had died not in Iran but in London.

'May Iskander's soul rest in eternal peace and may his family bear the catastrophe with submission and patience. Ameen.'

Princess Abida Sultan, a Council Muslim League leader today said she was deeply grieved at the death of Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza in London.

In a statement she said: "I share the pain with his bereaved family, and mourn the loss as a daughter and sister, in equal proportion to the sincere and warm friendship I enjoyed during his life-time.

"The political mistakes, blunders, or damages, attributed to him, were fully shared by many a self-appointed adviser and 'well-wishers' of the nation, who combined to collectively misadvise, misinform, mislead and take the meanest advantage of his trust and confidence in them.

"They have reaped the fullest harvest and are thriving on it without question or blame. Gen. Mirza alone paid the price of this defame while his innocent family suffer in silence with great dignity and fortitude.

"During his lifetime, it was for him to defend or explain his actions, after his death, let him who has not dined, wine, supported, adulated, and actively participated in perpetrating those alleged crimes, cautiously refrain from publicly offering his condolences and sympathies to the bereaved.

"My relationship being entirely personal, I take the opportunity of paying my sincerest homage to those of his noble qualities which remain enshrined deeply in my heart, even after he is gone."—PPI.

Condolences from from Z.A. Bhutto, M.A.H. Ispahani, Begum Raana Liaquat Ali Khan and Princess Abida Sultan of Bhopal.

Points for Nusrat

1. Tell Begum I may not be able to support her and the children in the same way as before.
2. My wife's car. I will pay the balance Rs. 7000/- to Farakh. The car should be given as a present to Mir Jehan from my wife. The papers Rs. the car may be with you. If not they lost.
3. As regards my wife's house at Bath Island, she would have liked to complete it and then rent out and then children could have lived on it. But as this is no longer possible, it might be sold and the proceeds kept for Mahid Khannam as it was her money from which the house was being constructed. House may be sold by Majid or Hassan.
4. The House at Peak PAKS belongs to Begum. My advice is she could sell it and with proceeds either build a small house or rent a flat. After Farah's marriage, she will not need a big house.
5. I have to pay a house building loan about Rs. 15000/-.
6. I have to pay Shikha about Rs. 4000/.
7. I have to pay Mahid Tailor about Rs. 800/-.
8. I do not know how much has to be paid to Kotian and the contractor. This can be done from the sale proceeds of the House at Bath Island.
9. There is lot wood, bath room fittings etc., lying in the President's House. This might be sold by Majid or Hassan Isphani.
10. The stuff lying in the house may be packed if permissible may be sent to England. If not may be handed over Isphani for storage.
11. Some Photographs given to me personally. They are in the big Dining Room of the President's House.
 - i. Sathover.
 - ii. Shah of Iran.
 - iii. King of Afghanistan.
 - iv. Mr. Ghulam Mohd.
 I would like to have them if possible.
12. There must be other dues owing to President House.
13. I am anxious no outstandings private or Government remain unpaid. (Signed Arifuddin Khan)
14. About Wedding present to- from me personally to Sheroo the only thing I can do now is to request that from my guns
 - i. One pair Churchills
 - ii. One rifle with telescope (Nawazish knows which)
 may be given to him.

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Iskander Mirza - Instructions for his
Secretary, Nusrat, from exile.

Omar Kureishi

I remember, always with a little sadness, meeting the late President Iskander Mirza (for whom I had great affection) at Lord's in 1974 when I was the manager of the Pakistan cricket team. He was standing in a queue, during the lunch interval, waiting his turn to buy a sandwich. I went to him and said: "What are you doing here Sir, please come up to the dressing-room and have lunch with the team." He declined politely. "At least come and watch the match with us." He told me not to worry about him. He showed not the slightest sign of distress that he should be standing in a queue. On the contrary, I was the one who was embarrassed. And he went up in my estimation. He did not need to be treated as a VIP. He was a VIP.

*Obituary by Omar Kureishi.
Reminiscing his meeting with
Iskander Mirza at Lords
in 1964.*

*Obituary from Lt. Gen.
S.M.A. Faruki*

More condolences on Mirza's death

RAWALPINDI, Nov 16: Lt-Gen (retired) S.M.A. Faruki, yesterday expressed profound grief over the demise of Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza and described his death as the loss of a great Pakistani much maligned and misunderstood by his countrymen.

Paying profuse tributes to Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza, he said: "He was generous to a fault. He was simple and unobstructive. He was always accessible even to the most lowly. Above all he was always ready to forgive those who had signed against him. In London I never heard him once bemoan his dethronement or speak ill about those who had betrayed him.

"As a friend he was considerate and affectionate. Noble and regal birth was stamped all over him.

"I mourn his loss as a great Pakistani much maligned and misunderstood by his countrymen and as a friend and brother to me.

"May his soul rest in peace."

DAWN

Our heads of state

Ardeshir Cowasjee

November 14, 1999

HOW are they remembered?

Major General Iskander Mirza: Born November 13, 1899, died November 13, 1969. A good career officer, a well-known political agent of Tank. After partition he served, inter alia, as our defence secretary, minister of the interior, and governor of East Pakistan. When Ghulam Mohammad was deposed, the politicians in power appointed him as their fourth governor-general, in which post he remained from October 16, 1955, to March 22, 1956, on which date he became the first president of Pakistan. On October 27, 1958, (a date that was to be known for some years as Revolution Day, a public holiday) he was deposed by his defence minister, General Mohammad Ayub Khan.

He was exiled and sent to London, where he worked for his living and died an honourable man. He is remembered with muted respect as a man to whom injustice was done.

Obituary by Sir Alec Douglas Home, ex British Prime Minister, in a London newspaper.

OBITUARY

MAJ-GEN I.

MIRZA

A dutiful

administrator

Sir Alec Douglas-Home writes:—

The outstanding characteristics of General Iskander Mirza were loyalty and a sense of duty. For him these standards were absolute.

His strength lay in his ability as an administrator and that Pakistan is still one nation is largely due to his firm and sympathetic handling of the emergency in East Pakistan in 1954. He was never very happy in the ways of politics and his term as President of Pakistan ended in disappointment and resignation. But he was too big a man and too robust to allow exile to damp his zest for living. From Sandhurst days he had played cricket and latterly there was seldom a match at Lord's that he did not attend and follow with the eye of the connoisseur.

In England he made many friends and they will sadly miss one who was the best and most loyal of companions.

Excerpt from an article by Ardeshir Cowasjee:

Our heads of state - How they are remembered.

Dawn. November 1999

DAWN

Sunday, November 16, 1969

Iskander Mirza

MAJOR-GENERAL Iskander Mirza's death will evoke quite a few memories of what doubtless was an eventful phase in the nation's political life. He wielded a great deal of authority even before he came to preside over this country. There is little doubt that he was one of the few men most responsible for determining the country's political orientation in the period that began after the disavowal of the late Khwaja Nazimuddin from the Prime Minister's office in April 1953 and ended with his own fall into oblivion in October 1958. For a part of this period when he was the first Governor-General and later, the first President he is believed, rightly or wrongly, to have been the main arbiter of the country's political destiny. This was a period of uncertainty. It was very crucial for it gave rise to some very vital issues. Could the country maintain its unity in the face of inter-regional conflicts and, if so, how? How far democracy was feasible in the conditions obtaining in Pakistan and to what extent its practice could be reconciled with the dictates of political stability and governmental efficiency? These were some of the questions that were then uppermost in the minds of the elites and the masses, as they still are. As one of the chief characters assigned by fate to act on the political stage, Gen Mirza played a crucial part in determining the answers to these and other questions.

It is the view of quite a few people that by virtue of the training that he received as a political officer under the colonial administration, he was not too well qualified to find answers to the very intricate problems of social, political and economic reorganisation that this country faced on becoming independent. He was unable to put any trust in the political process, and his critics maintain that he tried to look at political matters from the bureaucratic angle. A very practical man, Gen Mirza never hesitated to be regarded as a political liberal or as an idealistic reformer. He disliked the idea of playing to the gallery and seemed to like the image of the "strong man" which the Western Press generally projected of him. He won universal recognition as an exponent of "controlled democracy", although it must be said that it was left to his successor to define the concept. Here it is to be noted that he is not the only or the most important person who promoted the concentration of effective power in the hands of the bureaucrats. It was a conjunction of circumstances which brought about the bureaucrats' ascendancy. His own responsibility, in the subjective sense, is reduced by the fact that there were others who were working assiduously — and cynically — towards the assumption of power by the bureaucrats.

We are not yet sufficiently remote in time from the period in which he was one of the principal wielders of authority and ultimately the holder of the highest office in the land to be able to anticipate history's verdict on his performance. The assessment of the role he played is a controversial matter, but it is a fact that we do not yet possess a full knowledge of all the relevant facts before forming such an assessment in a spirit of complete objectivity. It has been said that he betrayed his firm bias against democracy and a strong will to personal power when in 1958 he abrogated the Constitution he was sworn to defend. Those who thus accuse him are prepared to concede that the 1956 Constitution was an imperfect document. But they hold that the Constitution could, with suitable changes, have enabled the country to take the road of democratic evolution. The present is no occasion to evaluate such opinions. Not all the facts and materials that are necessary for one to judge the lawfulness of the 1958 crisis and the role that Gen Mirza played in it are known to the people. Perhaps the publication of what is believed to be his political autobiography will supply some of the information that has been missing and enlighten us on the pressures under which he worked, on the motives that propelled his actions and on the compulsion of the shaping factors then in operation. But political controversy apart, one must note that Gen Mirza's rise to power was accounted for by some personal qualities which are not denied even by his detractors. He possessed a great deal of personal charm, dynamism and the capacity to make decisions. His political opinions were strongly held and he did not mind if giving them full-blooded expression detracted from his popularity with the multitudes. The sorrow of his family members will be shared by the many friends that he made in this country and in others.

Obituary - Dawn Editorial, 16 November 1969.

THOUGHT FOR TODAY

And those who deny Our revelations—step by step We
lead them on from whence they know not.

—QUR'AN—7,182

MORNING NEWS

Phone :
FBX 244141-42-43-44
1, D.I.T. Avenue,
Dacca, PAKISTAN

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1969—RAMAZAN 5, 1390 (II)

Iskander Mirza

THE sudden death of Major General Iskander Mirza, the first President of Pakistan, removes a colourful personality. Living in exile in a land whose rulers he served so ably as a civil servant in India for about three decades, he will be buried in neighbouring Iran. He will, however, not be remembered in Pakistan for his administrative acumen alone but also for being a pivotal character in the nation's political scene at a crisis-ridden time.

Despite all the antipathy felt by the common man towards those who served the British when he fought for freedom, Iskander Mirza displayed such political tact and insight as to make his presence felt in the corridors of power. His civil service background never handicapped him in the achievement of his political ambitions. On the other hand, he made extremely good use of his experiences as a political agent. He could trade blows with the politicians without wincing. His rise to the highest office in the country was almost meteoric. Within six months of his becoming the Governor of East Pakistan, which had seen the ruling Muslim League suffer its worst defeat, Iskander Mirza became a Minister in the Central Cabinet. And for his constituency he chose the

Punjab where about a year earlier he had Martial Law imposed to crush the anti-Qadiani agitation.

Within nine months of his joining the cabinet, Iskander Mirza so controlled the delicate balance of power at the Centre that he was to become the obvious choice to replace the Governor General, late Ghulam Mohammad, who lay critically ill. Once he had his hands on the levers of power, he created the Republican Party and brought some of the disparate political personalities on the same platform. We are still too near the events to assess the crucial role he played not only in creating a political party, nurturing a coalition at the Centre but also in abrogating the constitution, dissolving the parliament and putting the country under military rule with Ayub Khan as his Prime Minister. The 'revolution' ate its own child and within 20 days of the promulgation of Martial Law, Iskander Mirza was flying to London as a pensioned exile. Now that death silences all controversies, it is left to the future historians to pass the final verdict on the role that Iskander Mirza played in the fortunes of Pakistan. We extend our condolences to the bereaved family. May his soul rest in peace.

OBITUARY

MAJ-GEN ISKANDER MIRZA

First president of Pakistan

Major General Iskander Mirza, C.I.E., O.B.E., who died on Wednesday night, was the last Governor General and the first President of Pakistan. His services, first to the British *raj*, and later to Pakistan, were numerous and distinguished, and although his later years were passed in enforced retirement from active affairs, he is sure of his place in history.

Syed Iskander Mirza was born on November 13, 1899, in Bombay into an aristocratic family of Persian origin long settled in India. Educated at Elphinstone College, Bombay, he was nominated to the first batch of Indian cadets to enter Sandhurst and in 1920 became the first Indian ever to be gazetted to the Army from that famous establishment. After six years of military life he was selected for the Political Service in 1926. In 1938 he was promoted to the key position of Political Agent, Khuzdar; three years later he became deputy commissioner of Peshawar. This long experience on the Frontier shaped the whole of his later life; he learnt there—and never forgot—how to get his own way by playing off faction against faction, and thereby reducing to impotence any opposition which threatened him.

After serving for a short time as Political Agent to the Omra States, he became joint secretary in the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi in 1946. He thoroughly enjoyed European society; he made many friends in the Government of India both on the civil and the military sides.

When the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947, he opted for Pakistan, and soon found full employment for his talents for organisation in the reconstitution of the Pakistan Army. But after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Iskander found that conditions were changing, and that as a civil servant he could do very little unless he could keep in the good graces of the political leaders.

In 1954 he was taken off military work and sent with full emergency powers to deal with the threatening situation which had arisen in East Pakistan. Iskander Mirza handled the crisis with vigour and imagination; he arranged for an equitable distribution of food supplies; he dealt forcefully with disorders; he won widespread popularity by his personal supervision of relief work. This experience gave him the first taste of quasi-absolute power which he had enjoyed since he had left behind his work in tribal territory; it confirmed him in a conviction that politicians were inherently a race of muddlers, who must be kept in order by trained administrators. In November, 1954, Iskander Mirza was recalled from East Pakistan to take up the important post of Minister of the Interior, States and Frontier Regions. Upon him fell the main responsibility of carrying through, in the teeth of vested interests, Ghulam Muhammad's plan for sweeping away all the provincial and state administrations of West Pakistan, and of forming that area



July, 1955. Ghulam Muhammad's health broke down. Iskander Mirza stepped without serious opposition into the post of acting Governor General. In October of the same year, Ghulam Muhammad resigned, and Iskander Mirza succeeded him.

Iskander Mirza seemed now in a position to realize his dream of a Pakistan administered and governed by civil servants, with himself at the head of everything. But in order to attain this, he was obliged to reduce the politicians to impotence; and, unfortunately for him, this meant fighting them on their own ground. In the process, he lost the ideals which had sustained him through so much of his career, and he began to value power for its own sake. Moreover, he became so preoccupied in retaining it, that he had little energy left for setting to rights the many shortcomings which had developed in the Pakistan administration. Gradually, his preference for using as his tools able scoundrels rather than less clever honest men led to a steady deterioration in the whole tone of public life.

While the politicians wrangled, and the state of the nation went from bad to worse, Iskander Mirza was mainly preoccupied in keeping so much power in his own hands that nothing could be done without his consent. Pakistan was steadily approaching bankruptcy; prices were rising; food was short; graft and corruption were rampant; even smuggling rings found powerful protectors in the highest places. In this crisis, some of the younger Army officers, losing patience, thought that a military coup on the Iraq model offered the only prospect of saving the country. But before they could take action of this kind, which would have involved much bloodshed and profited only the communists, the commander-in-chief, General Ayub Khan intervened. On October 28, 20 days after the declaration of martial law (which had already been relaxed in favour of the ordinary civil administration), President Iskander Mirza was persuaded to resign. He left Karachi on November 2, 1958, for London, where he continued to live in political retirement. His long service in India had won for him many British friends, and his retirement brought out once more many of the genial "bonhomous" characteristics which those who had known him in his Frontier days had always so much admired.

Obituary in The Times.

OBITUARY
MAJOR-GENERAL ISKANDER MIRZA

Iskander Mirza, who died on 13 November 1969, was Governor General of Pakistan (1955-6) and the first President (1956-8) when that country became a republic. Others have written of his career; the purpose here is to portray in a few strokes the man and the friend. He was a regular supporter of this Society, and was a notable figure at our annual functions.

Iskander was a cadet of the Nawab-Wazir house of Murshidabad from whom Clive obtained the Diwani of Bengal; to put a point on it, he was descended from Surajuddaula. As such, he was heir to the Persian tradition of the Mughal grandees, a dignity qualified by more than a shade of finesse, a practical savoir faire – for Persia is the France of Asia – and an underlying modesty which calls for no personality cult to express it. In these days of stridency such a man might have achieved, and for a time did achieve, great results. Honour in this tradition is paid to the integrated person, and needs no advertisement in his lifetime.

Iskander Mirza chose the Indian Army as his career, and was the first Indian-India was then one – to go through Sandhurst. In 1926 he applied for the Indian Political Service, and served for many years on the North-West Frontier, where his quality greatly appealed to the Pathans of that region. Later, he held charge of the Peshawar District and the Khyber Agency, and at the time of transfer of power was able from the Defence Ministry to give to Jinnah the advice he needed to make bricks without straw in the early days of partition. After a later spell as Governor of East Pakistan, where his Bengali inheritance was of untold value, he succeeded Ghulam Muhammad as Governor-General.

As President of Pakistan he was still the same in all essentials, his dignity mingled with the good-fellowship of his upbringing – he had won a cricket blue at Sandhurst – an outward presence apparently simple but concealing an instinctive statescraft, a solemnity continually lightened by a gurgle of laughter or a smile. And he never forgot, or failed, a friend.

For three difficult years he held Pakistan together. He brought in Dr. Khan Sahib, his one-time Pathan opponent, as Chief Minister in West Pakistan. His Frontier service gave him the necessary insight in the west, and his Bengal origins stood him in good stead in the East. He put through what is known as the One-Unit of the Western wing, in an endeavour to balance West with East. But then, as now, the baffling problem of running unequal horses in double harness defeated him, and he saw nothing for it but, in October 1958, to abrogate the constitution and establish what became Army rule.

In this coup he sought the aid of General Ayub, his Commander in Chief. Perhaps inevitably, dual control failed, Ayub deposed him and assumed the power. For his last eleven years President Mirza lived in exile in London. Never during that time, though he had private reservations, did he say or do anything that could embarrass his successor, or his country. In foul weather, as in fair, he remained a patriot.

Iskander Mirza was twice married, to Rifa'at who predeceased him, and to Nahid Begam, who shared his years as head of state and in exile. Both sustained him through hard days, and both were able to reinforce the Persian Principles for which he stood.

President Mirza came closer than any of his compatriots to reaching an honourable accord with India and with Afghanistan. His visit to Delhi with Dr. Khan Sahib is still remembered. He won the respect of Nehru and of King Zahir Shah, who stands for a way of life and thought very close to his own. His obsequies in Tehran are a moving tribute to the honour in which his memory is held by the Shah and his government. He will be deeply mourned, not only in Pakistan.

There is extant a translation of some lines of the most famous of Afghan poets, Khushhal Khan, which well express the man Iskander Mirza was:

... whose glance bestows a grace,
Who, though full filled wherewith to grasp success;
Can sweetly smile, is apt to tenderness.

OLAF CAROE.

*Obituary from Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Kruuse Caroe.
Ex Governor NWFP 1946-47 and author of 'The Pathans'.*

Secret & Personal

To the Quaid-e-Azam

24/8

H. M. G. S. Government that the British Govt. will hand over the administration of India by June 1948 to such authority or authorities as may be in the best interests of the people of India makes it incumbent on the Muslim Nation to start preparations immediately to meet all eventualities. Though the position of Muslims has improved beyond all comparison since 1936 thanks to the efforts of the Muslim League and its great Quaid-e-Azam yet the time has been ~~approaching~~ to make up the ~~loss~~ due to the Muslim Nation's century of ~~oppression~~ ^{oppression}. Our position is ~~oppressively~~ ^{oppressively} ~~oppressed~~ in the Round Table & our position has deteriorated since the collapse of the Paris Powers. Our proportion in the ~~Assembly~~ ^{Assembly} has come down to 30%, the Navy ~~has~~ ^{is} not matter as the Indian Navy ~~is~~ ^{is} negligible, & in the ~~air~~ ^{air} force our position is deplorable. In the ~~officer~~ ^{officer} ~~rank~~ ^{rank} ~~position~~ ^{position} is worse - It is not possible to improve appreciably ~~as long as~~ ^{as long as} our position in the Round Table ~~is~~ ^{is}

F-895

3/3
 Bazar & Guernghashan massacre in
 which similar methods were employed
 show beyond a doubt what we have
 to expect unless we find ways and
 means of meeting a pecuniary
 stronger enemy on more or less equal
 terms.

Our fighting strength is
 in the North West. We should
 take practical steps in this
 respect. I suggest an Islamic
 confederation of the North West
 consisting of

- (1) Kalat state
- (2) Tribes of ~~Wagarian~~ Baluchistan
- (3) The Shikhan
- (4) The Mahab
- (5) The Wania Wagians
- (6) The North Wagarian
Wagians
- (7) The Dours
- (8) The Tribes of the Khar
Valley
- (9) The Gharzais
- (10) The Afghans
- (11) The Sikhan
- (12) The Hazargais
- (13) The ~~Wagarian~~ (Wagarian)
- (14) The Bijam Tribes
- (15) Chitral state

T-895

16. Sir State

244

17. Sir State

18. The Tribes of the Black Mountain
(Chagoria & Marasia)

19. The Khyber Tribes.

If we succeed we will
have a fighting force of over
30000 men at the disposal of
this confederacy with another 15000
men for the Afghan Tribes in
support in case of necessity. I am
of the opinion that if this materializes
England will soon start taking some
imp. Portion of this scheme is
very difficult but not impossible for
the Muslim League which has performed
the miracle of the present day
'Muslim India'. We should work
secretly & try to get the sympathy of
the British Administrators of the areas
concerned. We can obtain rifles, machine
guns & ammunition through Kalat State
by doing a little 'gun running' up the
Persian Gulf. The scheme requires careful
staff work & I am afraid money. Political
work should start first.

[Signature]

Correspondence from Iskander Mirza to The Quaid e Azam relating to Prime Minister Clement Atlee's announcement on 20th February 1947 stating the British intention of transferring power in the Subcontinent by June 1948.

Secret & Personal

To The Quaid e Azam _____

H.M.G's announcement that the British Govt. will hand over the administration of India by June 1948 to such authority or authorities as may be in the best interests of the peoples of India makes it incumbent on the Muslim Nation to start preparations immediately to meet all eventualities. Though the position of Muslims has improved beyond all expectations since 1936 thanks to the efforts of the Muslims League and its great Quaid-e- Azam yet the time has been too short to make up the leeway due to the Muslim Nation's century old sleep. Our position is especially precarious in the Armed Forces and our position has deteriorated since the collapse of the Axis Powers. Our proportion in Army has come down to 30%. The Navy does not matter. The Indian Naval strength is negligible, and in the Air Force our position is deplorable. In the officer ranks our position is worse. It is not possible to improve appreciably situation as we are our position in the Armed Forces. The Bihar and Guran...massacres in which similar methods were employed show beyond a doubt what we have to expect, unless we find ways and means of meeting a numerically stronger enemy on more or less equal terms.

Our fighting strength is in the North-West. We should take practical steps in this area. I suggest as Islamic confederation of the North-West consisting of:

- 1) Kalat State
- 2) Tribes of Baluchistan
- 3) The Shuanis
- 4) The Mahmands
- 5) The Wania Wazirs
- 6) The North Wazirisatan Wazirs
- 7) The Daurs
- 8) The Touris of the Kurram Valley
- 9) The Urakzais
- 10) The Afridis
- 11) The Shinwaris
- 12) The Mullagaris
- 13) The Makranis (upper and lower)
- 14) The Bijour Tribes
- 15) Chitral State
- 16) Dir State
- 17) Swat State
- 18) The Tribes of the Black Mountains (Chargazais and Nawarzais)
- 19) The Nindihar Tribes

If they succeed we will have a fighting force of over the 300,000 men at the disposal of this confederacy with another 150,000 men from the Afghan Tribes in the support in case of security. I am of the opinion that if this materializes Congress will soon start talking sense. Implementation of this scheme is very difficult but not impossible for the Muslim League which has performed the miracle of the present day 'Muslim India'. We should work secretly and try and get the sympathy of the British administration of the areas concerned. We can obtain rifles, machine guns and ammunition through Kalat State by doing a little "gun running" up to Persian Gulf. The scheme requires careful staff work and I am afraid money. Political work should start first.

Iskander Mirza

Correspondence from Iskander Mirza to the Quaid-e-Azam marked Secret & Personal. (Transcribed copy)




Captain Iskandar Mirza with Mardan District Officials at his Farewell Party. Swabi, 18 April 1938.



Captain Iskandar Mirza with Representatives from Mardan at his Farewell Party. Swabi, 18 April 1938.



Captain Iskander Mirza as Political Agent in NWFP.



Iskander Mirza as Political Agent.




*Iskander Mirza at his Farewell organized by the
Nowshera SD Police Officers in 1933.*



*Iskander Mirza, sitting second from left in the first row, at
Provincial Training Class, 1926-27.*



Iskander Mirza with his staff during a posting as Political Agent in one of the States in British India.



Peshkush to Major Syed Iskander Ali Mirza Sahab DC
Peshawar at his Farewell Party on 10 February 1945.



As a young officer. Iskander Mirza sends this photo for his wife, Rifaat Begum, from the Frontier.



*Begum Rifaat Iskander
Mirza at St Marks Square
in Venice, 1950.*




*Begum Rifaat Iskander
Mirza with Iskander Mirza
in their 203-A, E.I. Lines
official residence in Karachi*




Iskander Mirza as a young IPS Officer.



*Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza & Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza
being introduced to the Shahinshah of Iran.*



*Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza talking to Naval Officers
at a reception for Shahinshah of Iran.*




*Iskander Mirza as Defence Secretary with wife, Begum Rifaat Iskander Mirza,
on US Naval Ship, USS President Eisenhower.*



*Iskander Mirza, Secretary Defence, Brig H. I. Ahmed and
Shahinshah of Iran. March 1950*



*Postcard to wife, Rifaat, from Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza
from Geneva, Switzerland, 1948.*




*Postcard to wife, Rifaat, from Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza
from Geneva, Switzerland, 1948. (Back of Postcard)*

THE ISKANDER MIRZA INTERVIEW

(By Pakistani legislator and diplomat,
Mirza Abul Hassan Ispahani
in London on
23 September 1967)



*Postcard to wife, Rifaat, from Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza
from Geneva, Switzerland, 1948.*



*Postcard to wife, Rifaat, from Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza
from Geneva, Switzerland, 1948. (Back of Postcard)*

THE ISKANDER MIRZA INTERVIEW

(By Pakistani legislator and diplomat,
Mirza Abul Hassan Ispahani
in London on
23 September 1967)

Audio Cassette 1:

Hassan Ispahani:

00:00

In London, on the 23rd of September nineteen-hundred and-sixty-seven, Iskander, we are meeting in an excellent atmosphere, good weather and, above all, in a free country. We can therefore talk as we like –

long pause: **00:18 – 00:30**

00:30 – 01:47

For years.. which I want to clear with you today. You know as well as I, that neither of us is going younger and time is flying fast in keeping with our modern jet age. So, with your permission and consent, I shall put to you a few questions to which I hope you will give appropriate answers. I think that this little talk will certainly be good for the future historians at least. Today you are condemned for all that has happened during the period that you held the reins of power in Pakistan and President Ayub's book, published recently, appears to have put a Royal Seal on your mismanagement and misfeasance. Shall I start?

Iskander Mirza:

01:50

Yes.

Hassan Ispahani:

01:54 – 03:12

Thank you. I shall. To start with, I shall go back a little to your early period of Governor-Generalship and Presidentship. Was it necessary for you and Gurmani to bring into being a child like The Republican Party which I often anticipated will die as soon as you (were) deposed or left office? Such parties, as in Republican Party have existed in the past, exist today and may or will exist in the future – these parties do not grow from the grassroots and, therefore, when their creators are no more, just

vanish into thin air. Will you give me some information on the reasons that prompted you to start a party when you were in power?

Iskander Mirza:

03:17 – 07:19

In order to make the story complete, it is very necessary to go still further back, i.e., in 1954 September. I think you remember that one day you came in London to the hotel I was staying and told me let us go to the airport as the Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra was returning from the United States so I accompanied you to the airport and, before our arrival, apparently, Muhammad Ali and Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and the party had arrived at the airport. As soon as Mohammad Ali Bogra saw us, he said don't you know that there is a great deal of trouble in Karachi and that they have just heard from one of the Ministers, Mr Malik on the telephone that Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad is about to declare Martial Law. I knew nothing about it and was astounded and just then General Ayub also came from America and he also joined us. I told Ayub what I heard and he took me aside and he said don't propose anything because, before leaving for America, I have been promised to by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad that I shall be asked to take over the country. so I said, look, this would be a very stupid thing to do; he is a very sick man and you must not take everything he says seriously, let us have time and see how things come about when we return to Karachi. Then Mohammad Ali Bogra asked me if I could get a special aeroplane so that we could get there quickly. Well, I tried to get a Canberra from the Royal Air Force but it was not possible so another airplane, I think it was an Argus, was placed at our disposal; so we all, including Mr Ispahani who was then High Commissioner, flew to Karachi without even saying goodbye to my wife and the same happened to the High Commissioner. On arriving at Karachi, we saw an enormous crowd in an excited state and the

amusing thing is, on the way, Mohammad Ali Bogra asked me if I could arrange some army to guard him on the airport. I said, yes it could be arranged but do you really think it is necessary. He said, yes. His information is that it would be very necessary. So I telephoned to General Musa by aerial telephone from the air to inform him that we are arriving at such-and-such a time and would he very kindly arrange for a company in battle-order to be ready on the airport to protect the Prime Minister.

07:22 – 10:56

So when we landed, there was a very excited crowd all around running here and there with the Director of Civil Intelligence jumping into air from one side and somebody else jumping from another and the whole place was like a mad house. I then suggested it to the High Commissioner, Mr Hassan Ispahani to get hold of Bogra, put him in a car and take him to the Governor-General's House and I would follow later with some others. So when we got to the Governor-General's house (and) General Ayub and I went towards the Governor-General's room, there was no sign up to then of Mr Ispahani and Mohammad Ali Bogra. When we got in there, we saw Chaudhry Muhammad Ali walking about in the room and the Governor-General lying on the floor on a white sheet in a terrible state – was almost foaming in the mouth and striking in the air, right and left. His face was red and he looked really ill and really not quite in his senses. We asked him what has happened? Why are you lying on the ground and why are you in such a state? Oh he said, I am very angry; I want to get rid of this government, I don't want to see the face of the Prime Minister; he has been disloyal to me – I want you to take over the country. So I talked to him quietly and I said, look this is not the way to do things, what is the world going to say? You wait. Mohammad Ali Bogra must come by now and he will come up and you must see him and have a heart-to-heart talk. You can't settle things like that. So, one of the servants was sent down and Mohammad Ali Bogra with Mr Ispahani entered the room. In the first minute, I thought

Governor-General was going to burst and get a mental collapse but he gradually recovered and then started talking and he was very furious. However, things came to a pass and they came to an agreement on the basis that a new cabinet would be formed and that the assembly would be suspended. And things would start de novo from the next day. Chaudhry Mohammad Ali was running between the Governor-General and Bogra and drafting something for all this to take effect the next day.

10:58 – 13:37

From the next day, Ghulam Muhammad gave a list of certain names whom he wanted in the cabinet; that of Mr Ispahani, General Ayub, myself, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali with Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister and the others he told him to select himself. So, we sat down in the cabinet room of the sorry before I come to the time when we went into the cabinet room and sat down, the proclamation which was drafted by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali in consultation with Bogra, Nawab Gurmani and Ghulam Muhammad was drafted and issued to the press. We then sat down and started thinking what next to do. Government was selected and was sworn in a few hours' time. No. I am sorry, it was sworn in the next day – our job was to try and clean up the administration as much as we could and to work for the bringing in of the new constitution so that the people may start having a share in the government of the country. This was our principal task but before we could come to it, it was decided to have a sort of an election – which I did not have yet understood on what basis and what was the electorate; and it was a big farce in my opinion; however, some of the officers were selected and some not and another cabinet was formed after about six months and then the constitution making started furiously and Mohammad Ali Bogra had to go away to America as Ambassador; which assignment he was very fond of.

13:41 – 17:04

We also, unfortunately, lost the services of Mr Ispahani who refused to be elected on the terms proposed. A few months after this, the Governor-General got very seriously ill and it was quite impossible to do anything about his health because he was suffering from paralysis and heart trouble and very high blood pressure – the doctors said that he must not continue as Governor-General for the moment. And then cabinet decided that I should act as Governor-General so, as soon as I took over as Governor-General, the question arose who should be Prime Minister? Bogra was going to America as Ambassador and then Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, accompanied by Gurmani, came to me and he said that it is the opinion of the Muslim League Party that Mr Suhrawardy, the leader of the Awami League who had about 13 men in the Assembly, to be the Prime Minister. I said this is a very peculiar way of starting a new constitution because, in any constitution, the largest party forms the government and I really cannot understand how I can overwrite that provision. I said I am going to ask you, Chaudhry Sahib, to form a government – if you are not able to form a government, then it's for you to come to me and tell me that you have failed; you can't tell me to ask this man or that man to be Prime Minister. This is for you to try and form a government and come to me and tell me this is the government I have formed or this is the government which can work. He then told me that he would like to be Prime Minister and work the constitution for which he has worked so hard provided I talk to Mr Suhrawardy and try and get him around. I said I will try. I went to Mr Suhrawardy's house and I talked to him and, ultimately, he agreed that he would not vehemently oppose Chaudhry Mohammad Ali's government but he will be in the opposition but will not be in the government itself. I said this ought to be enough for you, Mohammad Ali. He said, yes! And he formed the government.

17:08 – 17:38

This government brought in the one-unit scheme by which I mean that it was decided that the whole of the West Punjab, Sindh & Frontier and Baluchistan should lose their respective identities and merge into one province to be known as the West Pakistan province.

Hassan Ispahani:

17: 40 – 18:00

Excuse me, General. Here, I want to put another question to you. Were you not one of the prime movers of this one-unit formation or did you not help very strongly through your influence with Khuhro and others to form this one unit? Will you please explain?

Iskander Mirza:

18:02 – 20:51

However, I was sitting in the President's House when a telephone call came from Lahore – and Dr Khan Sahib told me that he has formed a new party. I said what party? He said, I have formed a Republican Party. I said, why? He said, because I can't trust the Muslim League; they have done me down and I have formed a new party. I said, who has joined your party? He said, most of the members of the Muslim League. I expressed my surprise and I said well I personally was against the fragmentation of the Muslim League in this manner and I do not understand why this has been done and I said have you consulted Nawab Gurmani? He said Nawab Gurmani is the man who put the idea in our head of forming the Republican Party. So I said, did you, have you spoken to the Prime Minister, Mr Mohammad Ali? He said no, why should I? I said, when you are breaking a party, you might have talked to the Prime Minister who, after all, is the head of the Muslim League Party. He said, no we have not talked so I said, I think you haven't been very wise. However, see what you can do and talk to him but, in the meantime, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali had also heard of it and he came to

see me looking very sad and glum and he said this is what they have done. I said, I have no hand in it Mohammad Ali. This is the hand of your great friend, Gurmani. I am told, the whole conception is his (and) I have nothing to do with it and now, whatever everybody might say, I have nothing to do with it. I can't tell them to break the party just as I couldn't tell them not to form the party; I can't tell them to break it. It is now for you, as Prime Minister, to see that this thing dies in its infancy but he didn't take any action and most of the Muslim League members of the Punjab Assembly joined the Republican Party and, when the vote of confidence for Khan Muhammad Sahib came, he won by one vote or the casting vote of the President who was also a member of the Republican Party, the Chief Minister of Khairpur, by the name, Mumtaz Qizilbash.

20:57 – 21:54

He decided that he will not remain as the President of the Muslim League but will make Sirdar Abdur Rab Nishtar as President. I was going on to the Chittagong Hill Tract; (and) before going I sent for Chaudhry Mohammad Ali and I said, look you know Nishtar perhaps for 10 years; I have known him for twenty-five years. Please listen to me and don't make him President of the Muslim League or you will be in trouble. He is a religious fanatic and he will work against you behind your back and he will try and control the whole government as President of the Muslim League because he seems to think that he is no less a man than the Quaid-e-Azam.

21:58 – 23:15

Chaudhry Mohammad Ali hummed and hawed and give me no direct answer. When I was in East Bengal, I had returned from the Chittagong Hill Tract to Dacca, I got a telegram from Chaudhry Mohammad Ali requesting me to return to Karachi as early as possible as things were not going as well as they should and there was a Muslim League agitation on minor points. So I returned to Karachi as quickly as I could, cancelling my tour to the Sundarban, and had a talk with Chaudhry Mohammad

Ali and he said you were absolutely right about Sirdar Abdur Rab Nishtar and now I am having all sorts of trouble. I said this will increase. I assure you these troubles will increase because I know him.

23:20 – 24:22

I said Liaquat Ali Khan was a clever politician; why did he take the job of President of the Muslim League when Quaid-e-Azam died? Because he knew that somebody else, whomever he appointed, will try and control the country through disorganization. Naturally as a wise man and he kept that up and this was also kept up by his successors as Prime Minister and you, for no reason at all, have divested yourself of a very strong position in the country. I said there is very little I can do to help; however, you will have to go on. The agitation started, his house was picketed, there were police action and the Mullahism was increasing. And one day, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali comes to my office and said, “please shoot me, I make too many mistakes.”

24:25 – 26:21

Now when a Prime Minister of the country comes to the President and tells him to shoot him, he has made too many mistakes and he is almost weeping, the only conclusion the President can arrive at is the man has lost his nerves and is no longer able to continue as Prime Minister. Just about then, Nawab Gurmani also came from Lahore to see me on some job and talking about Chaudhry Mohammad Ali; I said, look, things are not too good. This man who has brought in the constitution has lost his nerves within a year and I don't think, in these conditions, it is fair on the country that he should continue as Prime Minister. Nawab Gurmani said he quite agrees. So I then sent for Chaudhry Mohammad Ali and I spoke to him, I said, don't you think you should resign and go to England for treatment. He said, I have no money to go to England for treatment. I said, that can be arranged by Government and I will see that you get enough finances to get proper treatment

in London. He was quite happy about that and he put in his resignation and he was sent to London where he stayed for three or four months and got his treatment.

26:29 – 27:26

This was a first installment I had of trying to run 1956 constitution which I had from the very beginning told Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, will not work in this country. This constitution we have brought in is just like the British Constitution but we have forgotten the main things in the British Constitution, the Permanent Head of State. Countries like France, who are far more educated than we are, have failed to run this constitution. And I was telling you from the beginning to try and get some Constitution which would run in this country and, to this end, I also got an American expert to advise you. But you all were determined to have this Constitution and now this is the first installment. I said God knows what will happen in the future.

Hassan Ispahani:

27:34

Iskander, will you kindly tell me, as briefly as you can, why you kept on changing Ministers and Prime Ministers as often as a man changes his singlet on a hot and a humid summer's day.

Iskander Mirza:

27:59

After Chaudhry Mohammad Ali had a breakdown, which was not caused by me but by his mental condition which he got because he was trying to work the Constitution of 1956 in a country not suited for it. I had to think whom to get as new Prime Minister. I had a talk with Dr Khan Sahib and Nawab Gurmani and I said I think it would be better if we went back to the old idea of the Muslim League and get Mr Suhrawardy to form a cabinet in cooperation with the Republican Party. Between them they have the majority to do so. The Hindu Members would also support this coalition. They all agreed that

a trial should be given and, as in my opinion, Mr Suhrawardy was a brilliant Parliamentarian and a very clever man, I decided to give him a try and I sent for him and I said, would you be able to form a ministry in coalition with the Republican Party and the Hindu Members of the Assembly. He said quite definitely that he would be and then I told him to go and then I had a talk with Dr Khan Sahib – the leader of the Republican Party and see what he could do about it. He came back after a short time and he said he was ready and that he will give me names by the next day and his cabinet was sworn in. He worked very well. He was the first man who had the courage to bring the issue of the Baghdad Pact into the Constituent Assembly and had the motion supporting the Pact passed in Parliament. He was very fond of touring outside countries and there were a lot of troubles during those tours but I disregarded them because he was carrying on the Administration better than his predecessors.

Audio Cassette 2:

Iskander Mirza (continues....)

00:05 – 03:07

.....Long-standing invitation to go on a State visit to Iran in late October 1956. Suhrawardy at that time was in America and was due to arrive the day after I left for Iran. But on the evening of my going to Iran, I received a telegram, brought by the Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain from the Prime Minister informing me of the attack on Port Saeed and the actions they were going to take in regard to the Suez Canal. I expressed my surprise that I, as a Head of a country in the Commonwealth has been faced with a fait accompli and at the time when I am about to leave the country to go to Iran. But I said, I will try now to send a telex to His Imperial Majesty, the Shahinshah and request him to invite the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Iraq to come to Tehran because of this situation which we could then discuss and formulate a plan for joint-action. I sent the telex and, before I had left for Iran, in a few hours I received an answer from His Imperial Majesty that Prime Ministers of Turkey and Iraq were coming to Tehran during my visit. So I left Karachi at about 4 o'clock in the morning and reached Tehran the same morning at about 9. There I had talks with the Imperial Majesty and we awaited the arrival of the other Prime Ministers who arrived the same day at different times.

03:17 – 07:37

There was a usual official banquet in the Gulistan Palace that night but the next day things started moving faster. We started holding meetings with the Prime Ministers of Iran, Turkey and Iraq and His Imperial Majesty in the chair and discussed the situation. It was not an easy situation. Our sympathies, as Muslims, were with Egypt. Our interests, as members of the Baghdad Pact, were to take such actions as not to disrupt this Pact and so we decided after long discussion to await

development. That night, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, I got a telephone message from our Ambassador in Tehran, General Raza, that the British Ambassador wants to see me urgently. It was then about 4 o'clock in the morning when the British Ambassador arrived and said that the British Government have received an information that the Pakistan Prime Minister has declared in an open meeting in Karachi that he was going to leave the Commonwealth. I told the British Ambassador that it is a very great surprise to me. However, you can assure the British Government that, as long as I am the President of Pakistan, we are not leaving the Commonwealth so easily. And that I must have time to think what actions I am going to take to undo the troubles created by that speech. I asked the Ambassador to come at about 10 or 11 in the morning and then I would be able to tell him what action I have taken. As soon as the Ambassador left, I tried to go to sleep but I couldn't because I was worried so I sent for a Military Secretary, gave him a letter to the Prime Minister, Mr Suhrawardy and sent my aeroplane with the Military Secretary and told him to deliver this letter to the Prime Minister. And the aeroplane should wait (for) the Prime Minister's order. The letter had asked the Prime Minister that the situation here was rather difficult and, as the Prime Ministers of all the other Muslim countries of the Baghdad Pact were here, it would be better if you come too. He arrived the next day. I saw him and I said that his China visit has, it seems, to have completely changed you and this is the first time I got an inkling that he was not a very stable man. Because when he was in Tehran and the other Prime Ministers would talk to him, he was more for anti-Arab action than anybody else.

07:41 – 09:55

After having made his speech in Karachi that he would leave the Commonwealth, if they don't immediately evacuate the Suez Canal-Port Saeed in Suez Canal area; he was more with them than anybody else. So I came to the conclusion that I haven't got a very stable Prime Minister in dealing with

Foreign Affairs (and) likely to change it any moment. But I kept that to myself and we returned back to Karachi as quickly as possible and cancelled our visit to Iraq. Matters went on like this until, suddenly, one day, Dr Khan Sahib and other members of the Republican Party arrived in the Government House and produced certain speeches of Mr Suhrawardy which he had made in different parts of West Pakistan, attacking the Republican Party in the violent manner – and they said this is impossible to cooperate with this man and we want to get rid of him. I told Dr Khan Sahib that it is very easy to say that you want to get rid of the Prime Minister but the country has also got to run not only the Republican Party but the country has got also to run and you must think of the country. And I suggested a meeting between Dr Khan Sahib and one or two of the leaders of the Republican Party and Mr Suhrawardy. The next day I telephoned to Mr Suhrawardy and I said that you have created the great deal of trouble with your allies in the coalition; you better come tomorrow morning and discuss and see that what settlement is possible.

09:59 – 13:01

I also forget that, at that time, there is a great deal of talks and rumours about corruption in the ministries of industries and commerce. And this was forcibly put to me by Dr Khan Sahib. I said, well when we talk with Mr Suhrawardy, we will try and solve this problem too. The next day, practically the whole day was taken up in clearing up the differences between Mr Suhrawardy and Dr Khan Sahib and we had almost cleared up everything. And I said alright, this new pact; I must get a signature of both of you next day and this pact I will draft and keep it ready tomorrow by 11 o'clock and both of you must be here. During the night, I don't know what happened, Mr Suhrawardy, before informing me sends a letter to one of the newspapers; I think it was *The Morning News* that he has demanded the summoning of the Assembly. And that these differences with the Republican Party are of no consequence as he got a complete majority. He having

thirteen members of Awami League in the Parliament. As I got up and I read this, I couldn't believe my eyes. And just then a letter came from Mr Suhrawardy demanding that the Assembly should be summoned. I telephoned to Mr Suhrawardy and I said this is a definite double-cross. You come to an agreement with me yesterday that you will agree to all these pacts... all these conditions of the pact. Which one was that Mr Mansoor would leave the Ministry of Industries & Commerce where he was in, because there was a big rumour of corruption; now you have said that you are demanding the recall of the Assembly; without even informing me, you put it in the press. I said, I now demand your resignation within two hours or I will dismiss you. He came and actually wept. I said nothing doing, you first put in your resignation so he put in his resignation.

13:07

And now the funny thing is, shortly after he put his resignation and I induced the Muslim League to form a Government with the Krishak Praja Party and the Hindu members. Dr Khan Sahib went and joined Suhrawardy and they became great friends. I said this is very amusing thing for me and I could never have dreamt Dr Khan Sahib doing this sort of volte-face; once demanding Suhrawardy's head on a plate and then going and joining him. However, I arranged the coalition between the Muslim League and the Krishak Praja and the Government was formed. This government, I honestly tell you was the easiest government to work with. They were honest, they were straight, not brilliant but quite good.

Hassan Ispahani:

14:17

But who was the Prime Minister of this new Government?

Iskander Mirza:

14:19

Mr Chundrigar.

14:23

Mr Chundrigar was the Prime Minister and this government were working, in my opinion, very well and I was very happy for the first time; I didn't have worries every day. I had to go on a state visit to Portugal and Spain and so. after seeing this government work for about two months, I left for England and from there I went to France and then to Portugal and Spain. While I was in Portugal, I started receiving telegrams from Mr Chundrigar that all was not well with the coalition and that the Republicans were again creating trouble. I didn't take much notice. I finished my tour and came back to Karachi and I met Mr Chundrigar at the airport; he seemed unhappy – and he said coalition has almost broken down. I said, look on the one hand you all say President is only for show and on the other you make him do all the dirty work. Why can't you all solve these differences yourself? Why should I have to come every time into it? He said, well the situation is such that you have to come in. So, I then sent for Dr Khan Sahib and said now what is the trouble? They produced some speeches made by Daultana and Mr Chundrigar in West Punjab in which they had strongly supported the Muslim League Party. So, Dr Khan Sahib said this is going against the Republican's Party's interest and they are creating a Muslim League Party on our head. I said, look the Muslim League Party has been in existence for God knows how many years; you are only a two-year show and why can't they go around and say you must support the Muslim League. Why don't you go and say you support the Republican Party? The coalition government to form the government does not mean to give up your own party or you give up supporting your own party. So you go and do your own thing. Then I had a meeting with some of the leaders of the Republican Party in which Firoz Khan Noon and Mumtaz Daultana and Nawab were there and some others and I.

Hassan Ispahani (interrupts)

17:28

You mean Muzaffar Ali Khan?

Iskander Mirza (...continues)

17:31 – 18:24

Muzaffar Ali. Yes. and I said, I am really fed up to the teeth with all this which goes on. Every time there is some trouble when I go out of the country and now, this time, there is no reason for it as I told the Republican Party that those speeches which you brought, I said, they do not impress me at all and Dr Khan Sahib was surprised that they didn't impress me. I said they don't impress me at all and now you want to break with this party and Dr Khan Sahib has gone and joined hands with Mr Suhrawardy again. I said I don't understand all this and I said, I really would like to resign and get out of all this mess. You all cannot run the government in this way. This is my firm conviction.

18:32 – 23:04

They got against Chundrigar who was an honourable man and came and handed over his resignation. I told Chundrigar, I do not accept your resignation. I will keep you for another month and see if it is possible to get the Republican Party to see reason. But what I saw was that Dr Khan Sahib and Suhrawardy were getting closer and closer together. So I could not understand it. I asked Doctor that one day you are kicking Suhrawardy and other day you are becoming blood brothers. I just don't understand it. He said, yes this is politics. (IM mutters to himself - Well I don't understand this kind of politics). However, I said you can do what you like and I will do what I like and I am going to keep Chundrigar as long as I can and he was furious you know. In his heart of hearts, he hated the Muslim League that came out in this – what is Muslim League? I said, well they gave you Pakistan, whatever it is. But you can't go on like this. However, I couldn't do anything in that one month but then I was also determined

to see that neither Dr Khan sahib, nor Mr Suhrawardy came into the cabinet. I told Sir Firoz Khan Noon, you form the cabinet as the Deputy Leader of the Republican Party. And I said Krishak Praja will form an alliance with you and you carry on. He said, alright. And it was a very, very weak government, not able to do anything; and I knew it from the beginning but I was not able to do anything much myself. As at that time, I was most anxious that the election should take place in February and they should get the government they want. And I was so sick by that time of all this nonsense which was going on that I wanted to get out if possible. So, this government went on getting weak and there was nothing... he was a great gentleman, I must say that much for Sir Firoz; absolutely honest and well-meaning but he didn't have the brains or the capacity to be a good Prime Minister in a difficult country like Pakistan with an impossible constitution. So, we wanted some Bengalis to come into the ministry. We selected two. I swore them in. In the morning, I swore them in, in the evening they resigned. I inquired of Sir Firoz Khan and I said, why is this? He said, oh they wanted the Ministries of Industries and Commerce. As, I couldn't give them those, they resigned. I said, this is a funny thing, everybody wants to make money, what is the idea? Just then, Mr Menderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey, on his way from Formosa, came to stay with me for three days. One evening, he said, I want to talk to you. So I said, let us walk in the garden. We were walking in the garden and he told me that his ambassador has told him repeatedly that this country is going. You are our ally and naturally we are very concerned. He said, there comes a time when the head of state has to take any risk of his life or anything to try and save his country and whatever I have heard here from my embassy, this time has come and your Excellency must do something. I advise you as a friend of the country. I said, look I have also been thinking but I have not quite formulated in my head what I should do?

23:05 – 24:30

Because, as the elections are three or four months away, let these three or four months pass and they have their election, they can do what they like. He said, yes that only if you don't care whether the country goes to the dogs or not, you will do that but you got to hold it. I said, I will, I will think. Then I get a news that they have, first news was that the Krishak Prajak Party have killed the Deputy Speaker of the Bengal Assembly while it was in-session. And things are really getting in terrible state. There were speakers through which they put loud speakers at the President's House like Abdul Qayyum Khan and deliver the most abusive speeches. And the government was helpless to do anything or didn't care to do anything. So I got fed-up. I decided, I will take action. Now there were two courses for me; to suspend the constitution or to abrogate it. Suspension meant, having one court case after the other, as Ghulam Muhammad had when he suspended the constitution. You remember those two court cases?

MVO 1 (far from the mic)

24:30

Yes in 1954.

Iskander Mirza (... continues)

24:32 – 26:40

I said, why go through all that today; abrogate the constitution and immediately ask Justice Munir to come and have a look at the 56 Constitution carefully and bring about such amendments which will be suitable for the country. That was in my head and, for the time being I thought, you see there would be a turmoil, especially in Bengal where Awami League would be thrown out. I must have Martial Law to support the civil power quickly and to have Martial Law. I must have a Martial Law Administrator and all that.

And here I had no ambition – personal ambitions to be a dictator. I said, I will (ask) General Ayub who was my

friend for twenty-five years to come and be Chief Martial Law Administrator and Prime Minister and have some military officers in the cabinet and also the greater majority of the civilians. This is agreed to between General Ayub and me and I fixed the date as 7th of October for issuing my proclamation which you must have seen, which I have said, this Martial Law is not a punitive measure but a preventive measure, i.e., not to punish the people but to prevent any trouble and that I will remove Martial Law as soon as possible. And this assurance, I also gave to President Eisenhower, Mr Macmillan and the Shah of Iran.

26:45 – 28:27

I wanted also to inform Nehru of what we had done but I just didn't have the time at that period. Otherwise, I didn't think there was anything wrong in telling Nehru that a neighbouring country of yours have done this because it was always my wish that India and Pakistan should live in cooperation but which was quite impossible because of the attitude of Mr Nehru as regards Azad Kashmir. So, the day was set for the 7th – General Ayub arrived on the 5th. There was no such talk of his saying "to make things legal, I must write letters here and letters there" as said in his book. No letter writing of mine would have made an illegal act (and the revolution is always an illegal act) legal. I saw no necessity of writing letters all-round the countryside. All the letters I wanted to write, which I did was to the then Prime Minister, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, explaining that I have to bring in this Martial Law as, in my judgement, now there was no way out to save the country and expressing my deep regret that I had to do it in a time when he was the Prime Minister. That was the only letter I wrote.

28:32 – 29:50

All these stories which Ayub Khan says in his book that he talked to me again and again about writing a letter to him about.. not to do this and not to do that during the Martial Law period are complete lies. I never had any talk of this nature with him. The

only talk I had with him, which he didn't like, was that I must remove Martial Law by the 7th or 8th of November because it is no longer necessary. The country has taken the revolution with enthusiasm and I see no reason why the people should be punished or made to suffer only hardship unnecessarily.

29:58

Like... in his book, General Ayub says that he was informed by Air Commodore Rab that I had asked him to arrest three Generals, Yahya, Hamid & Sher Bahadur. Two of them on the General staff and presumably in Rawalpindi, in the midst of an army division, 700 miles away from Karachi – and one in Karachi doing the job of Director of Military Intelligence whose activities had been....

Audio Cassette 3:**0.00 – 7.07**

Innuendos and attacks of the nature which have found their way into the book I must refute: they are not only inaccurate, but are based on trumped up reports by men like Air Commodore Rab. This person considered the military control of the time a God-given opportunity to wreak vengeance for his supersession in the command of the Pakistan air Force, by Air Commodore Asghar Khan (now Air Marshal).

For this bit of work Rab was amply rewarded. He was drafted into the Foreign Office and appointed Chief of Protocol; after a brief period, he was named Pakistan's Ambassador to Turkey, and, later to Lebanon, an assignment he still holds. This makes one think of the possibility of a collusion between Rab and Ayub from the beginning.

There were four Generals in the Cabinet at the time, Ayub, Sheikh, Azam, and Burki, all the later three very close to Ayub. I would ask any reasonable man to consider what I could hope to achieve by the arrest of the three Generals Yahya, Hamid and Sher Bahadur? Yahya and Hamid were on the General Staff and should have been in Rawalpindi at the time I am supposed to have ordered or requested their arrest. Sher Bahadur was in Karachi as Director of Military Intelligence. A person possessing average wit would regard a request or order to an Air Force Officer to arrest two Generals in Rawalpindi about 700 miles from Karachi, or a General in Karachi in the midst of an area in which at least one infantry brigade was deployed within immediate striking distance, as an act of a deranged mind, or consider it to be a fakir's fairy tale.

What makes the assertions more absurd is that I am supposed to have issued orders over the telephone, at a time the lines of all those who counted in the country, including the President's, were being systematically tapped.

If I had harbored any self-interest, would I have initiated

the revolution? There was nothing easier for me than to sit back, do nothing, and remain President of Pakistan. If the revolution of 7 October 1958, had failed, and no amount of letter writing could convert an illegality into legality, I should have been the only person who would have been shot. I took the calculated risk because, in my judgement, there was no other course left if the country was to be saved.

In my Proclamation of 7 October 1958, which I drafted and issued, I could easily have retained all powers in my hands. I had no desire to be a dictator.

My cardinal error was that, I trusted persons whom I knew, and helped, for twenty years; I regarded them as reliable and trustworthy friends.

A letter from General Ayub Khan, written in April 1958, will prove I had no cause to suspect his loyalty, and want of faith: -

I shall read the letter, now to you.

(Letter begins)

“My Dear President,

Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up of Defence Forces. In doing so you have shown tremendous courage, and wisdom, and have done the Defence Forces, and the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud of you. I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come up to your expectations. I can promise you my very best effort.

“Once again, I thank you and the Khanum for your kind hospitality during my stay here. As usual, I have been very comfortable.

With respects.

Yours sincerely,

M.A. Khan.” (end of letter)

I must express my deep regret that, even my wife, who devoted all her time to social work, and to enhance the prestige of the President's House, has not been spared. I categorically deny that she asked me to get rid of Ayub Khan. There was absolutely no reason for her to do so. The allegation only proves that, there was someone in the President's House base enough to fabricate tales in the hope of improving his situation. A man of honour would not take upon himself the task of a spy in the household of his Head of State.

Several experienced men, among them leading politicians, repeatedly advised me not to grant extension after extension of service periods to the Chiefs of the Defence Forces, saying it was a dangerous practice, unknown in Great Britain, U.S.A. and some other great countries.

All the accounts of the talks from 5th December, to the time of the Military coup d'état, given in the book, have no basis. Why should I get apprehensive if General Ayub addressed a large crowd in Dacca? In an area where 55 million inhabitants are concentrated in 50,000 square miles, crowds are normally to be seen or can be collected. When I was Governor of East Bengal, I addressed large crowds in several places at difficult times, and the then Central Government did not dream of suspecting my loyalty.

There is no logic in all this. Ayub Khan wishes to make people believe that I worked to destroy the revolution, so that I may be shot. Is this sense?

SECTION B

THE GWADAR PAPERS

*Introduction to the Gwadar Papers and President
Iskander Mirza's role in the acquisition of Gwadar
and Pak-China relations based on declassified
documents from The National Archives
of the UK, AGDA & Wilson Centre*

Syed Khawar Mehdi

There is no study of the history and politics of the Gwadar acquisition/purchase, especially the role of Pakistan's first President. It is regrettable that Mr Iskander Mirza's role was most brusquely erased from all official records in order to paint a very unidimensional picture and thus the search for alternative, authentic sources outside Pakistan. The quest to get facts took us to the National Archives in the UK and other similar sources. The time spent in reviewing declassified files, spanning thousands of pages yielded results with a better appreciation of Iskander Mirza's role in the acquisition of Gwadar. There are documents that were declassified at my request and many more documents that are yet to be declassified; nonetheless, the unearthing of his role in the acquisition of Gwadar was of

historical significance and one to be shared in the Memoirs.

The declassified documents at the National Archives offer credible evidence of Iskander Mirza's vision and strategic foresight. He played a critical role in the final acquisition of Gwadar which is supported by the declassified records. While Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon is given reasonable credit for negotiating the deal, Iskander Mirza was the powerful Head of the State and the astute lead when it came to foreign affairs, not only in policy making but also hands-on in making important decisions and overseeing the process. The no-nonsense President didn't tolerate interference in foreign policy; he once told a western ambassador that "he had communicated to the prime minister that he would back him to the hilt except if he washed out on foreign policy or meddled with military." President Mirza showed every indication that he intended to be in control of the country but would back the PM so long as he did not cross him on foreign policy. Also, Mirza's narration of how he stemmed PM Suhrawardy's anti-western stance on the 1956 Suez Canal crisis shows that it was he who ultimately steered foreign policy and not the prime minister.

Unlike India, Pakistan had no European enclaves to deal with but wanted to end Omani occupation of the peninsula of Gwadar on its southwest coast. Oman had been an Arab maritime power with possessions down the east coast of Africa as well as Muscat and Oman itself. As part of its maritime empire, Oman had held Gwadar on the coast of Baluchistan since 1784. Gwadar was comprised of a fort and a small town on a sandy peninsula along an otherwise featureless coast with a total area of about 307 square miles (795 km). Its boundary in the desert with the Makrān region of Baluchistan was never defined, even by the British, who made it a port of call for steamships. Upon Pakistan's independence in 1947, the Sultan of Oman, Sa'id ibn Taymur, initially refused Pakistani approaches arguing that, as a Dominion, Pakistan was not totally independent. The Sultan insisted any negotiations over Gwadar be between

Oman and the UK. However, the British insisted Pakistan was independent and refused to become involved. Gwadar was sold to Pakistan on 6 September 1958 for £3 million (Nicolini, 1999). (From “Waiting for the Esquimo. An Historical & Documentary Study of the Cooch Behar Enclaves of India and Bangladesh. University of Melbourne, 2004.)

The Gwādar port is located on the coastal area of Makrān. For centuries, Makrān was Terra Incognita where exilics, rebels and fugitives would seek refuge. Among the first were the Omanis who gradually imposed their power on the main coastal centres. The case of Gwādar is of particular interest as the town; its port and the surrounding territory were granted as a jāgir (a temporary grant of land exempted from taxation) by the Khan of Kalāt to the Āl Bū-Saīd (Sultan bin Ahmad) of Oman. From a jāgir, Gwādar soon assumed the status of an enclave of the Sultanate of Oman. As close connections always existed between the two countries, the Omani presence in the Makrān region facilitated their control of the local trade and the regional and tribal mechanisms of power. The strategic role of the port of Gwādar was crucial within the framework of the slave, ivory and spice trade between the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa on the one side and Central Asia on the other. During the second half of the 19th century, Gwādar was a dominion of the Sultans of Oman, a source of income for the Gichkī from Kech, a strategic observation post for the English government along the coast of Makrān in the direction of Persia and a staging-post of the Indo-European telegraph line. (Beatrice Nicolini—Historical & Political Links between Gwadar and Muscat from 19th Century Testimonies).

The British were well aware of Gwadar’s strategic importance and, while there was interest, no breakthrough had ever been made due to the indifference of Omani rulers. In 1784, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Muhammad Naseer Khan I, of the Brahui Ahmadzai clan, granted suzerainty over the Gwadar peninsula and its hinterland to Sultan bin Ahmad of the Al Said dynasty of

Muscat who, due to an internal power struggle with his brother, Said bin Ahmad, had escaped to Gwadar from Muscat in 1784. Upon returning to Muscat in 1792 and capturing power, Sultan bin Ahmad maintained his possession of Gwadar by appointing a Wali (Governor) and ordering a fort to be built there. Sultan bin Ahmad also ordered his government to attack and annex the nearby Persian port of Chahbahar though nothing is known of this grandiose plan's execution.

As Gwadar is a pivotal keystone to the future of geo-economics and connectivity in the region, its acquisition from the Sultanate of Oman was a strategic foresight and a brilliant masterstroke from Pakistan. Iskander Mirza's strong-armed diplomacy along with the able guidance of Prime Minister Sir Feroz Khan Noon's government throughout the acquisition process was instrumental in achieving the desired results. It was the only time since the initial accession of the princely states in 1947–8 that Pakistan's territory had increased.

Certainly, President Iskander Mirza's regional clout, good terms with the international community and the respect he enjoyed with the British Government played a very important role, although it never deterred him from twisting Great Britain's arm in extracting a good deal for Pakistan. In a letter marked SECRET dated 25 November 1957 from Sir Derek M.H. Riches, Head of Eastern Department, Foreign Office, to Sir Bernard Burrows, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, based in Bahrain – "I think that you should know the following piece of information for your own guidance only. In conversation with the Prime Minister on October 30, the President of Pakistan brought up the subject of Gwadar which he said really must be settled in Pakistan's favour if Pakistan were to remain in the Commonwealth." This can indeed be verified from the records in the Foreign Office archives of Pakistan, UK & Oman. Gwadar was officially purchased by Pakistan on 8 September 1958 and, on 8 December 1958, after 174 years of Omani rule, it became part of Pakistan.

Unfortunately, history as scribed by the State and its retainers made sure to understate President Mirza's contributions through callous censorship, and his role in the Gwadar acquisition became one of the many casualties.

Based on historical accounts from the memoirs of a former ambassador of China, it appears that the seed to the idea of CEPEC was laid as early as the 1950s. Also, in the NYT report of 9 September 1958, Pakistan had plans to develop Gwadar as a second port of West Pakistan.

In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, there were no professional diplomats and Geng Biao was transformed overnight from a general into an ambassador. In 1956, Geng Biao was appointed the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan and the appointment coincided with the founding ceremony of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Geng Biao wrote in his memoir (Geng Biao memoirs (1949 to 1992) "Pakistan is a close neighbour of China and has friendly relations in history. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a great opportunity to enhance bilateral exchanges and friendship."

In March 1956, Geng Biao arrived in Pakistan. A few days after his arrival, Iskander Mirza made an exception to meet him before the presentation of his diplomatic credentials as China's ambassador to Pakistan. At that time, an official of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry told Geng Biao that this was the first time for the Governor General to meet a foreign ambassador who had not yet presented his credentials which showed the importance the Governor General attached to the Chinese government and its ambassador.

On 23 March, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was officially established. Geng Biao accompanied Chinese Vice Premier He Long to the founding ceremony. Governor General Iskander Mirza became the first President of Pakistan and Geng Biao presented his credentials as the first Chinese ambassador to Pakistan after the official founding of the country as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. President Major General Iskander Mirza,

General Ayub Khan and General Geng got along very well as they shared a common background with similar interests like hunting. Within no time, General Geng Biao achieved complete harmony with the Pakistani leadership in establishing the foundations of a strong relationship between the two armies.

General Geng Biao, during his appointment as the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan in 1956-59, realized the importance of connecting China and Pakistan by road. The highway was a joint Pakistani and Chinese project and the idea to build the Karakorum Highway (KKH) was first conceived by Geng Biao. The work on the Karakoram Highway started in 1959, was completed in 1979 and opened to the public in 1986.

President Xi Jinping served as General Geng Biao's Staff Officer. As a young officer, Xi Jinping was trained and mentored by General Geng Biao who later became the Vice-Premier of China during 1978-1983.

George Cunningham, who was then the Governor of the North West Frontier Province, wrote in his diary in September 1947 how the Pakistan government was allowing "small parties of Muslims to infiltrate into Kashmir" and how they supported the armed lashkar by providing aid and ammunition. His diary entries detail his conversations with Liaquat Ali Khan (the first Prime Minister of Pakistan) and Colonel Iskander Mirza (later the first President of Pakistan) and their knowledge and involvement in supporting the tribal infiltration into Kashmir. Iskander Mirza's IPS background, postings in NWFP and vast experience including his role in Kashmir helped in foreseeing the strategic importance of such a road connecting the two countries and explains his reaching out to the Chinese.


According to Filippo Boni in the Policy Brief titled 'The US-China rivalry in South Asia and Pakistan's hedging dilemma' from the Robert Schuman Centre at the Global Governance Programme, "In the following year (1956), Iskander Mirza, the Pakistani President, decided to visit China despite concerns expressed by the US administration. He reassured the US that

Pakistan would “abide by all our obligations to the United States” and noted that the country had faith in the Southeast Asia Treaty and Baghdad Pact and we will abide by all the treaties we’ve signed... but he felt that there will be no danger in going to Beijing. Further evidence of Pakistan’s desire to keep a door open to China, while being tied to the US system of Cold War alliances, can be found in a 1956 cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan in which Chinese diplomats noted that Pakistan was “relatively enthusiastic about developing trade between the two nations. ... The number of solo meetings that our ambassador and chargé d’affaires had with the Pakistani president and prime minister in May and June is unprecedented. The various leaders of landlord and capitalist political parties, and giants in industry and commerce, all emphasise when [we] meet that China’s progress is amazing, that it is the strongest nation in Asia and that Chinese and Pakistanis should be friendlier.”

Similarly, in a declassified confidential cable dated 17 May 1956 from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan reporting to MOFA in Beijing with cc to Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai on the Pakistani President’s Exclusive Conversation with American Reporters, it is obvious that President Iskander Mirza’s strategic overture to China was not looked upon kindly by the much-disappointed American media. The cable says (1) According to United Press International (UPI) reports, Pakistani President Iskander Mirza issued a very foolish statement when meeting alone with UPI reporters the other day saying that nothing in Pakistan’s stance and actions with regard to Communist China implies a lessening of its friendship with the United States, or a move toward neutrality in international affairs. The Pakistani prime minister, on his upcoming visit to China on 2 June, will not reduce Pakistan’s obligations toward the United States or other Western countries. Mirza said: “We abide by all our obligations to the United States; we have faith in the Southeast Asia Treaty and the Baghdad Pact, and we will

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

abide by all the treaties we've signed.



*General Geng Biao. Ambassador to Pakistan and
the architect of Pakistan China relations*

There are some who worry about what direction our government officials are moving in (implying moving toward a neutral line), but I feel there will be no danger in going to Beijing.” (2) Mirza stated: The United States should face the facts and recognize China so as to ease the international situation. He said that, although Pakistan is one of the Southeast Asia Treaty nations, and a close ally of the United States, it has still recognized Beijing; although it is difficult for the United States to recognize Beijing after having established Taiwan, it should not ignore this government that does, in fact, exist. If the United States recognized China, it could draw China away from the Russian Communist Party clique, and the United States and Britain could influence China to take a position more beneficial to the West in international affairs. (3) Regarding the issue of Sino-Japanese trade, Mirza advocated increasing Sino-Japanese trade so that “Communist China will not have to rely completely on Russia.” He also holds that Japan should be

accepted into the United Nations to make it more influential in Asian affairs.

It is obvious that President Iskander Mirza was his own man and not playing to the tune of international power brokers. It was Pakistan's interest and sovereignty that ruled supreme in his policies and as obvious in his statements. In another cable from the Chinese Embassy in Karachi to Beijing reporting on Iskander Mirza speeches during his visit to Turkey on 28 July, he (Iskander Mirza) said: in a world where distances are shrinking more and more, to speak of neutralism is like reciting a romantic poem. But he also said that "coexistence means fully respecting other nations' sovereignty and independence and complete non-interference in their internal affairs," "amity and cooperation," and using "peaceful negotiation and mediation to resolve differences." In Turkey's parliament, he said: "It is only through strong, active, constructive actions that peace can be maintained. We do not at all believe that peace can only be maintained through the force of power politics."

These words and similar other sentiments expressed on various occasions by Iskander Mirza were not exactly the kind of music US was attuned to hearing and it wouldn't be preposterous to assume that the idea to disengage Iskander Mirza from the power equation gained footing from thereon and so began the search for a person to deliver on their terms. Thus were laid the seeds to a vassal state in the region and proven subsequently as history unfolded.

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DECLASSIFIED FILE FO
371/126929
1957

**Negotiations between the Sultan of Muscat and Pakistan
concerning Gwadar oil rights**

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1957	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT ARABIA	E A 1084/17
FROM Mr. Chauncy Muscat No. 147 Dated 18 Aug Received in Registry 19 Aug	Pakistan claim to Gwadar. Report approach to Sultan to hasten negotiations. Sultan would give his reply during visit in October.	
References to former relevant papers 16 - 13 E.A. 1084/225	MINUTES Draft submission. John B. Denna August 20 A. F. O. Hunt by Mr. Carson August 20	
(Price) 126929 (How disposed of)		
(Action completed) (Index)		
References to later relevant papers	47324	

Declassified File FO 371/126929

SUSPEND

Registry No. _____

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) _____

(Date) _____

Despatched _____

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with _____ priority
without _____

Draft.

Telegram to:— Bahrain

No. _____

(Date) _____

And to:— _____

[Security classification] _____
—if any _____

[Codeword—if any] _____

Address to Bahrain

telegram No. _____ (date) _____

repeated for information to United Kingdom
High Commission Karachi, and Muscat,
Muscat Telegram No. 117 of August 1971; Gwadar.

Repeat to:—
Karachi
Muscat,

En-Clef.
Code
Cypher

Distribution:—
Middle East
Secret.

Copies to:—

20/8

The Sultan's attitude is disappointing and it will be very difficult for us to convince the Pakistanis that we have done our best. It is important to our relations with Pakistan that we should do (and appear to be doing) everything possible to secure a satisfactory settlement of this problem which was raised with the Prime Minister when Mr. Suhrawardy was in London. It may, in the end, be necessary to accept the position that the Sultan will not give an answer before his visit to London in October. But it would be most desirable to be able to assure the Pakistanis now that, when in London, the Sultan will discuss Gwadar with a Pakistani representative as well as with us. We appreciate your difficulties in pressing the Sultan further at this stage but we need to have something more to show the Pakistanis for our efforts than at present. If there is no hope of the Sultan changing his mind and agreeing to receive a Pakistani representative in Muscat before October, then that.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

SECRET

E A 1084/B-

CHAIR

Sahr Gwadar is an enclave in Baluchistan on the north-west coast of Pakistan, belonging to the independent Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. At the end of the 16th century, the then Ruler of Gwadar, the Khan of Kalat, granted to an ancestor of the present Sultan of Muscat and Oman (who had fled from his own country following tribal disturbances) the right to live and collect taxes in a certain area round Gwadar (the boundary is in dispute). From that time onwards, Gwadar has been under the sovereignty of Muscat. In 1947 the old Indian province in which Gwadar is an enclave acceded to Pakistan after the partition of India.

Since 1949 Her Majesty's Government have been trying to negotiate the transfer of Gwadar to Pakistan. The Pakistanis wish to take it over as soon as possible. They claim that smuggling from the port of Gwadar leads to serious pressure on the Pakistan rate of exchange, lowers prices in Baluchistan, and generally dislocates the economic life of the area. They hoped at one time to obtain the territory by contesting the legality of the Sultan's possession. Our legal advisers went into this question some four years ago at the request of the Government of Pakistan, and their conclusions were that the Sultan had a good title in law to Gwadar. This information was communicated to the Pakistan Government.

/end

Declassified File FO 371/126929

and apparently discouraged them from pursuing the idea of legal remedy. During protracted negotiations from 1949 to 1955 the Sultan of Muscat was reluctant to agree to any of the proposals made for the lease or sale of Gwadar, on the grounds that it would be dishonourable to sell a possession he had received from his ancestors. The Sultan, moreover, refused to negotiate with the Pakistan Government except through Her Majesty's Government.

In 1955, however, it became apparent that the Sultan was less averse to the idea of sale than he had been previously. After further negotiations, an aide-memoire was presented to the Sultan on January 8 of this year by Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. The aide-memoire proposed an open agreement for the lease of Gwadar to Pakistan for ten years at an annual rental of £100,000 sterling paid in advance as a single payment of £1,000,000, and a secret agreement for the outright sale of Gwadar to Pakistan when the lease expired for a further lump sum. The open agreement also stipulated that the Sultan would receive 5% of the Pakistan Government's profits from any oil which might be found within a defined area of Gwadar, (including a seabed area,) for a specified number of years from the start of production. The size of the lump sum to be paid on the expiry of the lease was to be inversely proportional to the number of years for which oil royalties would be paid.

The Sultan asked for time to consider the offer, but he had not given a decision before the troubles in Gwadar

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

began in July. Following the successful suppression of the rebellion in Oman with the help of British forces, the Pakistan Government, in the face of a mounting Press campaign in Pakistan against the Sultan have asked H.M.C. to press him to agree to an early settlement, and if necessary, to receive a Pakistan representative to conduct direct negotiations. When the H.M. Political Resident put this proposal to the Sultan on August 18, the latter said that he could not give a decision until his visit to London in October, and that in no circumstances would he agree to negotiations except through H.M.C. Further instructions to H.M. Political Resident are now under consideration.

Declassified File FO 371/126929


Letter

August 21, 1967

With reference to our
telephone conversation
yesterday, I enclose a short
note on Gwadar prepared in
the Foreign Office. It is
classified Secret.

My . Sir Edward Ford, K.C.V.O., C.B.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death



Declassified File FO 371/126929

American Meddling in Pakistan-Muscat Relations.

A report from Karachi referred to the 'Times of Karachi' for a report that Wendle Philips, "an American businessman, now chief economic adviser to the Sultan of Muscat", was believed to have arrived in Karachi in an attempt to prevent a settlement of the Qudat dispute between Pakistan and Muscat. Pakistan had been negotiating with the Sultan of Muscat through the good offices of Britain, but hitherto it had proved impossible to "pin down" the Sultan to any definite commitment. Philips, said the paper, had extensive oil interests in the Persian Gulf and in Qudat, where he had obtained a monopoly of oil prospecting "for that smugglers' paradise". It was believed that he wished to postpone a settlement between the Sultan and Pakistan until the area had been prospected for oil. The paper said that the whole issue was permeated by "a strong smell of oil" and complained that Qudat was used as a centre for smuggling gold, textiles and other goods into Pakistan. (RUMA.5.9.57)

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MUSCAT

Cypber/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

No. 163

D. 8.37 P.M. September 16, 1957

September 16, 1957

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Muscat telegram No. 163 of September 16.
Repeated for information to Bahrain

A Karachi newspaper is alleged to have reported that Wendell Philips, described as "chief economic adviser to the Sultan of Muscat", has obtained sole rights to prospect for oil in Gwadar, and is therefore interested in delaying a settlement on Gwadar between the Sultan and Pakistan.

2. Please confirm that no concession for oil prospecting has been granted to anyone in respect of Gwadar. Subject may be raised by Pakistani Foreign Minister who arrives here tonight.

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Eastern Department
News Department
Information Policy Department
Economic Relations Department

777777

Declassified File FO 371/126929

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
MR. SUPRAWARDY

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th of August about the problem of Qadur. I am glad that you wrote to me as it gives me an opportunity to explain to you direct all that we have been doing, or trying to do, to help you in this matter since we last met in London.

2. I myself had previously issued instructions that this should be taken up most strongly with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. As you have already been informed through our High Commissioner in Karachi and through your High Commissioner here, the Political Resident in Bahrain, acting on these instructions, exerted the strongest possible pressure on the Sultan to settle the Qadur question. He was asked to try to secure the Sultan's agreement to meet a Pakistan representative at once for direct negotiations.

3. Sir Bernard Burrows has reported that he used every available argument with the Sultan, including the difficulties of your Government with your public opinion. I am satisfied that he did his best to persuade the Sultan to make an immediate move. I share your disappointment that, despite the strongest possible pressure the most that Sir Bernard Burrows was able to induce the Sultan to say was that he would give his answer to the United Kingdom Government when he visits London in October and November next.

4. Like you, I am sorry that more definite progress has

/act

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

not been possible. But as you know, the Sultan is the head of an independent state, and there are limits beyond which we cannot press him. Moreover, it is true that at the present moment the Sultan has other matters forcing themselves on his attention. In any case we are satisfied that it would be unproductive of positive results to press the Sultan further until his visit here at the end of October. To do so might only risk causing him to make up his mind against making any move in the direction we both desire and to content himself with dealing with your specific complaints e.g. smuggling. His strength lies in his legal position on which, as you know, we should be bound to take the line that we and the Government of India (previous to 1947) had accepted his title to Qadur.

5. You may be sure that when the Sultan visits this country next month we shall again press him to give a satisfactory answer on Qadur. We shall at that time also press him to enter into direct discussions with your Government. Indeed, if the President of Pakistan is in London privately at the same time as the Sultan, as we understand he may be, we could (if this is agreeable to you) suggest to the Sultan that the two should have a conversation. I cannot of course say what the Sultan's reaction will be to this, but we will do all we can to persuade him.

6. The next move cannot be made until the Sultan's visit at the end of October. Until then I fear we must, as you say, possess our souls in patience.

Declassified File FO 371/126929

SECRET
PRIME MINISTER'S
Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office
PERSONAL TELEGRAM

TO: H.E. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN (NOTING)
SERIAL No. T-101/57
(Sent 21.54 hours 7th September, 1957)

CYPRUS

No. 1667 **SECRET**

*Copied to Sir B
Barrow v/c dfr
22/9
N/A*

QUADUR

The Prime Minister has received a message from Mr. Suhrawardy about Quadur, copy of which will be sent to you by bag.

2. Please convey to Mr. Suhrawardy following personal message from Prime Minister in reply. Begins.

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th of August about the problem of Quadur. I am glad that you wrote to me as it gives me an opportunity to explain to you direct all that we have been doing, or trying to do, to help you in this matter since we last met in London.

2. I myself had previously issued instructions that this should be taken up most strongly with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. As you have already been informed through our High Commissioner in Karachi and through your High Commissioner here, the Political Resident in Bahrain, acting on these instructions, exerted the strongest possible pressure on the Sultan to settle the Quadur question. He was asked to try to secure the Sultan's agreement to meet a Pakistan representative at once for direct negotiations.

3. Sir Bernard Burrows has reported that he used every available argument with the Sultan, including the difficulties of your Government with your public opinion. I am satisfied that he did his best to persuade the Sultan to make an immediate move. I share your disappointment that, despite the strongest possible pressure the fact that Sir Bernard Burrows was able to induce the Sultan to say was that he would give his answer to the United Kingdom Government when he visits London in October and November next.

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/5.

SECRET

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

SECRET

- 2 -

5. You may be sure that when the Sultan visits this country next month we shall again press him to give a satisfactory answer on Qadur. We shall at that time also press him to enter into direct discussions with your Government. Indeed, if the President of Pakistan is in London privately at the same time as the Sultan, as we understand he may be, we could (if this is agreeable to you) suggest to the Sultan that the two should have a conversation. I cannot of course say what the Sultan's reaction will be to this, but we will do all we can to persuade him.

6. The next move cannot be made until the Sultan's visit at the end of October. Until then I fear we must, as you say, possess our souls in patience. Ends.

Copy to:-

RAIOMAN DISTRIBUTION

10 Downing Street Mr. Zuluts

MIDDLE EAST DEPT.SECRET

Declassified File FO 371/126929

SECRET

Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN

TO: SAHRAH

D: Karachi 10.37 hours 6th October, 1957
R: 10.38 hours 6th October, 1957

P/W

CIPHER
SECURITY

E A1004/20 (2)

No. 1451 SECRET

Addressed Commonwealth Relations Office No. 1451, repeated Bahrain No. 917K (or No. 915M), (Commonwealth Relations Office please pass).

Your telegram No. 1962 (not to Bahrain).

ADVISE

Grateful for earliest possible indication of dates of Sultan's visit. I have no doubt that President Iskander Mirza is hoping to meet the Sultan in London and if this is not going to be possible I ought perhaps to warn him discreetly.

Copy to:-

D.II

Foreign Office

Mr. D.T. Test

Copy to Foreign Office (Telegram Section) for retransmission to Bahrain.

ALLOTTED TO INDIA EAST DEPT.

SECRET

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

1967	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT ARABIA	EA 1084/22				
FROM Mr. de Zulueta No. 10 to min ward C.E.O. id. No <u>Top Secret</u> Dated Oct. 16 Received in Registry— Oct 21	QWAGWA. Transmits copy Mr. Subramanyam's letter to PRIME MINISTER of 11 October for consideration. (Letter forwards Pakistani Intelligence Board report).					
References to former relevant papers -20	MINUTES As Vines cleared a draft tel to Karachi with Mr. (attached) Dft to Bahrain submitted Dated West 20/10					
(Print) (How disposed of) D/R in B.B. Bureau Bahrain from Mr. Riches 28 Oct	A lot of the stuff in the "intelligence report" was hotted out in August by the Pakis & refuted in detail by the Gulf (e.g. the nonsense about Puri) B 25.10					
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>(Action completed)</td> <td>(Index)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>[Signature]</i></td> <td><i>[Signature]</i></td> </tr> </table>	(Action completed)	(Index)	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	A. C.E.O. to Karachi 2174 23 October B. Karachi to C.E.O 1268 14 October C. C.E.O to Karachi 2190 24 October See tel to Bahrain at EA 10399/6 B/W 9/11	
(Action completed)	(Index)					
<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>					
References to later relevant papers EA 10399/6	M4630 51721-14					

Declassified File FO 371/126929

TOP SECRETPrime Minister,
Pakistan.*2 copies please*
Karachi, the 11th October
1957.

My dear Prime Minister,

I thank you for your very considerate reply to my letter regarding Omdur. There are indeed many reasons why the Sultan of Muscat is resisting settlement with Pakistan. India is taking advantage of the situation and may so entrench itself in Omdur as to create an international complication. It may ultimately become insoluble. I am sending you a copy of a report of our Intelligence Branch which will throw a flood of light on the hesitation of the Sultan to give up Omdur and come to a settlement with Pakistan.

I am sorry that I cannot agree with the point of view of the British lawyers that the Sultan of Muscat has any legitimate sovereign claim on Omdur. I could send you a brief which will set out the history of the place, and which, in my opinion, demonstrates irrefutably that the Sultan has no sovereign rights. I, however, refrain from doing so in view of the attitude of the British Government, and also because at this stage a consideration of this will be academic, frivolous and a waste of time.

I am awaiting anxiously the results of the forthcoming meeting between the Sultan of Muscat and yourself.

With kindest regards and many thanks for your efforts to arrive at a settlement,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.)

H.S. SUBRAMANY.

The Rt. Hon'ble
Mr. Harold Macmillan,
Prime Minister of U.K.,
London.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

TOP SECRET

The port of Qandar has become a virtual base for anti-social activities against Pakistan. The agents of Muscat and India operate there freely in carrying on large scale smuggling of gold, currency, cloth and other consumer goods into Pakistan. They have maintained their links with local smugglers in Karachi who in turn smuggle rice, wheat flour and kerosene oil from Pakistan. All goods smuggled from Bombay, Persian Gulf and other foreign countries are stored at Qandar from where they are smuggled into Pakistan both by land as well as by sea. The smugglers at Qandar accept mostly Indian currency and pound sterling from their customers in Pakistan with the result that the Pakistani currency has no circulation there. Some time ago the exchange rate of Pakistani currency was something about Rs.155/-/- for 100 Indian rupees. At present Pakistani currency is almost out of circulation at Qandar.

Hilal Bin Hamad, the Wazir (Governor) and Abdul Rah, the Mudser (Collector) respectively of Qandar are mixed up with these smugglers who take their shares from them. Both the Government of India and the Sheikh of Muscat are in the know of this business and purposely connive at these activities. Kanda Allah Bux and Kanda Yousuf, two notorious Baluchi smugglers of Qandar, who hold considerable influence over the Baluchi population of Qandar and Pakistani Baluchistan are in the good books of the Sheikh of Muscat. The Sheikh often invites them to Muscat where they are treated as State guests and provided with all sorts of luxuries at that place. These smugglers exercise equal amount of influence over the Indian smugglers who operate there. They visit Karachi frequently to organise smuggling

Declassified File FO 371/126929

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operations here. They have their own launches which operate between Qadad, Omara, Pasni and Karachi for smuggling activities. Kauda Allah Bux and his brother Kauda Ahmad have got their own houses in Kalakot, Lyari Quarters at Karachi. Younsuf Marzook, a notorious Arab smuggler of Karachi who had been expelled sometime ago, has taken abode at Kuwait but operates at Qadad under the protection of Qadad authorities. Some time ago a Karachi smuggler who could not pay the black money at Qadad was arrested by Abdul Rab and put in a well which is used as prison there. It was with great difficulty that his men from Karachi went to Qadad, paid the black money purchased at abnormal rates in Karachi and secured his release. These organised smuggling activities continue to affect Pakistan economy adversely and are greatly responsible for the undervaluation of Pakistani currency in the Persian Gulf.

The population of Qadad is about 8,000. Out of them, there are about 200 Hindu business men including those who have migrated from Sind after partition. They are all Indian nationals and rabidly anti-Pakistan. About 1,000 Khojas from Bombay have also made their way to Qadad and established their business there. They have got their links in Bombay and Karachi which facilitates their smuggling activities at both ends. The rest (6,800) are all Baluchis who have got all their natural links with Pak-Baluchistan. They are all under the influence of Kauda Allah Bux and Kauda Yousuf who in turn are under the influence of the Sheikh of Muscat.

It is a fact that the practise of slavery is still in vogue throughout the Sheikhdan. There are regular markets at Nizma, Abri and Zahira Moazzam where slaves

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

- 3 -

are sold and purchased as a commodity. The Arabs take a leading part in this nefarious business. There are instances of Pakistanis having been kidnapped from Karachi, Baluchistan and the North Western regions of West Pakistan from time to time for sale at these markets. The Pakistani Mirasis are in link with Arab traders and kidnap children from here who are then taken by them or handed over to Arab traders for sale at these markets.

There is a great concentration of Indians in Qadad. The Sheikh of Muscat himself has got large business interests in Bombay. His father, Syed Taimur, is living in Bombay for some time past. The Sheikh also pays frequent visits to Bombay and is more inclined towards India than Pakistan. The Government of India have ever been anxious to increase the scope of their influence in Qadad for strategic purposes. Towards the close of the year 1955 it was reported that the Government of India had offered a handsome amount of money to the Sheikh of Muscat to grant India certain facilities in the port of Qadad. It was proposed that if the management of the port was run on systematic and commercial lines with the assistance of Indian technical experts, it could be a source of great revenue to the Sheikh. India wanted to conclude an agreement with the Sheikh of Muscat whereby the entire administration of the port was to be temporarily transferred to India in exchange for a handsome amount of money in the first instance. The revenues of the port were to be divided between the Government of India and the Sheikh equally after deducting the expenses of the administration. We do not know whether the Government of India have succeeded in concluding

Declassified File FO 371/126929

- 4 -

a secret agreement with the Sheikh of Muscat but we have reasons to believe that it is as a result of some secret understanding that the Sheikh of Muscat has proposed to appoint Mr. Puri, a senior officer in the Indian Consulate at Muscat, as Administrator of Gedar in place of Mr. Wyne, who has proceeded to England on a long leave. It is significant to note that all those who are in touch with Gedar confirm this appointment whereas Kauda Yousuf who has come to Karachi on 8.8.1967 contradicts it. It is possible that Mr. Puri may not have taken the charge as yet, but the authenticity of this proposal cannot be denied.

Informations gathered by us go to show that India has organized propaganda campaign against Pakistan in particular and against the British in general throughout the Persian Gulf. The Sheikh of Muscat is also understood to be unhappy with Pakistan in the heart of his hearts though he does not express his feelings freely. He connives at the activities of his agents in spreading hatred and disaffection against Pakistan in collaboration with Indians. Some time ago a move was initiated by certain young Baluchis for the return of Gedar to Pak-Baluchistan. This was opposed by Indian Hindus and Arab smugglers who had the support of the Sheikh with them. The Sheikh deputed Kauda Allah Bux and Kauda Yousuf and bribed them heavily to suppress the move.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

CONFIDENTIAL
(SA 1034/22)

TOP SECRET

Prime Minister,
Pakistan.

Karachi, the 11th October
1957.

My dear Prime Minister,

I thank you for your very considerate reply to my letter regarding Gwadar. There are indeed many reasons why the Sultan of Muscat is resisting settlement with Pakistan. India is taking advantage of the situation and may so entrench itself in Gwadar as to create an international complication. It may ultimately become insoluble. I am sending you a copy of a report of our Intelligence Branch which will throw a flood of light on the hesitation of the Sultan to give up Gwadar and come to a settlement with Pakistan.

I am sorry that I cannot agree with the point of view of the British lawyers that the Sultan of Muscat has any legitimate sovereign claim on Gwadar. I could send you a brief which will set out the history of the place, and which, in my opinion, demonstrates irrefutably that the Sultan has no sovereign rights. I, however, refrain from doing so in view of the attitude of the British Government, and also because at this stage a consideration of this will be academic, frivolous and a waste of time.

I am awaiting anxiously the results of the forthcoming meeting between the Sultan of Muscat and yourself.

With kindest regards and my thanks for your efforts to arrive at a settlement,

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Hon'ble
Mr. Harold Macmillan,
Prime Minister of U.K.
London.

(Sgd.) M. S. SUHRAWARDY.

Declassified File FO 371/126929

TOP SECRET

The port of Qwader has become a virtual base for anti-social activities against Pakistan. The agents of Muscat and India operate there freely in carrying on large scale smuggling of gold, currency, cloth and other consumer goods into Pakistan. They have maintained their links with local smugglers in Karachi who in turn smuggle rice, wheat flour and kerosene oil from Pakistan. All goods smuggled from Bombay, Persian Gulf and other foreign countries are stored at Qwader from where they are smuggled into Pakistan both by land as well as by sea. The smugglers at Qwader accept mostly Indian currency and pound sterling from their customers in Pakistan with the result that the Pakistani currency has no circulation there. Some time ago the exchange rate of Pakistani currency was something about Rs.155/-/- for 100 Indian rupees. At present Pakistani currency is almost out of circulation at Qwader.

Hilal Bin Hamed, the Wazir (Governor) and Abdul Rab, the Muzdar (Collector) respectively of Qwader are mixed up with these smugglers who take their shares from them. Both the Government of India and the Sheikh of Muscat are in the know of this business and purposely connive at these activities. Kande Allah Bux and Kande Yousuf, two notorious Baluchi smugglers of Qwader, who hold considerable influence over the Baluchi population of Qwader and Pakistani Baluchistan are in the good books of the Sheikh of Muscat. The Sheikh often invites them to Muscat where they are treated as State guests and provided with all sorts of luxuries at that place. These smugglers exercise equal amount of influence over the Indian smugglers who operate there. They visit Karachi frequently to organise smuggling

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

- 2 -

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The population of Qwader is about 8,000. Out of them, there are about 200 Hindu business men including those who have migrated from Sind after partition. They are all Indian nationals and rabidly anti-Pakistan. About 1,000 Khojas from Bombay have also made their way to Qwader and established their business there. They have got their links in Bombay and Karachi which facilitates their smuggling activities at both ends. The rest (6,900) are all Beluchis who have got all their natural links with Pak-Beluchistan. They are all under the influence of Kande Allah Bux and Kande Yousuf who in turn are under the influence of the Sheikh of Muscat.

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Declassified File FO 371/126929

- 3 -

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There is a great concentration of Indians in Gwadar. The Sheikh of Muscat himself has got large business interests in Bombay. His father, Syed Taimur, is living in Bombay for some time past. The Sheikh also pays frequent visits to Bombay and is more inclined towards India than Pakistan. The Government of India have ever been anxious to increase the scope of their influence in Gwadar for strategic purposes. Towards the close of the year 1955 it was reported that the Government of India had offered a handsome amount of money to the Sheikh of Muscat to grant India certain facilities in the port of Gwadar. It was proposed that if the management of the port was run on systematic and commercial lines with the assistance of Indian technical experts, it could be a source of great revenue to the Sheikh. India wanted to conclude an agreement with the Sheikh of Muscat whereby the entire administration of the port was to be temporarily transferred to India in exchange for a handsome amount of money in the first instance. The revenues of the port were to be divided between the Government of India and the Sheikh equally after deducting the expenses of the administration. We do not know whether the Government of India have succeeded in concluding

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

- 4 -

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Declassified File FO 371/126929

SECRET

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

A 1064/22 (C)

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN

EPTD: SAHREIN (SAVING VIA FOREIGN OFFICE)

(SENT: 23.05 hours, 26th Oct., 1957)

FELICITY

NO. 2190 ALABAMA

Y. J. Zhang, L. H. Fu

Copy to:-

Copy to Foreign Office for retransmission. SAVING to Bahrain.
MIDDLE EAST DEPT.

SECRET

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

1957		E EASTERN DEPARTMENT	EA 1084/23
		ARABIA	
FROM Mr. de Luchin No. 10 to Mr. de Ward C.A.O. No. Dated Oct 31 Received in Registry— Nov 4		GUARANTY. Extract from Record of PRIME MINISTER's talk with PRESIDENT of Pakistan about settlement.	
Reference to further relevant papers 1/22 (Print) (How disposed of) DH) Bin 3. Binnari Bahraini from Mr. Racheg. from Mr. 25		MINUTES Dairi went we will Tell Bahrain if CRO agree 6/4 No. Vines told me that CRO. will be sent in a day or two 3 No. Vines told me today that CRO agreed to the going to Sir A. Binnari. I think it we be better not to send it to him Chamney Dairi went 2/4 6/4	
(Action completed) 25/11	(Index) 25/11	Reference to later relevant papers 49724	

Declassified File FO 371/126929

Secret

E A 1092/23

Secret

Enter

EXTRACT FROM RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERAND THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN ON OCTOBER 30.*(Included in Sir de Zetland's letter of Oct 31 to Sir Harold Gell)*

The President then mentioned the question of Gwadar which he said must really be settled in Pakistan's favour if Pakistan was to remain in the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister said that it was hoped to have discussions with the Sultan of Muscat in November either in London or in Muscat. The Sultan was a difficult man but he was beholden to the United Kingdom. It might help him to make up his mind about Gwadar if Pakistan applied some pressure on the frontier. The President asked if Her Majesty's Government would like this pressure applied now but the Prime Minister said that it would be better to wait for the moment.

Secret

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

23/10 23/10-15

+10
Bay Nov 25

Registry
No. EP1084/23

Top Secret.	250 27/10
Secret. XXX	
Confidential.	
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Open.	

Draft Letter

To:
Sir Bernard
Burrows, K. C. M. G.,
Highway,
Bahrain

From:
D. M. R. Riches, Esq.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN
23 NOV 1967
27/10

I think that you should know the following piece of information, for your own guidance only.

In conversation with the Prime Minister on October 30 the President of Pakistan brought up the subject of Gadar, which he said really must be settled in Pakistan's favour if Pakistan were to remain in the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister refused to the discussions we hoped to have with the Sultan of Muscat either in London or in Muscat, and agreed that the Sultan was a difficult man but he was beholden to the United Kingdom. It might help him to make up his mind about Gadar if Pakistan applied some pressure on the frontier. The President asked if H.M. Government would like this pressure applied now but the Prime Minister said that it would be better to wait for the moment.

~~The above is for your own information only.~~

(D.M.R. RICHES)

27/10

Declassified File FO 371/126929

OUTFILE

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(EA 1054/23)

November 25, 1957.

Dear Bernard,

I think that you should know the following piece of information, for your own guidance only.

In conversation with the Prime Minister on October 30 the President of Pakistan brought up the subject of Gwadar, which he said really must be settled in Pakistan's favour if Pakistan were to remain in the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister said that the Sultan was a difficult man but was beholden to the United Kingdom. It might help him to make up his mind about Gwadar if Pakistan applied some pressure on the frontier. The President asked if Her Majesty's Government would like this pressure applied now but the Prime Minister said that it would be better to wait for the moment.

Yours truly,
(Sgd) Derek Riches
(D.M.H. Riches)

Sir Bernard Burrows, K.C.M.G.,
Bahrain.

SECRET

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

1957	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT ARABIA	E A 1084/24 ✓
FROM Foreign Office Minute 3. Ormsby-Gore. No. Dated November 4 Received in Registry November 5	Account of discussion between PRESIDENT of PAKISTAN, LORD HANE and Mr. Ormsby-Gore about the possibility of the President's meeting the Sultan of Muscat to discuss Gwadar.	
References to former relevant papers EA 10399/6 7	MINUTES Please see attached draft letter to the C.R.O. on a possible meeting of the President of Pakistan with the Sultan of Muscat. This diverges slightly, but only slightly, from the suggestion in paragraph 4 of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's minute. It seems unnecessary to alarm the Pakistanis unduly at this moment by pointing out that the Sultan is particularly stubborn about Gwadar.	
(Print)	<i>A.R. Walsley</i> (A.R. Walsley) November 5, 1957.	
(How disposed of) D.H.M. Constantino from Mr. P. B. L. to Mr. B.	<i>Ministry of State</i> <i>H. B. L. 5/1</i> <i>Diff sent</i> <i>B.O. 12/11 80W</i> <i>4/1</i> The C.R.O.'s reply will be despatched in a day or two. <i>83W</i> <i>14/1</i>	
(Action completed) <i>R. 24/11</i>	(Index) <i>6/11</i>	
References to later relevant papers	M4630 51726-1A	

Declassified File FO 371/126929

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9.08.64/24

E

This weekend I was a fellow guest with the President of Pakistan at Lord Home's house in Scotland. On Saturday evening Lord Home mentioned to the President that there was a suggestion that he might meet the Sultan of Muscat and Oman in Bahrain on his way back to Pakistan in order to discuss Qwador.

2. The President was not very enthusiastic. He said that he had been quite prepared to meet the Sultan in London, where he had hoped to find him, but a special meeting in Bahrain would be a very different matter. However he was anxious to do anything which we felt might bring us all to a satisfactory solution.

3. I said that I fully recognised his difficulties, and as the Sultan was a very stubborn man it would be important to know whether there was any real hope of progress before a decision on a meeting in Bahrain was arrived at. The President agreed and said that his preliminary view was that such a meeting might do more harm than good unless we could assure him that the Sultan was in a frame of mind which might lead to some agreement.

4. Since returning to the office I have seen the telegrams which indicate that the Sultan is by no means in this frame of mind, and I think it would only be right that Lord Home should so inform the President of Pakistan.

5. While we were discussing the Qwador problem, Lord Home asked the President whether the Pakistan Government were likely to improve on their offer to the Sultan. The President said that he understood that they were prepared to pay 52 million and 5p on any profits arising from the production of oil in Qwador, if any was in fact found there. The Pakistan authorities were convinced that there was no oil, but the President realised that the Sultan was still very suspicious about this. When pressed by Lord Home he said that it was conceivable that the Pakistan Government might improve their offer to, say, 10% of the possible oil profits, but he thought it would be difficult for them to go much further than that without being accused by Pakistan public opinion of giving away too much.

D. Dunsby Gore

November 4, 1957

Eastern Dept.

Copies to:

Lord Home

Private Secretary
Sir F. Meyer Hillier
Mr Harvey
Mr Wright
A.R.D.

Commander Noble
Lord Gosford
Sir W. Hayter
Mr Doolley
S.R.A.D.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

deep in dept *outfit*

Registry
No. (EA.1084/26)

Top Secret	DTW
Confidential	2/11
Restricted	2/11
Open	2/11

Page 6

Draft Letter to:

H. E. Coster,
Secy., CMO,
Commonwealth
Relations Office

From:
Mr. H. Hecley.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Hy E

Hy D

ARN

You will have seen Foreign Office telegram No. 1819 to Bahrain, and Bahrain telegram No. 1364 and 1372 in reply, about the possibility of a meeting between the Sultan of Muscat and the President of Pakistan during the latter's return journey to Karachi.

2. The Sultan's "reluctance" to receive the Duke of Edinburgh last year is not in fact strictly relevant, since the stumbling block then was the fact that the Sultan was in Dhofar with most of his furniture and effects, and his Court could not be transported back to Muscat in sufficient time to prepare for His Royal Highness without abandoning a number of previous commitments. But you will have seen from Mr. Ormeby-Gere's minute of November 4, a copy of which was sent to your Secretary of State, that the President ^(my case) ~~was~~ ^{himself is} not very enthusiastic about the idea of a meeting, ~~when the subject came up last weekend.~~ It seems therefore most unlikely that he would agree to travel to Muscat in a ^{without the assurance of being able to do more than make} ~~warship merely for the purpose of making~~ personal contact, ^{I think it unnecessary to} ~~and it is necessary to the point~~ tell the President all that we suspect about the Sultan's attitude, ^{of the Sultan coming up to Bahrain for} ~~visiting there, we think that the best time~~ to take with him would be to say that the Sultan would find it extremely difficult to leave Muscat between now and his departure for London, since he is engaged ~~almost single-headed~~ on the task of clearing up after the recent rebellion and making sure that things will run on smoothly while he is in this country. ^{2. It} ~~circumstances therefore, we think it will be best~~ ^{to not to proceed with this proposal for a} ~~meeting.~~

/ 3. The final

Declassified File FO 371/126929

3. The final paragraph of Mr. Crumby-Gore's minute of November 4 contains an interesting statement about ~~the Pakistan attitude to a~~ possible increase in ^{Pakistan} ~~the~~ offer about oil profits. I think that we should tell this to the Political Resident for his personal information and not of course for any communication to the Sultan. ~~we~~ ^{in that in many positions to} would make clear that the President was not ~~officially~~ ^{officially} committing the Government of Pakistan. If you agree we will inform the Political Resident at the same time as we tell him of any action taken with the President on the lines of the earlier part of this letter.

Flag D

*In case we would
ask that we hint
of the possibility
that the Pakistanis
might improve
their offer
should be given
to the Sultan.
And no*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 6, 1957.

Dear Colar.

You will have seen Foreign Office telegram No.1849 to Bahrain, and Bahrain telegrams Nos.1364 and 1372 in reply, about the possibility of a meeting between the Sultan of Muscat and the President of Pakistan during the latter's return journey to Karachi.

2. The Sultan's "reluctance" to receive the Duke of Edinburgh last year is not in fact strictly relevant, since the stumbling block then was the fact that the Sultan was in Khobar with most of his furniture and effects, and his Court could not be transported back to Muscat in sufficient time to prepare for His Royal Highness without abandoning a number of previous commitments. But you will have seen from Mr. Ormsby-Gore's minute of November 4, a copy of which was sent to your Secretary of State, that in any case the President himself is not very enthusiastic about the idea of a meeting. It seems therefore most unlikely that he would agree to travel to Muscat in a vessel without the assurance of being able to do more than make personal contact. I think it unnecessary to tell the President all that we suspect about the Sultan's attitude. If you agree, we need only say that we have ascertained that the Sultan would find it extremely difficult to leave Muscat between now and his departure for London, since he is engaged on the task of clearing up after the recent rebellion and making sure that things will run smoothly while he is in this country. In the circumstances, therefore, we think it would be best not to proceed with this proposal for a meeting.

3. The final paragraph of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's minute of November 4 contains an interesting statement about a possible

/increase

R. E. Colar, Esq., C.M.G.,
Commonwealth Relations Office,
S.W.1.

Declassified File FO 371/126929

increase in the Pakistani offer about oil profits. I think that we should tell this to the Political Resident for his personal information and not of course for any communication to the Sultan. Indeed we would add that no hint of the possibility that the Pakistanis might improve their offer should be given to the Sultan. And we would make clear that the President was not in fact in any position to consult the Government of Pakistan. If you agree we will inform the Political Resident at the same time as we tell him of any action taken with the President on the lines of the earlier part of this letter.

H. Bealey
(H. Bealey)

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

1957	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT ARABIA	E A 1084 / 35				
FROM Sir B Burrows Bahrein to Mr. Riches No. Date Nov 8 Received in Registry— Nov 12	Quatun Comments on points in Mr. Sahrawi's letter of October 11 and considers they should be replied.					
References to former relevant papers 15 -132	MINUTES [1-22] The so-called interleague report was pretty fair nonsense, but I don't think it is worth passing any of those comments on to the Liberator or to the CRO and recommend we take no action on this letter.					
(Print)	Daina West 15/11					
(How disposed of) 1/11 Sir B Burrows Bahrein for Mr. Riches 21/11 (2) may be shown by rural. 1/11 Mr. Carson CRO from Mr. Riches 21/11	I should have thought it was worth while asking the CRO to transmit orally to the Pakistanis the substance of Sir B Burrows' comments (including the first one). 16/11					
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>(Action completed)</td> <td>(Index)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2/25/11</td> <td>1/11</td> </tr> </table>	(Action completed)	(Index)	2/25/11	1/11	I agree 16/11 2 drafts submitted Daina West 19/11	
(Action completed)	(Index)					
2/25/11	1/11					
References to later relevant papers	M4630 51720-1A					

Declassified File FO 371/126929

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,

DOWNING STREET,

LONDON, S. W. 1.

12th November, 1957.

MR. H. 6/5.

A 1084/26

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter 10/11/57

10/11/57

10/11/57

Dear Bealey,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th November about the possibility of a meeting between the Sultan of Muscat and the President of Pakistan during the latter's return journey to Karachi.

2. The Political Resident's views on the probable reactions of the Sultan to any suggestion of this kind are discouraging. In conversation with my Secretary of State the President made it clear that he was not willing to meet the Sultan in the Persian Gulf unless it appeared that there was a possibility that a settlement over Qandur might be reached. We agree, therefore, that we should not seek to further the idea at present. We propose in the circumstances to say nothing more about the matter unless we have to. Any explanation by us to the Pakistanis of the reasons why we no longer favour the idea might lead them to ask what further steps we intend to take to put pressure on the Sultan on their behalf.

3. We have no objection to the Political Resident being informed of the hint dropped by the President that Pakistan might be prepared to improve their offer on Qandur, provided of course that no hint of this is passed on to the Sultan. In doing so you might also make it clear to Burrows that, in our view, it represents only an indication of how far the Pakistanis might be prepared to go before they would decide to break off negotiations. It is most unlikely that they would make this offer except in the last resort.

Yours sincerely,

H. E. Costar

(H. E. COSTAR)

H. BEALEY, Esq.,
FOREIGN OFFICE,
LONDON, S. W. 1.

DECLASSIFIED FILE FO 371/132791 1958

Negotiations between Pakistan and Muscat on oil rights at Gwadar

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Declassified File FO 371/132791

128		E EASTERN DEPARTMENT		E A1084/24
		ARABIA		
FROM U.K. High Commissioner to Pakistan from 20. No. 890 SECRET Dated May 27 Received in Registry May 28		<u>Guadalupe</u> Pakistan navy ordered to carry out operation supporting troops on isthmus at Guadalupe. Orders finally countermanded. 1084		
References to later relevant papers		MINUTES The telegram was discussed at the Meeting with Departmental working on May 27 to discuss the letter and, when the letter under 13 points was as it was evidence of the likely strength of the Pakistan reaction to any failure on our part to secure satisfactory settlement on Pakistan in the Middle East. It is noted that the Pakistan informed of the progress of our talks with the letter on the subject. 2. The latest developments coincide surprisingly with the letter's aim on May 26. 3. It appears that the Pakistan is in the process of playing up the idea of an exchange of legal views, provided we do not arrange otherwise. 48371		
(Print) 132791 (How disposed of)				
(Action completed) PS 20/5/58		(Index) 6/7/58		
References to later relevant papers + 27 451				

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

Dimension of the boundary, though the whole house would be as much as shadow being when each side is waiting why to the better view. I understand that the C.R. are not here to give the legal backing.

Dr. L. 41

The C.R.O. have answered, having closed the draft with us.

Ar. 24/11

John

Number of copies

Number of copies of enclosures:

1055E

Declassified File FO 371/132791

E

O. [unclear]

FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSION IN KARACHI (AGTIN)

Re: Karachi 11.33 hours 27th May, 1958
 09.2 hours 27th May, 1958

SECRET

Mr. 500 SECRET EA1061/24

M. [unclear] 27/5
 M. [unclear]
 [unclear]

CHARGE

I learnt in great confidence last night that Pakistan navy had yesterday been ordered to carry out operation in support of troops who were to take up position on isthmus at Qadur. Orders were countermanded at last moment.

2. Foreign Secretary when I met later volunteered information about this. He said that military intelligence (about which he expressed some scepticism) had reported that several Pakistanis had been murdered in Qadur. Prime Minister had been furious and had issued orders for operation. He had been calmed down and had agreed to raise matter with us. Instructions had been sent to Durrani accordingly.

3. I mentioned to Haig my surprise at how that idea of sending Tyabji to London to discuss Qadur boundaries etc. had been abandoned and I made points in paragraph 3 of my telegram to Mr. Haig. Haig seemed uncertain of reasons for change of plan but appeared receptive to my arguments. He added that he understood that Sultan was due to arrive in London yesterday.

4. I understand that Qadur operation has been cancelled for time being. I would however urge that either in reply to Mr. Haig's message or separately we should encourage the Pakistanis to revert to the idea of an exchange of land vis-a-vis. Above all I hope we shall be able to keep Pakistanis very closely informed of basis upon which negotiations with Sultan are opened and of their progress.

Copy to:-

SECRET


C.C.O. Mr. Coster
 Mr. Moon

P.S. to Prime Minister (42)

Foreign office Mr. to Foreign Secretary (6)
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Galsworthy

AMOUNT IN PENCE AND NET.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death



Declassified File FO 371/132791

SECRET

UNITED KINGDOM HIGH COMMISSION,

KARACHI

11th June, 1958

~~SECRET~~

REF 47/52/1

When I saw the President yesterday, he asked me whether there was any further news about the negotiations with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman over Gwadar. I gave him the message in your telegram No.1177 and I then went on to read the operative part of the Prime Minister's message to Mr. Noon about the trouble over boundary stones (your telegram No.1196). The President seemed to think well of the suggestion that the status quo should be preserved pending the outcome of the negotiations with the Sultan.

...

I enclose an extra copy of this letter for the Foreign Office.

(R.W.D. Fowler)

J.M.G. Jones, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Commonwealth Relations Office,
London, E.C.1

SECRET

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

1958	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT ARABIA	✓ EA1084/27
FROM Commonwealth Relations Office (Comm'd) Ministry of S & S to Foreign Secretary. No. Dated May 22 Received in Registry— June 2.	Sultan of Muscat and Gwadar Pakistan relying completely on our success in getting a settlement	
References to former relevant papers EA1054/36	MINUTES (A) Mr Paul Cinceros to Mr Cole, (Comm'd) Commonwealth Relations Office. May 25. See now for further submission May 27	
(Pmt)	1/6	
(How disposed of)	The submission has taken care of the question of substance. See reply to No. 10, to keep the Prime Minister informed. on EA1054/36. APW 3/6	
(Action completed) Jawid (Index) 6/7/59		
References to later relevant papers		

Declassified File FO 371/132791

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
- 2 JUN 1957

EA1004/27

Secretary of State
Mr. F. H. Taylor
Sir W. Haycraft
Mr. Butler
E. Dept.

Commonwealth Relations Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I know that you are fully determined to put the screws on the Sultan of Muscat over Gwadar. This is only to bring you up to date on the latest moves which underline how strongly the Pakistan Government feel and how completely they rely on our success in getting a settlement.

2. Mr. Noon has recently sent another message to the Prime Minister (the latest in a long line) in which he says that he is depending on us to have Gwadar "finally settled" in the talks with the Sultan.

3. In putting the matter to the Sultan, therefore, we must bear in mind that if he rejects the Pakistani proposals outright or refuses to enter into discussions with Pakistan about them, the Pakistanis rightly or wrongly will blame us for

/the

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

the failure and, because they regard the Sultan's desire for an agreement with us as the means of bringing pressure to bear on him, will be incensed if we nevertheless enter into an agreement on other matters with the Sultan. With the Pakistani elections coming on, and with a Prime Minister possessing the ebullient character of Mr. Noon, there will be serious risk that he may rush into some foolish statement or action which he might afterwards regret but could not undo.

4. Mr. Noon's speech of March 8th shows the way Pakistani minds work when they think they do not get the support from the West which they expect. We do not want a repetition which might next time not stop at words. Action might take the form of a direct Pakistani violation of Gwadar territory in which both sides would look to us for the full support which we could give to neither. The matter might even be carried to the United Nations. It could seriously prejudice the chances of success of the recent U.S. approach to India and Pakistan about Kashmir. It could undermine Pakistan's influence, at present exercised to our advantage, with other Muslim powers including those in the Persian Gulf, and consequently weaken the cohesion of the Baghdad Pact. In any case even if Gwadar is not violated Pakistani resentment would probably have effects on their present policy of co-operation with us and the West.

/5.

Declassified File FO 371/132791

5. I hope, therefore, that the expected resistance of the Sultan to the suggestion that he should consider giving up Gwadar will not be accepted without a struggle and without giving careful consideration to the consequences which may be serious to our relations with Pakistan.
6. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.

A handwritten signature, possibly 'H', is written in dark ink.

22nd May, 1958

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

NOTIFICATION FOR
ARCHIVAL
SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

EA 1084/35

Foreign Office (Secret) and Whitehall (Secret) Distribution

ARC 100 100
NOT 100 100

Copy No. 13

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT AND OMAN AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON JUNE 4th, 1958

Present:

Secretary of State
His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman
Mr. Julian Amery
Mr. H. Boley

After some preliminaries, the Secretary of State reminded the Sultan that he had undertaken to inform Her Majesty's Government during his visit to London of his views on the question of Gwadar. The Secretary of State outlined the advantages to the Sultan of friendly relations with Pakistan, and the risks of forceful action by Pakistan if a mutually acceptable settlement of the Gwadar question could not be negotiated. He explained further that the present dispute between a member of the Commonwealth and a neighbouring State in close and friendly relations with Her Majesty's Government was highly embarrassing from our point of view. He was sure that the Sultan would understand that, if the Pakistan Government should decide to occupy Gwadar or at least the whole territory up to the isthmus connecting the town with the mainland, it would not be possible for Her Majesty's Government to intervene effectively to protect the Sultan's interests. He therefore viewed the problem with concern and again invited the Sultan to express his views on it.

2. The Sultan said that he had indeed assured both Sir Bernard Burrows and Mr. Amery that he would state his views on Gwadar during his visit to London. It was still his intention to do so "but not to-day." He would be in London for some weeks, and he would like to consider the matter further.

3. The Secretary of State said he fully understood that the Sultan was reluctant to contemplate ceding a part of his territories to a Foreign Power even against a substantial consideration. But there were other advantages for Muscat which might be expected to follow a friendly settlement. Muscat was bound to need an increasing number of foreign experts and specialists of various kinds, and could not hope to obtain these exclusively from the United Kingdom. Nor would United Kingdom subjects in all cases be suitable. If Muscat was to avoid the dangers to which other States in the Persian Gulf had exposed themselves by admitting Egyptians in educational and in technical jobs, it would need an alternative source for such personnel. The Sultan already employed some Pakistanis as officers and non-commissioned officers in his armed forces, and if relations between the two countries were generally good he should be able to recruit Pakistanis in other capacities as well.

4. The Secretary of State then said that the question of Gwadar could not altogether be dissociated from the negotiation of a final agreement on the limits of that which had been initiated by His Highness and Mr. Amery in January. The Pakistanis would be incensed if they learned that Her Majesty's Government had concluded an agreement of this kind with Muscat despite a refusal by the Sultan to negotiate a settlement of Gwadar. In that event it would be necessary to consider very carefully the public presentation of the agreement on defence and civil development.

The Sultan took note of this but did not offer any further comment.

SECRET

19029-20 215-35

Declassified File FO 371/132791

SECRET

Recd of Conversation between the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs and the Sultan
of Muscat and Oman, at the British
Office on June 10th, 1958.

13 JUN 1958
E41056/36

Present Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Sultan of Muscat
Mr. Julian Amery, Mr. H. Barclay

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT

Print
F.O. (Secret)

W.L. (Secret)

(THE SECRETARY OF STATE received the Sultan of Muscat at 4 p.m. on June 1. Mr. Amery and I were also present.) After some preliminaries, the Secretary of State reminded the Sultan that he had undertaken to inform H.M.G. during his visit to London of his views on the question of Gwadar. The Secretary of State outlined the advantages to the Sultan of friendly relations with Pakistan, and the risks of forceful action by Pakistan if a mutually acceptable settlement of the Gwadar question could not be negotiated. He explained further that the present dispute between a member of the Commonwealth and a neighbouring State in close and friendly relations with H.M.G. was highly embarrassing from our point of view. He was sure that the Sultan would understand that, if the Pakistan Government should decide to occupy Gwadar or at least the whole territory up to the isthmus connecting the town with the mainland, it would not be possible for H.M.G. to intervene effectively to protect the Sultan's interests. He therefore viewed the problem with concern and again invited the Sultan to express his views on it.

Copy Bahrain
Muscat

2. The Sultan said that he had indeed assured both Sir Bernard Burrows and Mr. Amery that he would state his views on Gwadar during his visit to London. It was still his intention to do so "but not today". He would be in London for some weeks, and he would like to consider the matter further.

Carachi

Powder.

Washington

3. The Secretary of State said he fully understood that the Sultan was reluctant to contemplate ceding a part of his territories to a foreign power even against a substantial consideration. But there were other advantages for Muscat which might be expected to follow a friendly settlement. Muscat was bound to need an increasing number of foreign experts and specialists of various kinds, and could not hope to obtain these exclusively from the U.K. Nor would United Kingdom subjects in all cases be suitable. If Muscat was to avoid the dangers to which other States in the Persian Gulf had exposed themselves by admitting Egyptians in educational and in technical jobs, it would need an alternative source for such personnel. The Sultan already employed some Pakistanis as officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in his armed forces, and if relations between the two countries were generally good he should be able to recruit Pakistanis in other capacities as well.

/s.

CONFIDENTIAL

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

1. The Secretary of State then said that the question of Gwadar could not altogether be dissociated from the negotiation of a final agreement on the lines of that which had been initialled by His Highness and Mr. Amery in January. The Pakistanis would be indignant if they learned that H.M.G. had concluded an agreement of this kind with Muscat despite a refusal by the Sultan to negotiate a settlement of Gwadar. In that event it would be necessary to consider very carefully the public presentation of the agreement on defence and civil development.

The Sultan took note of this but did not offer any further comment.

H. Beeley

(H. Beeley)
June 6, 1958.

S. 93. *has seen.*

for
17/6

Declassified File FO 371/132791

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
- 1 JUL 1952
EA1084/34

CONFIDENTIAL

OSADUR

Flag A
EA1084/34

In a minute of May 29 the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations stated that the High Commissioner for Pakistan had informed him that he, the High Commissioner, had been instructed by his Government to ask for enquiries to be made into alleged disturbances in Osadur on May 22 and 23. According to the Pakistani account, the Sultan's Wali and his English Administrator failed to take the necessary steps to protect the Pakistanis involved, four of whom were said to have been killed.


2. The facts, as reported by Mr. Wynne and by Bahrain, are set out in the attached draft reply to Lord Home's minute.


3. It seems clear, both from the Pakistani reaction to this incident and from further reports received since from Mr. Wynne (Bahrain telegram No. 722), that the Pakistanis are determined to turn on the heat while the Sultan is in London. In replying to the Commonwealth Secretary, we might refer to the "status quo" idea which the Prime Minister has already put to Piroz (C.R.O. telegram No. 1198 to Karachi) and to which Piroz has not replied although the suggestion seems to have gone down well with the President of Pakistan (Mr. Fowler's letter to Mr. James of June 11).


Flag B
-13

Flag C
-126


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EA1084/34


 (D.M.S. Riches)
June 24, 1952.


 26/6



 26.6


 26/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

Registry
No.

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1/16

Inst. minute to
Secretary of State
for Commonwealth
Relations

FS/58/94.

from:-

Secretary of
State

Copy to:-
Prime Minister

Done

Cag

Letter despatched by
Post

As requested in your minute of May 29
I have had enquiries made into the incidents
in Qandor on May 22 which resulted in several
deaths.

2. Reports which the Political Resident has
received ^{by courtesy of} the Muscat authorities indicate
that the trouble began when one of the Askars
who are responsible for guarding the bazaar
area, ran amok, probably as the immediate
result of a quarrel with a fisherman over the
price of his fish. He stabbed the fisherman
and then opened fire with his rifle at three
persons who he thought were coming to arrest
him. In the process his rifle became
jammed and he then proceeded to stab anyone
who came in his way until finally his dagger
broke. The Askar was eventually arrested
by the Wali and confined and subsequently
sent back to Muscat.

3. Of the three people who had been shot,
two died immediately and the third shortly
afterwards. Four of the five people
stabbed, including an old woman, died from
their wounds. Three of the victims were
Pakistani nationals.

4. Although the Askar concerned belonged
to an Qandri tribe, the incident does not
appear to have been political in origin.
Prompt action was taken by the Wali and by
the Administrator, Mr. Wynne, not only to
arrest the Askar but also to return to Muscat
both him and thirteen other Askars of the
same tribe. ~~These were already confined in prison~~
Everything possible was done
for the wounded from the medical point of
view.

view/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Declassified File FO 371/132791

view and the R.A.F. offered to send an aircraft to Gwadar with the Medical Officer of the Troopal Ocean Scouts.

5. I understand that the gist of the foregoing has already been telegraphed to the U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi, who has passed it on to the Pakistan Government. You will no doubt wish, however, to reply on similar lines to Karamullah.

6. In the meantime you will have seen from Bahrain telegram No. 722 of June 18 further reports from the Muscat authorities about Pakistan activity in the area, which tend to confirm your view that the Pakistanis are trying to put pressure on us and the Sultan while the Gwadar question is under consideration between us in London. In this connection you may wish to remind the Pakistanis of the Prime Minister's suggestion in his message to Feroz Khan Noon contained in telegram No. 1196 of June 6 to Karachi that it might be helpful for both sides to preserve the status quo as regards boundary marks pending the outcome of our talks with the Sultan. Although I understand that the President of Pakistan appears to think well of this idea, no reply has been received from Feroz.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.


*to Feroz Khan Noon
to the Prime Minister
May 21st
20/06/58
Feroz Khan*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.1

14th July 1958



*With the Compliments of the
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations*

We spoke. For clearance
by Foreign Secretary, please.

Declassified File FO 371/132791

SECRET.MESSAGE FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER
OF PAKISTAN.

1. I have at last been able to extract from the Sultan of Muscat a preliminary expression of his views on Gwadar. They are distinctly promising. He is in principle ready to reach an understanding, the details of which our Acting High Commissioner will communicate to you. They are broadly that he should be compensated for losses of revenue from Gwadar by a payment of 43 m., and that he should retain a 10% right to profits on oil based upon the whole output for 25 years as from the date of commercial production. He also asks that the negotiations be conducted through us and be kept absolutely secret until finalised.
2. The Sultan has made a great point about nothing made to look as if he was yielding to pressure. It is, therefore, in my view essential, if we are not to endanger the whole operation, that the matter should be kept strictly secret for the time being. Indeed, if it were to leak out prematurely, there is a risk of the whole arrangement being prejudiced. I hope also that your people in the Gwadar area will do nothing to embarrass the Sultan at this stage.
3. When you have studied the Sultan's offer you will no doubt let us know what we can reply. The Sultan proposes to leave the United Kingdom not later than July 27th. He may leave as much as a week earlier.
4. Meanwhile, I should like you to know for your own confidential information that very satisfactory progress has been made in our talks with the Sultan on military and economic affairs and we hope that our agreements with him will be in final form very shortly.

SECRET.

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

SECRET

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EA 1084/44

Foreign Office (Secret) and Whitehall (Secret) Distribution

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Copy No 13

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT ON JULY 10, 1958

Present:

The Secretary of State
Mr. Julian Amery, M.P.
Mr. Shuckburgh
Major Chauncy

His Highness the Sultan of Muscat

In opening the conversation on the subject of Gwadar the Sultan said that there were many countries which possessed territories not contiguous to their homelands. When they were strong countries this did not arouse question but for Muscat, which was weak, different rules seemed to apply. Threats were being made about her possession of Gwadar. He would like, before expressing his views on the subject, to ask the Secretary of State a question: "How would Her Majesty's Government react if they were asked to hand back the Kuria Muria Islands which had been given to Queen Victoria by his ancestor. Would we regard this as a friendly request?"

The Secretary of State said that we should judge a case like that on its merits. On the whole we were guided by expediency rather than by legalism in such matters; frequently we had handed back territories gained in war if we thought it was in our general interest to do so and we would not feel ill-disposed towards a country making such a request if it was part of a general bargain which we thought a good one.

The Sultan thanked the Secretary of State for this statement. He then went on to say that Gwadar was not his personal property. It was part of the dominions of Muscat and Oman, and he was not in a position to sell it. Nevertheless, in order to help Her Majesty's Government and in deference to their advice, but not out of concern for the Pakistanis, he was prepared to hand the territory over. He would not sell it or lease it; he would hand it over. But there would be considerable loss of revenue for Muscat—he would be deprived of a source of recruits and there would be other minor inconveniences, for all of which he would require to be compensated. He wanted it to be understood that he would be handing over the territory as it stands with its present boundaries. He would not recognise any artificial line drawn by the Pakistanis. (This remark seems to foreshadow a claim for percentage payments in case oil is discovered in the Gwadar territory.)

The Secretary of State thanked the Sultan for this statement which he said would be highly appreciated by the Prime Minister and his colleagues. He felt sure it was a wise decision and he appreciated the dignified manner in which the Sultan had taken it. He wondered how we should now proceed.

The Sultan made it clear that he would not enter into discussions with the Pakistan Government on the subject. It would be up to Her Majesty's Government to arrange the terms of compensation. He undertook to let Major Chauncy have an outline of his requirements. He said that the Pakistan offer of four years ago was now out of date and he implied that the price was insufficient.

The Secretary of State asked whether His Highness would agree to the establishment of a Pakistani consular representative in Muscat.

SECRET

19029—30 236—35

Declassified File FO 371/132791

2

SECRET

The Sultan replied that if the Gwadar affair was satisfactorily concluded he would consider this point having regard to the conduct of the Pakistanis in the meantime. He could not accept it as an automatic consequence of agreement on Gwadar, still less as part of the machinery for reaching an agreement.

The Secretary of State pointed out that to have a Pakistani representative in Muscat would undoubtedly be helpful in regard to such matters as recruiting soldiers from Gwadar after the territory had been handed over.

The Sultan said that when all this was concluded satisfactorily he would be prepared to reveal the reason why he had taken this decision which was a momentous one for him and his country.

He then referred to the Treaty of 1891 in which his grandfather had undertaken not to cede any part of his territories to an outside Power. He would now be in breach of this Treaty and this would have to be regularised.

The Secretary of State said that he would be extremely careful to protect the Sultan's interests in the future handling of this matter. In the first place the Sultan's decision should of course be kept secret. He would have to consider how much to tell the Pakistani Prime Minister. He was inclined for the moment to confine himself to saying that he had had a very satisfactory talk with the Sultan on Gwadar and to leave everything else until Mr. Firuz Khan Noon came to London towards the end of the month. He asked whether there was any chance of the Sultan being still in London at that time.

The Sultan replied that he must leave either on the 20th or 27th of July. He would not want to extend his visit solely on account of Gwadar. He hoped that in communicating with the Pakistani Prime Minister the Secretary of State would urge him to stop unnecessary activity by local Pakistani authorities on the borders of Gwadar and to prevent alarmist publicity likely to disturb His Highness's subjects. There were, for example, rumours going around in Gwadar to the effect that the Sultan was going to sell the territory in time for the Pakistani Prime Minister to enter there in triumph on August 14, which was Pakistan Independence Day.

The Secretary of State assured the Sultan that he would do everything possible to prevent difficulties for the Sultan. In particular he took the point that it must not be made to seem as if the Sultan had been under pressure from Her Majesty's Government or that he had succumbed to Pakistani threats. At this point the Sultan agreed with the Secretary of State that he had not in fact been subjected to pressure by Her Majesty's Government.

The Secretary of State then turned to the current negotiations in London and said that they seemed to be progressing satisfactorily.

The Sultan agreed that all points of principle had been agreed. He said also that it was quite acceptable to him that there should be an Exchange of Letters with the Secretary of State summarising the various elements in the negotiation. This would be for publication whereas the constituent elements would remain separated and be kept secret.

The Secretary of State undertook to produce a draft of such an Exchange of Letters.

SECRET

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1950	E EASTERN DEPARTMENT	E 1084/50.
	ARABIA	
FROM C.R.O. id. Secret No. Date 16/7 Received in Registry 21/7	Terms of Sultan of Muscat's offer in respect of quare Pakistani acceptance: Pakistan letter of 16 July. (Copy letter from Pakistani HQ. to C.R.O. 16/7.)	
References to former relevant papers -146	MINUTES 16/7/50 21/7	
(Print)		
(How disposed of) Mr. H. J. B. B. B. ✓ H. J. B. B. B. ✓ C. J. B. B. B. ✓ J. J. B. B. B.		
(Action completed) 21/7	(Index) 16/7/50	
References to later relevant papers	34409 3203-1	

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COPY of letter for Pakistan
H. H. Commission, Case No. 575 for
Chamela, India

COMMUNALTY RELATIONS OFFICE, (116)
DOWNING STREET,
LONDON, S. W. 1.
16th July, 1958.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
17 JUL 1958
EAS/450

I have now seen the Sultan's offer in respect to Gwadar,
the terms of which are as follows:-

1. The compensation for loss of revenue should be one payment of £3 million (£300,000 to be in United States Dollars in America: the rest in sterling in London).
2. The Sultan would retain a 10% right to profits on oil based upon the whole output for 25 years as from the date of commercial production to be paid annually in sterling in London. The profits to be certified by some approved means as the real and actual profits from all sources.
3. The Pakistan Government should remove all restrictions upon Pakistanis serving in the Sultan's Forces, i.e. that the men should not be employed in combatant roles.
4. The Pakistan Government should continue as at present to afford assistance in supplying technical personnel for the Sultanate e.g. doctors.
5. Facilities, which will include their good offices where necessary, will be afforded by the Pakistan Government for recruiting in Gwadar and Makran for the Sultan's forces. Such recruits would be taken upon Sultanate terms and be regarded whilst serving and on leave as an integral part of the Sultan's forces.
6. Facilities will be afforded for training, especially for military purposes, in technical schools in Pakistan e.g. wireless operators, mechanics, medical attendants etc.: at favourable rates as for the Pakistan Government's own trainees.
7. Exports of rice would be made available upon payment if required without restriction.
8. Persons in Gwadar who wish to remain Sultanate subjects should be freely permitted to do so, and recognised and treated fairly and their property respected.
9. The Sultan will provide a map of Gwadar prepared some two or three years ago by Mr. Wynne after his tour showing the actual boundary up to which Sultanate jurisdiction has existed in fact, to this date, and another small map of 1934 (or so) drawn by the Khudias (head men) to the same effect. The Sultan expects this to satisfy the Pakistan Government, but he will give it to Her Majesty's Government and will not enter into discussion with the Pakistan Government direct on this, or upon any other aspect of this whole matter.

/10. A

RECEIVED

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

SECRET.

-2-

10. A suitable guarantee must be provided by Her Majesty's Government for carrying out all conditions agreed which refer to the future.

11. These negotiations must be kept secret until finalised.

12. The "hand over" should be completed by the Sultanate handing over to Her Majesty's Government (e.g. the Wali and other officials would leave the place in the hands of Her Majesty's Consulate General and the latter leave on the arrival of the Pakistan officials). There should be no ceremonial or celebrations. Many Gwadar people preferred Muscat and had never complained, and may not like the change. This must be realised and great tact exercised by Pakistan and Her Majesty's Government.

13. Her Majesty's Government should write to the Sultan a letter to the effect that the undertaking contained in the letter of May 23rd, 1891 from Sultan Faisal is now regarded as ended.

14. A memorandum should be prepared to show how all this will be implemented after Her Majesty's Government have discussed it with the Pakistan Government.

I have been empowered by the Pakistan Government to accept these terms and to request Her Majesty's Government to convey this information to the Sultan and to prepare the necessary formal documents with a view to the earliest possible execution of this agreement.

Yours sincerely
IKRAMULLAH
H.C. for PAKISTAN

The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Home
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

SECRET.

Declassified File FO 371/132791

~~SECRET~~
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

July 18, 1958.

I enclose a copy of the conditions laid down by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman for the transfer of Qadur to the Pakistanis, in the form in which they appear in the Pakistan Government's acceptance of them.

2. These conditions were given to Chauncy by the Sultan. Chauncy read them over to the Sultan when he had written them down and the Sultan confirmed that they were correct.

3. The Pakistan Prime Minister sent instructions asking us to try to secure modifications of certain points in the conditions. Chauncy tried these on the Sultan but the Sultan was quite reasonably obdurate. The Commonwealth Relations Secretary is now informing the Pakistan High Commissioner that the Pakistan Government's acceptance of the terms has been conveyed to the Sultan, and that the Sultan and the United Kingdom officials are drawing up proposals for the timetable for the transfer of authority.

4. This is an untidy proceeding which causes distress both to lawyers and to others, and we have yet to work out how we can draft the necessary "agreements" to put the wishes of the Sultan and of the Pakistan Government into effect. However, it is now the case that the Sultan has offered to transfer Qadur on certain terms and the Pakistan Government has accepted. For all practical purposes the bargain has been struck and there can be no going back on either side. The Sultan, you will not be surprised to note, has obtained from giving us anything in writing, although we have communicated in writing to the Pakistanis the fact of his agreement.

5. In addition to the conditions themselves the Sultan made the following points in conversation with Chauncy.

On point 4 of the conditions, the Sultanate would of course meet the costs and the personnel would be used as the Sultanate's own employees, usually on contract.

On point 5, last sentence, for instance, deserters could be extradited if required. The Sultan would be prepared to consider an extradition agreement between the two countries if desired, which would cover this.

On point 11 the Sultan particularly stressed that he did not wish any of his officials to be told at present: he especially mentioned Innes and Waterfield.

6./

E. F. Given, Esq.,
Bahrain.

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

6. The Sultan will leave the U.K. on July 27 by air. In his latest conversation with Chauncey he envisaged that Qasur would not be handed over until early in September. He says that he needs to go to Balalash and find the only existing copies of the maps referred to in 29 of the conditions, and he wishes to make the necessary preparations to summon his officials from Qasur. Apparently he does not intend to tell these officials anything at all until they arrive in Muscat. Chauncey himself would meanwhile go to Qasur and stay there until the Pakistanis arrived.

7. This leisurely means of proceeding, however, will not appeal to the Pakistanis, whose idea at present is that the entire business should be completed within a few days at the longest. We fear that there will be difficulties over this matter of timing, and in the end the Pakistanis will probably force the Sultan's hand by leaking the story.

8. As regards other business, we are now about to hand the Sultan drafts of an Exchange of Letters setting out the ways in which we shall assist him, and of two Agreed Minutes, one of which will state the maximum figures of the subsidy and the other of which sets out the method of control of expenditure. We are also giving him a collection of tables showing the calculations of the subsidy, and we will send you copies of this next week, since it is conceivable that he may wish to argue on various points. Meanwhile you can take it that the figures remain as in the collection of calculations already sent to Bahrain, except that the cost of bombs for the Air Force has been reduced by £3,500 and various totals are thereby reduced by the same amount.

I am sending a copy of this to Muscat.

(A. R. Wainley)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED FILE FO 371/132792 1958

Negotiations between Pakistan and Muscat on oil rights at Gwadar

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
Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

TOP SECRET

Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

FROM: KARACHI (ACTING H.C.)

RTD: ANKARA
POMEH
TEHRAN
WASHINGTON
BAHRAIN



20

D: Karachi, 11.00 hours, 16th July, 1958
R: 00.00 hours, 16th July, 1958

OTHER
EMERGENCY
No. 1130 TOP SECRET

Addressed Commonwealth Relations Office No. 1138, repeated Immediate Ankara No. 31, POMEH No. 7, Tehran No. 37, Washington No. 96 and Bahrain No. 34 (Commonwealth Relations Office please pass all).

My telegram No. 1119.

TRADUR

I was summoned to see the Prime Minister this morning and (I given) the message in my immediately following telegram.

2. In its original form the last sentence read "We are taking steps to re-assume control of Gwadar". I said that this was a grave message and asked whether it meant that Pakistan forces were about to move into Gwadar. This was a time of crisis in the Middle East and we were asking to rally Arab opinion to our side. It was of the greatest importance to both our countries that nothing should be done to cause the waverers to turn to Cairo. Moreover if the position was as reported by Mr. Ikramullah, that a settlement with the Sultan was in sight, would it not be most unfortunate for the Pakistan Government to take any action which might cause the Sultan at the last moment to change his ground and give him the occasion to appeal to the Security Council. The Prime Minister said that nothing irrevocable would be done for a day or two and that there would be time for Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to reply. He then changed the last sentence to read as in my immediately following telegram. He had received an urgent telegram from President Iskander Mirza in Ankara asking him to take steps to secure Gwadar. Mr. Macmillan had assured him (Piruz) that he would arrange the transfer of Gwadar and the message he was sending would strengthen the United Kingdom Government's hands in dealing with the Sultan.

3. The Finance and Defence Ministers were in the room with the Prime Minister and endorsed the message which was read over to them. On the last occasion when the Prime Minister was in favour of occupying Gwadar (my telegram No. 890) it was (as I learnt later) the President who urged caution and persuaded the Defence Committee to recommend no immediate action. It seems that now the President has changed his view and has given the Prime Minister a strong lead in favour of occupation.

/L. I

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

-2-

I should add that the Prime Minister asked if it would be possible for Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to let him have a reply to his message later today.

U -
Copy to:- DIST. 'S'
C.E.O.

Foreign Office

Mr. Coats
Mr. Moon
Mr. Shackburgh
Mr. Riches
Mr. Walsley
Mr. Lucas

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Immediate to Ankara, POMEP, Teheran, Washington
and Bahrain

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TOP SECRET

Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: KARACHI (ACTING H.C.)

(Sent: 11.59 hours, 23rd July, 1956)

IN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE
No. 1568 PLESEE

My immediate preceding telegram.

Text of report. Begin.QADAR TO REVERT TO PAKISTAN?TALES WITH SULTAN OF MUSCATFrom our CorrespondentKarachi July 22nd

Negotiations between Britain and Pakistan on the return of Qadar, on the Makran Coast, to Pakistan are understood to have reached an advanced stage. Qadar is now under the Sultan of Muscat, who is under British protection.

General Mirza, President of Pakistan, discussed the matter with Mr. Macmillan last year; it is learnt that the Middle East crisis has given the negotiations urgency and that Pakistan may well reach an amicable agreement with Muscat, through the good offices of Britain, for the return of the port. Ends.

Copy to:-

D.I

C.R.O.

P.S. to Prime Minister (12)

Foreign Office

Mr. Moon

P.S. to Secretary of State

Mr. Shackburgh

Mr. Riches

Mr. Selmesley

Mr. Lucas

MIDDLE EAST DEPT.

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CONFIDENTIAL.LONDON.
July 27, 1958.

Your Excellency,

We have received Your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date and the Memorandum regarding Gwadar.

We hereby confirm that the conditions set out in the Memorandum are in accordance with our understandings.

Your sincere Friend,

Said bin Tainur
(SAID BIN TAINUR)

The Right Honourable
Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs,
London.

Exile, Funeral and the National Archives, London.

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RILEY - WOLSELEY
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The Birmingham Post

County Edition

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1958

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Democratic Victory Forecast
American Elections To-day

POWER AND ROADS HIGH ON LIST
By Our Political Correspondent

Minister to Speak on Fall in Rail Freights
By Our Political Correspondent

Former President Arrives in London



COMMONWEALTH FORCES PLAN
Integration for Defence

B.O.A.C. 'Had to Take a Firm Stand'

Chairman on 'Years of Concessions' to Workers

Gas Industry Pay Agreement

STANDARD'S PROFITS SOAR

Deposed President Iskander Mirza arrives in London on 4 November 1958.

THE TIMES TUESDAY NOVEMBER 4 1958

GENERAL MIRZA IN LONDON



TO CONTROL R.C. THIRD PROGRAMME

THE GARTH HUNT MOVING OFF



TO BE LET

HAMPTON & SONS

CHRISTIES

SOTHERY & CO.

Deposed President Iskander Mirza arrives in London. The Times 1958-11-04.



Deposed President Iskander Mirza in Hyde Park, London.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

RESTORING TRUST AND FRIENDSHIP

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir. - Having lived with the Pathans for over a quarter of a century I read with interest the article by Sir Olaf Caroe in the Pakistan Supplement of The Times of February 1.

On February 15 there appeared in The Times a letter from His Excellency the Ambassador of Afghanistan controverting the historical background expounded with knowledge and ability by Sir Olaf.

It is not my intention to digress into history in this letter but there are to references in His Excellency the Ambassador's letter which have hardly passed into history and on which the record needs correction.

(1) His Excellency says that in 1947 the great majority of responsible people of the North-West Frontier showed firm allegiance to Pushtoonistan by boycotting the referendum which excluded its establishment as an alternative choice to becoming a part of Pakistan. It is not so. The truth is that Dr. Khan Sahib, at that time the Chief Minister, boycotted the referendum not because the issue of Pushtoonistan was excluded but because as one of the leaders of the Indian National Congress he believed in the unity of India. Once Pakistan came into being this greatest Pathan of his day became one of its most devoted citizens. The idea of the gravitation of the N.W. Frontier towards Afghanistan never entered his head. Had he entertained any such idea, I, as Governor-General of Pakistan would not have promoted his appointment in 1955 as Premier of West Pakistan.

It must also be observed that despite this boycott, over 50 percent of the registered electors voted for adherence to Pakistan.

(2) Again His Excellency Mr. Kabir Ludin takes issue with Sir Olaf's statement that the Pushtoons influenced dynasties in Kabul. Ancient history apart, it is a fact that in 1929 Lashkars from Waziristan formed the spear head of the advance on Kabul under the leadership of two distinguished Afghan Marshals, their Royal Highness Shah Mahmood Khan, and Shah Wali Khan, which ousted bacha-I-Saqour and founded the present dynasty, which has done such great work for the consolidation and development of the Kingdom of Afghanistan. It is also a fact that in 1933, and again in 1938 and 1939, the Government of India had to take action on the urgent request of the Afghan Government to restrain the tribes of Waziristan and the Khyber from marching on Kabul and Jalalabad, indeed in 1939 two Afridi Lashkars of considerable strength under Khushal Khan and marched several miles into Afghanistan. I was Political Agent, Khyber, at the time and I know the trouble I had to force these Lashkars to retrace their steps.

I have had several talks on the North-West Frontier problems with that wise and great statesman the late Sirdar Mohammed Hashim Khan and since the birth of Pakistan with His majesty the King and the brilliant Prime minister, Prince Daud, I found full realization of one basic factor - the necessity and importance of friendly relations and cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan this feeling is universally reciprocated. The Solution of this question depends on a renewal of the personal equation. This is not beyond the genius of Afghans of Pakistanis. In fact Sir Olaf in his article of February 1 has suggested a method of easing the situation as a preliminary to a lasting arrangement. An agreement was signed in 1928 between the two Governments. If it could be implemented a good deal of suspicion and bitterness will disappear.

Mr. Editor, my main purpose in writing this letter is not to join issue with His Excellency Mr. Kabir Ludin, who is a good friend of mine, but to help in the restoration of friendship and trust between two neighbouring countries. Their cooperation is necessary in the interests of their people and of the Free World. If I succeed in getting the leaders of these two countries to think on these lines I will regard myself amply compensated.

ISKANDER MIRZA, First President of Pakistan.

49, Princes Gate, S.W.7, Feb. 20.

*Iskander Mirza's letter from exile to the Editor of The Times
on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Courtesy, his daughter
Begum Fakhri Asad Ali.*

49 Priests Gate
S.W. 7
Buckingham 3892

13th September, 1967

The Editor,
The Times,
LONDON

Sir,

In your issue of September 4th 1967, extracts from a book written by the present President of Pakistan contain certain allegations against me which leave me no alternative but to reply to keep the record straight. I shall be grateful if you will spare me, the last Governor-General and first elected President of Pakistan, space for this purpose.

At the outset, I assure you I bear no ill will or animosity against anyone, nor I have any intention or desire to enter in a controversy. What I am writing will be amplified in a factual book, begun some time back, but which I have not, so far, been able to advance adequately, owing to two severe heart attacks in the last year.

Innuendos and attacks of the nature which have found their way into the extracts printed in your newspaper I must refute: they are not only inaccurate, but are based on trumped up reports by men like Air Commodore Rab. This person considered the military control of the time a God-given opportunity to wreak vengeance for his supersession in the command of the Pakistan Air Force, by Air Commodore Azghar Khan (now Air Marshal). For this bit of work Rab was amply rewarded. He was drafted into the Foreign Office and appointed Chief of Protocol; after a brief period, he was named Pakistan's Ambassador to Turkey, and, later to Lebanon, an assignment he still holds.

There were four Generals in the Cabinet at the time, Ayub, Sheikh, Azam, and Burki, three very close to Ayub. I would ask any reasonable man to consider what I could hope to achieve by the arrest of the three Generals Yehya, Hamid and Sher Bahadur? Yehya and Hamid were on the General Staff and should have been in Rawalpindi at the time I am supposed to have ordered or requested their arrest. Sher Bahadur was in Karachi as Director of Military Intelligence and at that time most of his efforts were directed towards internal security as the country was under Martial Law. A person possessing average wit would regard a request or order to an Air Force Officer to arrest two General in Rawalpindi about 700 miles from Karachi, or a General in Karachi in the midst of an area in which at least one Infantry Brigade was deployed within immediate striking distance, as an act of a deranged mind, or consider it to be a Fakir's Fairy Tale.

Yours faithfully,
ISKANDER MIRZA

*Iskander Mirza's letter to The Times on Ayub Khan's book,
1967. Courtesy, his daughter Begum Fakhri Asad Ali.*

- 2 -

49 Princess Gate
S.W. 7
Washington 2892

CONTD.....

13th September, 1967

What makes the assertion more absurd is that I am supposed to have issued orders over the Telephone, at a time the Lines of all those who counted in the Country, including the Presidents', were being systematically tapped.

If I had harboured any self interest, would I have initiated the revolution? There was nothing easier for me than to sit back, do nothing, and remain President of Pakistan. If the Revolution of October 7th 1958, had failed, and no amount of letter writing could convert an illegality into legality, I should have been the only person who would have been shot. I took the calculated risk because, in my judgement, there was no other course left if the country was to be saved. In the Proclamation of October 7th 1958, which I drafted and issued, I could easily have retained all powers in my own hands. I had no desire to be a dictator.

My cardinal error was that, I trusted persons whom I knew, and helped, for twenty years; I regarded them as reliable and trustworthy friends.

A letter from General Ayub Khan, written in April 1958, will prove I had no cause to suspect his loyalty, and want of faith:-

President's House,
Karachi,
2nd April, 1958

"My Dear President,

Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up of the Defence Forces. In doing so you have shown tremendous courage, and wisdom, and have done the Defence Forces and the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud of you. I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come up to your expectations. I can promise you my very best effort.

"Once again, I thank you and the Khan^{um} for your kind hospitality during my stay here. As usual, I have been very comfortable.

With respects,
Yours sincerely,
M.A. Khan. "

CONTD.....

*Iskander Mirza's letter to The Times on Ayub Khan's book, 1967.
Courtesy, his daughter Begum Fakhri Asad Ali.*

- 3 -

49 Princes Gate
S.W. 7
Wenington 3892

CONFID.....

13th September, 1967

I must express my deep regret that, even my wife, who devoted all her time to social work, and to enhancing the prestige of the President's House, has not been spared. I categorically deny that she asked me to get rid of General Ayub Khan. There was absolutely no reason for her to do so. The allegation only proves that, there was someone in the President's House base enough to fabricate tales in the hope of improving his situation. A man of honour would not take upon himself the task of a spy in the household of his Head of State.


Several experienced men, among them leading politicians, repeatedly advised me not to grant extension after extension of service periods to the Chiefs of the Defence Forces, saying it was a dangerous practice, unknown in Great Britain, U.S.A. and some other great countries. I did not accept their view, believing that, in our country, any exception had to be made.

~~Events which followed one particular extension proved, conclusively,~~
the error of my judgement in not accepting good counsel.

All the accounts of the talks from 5th December, to the time of the Military coup d'etat, given in your extracts, have no basis. Why should I get apprehensive if General Ayub addressed a large crowd in Dacca? In an area where 55 million inhabitants are concentrated in 50,000 square miles, crowds are normally to be seen or can be collected. When I was Governor of East Bengal, I addressed large crowds in several places at difficult times, and, the then Central Government did not dream of suspecting my loyalty.

There is no logic in all this, and, I do not desire unnecessarily to exhaust the patience of readers by discussing matters of little consequence, and less relevance to history.

Yours truly,



Iskander Mirza

Iskander Mirza's letter to The Times on Ayub Khan's book 1967.
Courtesy, his daughter Begum Fakhri Asad Ali.

13th September, 1967

The Editor,
The Times,
LONDON


Sir,

In your issue of September 4th 1967 you have printed extracts from a Book, written by Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, containing several allegations against me and my wife. So far as I know, it is not normal practice for a President in office, to write his autobiography, and specially of the type carrying allegations against his predecessor and his wife.

One can only counter the allegations made by a President in Office by proving their incorrectness, and since it is not protocol, I consider that, I have no option but to be silent, for the present. This letter is merely to explain to your esteemed readers and to my many friends, the reason for my observing silence. It should not be understood wrongly, to imply that, most of what has been written about me, my decisions, and my wife, has an element of veracity.

I am writing my memoirs, begun sometime back, but which I have not so far been able to advance adequately, owing to two severe heart attacks in the last year. I hope when it is complete, your readers will be able to judge for themselves what really happened, or more important what consequence it has to the History of Pakistan.

Yours truly,



Iskandar Mirza

Iskandar Mirza's letter to The Times on 13 September 1967, mentioning Ayub Khan's book and, for the first time, his Memoirs. Courtesy, his daughter Begum Fakhri Asad Ali.

35 Petham Court

145 Furber Rd.

London S.W.3.

S. 6. 57.

My dear Nur Jehan,

I am very sorry for
the great delay in replying to your
letter. I hope you are all
well & happy.

We are O.K. Rather busy
as we are changing our flat &
getting in all that stuff which
has come from Karachi is not
easy. We have a whole lot after
7th Jan will be
49 Princeps Gate
London S.W.7.

Letter from Iskander Mirza to Nur Jehan, his eldest daughter.
Courtesy, Mehreen Madani. (A)

How are the children - Khawar
and Mehrun a great deal.

I don't think much of this idea
to broadcast the names of the previous
leaders of Pakistan through the mouth
of a man of the type of Qasim
Bhatti, a very infamous scoundrel.

Even the Ghalpore Hotel, is closed &
cannot depend during while I am
away. If they would only examine
the records of 1954-1955 they will
see that it was when I was Minister
of the Interior that some concrete
action was taken against Qasim Bhatti

Letter from Iskander Mirza to Nur Jehan, his eldest
daughter. Courtesy, Mehreen Madani (B)

+ his gang. Immediately the Fugate Hugs
 took over from me as Minister of the
 Interior. He increased the whole
 lot. The Politicians which were Blatant
 continue to have a merry time. I
 have been keeping quiet but if things
 continue like this will have to
 be out in the open.

I hope the P.E.H. Home
 problems are being settled. It belongs
 to your family & it should get
 it transferred to her name. As regards
 nothing I suppose the chance is gone
 surely my love up father. If the
 capital is going to be changed

Letter from Iskander Mirza to Nur Jehan, his eldest daughter. Courtesy, Mehreen Madani. (C)

the bank will go right down but
we will also be able to get a
home cheque.

I hope Mahmood is well.
Give him & the children my love.

Please send me Taj's address.

Yours Affly

Iskander

Letter from Iskander Mirza to Nur Jehan, his eldest daughter. Courtesy, Mehreen Madani (D)

35 Pelham Court

145 Fulham Road

London SW3

5th June 1959

My Dear Nur Jehan,

I am very sorry for the great delay in replying to your letter. I hope you are all well and happy. We are O.k. Rather busy as we are changing our flat and fitting in all that stuff which has come from Karachi is not easy. Our new address after 7th June will be

49 Princess Gate

London SW7

How are the children- Khanum misses Mehreen a great deal.

I don't think much of this idea to besmirch the names of previous leaders of Pakistan, though the --- of a man of the type of Qasim Bhatti, a self-confessed smuggler.

Poor Mr. Ghulam Mohd. Is dead and cannot defend himself while I'm away. If they would only examine the records of 1954-1955, they will see that it was when I was Minister of Interior that some concrete action was taken against Qasim Bhatti and his gang. Immediately Mr. Fazl e Haq took over from as Minister of Interior he released the whole lot - the politicians behind Qasim Bhatti continue to have a merry time- I have been keeping quiet but if things continue like this will have to come out in the open.

I hope the P.E.C.H.S house problems are being settled. It belongs to your Mummy and she should get it transferred to her name. As regards renting I suppose the chance is gone, somebody may turn up later. If the capital is going to be changed the rents will go right down but she will also be able to get a house cheaper.

I hope Mahmood is well.

Give him and the children my love.

Please send me Taj's address.

Yours affectionately

Daddy

Letter from Iskander Mirza to Nur Jehan, his eldest daughter. (Transcription of the original)




Iranian Armed Forces Officers carry Iskander Mirza's coffin draped in the Pakistan flag to his final resting place in Imamzadeh Abdollah cemetery in Ray, Tehran.



Iran Information Ministry logo. The Information Ministry of Iran covered the State Funeral of Ex President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan.




Iskander Mirza's State Funeral in Tehran, Iran. PM of Iran Amir-Abbas Hoveyda in centre, FM Zahedi on his right and Pakistan Ambassador S Shahnawaz on his extreme left




*Funeral Procession. Iskander Mirza was accorded a State
Funeral by the Shah of Iran.*



*Iskander Mirza's funeral leques Sipah Salar Mosque.
The coffin is draped in the Pakistan flag.*



*Editor's Reader's Ticket issued by
The National Archives.*



*The National Archives original files on Gwadar
from 1957 to 1958. Editor's research for Iskander Mirza's Memoirs and
on his role in the Gwadar acquisition.*

SECTION C

SECTION C

BOOKS FROM ISKANDER MIRZA'S PERSONAL LIBRARY

1. The Mughal Empire by S.M. Jaffar - 1936
2. History of India by John Clark
Marshman - 1893
3. The Moors in Spain by S. Lane-Poole - 1920
4. The Saga of the Tented Cities by
Wendell Endicott - 1952
5. The Rise and Expansion of the
British Dominion in India by
Sir Alfred Lyall - 1914
6. Fear Allah and Take your Own Path
by Al-Haj Qassim Ali Jairazbhoy - 1931
7. George Washington 4 volumes by
Douglas Southall Freeman - 1951
8. The Life of Napoleon by Charles
Macfarlane - 1855
9. Fontenoy by Francis Henry Skrine - 1906
10. Fire & Sword in the Caucasus by
Luigi Villari - 1906
11. The Upper and Lower Amoor by
Thomas Witleam Atkinson - 1860

12. The War in Abyssinia by Pietro Badoglio - 1937
13. Turkey in Revolution by Charles Roden Buxton - 1909
14. Mustapha Kemal. Between Europe and Asia by Dagobert von Mikusch - 1931
15. Turkey in Europe by James Baker - 1877
16. Decisive Battles. Napoleon to General Franco by J.F.C Fuller - 1940
17. The Gate-Keepers of India by Jai Krishan Chowdhry - 1932
18. Under Muslim Kings. The Ghaznawids by S.M. Jaffar - 1940
19. The Story of the North-West Frontier Province by J.M . Ewart - 1930
20. Waziristan 1919-1920. The Campaigns and their Lessons by H.de Watteville - 1925
21. Beyond Khyber Pass by Lowell Thomas - 1925
22. The Pathans (550 BC-AD 1957) by Olaf Caroe - 1958
23. Unto this Last & other Essays on Art and Political Economy by John Ruskin - 1913
24. Nana by Emile Zola - 1944
25. Quentin Durward by Sir Walter Scott - 1911
26. Biographies by Lord Macaulay - 1911
27. Macaulay - Lives of Atterbury, Bunyan, Goldsmith, Johnson and Pitt. By R. Scott & J. Sisson - 1915
28. History of Greece by C.W.C. Oman - 1895
29. The Voyage by Charles Morgan - 1940
30. Bismark in the Franco - German War 1870 - 1871, Volumes 1-2, Translated by Dr. Moritz Busch - 1879
31. Macaulay's Essays and Laws of Ancient Rome - 1914

Books from Iskander Mirza's Personal Library

32. Scott's Marmion by R. Scott – 1914
33. The Rose of Rouen by Guy Paget - 1940
34. The Book of the Epic by H.A. Guerber – 1921
(wedding gift)
35. Columbus by Rafael Sabitini - 1940
36. Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution
by F.G. Selby - 1906
37. A History of Eighteenth Century Literature by
Edmund Gosse - 1916
38. The Marquis of Carabas by Rafeal Sabitini - 1940
39. The Mask of Fu Manchu by Sax Rohmer - 1933
40. Over the River by John Galsworthy - 1933
41. Venture in the Interior by Laurens van der
Post - 1952
42. Dimitri Donskoi by Sergei Borodin - 1944
43. Prisoner of the Japs by Gwen Dews - 1941
44. The Dardanelles by Major-General Sir C.E.
Callwell - 1924
45. Desert Encounter by Knud Holmboe – 1931
46. World's Religions in Evolution by M.N. Dhalla
– 1953
47. Imam Hasan - Chief of Youth of Paradise by
M.A. Al-Haj Salmin – 1941
48. A Mind's Reproduction
by Sir Wasif Ali Meerza - 1934

اے اہل نظر ذوق نظر خوب ہے لیکن
 جو شے کی حقیقت کو نہ دیکھے وہ نظر کیا!
 مقصود ہنر سوز حیات ابدی ہے
 یہ ایک نفس یا دو نفس مثل شرر کیا!
 جس سے دل دریا متلاطم نہیں ہوتا
 اے قطرۂ نیساں وہ صدف کیا وہ گہر کیا!
 شاعر کی نوا ہو کہ مغنی کا نفس ہو
 جس سے چمن افسردہ ہو وہ باد سحر کیا!
 بے معجزہ دنیا میں ابھرتیں نہیں قومیں
 جو ضرب کلیمت نہیں رکھتا وہ ہنر کیا!
 علامہ اقبال

Zest for sight, no doubt, is true
O men endowed with art and tact
What aim or goal such sight can serve
Which fails to see the inmost part?
The aim of heart is to infuse
Eternal glow in human hearts:
What is the use of warmth that, like
A spark, expires and soon departs?
O vernal drop, what is the worth
Of mother-shell and such pearl,
If truth cannot defeat untruth
And river does not swell and swirl?
It may be poet's verse or song,
Or breath of one who plays on reed
What does that morning breeze avail
If stead of freshness sear it breed?
Without the aid of wondrous acts
No nation ever can advance:
An art that has no Moses'; Rod
A people's status can't enhance.

AFTERWORD

Besides the all-too-important historical corrections and restoration of Pakistan's exiled President's image being the primary objective, this book will generate many pertinent debates that are the critical need of the time; foremost being the debate on the Westminsterian form of Parliamentary Democracy and why it has not delivered in Pakistan, both with or without the crutches of the establishment. It makes one revisit Iskander Mirza's prophetic assertion with reference to Pakistan- "Democracy without education is hypocrisy without limitation" (in a letter dated 13 September 1967 to *The Times*, London.). It certainly doesn't condone or sanctify the repeated military interventions in Pakistan and, most malevolently, is misinterpreted and used by both the naysayers and self-serving dictators in justifying their misadventures, incompetence and poor governance in the charade known as democracy in Pakistan.

The statement clearly means that Education in Pakistan needs to be given due importance to raise the literacy rates so that people can be effective in managing their own affairs, holding the politicians accountable and keeping the armed forces in barracks, on borders and under civilian command in a

democratic system.

An important objective and a possible outcome of publishing this memoir would be to redefine Pakistan's national narrative in a rapidly-changing region where we have tensions on all our borders other than China, with whole new definitions of security and emerging threats and the utmost need to lay to rest the dysfunctional national security narratives and obsolete doctrines.

Iskander Mirza was not too far off when he said - "Ayub Khan was a friend of mine of twenty-five years' standing. I trusted him absolutely. Perhaps that was a mistake. He could now see that the revolution enjoyed overwhelming support from the public. He knew that I was consulting with Chief Justice Munir on the form of a new constitution. He knew that, if I had my way, the army would soon march back to barracks. Obviously, he had his own ideas about all this." To redefine Pakistan's national security narrative without redefining the role of its robust military would be an exercise in futility and lacking in sincerity to the ethos of a noble institution whose architect was Iskander Mirza. As Joint Secretary, Defence, based in Calcutta at the time of Partition, Iskander Mirza brought along with him *The War Book*, a manual compiled by the British on what important steps to take in case of a war. In his position as Joint Secretary, Defence, he was responsible for dividing the British Indian Army into the future armies of Pakistan and India which he accomplished with utmost professionalism making sure that Pakistan got its fair share.

Gwadar is a pivotal keystone to the future of geo-economics and connectivity in the region. Its acquisition from the Sultanate of Oman was pure foresight and a brilliant masterstroke by Iskander Mirza that became possible only due to his able guidance of Prime Minister Sir Feroz Khan Noon's government throughout the acquisition process. Certainly, his regional clout, good terms with the international community and the respect he enjoyed with the British Government and

Afterword

Muslim countries played a very important and understated role; Iskander Mirza did not hesitate in twisting the arm of Great Britain in extracting a good deal for Pakistan. In a letter marked SECRET dated 25 November 1957 from Sir Derek M. H. Riches, Head of Eastern Department, Foreign Office, to Sir Bernard Burrows, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, based in Bahrain, he writes: "I think that you should know the following piece of information for your own guidance only. In conversation with the Prime Minister on 30 October, the President of Pakistan brought up the subject of Gwadar which he said really must be settled in Pakistan's favour if Pakistan were to remain in the Commonwealth." This can indeed be verified from the records in the Foreign Office archives of Pakistan, UK & Oman. Suffice it to say that there is a long list of services above and beyond the call of duty by Iskander Mirza as a young IPS posted in NWFP, as Joint Secretary of Defence around Partition, Pakistan's Secretary of Defence, as the last Governor-General and the first elected President of Pakistan which have never been acknowledged or ever mentioned by the insecure members of the establishment who, for the better part of Pakistan's history, have decided who forms the face of Pakistan and, in the process have left us with a very distorted, truncated and fabricated history of Pakistan. Unfortunately, many academics and the media played along as well.

Sir Olaf Caroe, who was the Governor NWFP in 1946-47, in his Obituary for Iskander Mirza wrote "President Mirza came closer than any of his compatriots to reaching an honourable accord with India and with Afghanistan. His visit to Delhi with Dr Khan Sahib is still remembered. He won the respect of Nehru and of King Zahir Shah who stands for a way of life and thought very close to his own." Iskander Mirza, because of his extensive background in NWFP in various capacities and of his invaluable contribution, won him the respect of the Pakhtuns at the level of tribes as well as individual friendships on both sides of the Durand Line. In his own words "Let us hope that

in future there will be greater understanding between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: perhaps, eventually, a loose form of confederation.” According to Arwin Rahi “The idea of forming an Afghanistan-Pakistan confederation didn’t originate in the 1980s and especially wasn’t General Zia ul-Haq’s or Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s idea. To diffuse the bilateral tensions once and for all, in the mid-1950s, Afghanistan and Pakistan were considering forming a confederation. The confederation project had the tentative blessings of President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan and the Afghan Royal Family. General Ayub Khan, however, after assuming power, immediately and immaturely torpedoed the scheme. Iskander Mirza had a deep appreciation of history and was well aware of the post-independent sensitivities in Pakhtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line and Afghanistan’s insecurities vis-a-vis the newly-independent State of Pakistan. Even in exile, what kept him worried with respect to Pakistan’s security in the neighbourhood was Pakistan-Afghanistan relations which he greatly cared for and foresaw trouble in the days ahead because of the way things were taking shape. India, to him, was not a friend, rather a reality we had to work with.

Ever since Partition, Pak-Afghan relations had been unhappy because of the Pashtunistan question. According to him, “I had tried to understand the Afghan point of view ever since the days when I was Political Agent, Khyber, and Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Political Agent, Mohmands. I came to the conclusion that the Afghan suffered from being land-locked, and had developed a phobia about control of their outlets to the Indian Ocean.” He had a strong belief that it was necessary to give Afghans direct access to the sea and that it was also necessary to secure their cooperation in the affairs of the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier. The issues as spelled out by him remain to this date and are in worse shape.

Olaf Caroe continues – “His obsequies in Tehran are a moving tribute to the respect he enjoyed with the Shah (of Iran) and his government. He will be deeply mourned, not only

Afterword

in Pakistan.” Iskander Mirza’s invaluable services in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) are well known and acknowledged in *The Pathans*, Olaf Caroe’s magnum opus/scholarly work on the social and political history of the Pathans which he reverently dedicates to Iskander Mirza with the befitting note- “To My Friend, Iskander Mirza, First President of Pakistan. One of Those Who, Having Graduated in Mardan Among the Yusufzais, Are Admitted to a Life Fellowship in the Honourable Company of Pathans.”

Equally acknowledging of his able leadership was Sir Alec Douglas-Home, ex Prime Minister of Great Britain who pays glowing tributes and writes in his obituary- “The outstanding characteristics of General Iskander Mirza were loyalty and a sense of duty. For him these standards were absolute. His strength lay in his ability as an administrator and that Pakistan is still one nation is largely due to his firm and sympathetic handling of emergency in East Pakistan in 1954.”

Lt General (R) S.M.A. Faruki, in his obituary note in a Pakistani English Daily, expressed profound grief over the demise of Major General Iskander Mirza and described his death as a loss of a great Pakistani, much maligned and misunderstood by his countrymen. Paying profuse tributes to Iskander Mirza, he adds: “He was generous to a fault. He was simple and unobstructive. He was always accessible even to the most lowly. Above all he was always ready to forgive those who had sinned against him (General Ayub & other generals). In London I never heard him once bemoan his dethronement or speak ill about those who had betrayed him.”

The most touching and brutally honest obituary was from Princess Abida Sultan Sahiba, the heiress apparent who gave up her right to the Bhopal throne and migrated to the newly-formed Pakistan in 1950 with her son, Shahryar Khan, who later became our Foreign Secretary. In a statement issued to PPI she said: “I share the pain with his bereaved family, and mourn the loss as a daughter and sister, in equal proportion to

the sincere and warm friendship I enjoyed during his lifetime. The political mistakes, blunders or damages attributed to him were fully shared by many a self-appointed advisor and ‘well-wishers’ of the nation who combined to collectively misadvise, misinform, mislead and take the meanest advantage of his trust and confidence in them. They have reaped the fullest harvest and are thriving on it without question or blame. General Mirza alone paid the price of this defame while his innocent family suffered in silence with dignity and fortitude. During his lifetime, it was for him to defend or explain his actions, after his death, let him who has not dined, wined, supported, adulated, and actively participated in perpetrating those alleged crimes, cautiously refrain from publicly offering his condolences and sympathies to the bereaved. My relationship being entirely personal, I take the opportunity of paying my sincerest homage to his noble qualities which remain enshrined deeply in my heart, even after he is gone.” The genuine men and women who courageously and at great risk spoke in Iskander Mirza’s favour in their obituaries were people of character, great substance and high moral fibre to voice their opinion while the country was still under Ayub Khan’s autocratic rule.

Lately academics and scholars have started taking deep dives in the period covering the early years of Pakistan and a dispassionate discourse is emerging mostly from outside Pakistan, unfettered by the biases that were craftily embedded in our history books and people’s minds. In a paper titled “Hildreth, Mirza, Bhutto: Reflections on Pakistan’s 1950’s politics”, Professor Ian Talbot, a 2018 Mittal Institute Visiting Fellow and Professor at the University of Southampton, delved into the precarious politics of Pakistan’s formative years in the 1950s. Ian Talbot, who is Professor Emeritus, History of Modern South Asia at the University of Southampton, while referring to the acerbic criticism of Iskander Mirza’s politics in a paper, offers this discerning opinion, “Mirza was not however alone in undermining Pakistan’s fragile democracy. M.M. Syed

Afterword

argues that Pakistan's democratic failure owed much to the 'misfortune' of having such seasoned bureaucrats as Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and Ghulam Muhammad elevated to positions of authority. Moreover, Mirza's reputation was deliberately blackened by his 1958 co-coup leader Ayub Khan in the autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*. Ayub destroyed Mirza's papers and diaries which explains the absence of a serious study of his career. The reality of Pakistan's democratic demise can no more be solely attributed to Mirza, than to the distorting influence that the state's alliance with the US exerted."

With respect to the involvement of the US & UK in Pakistan's affairs in the 1950s. Ian Talbot argues "If London and Washington did not precipitate the coup, both unquestioningly accepted its justification. Ambassador Symon of the UK gave the Ayub regime a clean bill of health throughout the remainder of his time in Pakistan. In December 1959, President Eisenhower's visit was a public American endorsement.

"The American administration reconciled support for Ayub with its 'proclaimed devotion to democracy', by declaring that military rule was a 'temporary bridge' on the road to consolidated democratic government. British approval took the form of a 15-day Royal Visit in February 1961. It marked the high point of Symon's time in Pakistan. The Queen's speech, carefully crafted by officials, in response to Field Marshall Ayub Khan's welcome address, stated that it was not surprising if British political forms were found 'to need modification to meet circumstances far different.' The forms are not sacred', the young Elizabeth intoned, 'the ideals behind them are.'"

The first martial law in Pakistan was heralded by powerful endorsements from both HM the Queen and the US President and so began Pakistan's military's adventurism in Pakistan's politics.

More recently, in a documentary titled "Pakistan from Independence to Martial Law-1947-1958" produced by VOA (Voice of America) acclaimed scholars, historians, political and

public figures like the constitutional lawyer and writer Hamid Khan, politician and writer, Javed Jabbar and Dr Syed Jaffer Ahmed, the famous historian and writer, were interviewed. I am sharing the excerpts, both the original Urdu in Roman English and its English translation from the VOA documentary.

Hamid Khan @ 50:23 minutes

Mein samajhta hoon kay jab aaj ke context mein dekhta hoon to yeh behtar decade tha. Woh aaj phir us kay baad say itni jamhuryat bhee nahi dekhnay ko millee hai.

Uski yeh wajah thi kay abhee political cadre tha, jaisa bhee tha kamzor tha, jo bhee tha magar tha. Azaadi e sahafat bhee kissey hud tuk thi, us may bhee interference hoti thee. Aur kissy hud tuk wahan jamhori huqooq bhee logon key thay. Economic taraqi bhee jo aye hai yeh ek bara ghalat narrative deeya गया है के Ayub Khan nay ki hai.

In my opinion, 1947-1958 was a better decade in comparison to today's context. Since then, we've only seen democracy on a sliding scale. Democracy whatever one may say was there and irrespective of being weak survived as there was a political cadre. There was freedom of press to some extent with the periodic interferences and people too had democratic rights to certain extent.

A very wrong impression and a false narrative was created with respect to Pakistan's economic growth for which Ayub Khan is unduly credited.

Hamid Khan @ 51:01 – 51:05 minutes

Actually agar ap dekhain gay ke sub say Ziada taraqi agar kissi 10 saal mein hoyee hai tu yeh pehlay 10 sal may

In reality and if you look at the facts, it is clear that the most economic growth that ever happened in any ten years was actually in first ten years of Pakistan.

Javed Jabbar @ 51:06 - 51:34 minutes

Ap is say andaaza lagaein ke 1953-54 mein Korean war key ubharnay ki wajah se Pakistan ka GDP growth 10% hua. Saalana 10% growth in 1 year it was a record. Kiyoun ke hum ne bahut

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hungami bunyaad pur kapas, gayhuan aur deegar cheezian jin ki bari demand thi ye hum ne bhejna shuroo kar dee thein.

If you look at it and it's a fact that Pakistan's economic growth shot to 10% in 1953-54 as a result of the opportunities created due to the Korean War and how these were well utilized with a direct reflection on the economy. 10% growth in a year; it was a record growth due to good planning and timely decisions to export cotton, wheat and other high demand items in the international markets.

Hamid Khan @ 51:35 – 51:45 minutes

Aur us zamanay may qarzay koi nahi thay. Agar aap 1958 may utha kar dekh lain Pakistan ki Balance sheet to koi qarza nahi thay. Koi International Qarza nahi tha. Is ka matlab hum apnay zor pur chal rahay thay.

Moreover, there were no loans in those times. If you look at Pakistan's balance sheet from 1958, you will notice not a single loan; there was no international loan. It means we were strong on our feet then as a sovereign state.

Syed Jaffer Ahmed @ 49:30 – 50:23 minutes

Apni tamam tur kamzoryoun kay bawajod voh Giyara sal Dono Khitoun kay durmyan rabta tha. Aur agar 1959 may elections ho jatay tou mera khiyal hay kay jis tarah political formations bun rahi then, Teen parties ubhur kur samnay a gayee theen. National Awami Party thee with Molana Bhashani as its leader, Awami League with Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy as its leader aur Muslim League jis kay Qayyum Khan us waqt Sadr thay. Tou voh agla siyasi manzarnama jo tha us kay andar siyasi, national siyasi leadership ubhur rahi thee, parties ubhur rahi theen. Usko rokney hee kay leyay yeh Martial Law lagaya गया.

In spite of all the inherent weaknesses in those eleven years, there were political, social and economic links between the Eastern and Western wings of Pakistan and, had elections been held in 1959, I am confident that the political formations that were taking place and with the emergence of three main political parties, namely the National Awami Party with Maulana

Bhashani as its leader, Awami League with Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy as its leader and Muslim League with Qayyum Khan as its President; things were progressing politically towards the emergence of a national political leadership; to stop this process, martial law was imposed.

Iskander Mirza, with all his mistakes and questionable decisions, comes out as a resolute, no-nonsense man of high integrity who excelled as an administrator and openly preferred the Presidential form of government knowing fully well the land, its people, their literacy and psyche. He never minced words or suffered fools and was always dead honest in his views, actions and commitment to Pakistan. Iskander Mirza was on the same footing as his leader, Quaid-e-Azam, that Pakistan will be run on secular grounds. The mess we are in today for not following Jinnah's vision is a sad reflection of our leadership and institutions and how they were steered off course to keep vested agendas running.

The recent spate of events has proven that religion as a tool was the most disastrous policy ever undertaken by the insecure state in dealing with its illiterate but dangerously simple masses. We, in 75 plus years, have created these sclerosed single-track minds with no room for reason or logic and these very ideologies are haunting the state and its citizens and, most inexorably, consuming the very *raison d'être* for Pakistan. Jinnah would have been a very sad person had he been alive today.

Iskander Mirza was deeply skeptical of the ability and intentions of politicians who selfishly wrangled as the country went from bad to worse. Perhaps that was the reason for the concentration of power in the President that inevitably meant that nothing could be done without his consent and that inadvertently affected governance as well as the economy. The fact remains that, in spite of the questionable decisions, he comes across as a man of high integrity, strong character, commanding presence and yet the most accessible of the VIPs

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and one who excelled as an administrator.

There is no doubt that a lot has to be learned from his mistakes and his preoccupation in keeping so much power in his own hands which together contributed to his downfall and the fateful coup d'état by General Ayub Khan. President Iskander Mirza knew it all too well that he was not liked by the politicians and, in his own words, "Of course I shall be unpopular among our professional politicians by saying this but Pakistan is not yet ripe for the practice of democracy as the term is understood in Britain or America."

To expect an apology from the state and those responsible for the character assassination and wrongs done to Iskander Mirza would be naive and wishful. The idea is not to embarrass but to remind the state of its obligation to honourably face the truth, to magnanimously correct distortions in our written history, to rightfully restore President Iskander Mirza's image and to open up its archives for the public to see for themselves what grave injustice has been done to the noble man who never compromised on his beloved Pakistan.

Syed Khawar Mehdi
Karachi, 7 February 2023

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17th Poona Horse (Queen Victoria's Own). The Poona Horse was raised on 15 July 1817 as result of the Treaty of Poona, concluded on 13 June 1817, between the British headed by Lord Hasting, the then Governor-General, and Baji Rao II, the Peshwa. In accordance with Article VI of the Treaty, a force known as the Poona Auxiliary Force was to be recruited. This force was to be commanded by British officers and, although maintained by revenue arising out of the territorial grants made by the Peshwa, this force permanently stationed in the Peshwa's territory, was available if necessary for action against the Peshwa himself. The Residence at the Peshwa's court at Poona, who negotiated the Treaty in 1817, was Mountstuart Elphinstone who later became Governor of Bombay. Immediately after the Treaty was concluded, a number of military officers were ordered to raise, from the cavalry elements of the force, the Poona Auxiliary Horse — which was later, in 1921, called the Poona Horse (17th Queen Victoria's Own Cavalry).

5th Frontier Force Rifles. They were raised as the 25th Punjab Infantry or Hazara Gurkha Battalion in 1858. Their base was Abbottabad and remained so until 1947. This town was founded in 1853 by Major James Abbott, the first British deputy commissioner of Hazara District. It is a hill station situated northeast of Rawalpindi at a height of 4,120 ft. It is still the regimental centre for the Frontier Force of Pakistan.

Adjutant-General. A member of the army or air force who was initially a general's principal assistant or staff officer but eventually became a senior staff officer with only administrative duties.

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Anjuman-e-Ghuraba. A small organization with communist influences that was known for dangerous political activity in the NWFP during the colonial era.

Argonaut. BOAC's (British Overseas Airways Corporation) name for Canadair North Star airplane.

Awami League. A major political party in Bangladesh and one of the oldest. The All Pakistan Awami Muslim League was founded in Dhaka in 1949 by Bengali nationalists Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, Shaukat Ali, Yar Mohammad Khan, Shamsul Huq and joined later by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy who went on to become Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Banihal Pass. A name that in, Kashmiri, means "blizzard"—lies at an elevation of 9,290 feet (2,832 metres) in the Doda district. It is a pass in the Pir Panjal Range in the Indian-held sector of Jammu & Kashmir union territory in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent.

Bannu Brigade. The brigade was formed after the 1903 reforms of the British Indian Army by Herbert Kitchener when he was Commander-in-Chief, India. The brigade was part of the Northern Army and deployed along the North-West Frontier. The brigade was involved in the Operations in Tochi between November 1914 and March 1915 when it was commanded by Major General Vere Bonamy Fane.

Bhittani. The Bettani, also spelled Baittani or Bhittani, is a Pashtun tribe located mostly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Black Shirts. They were not a distinct movement but rather supporters of Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi and his Khaksar Movement—a social movement founded in 1931 in Lahore with the goal of freeing India from British rule and establishing a Muslim government in India that united both Hindus and Muslims. The membership of the Khaksar movement was open to everyone and had no membership fee regardless of the person's religion, race and caste or social status. The emphasis was on the equality of all people and the brotherhood of man.

Bolshevik. (Russian: "One of the Majority"), A member of the majority faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party which seized power in the October 1917 of Revolution. The Bolsheviks, also known in English as the Bolsheviks, were a far-left, revolutionary Marxist faction founded by Vladimir Lenin that split with the Mensheviks from the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party a revolutionary socialist political party

formed in 1898 at its Second Party Congress in 1903.

British regiment. In the British Army, for most purposes, the regiment is the largest ‘permanent’ organizational unit. A permanent unit of an army, it is typically commanded by a lieutenant colonel and divided into several companies, squadrons, or batteries and often into two battalions.

British-Indian Army. Commonly referred to as the Indian Army, it was the main military of the British Indian Empire before its decommissioning in 1947. It was responsible for the defence of the British Indian Empire, including the princely states, which could also have their own armies. The Indian Army was an important part of the British Empire’s forces, both in India and abroad, particularly during World Wars I and II. The first army officially called the Indian Army was raised by the Government of India in 1895.

Cadet College. A special military school system of British India and later Pakistan.

Cameronions (Scottish Rifles). The regiment was established in 1881 by merging the 26th (The Cameronians) Regiment of Foot and the 90th Regiment of Foot (Perthshire Volunteers) (Light Infantry). These became the new unit’s 1st and 2nd Battalions respectively. It was designated as a rifle unit, rather than regular infantry, and recruited in Lanarkshire, Dumfriesshire and Galloway. The 2nd Battalion was in India at the time of the amalgamation.

Canberra. The Canberra was originally designed to replace the world’s last wooden combat aircraft, the DeHavill Mosquito Bomber aircraft. The Canberra was the first jet-powered bomber to enter service with the Royal Air Force. It was unarmed and relied on high speed to escape enemy fighters. The worldwide production was of 1,352 aircraft. 925 of these were built in the United Kingdom with 782 being supplied to the Royal Air Force.

Cantonment. A permanent military station in British India. Cantonments are established under and governed by the Cantonments Act 1924. Presently, cantonments are different from the military stations in that the military stations are purely meant for the use and accommodation of the armed forces and are established under an executive order whereas the cantonments are areas which comprise both military and civil population.

Caucasus. The Russian Kavkaz is a mountain system and region lying between the Black Sea (west) and the Caspian Sea (east), mainly

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comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and parts of Southern Russia. The Caucasus Mountains, including the Greater Caucasus range, have historically been considered a natural barrier between Eastern Europe and Western Asia.

Chittagong Hill Tracts. Lying to the south of the Feni River in south-eastern Bangladesh is the Chittagong region which has many hills, hillocks, valleys and forests and is quite different from other parts of the country. The Hill Tracts are the only extensively hilly area in Bangladesh. It was historically settled by many tribal refugees from Burma Arakan in the 16th century and is now settled by the Jumma people. Today, they remains one of the least developed parts of Bangladesh.

Civil Disobedience Movement. This movement was aimed at forcing the British Government to accept the Congress demands regarding the future constitution of India. It was launched after the observance of Independence Day in 1930. The civil disobedience movement commenced with the infamous dandi march when Gandhi left the Sabarmati Ashram at Ahmedabad on foot with 78 other members of the Ashram for Dandi on 12 March 1930. After reaching Dandi, Gandhi broke the salt law.

Civil Intelligence. Is regarded as an “intelligence” that is devoted to addressing public or civic issues. The term has been applied to individuals and, more commonly, to collective bodies like organizations, institutions or societies. Civic intelligence can be used in politics by groups of people who are trying to achieve a common goal. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is a civilian intelligence agency in Pakistan. Established in 1947, the IB is Pakistan’s oldest intelligence agency. Appointments and supervision of its operations are authorized by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Constituent Assembly. It was formed to write Pakistan’s constitution and serve as its first (interim) parliament. Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly first convened on 10 August 1947, on the eve of independence and the end of British rule. The second Constituent Assembly was reconstituted on 28 May 1955. The constitution was promulgated on 23 March 1956, making Pakistan an Islamic republic.

Council of Ministers. The interim government’s executive branch was the Viceroy’s Executive Council. Originally headed by the Viceroy of India, it was changed into a Council of Ministers and Jawaharlal Nehru, the

Vice-President of the Council, was given the authority of a prime minister. All members would be Indians after independence, with the exception of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, who would take over as Governor-General in August and would serve in a ceremonial capacity.

Cripps Mission. A failed attempt in late March 1942 by the British government to secure full Indian cooperation and support for their efforts in World War II. The mission was headed by a senior minister, Sir Stafford Cripps. From 22 March to 11 April 1942, Stafford Cripps, a member of the War Cabinet, was dispatched to India to discuss the British Government's Draft Declaration on the Constitution of India with representative Indian leaders from all parties. The Cripps Mission failed and the issue of India's constitution was postponed until the end of the war.

Croton oil. An oil prepared from the seeds of *Croton tiglium*. It is a native or cultivated in India and the Malay Archipelago. Small doses taken internally can cause diarrhoea. Externally, the oil can cause irritation and swelling.

Cyrenaica. Also spelled Cirenaica; Arabic. Barqah. A historic region of North Africa and, until 1963, a province of the United Kingdom of Libya. It is the eastern coastal region of Libya. Also known as Pentapolis ("Five Cities") in antiquity, it formed part of the Roman province of Crete and Cyrenaica, later divided into Libya Pentapolis and Libya Sicca. During the Islamic period, the area came to be known as Barqa, after the city of Barca. As a result of the Italo-Turkish War (1911–12), Cyrenaica, with Tripolitania, was incorporated into the kingdom of Italy. The Italian colonists were evacuated during World War II when the British finally occupied the area following the victory at El-Alamein in Egypt (al-Alamayn; October 1942), and the population was once again 98 per cent Muslim and Arabic-speaking. After World War II, the inability of the great powers to agree on the future of the former Italian colonies protracted the British military administration, and a united Libya (comprising the three provinces) was not proclaimed until 1951. In 1963, the provinces were abolished and the country became a unitary state.

D-Day. In the military, D-Day is the day on which a combat attack or an important operation is to be initiated. It also refers to the day (6 June 1944) in World War II on which the Allied forces invaded northern France by means of beach landings in Normandy.

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Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The title of the deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the British Army. From 1942 until 1968, the Deputy Chief was the third-ranking member of the General Staff, subordinate to the Chief and Vice Chief.

Dewan. A powerful government official, minister or ruler. A dewan was the head of a state institution. Dewans belonged to the elite families in the history of Mughal and post-Mughal India and held high posts within the government.

Dilkusha Palace, Kabul. Meaning “Heart’s Delight”. The Palace was designed by the English architect, Mr Finlayson, for Amir Habibullah in 1907.

Divisions (military). A division is a large military unit or formation, usually consisting of between 6,000 and 25,000 soldiers. In modern military organizations, the smallest formation that comprises a balanced team of all the arms and services needed for the independent conduct of operations.

Durand Line. The Durand Line forms the Afghanistan Pakistan border, a 2,670-kilometre international land border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand Line was established in 1893 as the international border between British India and the Emirate of Afghanistan by Sir Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat of the Indian Civil Service, and Abdur Rahman Khan, the Afghan Emir, to fix the limit of their respective spheres of influence and improve diplomatic relations and trade. The British considered Afghanistan to be an independent state at the time although they controlled its foreign affairs and diplomatic relations.

East Pakistan Assembly. Also known as the East Bengal Legislative Assembly between 1947 and 1955, it was the provincial legislature of East Pakistan between 1947 and 1971. It was known as the East Bengal Assembly from 1947 to 1955 when the provincial name was changed. The legislature was a successor to the Bengal Legislative Council and the Bengal Legislative Assembly, which were divided between East Bengal and West Bengal during the partition of Bengal in 1947. It was the largest provincial legislature in Pakistan. Elections were held only twice; in 1954 and 1970.

Elphinstone College. One of the constituent colleges of Dr Homi Bhabha State University, a state cluster university. Established in 1823, it is one of the oldest colleges in Mumbai.

esprit de corps. A feeling of pride, fellowship and common loyalty shared by the members of a particular group.

Far East. A European term used to refer to the geographical regions that include East and Southeast Asia as well as the Russian Far East to a lesser extent. South Asia is sometimes also included for economic and cultural reasons. The term first came into use in European geopolitical discourse in the 15th century, particularly British, denoting the Far East as the “farthest of the three Easts” beyond the Near East and the Middle East. Since the mid-20th century, the term has mostly gone out of use for the region in international mass media outlets due to its euro-centric connotations.

Formosa. The main island of Taiwan, formerly known as Formosa, has an area of 35,808 square kilometres (13,826 sq mi), with mountain ranges dominating the eastern two-thirds and plains in the western third where its highly urbanized population is concentrated. The Republic of Formosa was a short-lived republic that existed on the island of Taiwan in 1895 between the formal cession of Taiwan by the Qing dynasty of China to the Empire of Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki and its takeover by the Japanese troops. The name Formosa dates from 1542 when Portuguese sailors sighted an uncharted island and noted it on their maps as Ilha Formosa (beautiful island). The name Formosa eventually “replaced all others in European literature” and remained in common use among English speakers into the 20th century.

Forward Policy. A set of foreign policy doctrines applicable to territorial ambitions and disputes in which emphasis is placed on securing control of targeted territories by invasion and annexation or by the political creation of compliant buffer states. The “forward policy”, called the Sandeman system, involved capturing and holding areas in the tribal zones in the hills. Strong points were captured, fortified, garrisoned and connected by roads which would be protected. The tribes would be allowed to run their own affairs in the hope that they would gradually come under the influence of the British government.

Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). A special set of laws of British India and which were applicable to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They were enacted in the 19th century and remained effective in Pakistan until 2018.

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Gilgit Scouts. A paramilitary force of the Gilgit Agency in northern Jammu & Kashmir. They were raised by the British Raj in 1913, on behalf of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir, to police the northern frontier of India. The force of Gilgit Scouts was continued by Pakistan till 1975 when it was integrated into the Northern Light Infantry of the Pakistan Army.

Governor-General. The title of an office-holder. Governors-general are designated as viceroys to act on behalf of the monarch of a personal union in any sovereign state that he or she does not ordinarily rule personally in the context of former British colonies. As agents of the British government in each Dominion and as representatives of the king, governors-general were British subjects selected on the advice of the British government until the 1920s. The governor-general was also usually the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces in their territory and, because of their control of the military, the post was as much a military appointment as a civil one. The status and responsibilities of the post of governor-general changed as the British Empire transformed into the Commonwealth of Nations keeping pace with the advancement of the territories toward self-government and independence. The holder of the office was generally known by that title until the Indian Independence Act of 1947 which established the offices of governor-general for India and for Pakistan. The filling of these posts necessitated a departure from normal practice because there could be no ministers to formally advise the crown until a governor-general had been appointed and ministers had taken office. In these circumstances the leaders of the Congress Party and the Muslim League were consulted and their advice was formally tendered to the crown by the British government.

Guides (Frontier Force). A regiment of the British Indian Army made up of British officers and Indian-enlisted soldiers to serve in the North West Frontier. The Guides Cavalry (Frontier Force) is an armoured regiment of the Pakistan Army which was raised in 1846 as The Corps of Guides. During more than a hundred and fifty years of military service, the regiment has earned the reputation of one of the most renowned military units in the world.

Gulistan Palace. Also known as Golestan Palace and sometimes referred to as the Rose Garden Palace. It is the former royal Qajar complex in Iran's capital city, Tehran. One of the oldest historic monuments in the city of Tehran, and of world heritage status, the Golestan Palace is part of a

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group of royal buildings that were once enclosed within the mud-thatched walls of Tehran's arg ("citadel"). It consists of gardens, royal buildings and collections of Iranian crafts and European presents from the 18th and 19th centuries.

Gurkhas. Soldiers native to South Asia, chiefly residing within Nepal and some parts of north-eastern India. The British Indian Army's Gurkha ranks followed the same structure as the rest of the Indian Army at the time. Unlike British officers serving in a Gurkha regiment, Gurkha commissioned officers held a "Viceroy's Commission", which was different from a King's or Queen's Commission. Any Gurkha holding a commission was technically subordinate to any British officer regardless of rank. After the Partition of India in 1947, and under the Tripartite Agreement, the original ten Gurkha regiments consisting of the twenty pre-war battalions were split between the British Army and the newly-independent Indian Army. Six Gurkha regiments (twelve battalions) were transferred to the post-independence Indian Army while four regiments (eight battalions) were transferred to the British Army.

Imperial Defence College. In 1922, a cabinet committee under Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, recommended the formation of the college. The college was founded in 1927 as the Imperial Defence College and was located at 9 Buckingham Gate until 1939. Its objective at that time was to instruct senior military officers on the defence of the British Empire. It was renamed the Royal College of Defence Studies in 1970.

Indian National Army. Indian nationalists and prisoners of war founded the Indian National Army (INA) during World War II with the goal of freeing India from the British Empire. Subhas Chandra Bose served as the leader of the INA which established its own temporary government with support from the Japanese military and launched an offensive against the British in India. They had some success but were defeated at the Battle of Imphal in 1944 were disbanded after Japan was defeated in 1945. Despite its brief existence, the INA came to be seen as a crucial player in India's war for independence alongside Mahatma Gandhi's domestic peaceful resistance movement.

Indian Political Service. The Indian Political Service (IPS) was a department during the British Raj. The staff employed by the IPD (Indian

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Political Department), known as the Indian Political Service, were generally referred to as political officers or colloquially as “politicals” and were recruited from these areas. Some came from the Indian Medical Service, some from the Indian Public Works and Engineering Department, and some from the Law Services. Two-thirds were recruited from the Indian Army and the next most numerous from the Indian Civil Service. Employees of the political service were predominantly European although small numbers of Indians were employed. Following Indian independence in 1947, a small number of British officials remained as Union of India personnel.

Interim government. Sometimes referred to as the Provisional Government of India, it was tasked with supporting British India in its transition to independence and was established on 2 September 1946 from the newly-elected Constituent Assembly of India. It remained in place until 15 August 1947, the date of the independence (and partition) of India and the creation of Pakistan.

Kaisar-i-Hind. The Kaisar-i-Hind Medal for Public Service in India was a medal awarded by the Emperor/Empress of India between 1900 and 1947 to “any person without distinction of race, occupation, position or sex ... who shall have distinguished himself (or herself) by important and useful service in the advancement of the public interest in India.”

Kakul Military College. Also referred to by its acronym, PMA (Pakistan Military Academy), is an officers’ training school established in 1947 located near the Kakul village in the city and district of Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is the sole service academy in Pakistan tasked with transforming cadets into army officers. For educational training, the institution is accredited by NUST (National University of Sciences and Technology).

Karachi Municipal Corporation. A public corporation and governing body that provides municipal services in Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan. The Karachi Conservancy Board was established in 1846 to control cholera epidemics in Karachi during the British rule. The board was upgraded into the Municipal Commission in 1852. The Karachi Municipal Committee replaced the Municipal Commission in 1853. On Bundar Road (now M.A. Jinnah Road), the Karachi Municipal Corporation Building’s foundation stone was laid in 1927. The Karachi Municipal Act of 1933 changed the Karachi Municipal Committee into the Karachi Municipal

Corporation. In 1976, the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation replaced the Karachi Municipal Corporation.

Kaimkhanis. A Muslim community of India claiming to be Muslim Rajputs. Qaimkhani or Kaimkhani (also spelled Qaim Khani and Kaim Khani). They converted to Islam in the 14th century.

Khassadars. The armed tribal levy used for territorial policing; a paramilitary force operating throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now a part of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan. The Khassadars were a locally recruited and maintained tribal security force paid for through a stipend provided directly to their tribes by the Pakistan government. Khassadars were first raised in Waziristan and other North-West Frontier districts of British India prior to World War I. Their prime functions during this period included the provision of picquets and escorts to protect camel convoys and other travellers when regular soldiers of the Indian Army were not available. They wore the normal clothing of the tribal groups from which they were recruited, distinguished by arm bands bearing the letter K.

King's Commission. Authority granted to a person or institution by a king; specifically, the authority to serve as an officer in the armed forces.

Krishak Proja Party or Krishak Praja Party or Krishak Sramik Party (KSP). Founded in 1936, the Krishak Praja Party was a spin-off of the "Nikhil Banga Praja Samiti" (All Bengal Tenants' Association). It was founded to represent the interests of tenant farmers in Bengal's landed gentry estates. Sir Abdur Rahim (judge) was its first leader. A. K. Fazlul Huq was elected leader in 1935 when the former was appointed as the president of the Central Legislative Assembly of India. In 1936, it took the name of Krishak Praja Party (Farmer Tenant Party) and contested the 1937 election. The party formed the first government in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. After the Partition of British India, A.K. Fazlul Huq revived the party as the Krishak Sramik Party (Farmer-Labour Party) in 1954 to contest the 1954 election as part of the United Front. The coalition won the election and formed the provincial government in the East Bengal Legislative Assembly.

Kukyat Abpashi. An irrigation system based on water custom.

Kumbh Mela. A Hindu festival and assembly, held once every twelve years at four locations in India, at which pilgrims bathe in the waters of the Ganges and Jumna rivers.

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Lahore Declaration. Commonly known as the Pakistan Resolution, it was a political resolution or statement drafted by the 25-member Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League. It was then formally adopted by the Muslim League membership at its general session on 23 March 1940 held at Lahore. This resolution asked for greater Muslim autonomy of Muslim majority states such as Punjab, Bengal, Sindh and NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) within British India. However, later, most people thought of this as a call for a separate Muslim state, Pakistan. The resolution was presented at Minto Park, (now renamed “Iqbal Park”), in Lahore by Maulvi A.K. Fazlul Huq on the instructions of the Working Committee. In fact, from the declaration made at this resolution the goals of the Muslim League became increasingly fixed upon achieving an independent nation-state. Today, the resolution’s importance is remembered in Pakistan by the Minar-e-Pakistan structure that stands in the Greater Iqbal Park, Lahore.

Mahsuds. A Karlani Pashtun tribe inhabiting mostly the South Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The Mahsuds were Pathan tribesmen who inhabited Waziristan. They were probably the most formidable fighters in the frontier. Fiercely independent, they had honed their fighting skills by years of raiding the settled areas to the east along the Indus and by attacking the trading caravans that travelled to and from Afghanistan. During the British colonial period, the Mahsuds were invaded several times by the British empire, in 1860, 1881, 1894–5, 1900–1, 1919–20, and in 1925. Since independence, many social, economic, and demographic changes have occurred in Waziristan. A large number of Mahsuds have joined mainstream Pakistani society. When the Hindu traders of Tank left after the Partition of India in 1947, most of their shops were taken over by the Mahsuds. Now the Mahsuds are employed in the militia and regular army, state bureaucracy and involved in businesses all around the country.

Mahwa flower. Commonly known as madhukaor Butter Tree, the mahwa flower is edible and a food item for the tribals. They use it to make syrup for medicinal purposes. Tribal people consider the tree and the mahwa drink as part of their cultural heritage. Mahwa is an essential drink for tribal men and women during celebrations.

Marwaris. The term Marwari once referred to the area encompassed

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by the former princely state of Marwar, also called the Jodhpur region of southwest Rajasthan in India. It is an umbrella term to classify both Hindus and Jains. It has evolved to be a designation for the Rajasthani people in general but is used particularly with reference to certain jatis that fall within the Bania community. Immigrants from Rajasthan into Eastern India, particularly Bengal, established their credibility in commercial enterprises and emerged as the leading merchants and traders. In the social and trade parlance of Calcutta and Dacca of the British period, all traders from North India passed for Marwaris. The Marwari diaspora to Bengal seems to have begun from the 17th century or even earlier. The Marwaris, as is well known, have a unique talent for trading and business, a talent that they have cultivated and put to use assiduously.

Military Intelligence. An agency known as MI, it is an administrative intelligence branch of the Pakistan Army. It is headquartered at the army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The agency (MI) was created by Major General Robert Cawthome who also served as its first director. Cawthome later established the ISI Directorate in the 1950s. Military intelligence is a military discipline that uses information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to assist commanders in their decisions. MI is one of the five main intelligence services in Pakistan.

Military Secretary. An administrative post in the federal government of Pakistan tasked with appointments, postings and other military administrative privileges given by the government. In Pakistan's political system, a military officer with the rank of brigadier serves as the military secretary to the prime minister; similarly a military officer with the rank of brigadier serves as the military secretary to the president. An MS (military secretary) is entitled to assist the office with correspondence in staff. Since the office is literally held by an aide-de-camp (ADC), MS do not execute promotions and appointments of military officers independently.

Mohmand. Also known as Momand. The tribe is one of the most prominent Abdali Pashtun tribes (later Durrani). They are descended from the first son of Daulatyar and the second son, Daudzai, according to Pashtun historical literature. The Mohmand Tribe resides in the Mohmand Agency and the Kunar province of Afghanistan. The Mohmands live on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from the Peshawar Basin to the confluence

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of the Kunar and Kabul rivers. The Bar Mohmands (Hill Mohmands) inhabit the network of hills between the Kabul and Swat rivers; these hills connect the Safed Koh with the Hindu Kush and form a barrier at the eastern end of the Nangarhar Valley. The Kuz Mohmands (Plain Mohmands) live in the plain country in the southwest corner of the Peshawar District in Kotla Mohsin Khan, Bahadur Killi, Kagawala, Landi and the surrounding areas. Most members of the Mohmand tribe speak a northern variety of Pashto. Rahman Baba and Abdul Hamid Baba are amongst the most popular Pashto poets. Abdul Ahad Mohmand from the Zabihullah Mohmand tribe was the first Afghan astronaut. Abdul Ahad Mohmand, belonged to the Mohmand tribe Zabihullah Mohmand.

National Assembly. The lower legislative house of the bicameral Parliament of Pakistan which also includes the upper house or Senate. The first session of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was held on 10 August 1947 at the Sindh Assembly Building, in Karachi. On 11 August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah was elected unanimously as the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the National Flag was formally approved by the Assembly. The present National Assembly and Senate both convene at Parliament House in Islamabad. The National Assembly is a democratically elected body consisting of a total of 342 members referred to as Members of the National Assembly (MNAs), of which 272 are directly elected members and 70 reserved seats for women and religious minorities. A political party must secure 172 seats to obtain and preserve a majority.

National Government. In the politics of the United Kingdom, a National Government is a coalition of some or all of the major political parties. In a historical sense, it refers primarily to the governments of Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain which held office from 1931 until 1940. The all-party coalitions of H.H. Asquith and David Lloyd George in World War I and of Winston Churchill in World War II were sometimes referred to as National Governments at the time but are now more commonly called Coalition Governments. The term “National Government” was chosen to dissociate itself from the negative connotations of the earlier Coalitions.

Northern Command Headquarters. Northern Command in India was a pre-war formation, with its headquarters located at Rawalpindi. It comprised the: Peshawar District; Kohat District; Rawalpindi District;

Lahore District; Waziristan District. On 21 April 1942, it was re-designated as the North Western Army. The Lahore District transferred to the newly formed Central Command, and the Rawalpindi District was absorbed by the Army Headquarters. In November 1945, it reverted to the title of Northern Command and the Rawalpindi District was reformed. When Central Command was disbanded c. June 1946, the Lahore Area and Sind Brigade came under command. On 15 August 1947, with the Partition of British India, Headquarters Northern Command formed the new headquarters of the Pakistan Army.

One Unit. A geopolitical programme launched by the Government of Pakistan led by the then Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra on 22 November 1954. The government claimed that the programme would overcome the difficulty of administering the two unequal polities of West and East Pakistan separated from each other by more than a thousand miles. To diminish the differences between the two regions, claimed the government, the “One Unit” programme merged the four provinces of West Pakistan into a single province to parallel the province of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

Operation Curzon. In 1947, following independence, the North-West Frontier region became a part of the newly-formed nation of Pakistan. It was based on the recommendations of the Tucker committee in 1944 which advocated the withdrawal of all regular forces from tribal territory into outposts or cantonments along the administrative border from where they could keep an eye on things. The un-administered districts would then once again become the responsibility of the local militias. The newly-formed Pakistani government ordered the withdrawal of forces from Waziristan because there were concerns that the presence of a regular military force in the area was escalating hostilities with the local tribesmen. This withdrawal began on 6 December 1947 and was successfully completed by the end of the month under the codename of Operation Curzon.

Patton tanks. Patton tank may refer to any of a series of tanks used by the United States military from the 1950s to the 1990s, named for General George S. Patton.

Peshawar Club. Established in 1863, it was formerly known as the Games Club and was located in a bungalow. At present, its premises are called No. 40, The Mall and has three tennis courts and a polo ground.

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Pig-sticking. The activity of hunting wild boar with a spear carried out on horseback.

Political Department. The Indian Political Department (IPD), formerly known as the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, was a government department in British India. In 1843, Governor-General Ellenborough reformed the administration organizing Secretariat of the Government into four departments—Foreign, Home, Finance and Military. Its political officers were responsible for the civil administration of frontier districts and also served as British agents to rulers of princely states.

Political Resident or Political Agent. A resident or political agent was an official of the British Government, who was based in a princely state and served as part-diplomat, part-adviser to the native ruler and part monitor of activities in the princely state. In the British empire, a political resident or political agent was the incumbent of an official diplomatic position involving both consular duties and liaison functions.

Probyn's Horse. The regiment known as 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse) was originally raised on 1 August 1857 by Captain Frederick Wale as Wale's Horse during the First War of Independence of 1857 and served at Lucknow. When Captain Wale was killed in action on 1 March 1858, he was replaced by Major Dighton Probyn. The 5th King Edward's Own Probyn's Horse, which was a regular cavalry regiment of the British Indian Army, was formed in 1921 by the amalgamation of the 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse) and the 12th Cavalry. After World War I, the number of Indian cavalry regiments was reduced from 39 to 21. The 11th King Edward's Own Lancers (Probyn's Horse) and the 12th Cavalry were amalgamated at Meerut on 28 August 1921 to form 5th King Edward's Own Probyn's Horse. On the Partition of India in 1947, Probyn's Horse was allotted to Pakistan. The regiment's new designation was 5th Horse although, informally, it continues to be known as the Probyn's Horse. The 5th Horse is an armoured regiment of the Pakistan Army.

Quaker. A member of the Religious Society of Friends, a Christian movement founded by George Fox c.1650 and devoted to peaceful principles. Central to the Quakers' belief is the doctrine of the "Inner Light", or sense of Christ's direct working in the soul. This has led them to reject both formal ministry and all set forms of worship.

Quit India Movement. Also known as the August Kranti Movement, it was a movement launched at the Bombay session of the All India Congress Committee by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi World War II on 8 August 1942, demanding an end to British rule in India. After the failure of the Cripps Mission to secure Indian support for the British war effort, Gandhi made a call to “Do or Die” in his Quit India speech delivered in Bombay on 8 August 1942 at the Gowalia Tank Maidan, a park in Tardeo, central Bombay. The All India Congress Committee launched a mass protest demanding what Gandhi called “An Orderly British Withdrawal” from India.

Radcliffe Award. The outcome of an official plan announced by Lord Mountbatten on 3 June 1947 regarding the Partition of India into two separate sovereign states—India and Pakistan. It was named for its architect, Cyril Radcliffe, who served as joint chairman of the two provinces’ boundary commissions. The Radcliffe Line was the boundary demarcated between the Indian and Pakistani portions of the Punjab Province and Bengal Presidency of British India. Following the Partition of British India in 17 August 1947, the demarcation line was publicized. Today, its western side forms part of the border between India and Pakistan while its eastern side forms the border between Bangladesh and India.

Rathor Rajputs. A Suryavanshi Rajput clan. The clan traces its lineage back to Rama, the mythical hero of the Hindu epic, Ramayana, and through him back to the sun god Surya himself. The Rathores hail from the Marwar region of western Rajasthan and inhabit the Idar state of Gujarat and also Chhapra and Muzaffarpur district of Bihar in a small numbers.

Red Shirts. A predominantly Pashtun nonviolent resistance movement known for its activism against the British Raj in colonial India. The movement was led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known locally as Bacha Khan, Badshah Khan, or Sarhadi Gandhi.

South Waziristan Scouts. A paramilitary unit which formed part of British India’s Frontier Corps. Based at Jandola, it consisted of two infantry battalions and a small force of mounted infantry. The South Waziristan Scouts replaced the South Waziristan Militia and was similar in structure to the Tochi Scouts. Their primary responsibility was to occupy dominant features along British communication lines especially those points which, if occupied by hostile tribes, would hinder the regular army’s movement in the Waziristan Agency.

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Staff College at Quetta. A staff college for mid-career army officers of the Pakistan Army. As the Army Staff College, it was initially established in 1905 at Deolali (near Bombay) and later shifted to Quetta in 1907. At Partition, those staff not staying in Pakistan moved to the Wellington Cantonment and formed the Defence Services Staff College, Tamil Nadu, India. It is the oldest military institution in Pakistan. The College was previously affiliated with the University of Balochistan but is now affiliated with the National Defence University (NDU) along with other staff and war colleges of the Pakistan Navy and Air Force.

Suleiman Khels. A Pashtun sub-tribe of the Ghilji tribe of Bettani confederation of Pashtuns. Mostly nomadic people. In the early 20th century, the tribe was recognized as generally pastoral.

The Baghdad Pact. The Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), also known as the Baghdad Pact and subsequently known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), was a military alliance of the Cold War. It was formed in 24 February 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The alliance was dissolved in 16 March 1979.

The Balkan War. A series of two conflicts that took place in the Balkan States in 1912 and 1913. The two successive military conflicts that deprived the Ottoman Empire of all its remaining territory in Europe except a part of Thrace and the city of Adrianople (Edirne).

Tochi Scouts. Formed in the North Waziristan Agency as a local militia in 1894, the Scouts operated in North Waziristan, with their headquarters at Miranshah. They were part of the Frontier Corps which consisted of a number of scout units stationed in the tribal territories.

United Front. A coalition of political parties in East Bengal which contested and won Pakistan's first provincial general election to the East Bengal Legislative Assembly. The coalition consisted of the Awami Muslim League, the Krishak Praja Party, the Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party) and Nizam-e-Islam. The coalition was led by three major Bengali populist leaders—A. K. Fazlul Huq, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and Maulana Bhashani.

Waziris. A Karlani Pashtun tribe found mainly in the Pakistan–Afghanistan border region of North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Bannu. The Waziris consisted of the Tochi (or Utmanzai) Waziris who lived along the Tochi and Khaisora valleys, and the Wana (or Ahmadzai)

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Waziris who lived around Bannu and Wana. Waziris are settled in the North Waziristan Agency. The Waziris speak the Waziristani dialect of Pashto.

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For various reasons, Iskander Mirza's memoirs could not be published in book form and, after more than half a century, they are being published in their totality. The memoirs lay open the facts for the people of Pakistan, historians and academics to judge the man who was a trusted lieutenant of Quaid-e-Azam and, while in Indian Political Service, secretly worked with Jinnah (who fully recognized the invaluable potential in the young Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar) towards the most challenging task of achieving Pakistan from the British.

In all fairness, General Ayub may not have been behind it all but the sycophants were in a stampede outdoing each other in casting aspersions on Iskander Mirza's financial propriety, his integrity and character. Such was the national atmosphere that structured average Pakistani's mindset for their first President and will be a miracle if this book, if not change, can at least initiate a debate on historical distortions, disinformation and withholding of important documented accounts that may not have gone down well with sitting government of the time to suit a certain ideology or, more dangerously, the planting of fake information to serve ulterior agendas.

"A fascinating account of Pakistan's tumultuous past by one of its most neglected early leaders. Iskander Mirza's memoirs challenge many of the key elements in the received narrative of his country's history."

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"A landmark book. An unfinished, yet very revealing, deeply disturbing memoir by the first President of Pakistan, supplemented by exclusive records and documents. Iskander Mirza becomes even more of an enigma. Personal integrity; remarkable capability; vast, varied experience; consistent commitment to Pakistan's wellbeing, yet abrogating the 1956 Constitution on 7 October 1958, inviting the armed forces and declaring martial law with startling naivety, "only one month", to be himself forcibly exiled forever in two weeks and to then adopt sustained, dignified silence till his demise in 1969. And for Pakistan's Government to disgracefully deny him burial in his own country. We are obliged to revisit history and to reexamine presumptions and perceptions in our perpetual search for the truth. Syed Khawar Mehdi has rendered an invaluable service to scholarship."

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